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  Evolution is a central underlying concept to a significant number of discourses in 
civilized society, but the complexity of understanding basic tenets of this important 
theory is just now coming to light.  Knowledge about evolution is constructed from both 
formal and “free-choice” opportunities, like television.  Nature programs are commonly 
considered “educational” by definition, but research indicates the narratives often 
promote creationist ideas about this important process in biology.  I explored how nature 
programs influenced knowledge construction about evolutionary theory using a 
combination of qualitative and quantitative approaches.  Because misconceptions about 
evolution are common, I examined how students’ conceptual ecologies changed in 
response to information presented in an example of a particularly poor nature film 
narrative.  Students’ held a diversity of misconceptions, proximate conceptions, and 
evolutionary conceptions simultaneously, and many of their responses were direct 
reflections of the nature program.  As a result, I incorporated the same nature program 
into an experiment designed to examine the effects of narrative and imagery on evolution 
understanding.  After completing an extensive pre-assessment that addresse  attitudes 
and beliefs about science knowledge, students viewed one of four versions of the nature 
program that varied in the quality of science and imagery presented.  The effect of 
watching different versions was only vaguely apparent in students with a moderate 
understanding of evolution.  The relationship was much more complex among students 
with a poor understanding of evolution but suggested a negative effect that was more 
influenced by public discourses about this “controversial” subject than conceptual 
understanding.  The relationships warranted examining learning from the perspective of 
the consumers of these programs.  I surveyed audience beliefs about the educational 
value of nature programs and found that an overwhelming majority believed the 
programs were “educational” and designed to teach about nature.  The results were 
particularly alarming because beliefs about the educational value may strongly impact 
learning outcomes.  An informal survey of nature programs aired during a “sweeps” 
month indicated that poor presentation of science, and specifically evolutionary theory,
was indeed the norm.  Indeed, nature programs may be contributing to the 
“deconstruction” of knowledge about evolution both in and out of the classroom. 
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CHAPTER 1.  
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Antibiotic resistance, gene therapy, disease, food production, environmental 
quality, and biotechnology are all areas of active biological research that address issues of 
public concern.  Indeed, all of these are issues where being an informed citizen requires 
an understanding of evolution.  Yet many Americans hold serious misconceptions about 
evolution and the process of science (Nelson, 2000; Rudolph & Stewart, 1998; 
Southerland, Abrams, Cummins, & Anzelmo, 2001; National Science Foundation, 2006).  
The form of misconceptions can range from misunderstandings about terminology (e.g., 
“adaptation” and “fitness”; Alters & Nelson, 2002; Bishop & Anderson, 1990) to 
misunderstandings about the process (e.g., the sources and causes of change – focusing 
on individuals rather than populations; Bishop and Anderson 1990; Greene, 1990).  These 
misconceptions can have far-reaching effects.  Indeed, proponents of intellige  design 
take advantage of these types of misconceptions, held so commonly by the general 
public, to foster consideration of their “alternative theory” in education.  School boards 
from Darby, Montana, to Dover, Pennsylvania, have voted to include, or are seriously 
considering adding, intelligent design or creationism as part of the science urriculum in 
their schools.  Less than half of the American population accepts the theory of evolution 
(National Science Foundation 2006), and the issue of whether and how evolution is 
taught in public schools remains highly contentious.  Science classes taught withou
evolution will not only impact future citizenship but a future workforce in biological 
research as well.  Nevertheless, most adults are removed from formal education settings, 
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and they must rely on other educational opportunities at the interface of science and 
society to learn.  Therefore, to counter these alarming trends, evolutionary biologists and 
ecologists must look to all learning opportunities, both formal and free-choice/informal, 
to educate the general public about one of the most fundamental concepts in biology.  My 
research explores how nature programming produced for television interacts with 
viewers’ knowledge and understanding to ultimately affect their understanding of 
evolution. 
 Exploring the contributions of learning that takes place outside of school is a 
complex task, and theories about the nature of learning in these environments draw on a 
variety of disciplines.  Lucas (1991) suggests several issues that need to be addressed to 
examine the impact and utility of informal sources of science learning.  For example, how 
do people process the information presented to them, and do authority and source affect 
processing?  And what should we expect of these informal sources given that often they 
are intended to be both entertaining and educational (Lucas 1991)?  Recently, researcher  
have started incorporating theories about how people learn science in school to learning 
in museums and other informal environments (Anderson, Lucas, & Ginns, 2003).  
Indeed, this approach strongly supports a view of learning that recognizes that the 
concepts held by individuals are the result of more than just the formal explanations 
learned in school.  Learning involves a complex combination of school experiences, as 
well as culture, language, and personal experiences and observations (Wandersee, 
Mintzes, & Novak, 1994).  In fact, the role of the individual in knowledge construction is 
reflected in the use of “free choice” terminology: “free-choice” science education implies 
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some intrinsic motivation of the learner, “informal” refers to the setting of the learning 
event, i.e., outside the formal school setting (Falk, 2001).   
 Television is one source of free-choice science education, and it can be a powerful 
tool for mass communication.  More than 280 million television sets are in use in the 
U.S., and these sets are turned on 5 hours/day on average (Nielson Company, 2009).  
These viewing habitats suggest that most people will spend more of their lives watching 
television than they will in school.  Moreover, broadcasted programs are available 24 
hours per day, and channel diversity is increasing.  Indeed, over half of the general public 
(51%) considers television their leading source of science news and information 
(National Science Foundation 2006).  Recently, cable and satellite markets have 
expanded to include stations with science-based programming within an entertainm nt 
context; The Learning Channel, Discovery Channel, and Animal Planet broadcast 
programs with considerable science content.  Along with the trend for internet videos, the 
conversion to digital television will increase the number of channels even more.  As a 
result, the likelihood that individuals will be exposed to science programming that will 
affect their understanding of ecological sciences is high.   
 The accuracy with which nature programs actually represent nature has r ceived 
much attention recently.  Both Bousé (2000) and Mitman (1999) clearly endorse 
embracing a highly skeptical view of the reality presented in wildlife films, warning that 
this genre is driven by the need for compelling story lines rather than scientifi  accuracy.  
In fact, the most beautiful and engaging nature films often include narratives that endorse 
creationist accounts of life on earth (Dingwall & Aldridge, 2006).  As part of the 
narrative, many wildlife films individualize the “struggle for existence”; they humanize 
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the dramas (e.g., the orphan that struggles to survive and returns victorious to breed) that 
can mislead viewers to teleological and Lamarckian misconceptions about evolution.  
Indeed, Aldridge and Dingwall (2003) and Dingwall and Aldridge (2006) show that 
references to evolution in nature programs are often teleological – that is, they imply 
evolution is driven by some purpose.  These authors conclude that the narratives in this 
genre actually increase the differences in understanding of evolution between the general 
public and biological scientists (Dingwall & Aldridge, 2006).  They note “it is highly 
questionable whether wildlife and nature programming is making an appropriate 
contribution to the preparedness of civil society to deal with key issues in biological and 
environmental sciences” (p. 148).   
 Indeed, the video images so important to a well-crafted program may interact with 
the narrative and become powerful “virtual witnessing” events (Kirby 2003, see also 
Graber, 1990).  The “plausibility” of pictorial images can have extensive impacts.  For 
example, scientific reconstructions of bat-winged pterosaurs were so influenced by early 
artistic interpretations that Padian (1987) notes, “a picture is not only worth a thousand 
words; however inaccurate, it may be worth a wealth of well-documented evidence to the 
contrary” (p. 76).  Clearly, virtual witnessing can result in an epistemological impact 
difficult to overcome, especially with socially controversial topics such as evolution.  
Research into the effects on learning from one beautifully crafted nature film suggests 
that the misconceptions presented in the narration do indeed affect undergraduate 
students’ understanding of evolution (Bright, Brewer, Snetsinger, & Perkins, 2003). 
 The essence of the problem, then, is that people continue to learn outside of the 
classroom, and they may be incorporating mixed messages into their understanding 
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depending on the formal and informal science sources from which they draw their 
knowledge.  Moreover, learning can be gradual and assimilative, implying incremental 
changes in individuals’ conceptual understanding; or learning can be rapid, involving a 
substantial restructuring of knowledge (Mintzes & Wandersee, 1998; Mintzes, 
Wandersee, & Novak, 1997).  Personal experiences comprise a powerful source of 
perceived evidence that can be incorporated into “lay theories” about how the world 
works.  Where these lay theories relate to ecology, and evolution in particular, they can 
lead to misconceptions that can be very difficult to alter (Wandersee et al., 1994).  So, if a
nature program resonates on some level with individuals’ “lay theories” about evolion, 
it may have long-lasting effects on learning.  For example, people identify with 
individuals, not populations, and the concepts of “improvement” and “adaptation” 
frequently are applied to individuals overcoming adversity – everyone loves the triumph 
of the underdog.  Whether this application stems from a personal experience (such as a 
sibling that overcomes a serious disease) or an experience they perceive from watching 
television (such as the orphaned cheetahs that survive in the harsh and cruel savannah), it 
may end up as an unconscious embodiment of the process of evolution.  Of course these 
events are relevant to biological evolution; who survives and who does not underlies a 
major component of fitness and the process of natural selection.  The focus on changes 
within an individual, however, misrepresents the fundamental process of evolution – a 
turnover among individuals within populations. 
 Evolution is a complex concept, and the path of least resistance is often the wrong 
one.  Picture someone relaxing in front of a large, high-definition television watching a 
gorgeous nature film with a carelessly articulated narrative.  Narration that incorporates 
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teleology as a mechanism may not directly promote alternative “theories” to volution, 
such as “intelligent design” (Dingwall and Aldridge 2006), but it can promote altern tive 
conceptions nonetheless.  Conceptual change is a complicated process, however; 
concepts about evolution may be so interwoven that a change in one requires a change in 
many others (Demastes, Good, & Peebles, 1996).  New concepts cannot be easily learned 
if alternative models that explain a phenomenon already exist in the learner’s mind 
(Committee on Undergraduate Science Education, 1997).  If undergraduate biology 
majors do not have an adequate understanding of evolution even after a year of college 
biology (Nehm & Reilly, 2007), how can we expect them to interpret beyond the 
misconception-laden narratives of nature programs?  Lawson and Weser (1990) show 
that introductory non-major college biology students who were more skilled in reasoning, 
however, were less likely to hold nonscientific beliefs than were students less skilled in 
reasoning.  Therefore, other metrics of understanding related to reasoning and 
epistemological beliefs may be required to address the interaction between formal and 
informal sources of science knowledge.   
 Personal epistemology, or beliefs about knowledge, may be closely tied to an 
individual’s learning outcomes about evolution.  Numerous models are available that 
address how individuals’ beliefs about the certainty, source, justification, acquisition, and 
structure of knowledge affect learning (see Duell & Schommer-Atkins, 2001).  
Researchers generally agree that these beliefs play an important role i  learning.  For 
example, if people believe knowledge is certain and passed down by authority figures, 
they are less likely to question authority in the classroom (Schommer-Atkins, 2004) or in 
free-choice learning environments.  This can be particularly worrisome with regards to 
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“ill-structured” problems (problems that cannot be solved with a high degree of certainty; 
King & Kitchener, 1994) and controversial or socioscientific issues (issues that require 
consideration of societal interest, effect, and consequence; Sadler 2004).  Many 
ecological issues can be framed within these contexts.  Epistemological beliefs, therefore, 
may be important in the interpretation of evidence regarding controversial topics, such as 
the relationship between human immunodeficiency virus and the AIDS syndrome 
(Kardash & Scholes, 1996), animals used in research (Zeidler, Walker, Ackett, & 
Simmons, 2002), and evolution (Sinatra, Southerland, McConaughy, & Demastes, 2003).    
 Similarly, epistemology is a component of the Nature of Science (NOS) 
framework (Sandoval, 2005).  Many educators advocate teaching and learning the nature 
of the scientific endeavor to help students overcome misconceptions about evolution and 
other socioscientific issues (e.g., Khishfe & Lederman, 2006; Lombrozo, Thanukos, & 
Weisberg, 2008; Nelson, 2000; Pigliucci, 2007; Scharmann & Harris, 1992; Working 
Group on Teaching Evolution, 1998).  NOS also is complex, however, involving abstract 
concepts such as uncertainty and the tentative nature of conclusions.  Certainly, teaching 
NOS has met with mixed results (e.g., Abd-El-Khalick & Lederman, 2000; Akerson, 
Morrison, & McDuffie, 2006; Khishfe & Lederman, 2006; Nehm & Schonfeld, 2007; 
Sandoval & Morrison, 2003; Scharmann & Harris, 1992), and the research addressing 
how NOS affects evolution understanding is limited (Crawford, Zembal-Saul, Munford, 
& Friedrichsen, 2005; Lederman, 2006).  Nevertheless, a sophisticated understanding of 
NOS may be a valuable indicator of the acceptance of evolutionary theory.   
 What, then, is the influence of nature programming on knowledge development 
related to ecology and evolution?  Ultimately, two kinds of information are needed: (1) 
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whether viewers have and use the knowledge the nature program expects, and (2) what
knowledge viewers actually have and use to understand the nature program (Livingstone, 
1998).  Providing viewers with knowledge they can use about evolution when watching 
nature programs depends on conceptual understanding of science and evolution.  Wildlife
and nature films that present evolutionary science poorly may be particularly insidious if 
audiences perceive the genre as educational.  The prior experiences audiences have with 
specific genres are critical in their textual readings and interpretation of new experiences 
– for example, audiences expect certain types of character and plot development in soap 
operas because of past experiences with soap operas, and they interpret these elements in 
light of those past experiences (Livingstone, 1998).  Moreover, emotional connections 
affect recall and memory (Fujioka, 2005).  Past experiences with educational 
programming may leave audiences unaware that narratives in wildlife and nature 
programs are shaped from dramatic perspectives rather than real-life perspectives (Bousé, 
2000; Mitman, 1999).  For example, in wildlife programs orphans are often main 
characters in narratives, but life history evolution predicts that in species with high 
parental care (as in most charismatic megafauna), orphans will rarely su vive to 
adulthood.  Wildlife and nature programs are traditionally considered documentaries, a 
title that confers meaning to audiences, yet they routinely incorporate drama, adding 
emotional effect, so much so that Bousé (2000) suggested “docu-drama” as a more 
accurate label.   
 In my research, I examined the educational impact of wildlife and nature 
programs that address ecology and evolution (Figure 1.1).  The overarching question for 
my work was “How does television affect learning about evolution and the natural 
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world?”   Learning implies incorporating the “correct” information into knowledge 
schema.  The public understanding of science is fraught with misconceptions, especially 
regarding difficult, and in the U.S. controversial, topics such as evolution.  Ultimately, 
individuals draw on a web of knowledge sources that may or may not reflect current 
science understanding.  Therefore, stemming from this broad overview question, I 
explored whether or not poor representation of science resulted in development or 
enhancement of misconceptions from a constructivist context.  Specifically, I sked: 
 Does the poor representation of scientific concepts in television lead to 
misconceptions about evolution? 
 Does personal epistemology and/or prior knowledge affect the influence of 
wildlife and nature programs on evolution understanding? 
 Do audiences perceive wildlife and nature programs as educational, and if so, 
does that perception influence their interpretation? 
 If audiences do turn to wildlife and nature programs for educational content in the 
free-choice marketplace, are they getting good quality educational content?  
 If understanding the nature of the scientific endeavor is important to acceptance of 
evolutionary theory, how early can we begin to teach these important concepts? 
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Figure 1.1.  The research model.  C2-C7 represent the chapters that address these theoretical constructs. 
Prior Media 
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C7 
C5 
C6 
C2 
C3 
Evolution 
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Virtual Witnessing Event 
C4 
C4 
C4 
C4 
C4 
Personal Epistemology 
Prior Knowledge 
about Evolution 
Nature of Science 
Understanding 
Attitudes towards 
Evolution 
Attitudes towards 
Science 
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Overview of Dissertation 
 
Chapter 2.  Literature Review: Evolution in education and discourse 
Purpose: To examine the context of the research by examining the relevant literature 
 
 This research is highly interdisciplinary, bringing together communication, 
conceptual change, cognition, educational psychology, evolution education, personal 
epistemology, public understanding of science, and television production.  Throughout, 
the challenges of the nature of the scientific endeavor affect the decisions we make 
regarding the nature of knowledge, our acceptance of uncertainty, and the extent w 
accept the reality science paints.  Chapter 2 reviews the literature related to evolution in 
education and discourse in this light, exploring how the controversy arose, the 
development of the theory of evolution, and finally how the controversy is situated in the 
most influential public court of opinion – the marketplace of ideas. 
 
Chapter 3: Fatal Flower frailties: Using nature films to help address misconceptions 
about evolutionary theory 
Purpose: To explore the conceptions students have about evolution and to determine the 
impact a curriculum based on the film Fatal Flower has on those conceptions. 
 Does the poor representation of scientific concepts in television lead to 
misconceptions about evolution? 
 
12 
 Understanding evolution is important to citizenship, but ever since the topic was 
returned to the science classroom in the late 1930s, educators have struggled with how to 
teach this complex theory.  Students bring prior knowledge to the science classroom, 
prior knowledge that clearly affects learning (Clough and Wood-Robinson, 1987; Posner, 
Strike, Hewson, & Gertzog, 1982).  Their concepts about processes, such as evolution, 
are often quite different from scientific explanations.  These naïve conceptions ar se from 
a number of sources, including (1) those that begin with vernacular issues related to the 
interpretation of “adaptation” and “fitness;” (2) those derived from personal experiences, 
like overcoming disease, or raising pets; (3) those that come from informal sources 
(television, internet, families, religions), such as wives tales about the nine lives of cats; 
and (4) those that arise because formal education does not adequately address the p ior 
conceptions that students hold, resulting in newly constructed or modified alternative 
conceptions (Alters & Nelson, 2002; Committee on Undergraduate Science Education, 
1997).  It is especially important that formal education engage prior conceptions because 
the frameworks established in school affect whether knowledge construction outside of 
the science classroom reflects scientific thinking.  Wildlife and nature programs are 
appealing and popular experiences, but they often represent evolutionary science poorly 
(Aldridge & Dingwall, 2003; Dingwall & Aldridge, 2006).  If nature programs are used 
as a source of learning outside of formal classrooms (or if they are used unconditionally 
within the science classroom), then individuals are more likely to construct knowledge 
that does not reflect scientific thinking.  However, these programs may be valuable tools 
in the science classroom, allowing teachers to use the narratives as examples of 
inadequate explanations of the evolutionary process. 
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 Within a climate of controversy surrounding evolution education, the imperative 
for research in student understanding is that much greater.  The only consistent result 
from a quarter century of research, however, is that broad misconceptions persist despite 
coursework (e.g., Chinsamy & Plagányi, 2007; Jensen & Finley, 1996; Nehm & Reilly, 
2007).  Meaningful learning may necessitate the reconstruction of a significant segment 
of the learner’s conceptual and propositional framework to include general and broadly 
inclusive concepts (Posner et al., 1982; Mintzes et al., 1997; Nussbaum, 1989).  More 
recently, efforts have focused on the intricacy of student thinking and explicit approaches 
to overcoming misconceptions.  Understanding evolution requires knowledge of a 
diversity of concepts that ranges from descriptive (e.g., populations and species) to highly 
abstract (e.g., genes and probabilities) (Lawson, Alkhoury, Benford, Clark, & Falconer, 
2000).  Therefore, research that addresses the conceptual ecologies students hold may
provide valuable insight to how evolutionary knowledge is constructed and re-
constructed. 
 This chapter explores the results of a curriculum designed using the nature 
program, Fatal Flower, as a surrogate for students’ conceptions, providing valuable 
insight to how students think about evolution in the context of their personal relationship 
with their television experience.  The curriculum uses the nature program to draw out 
student misconceptions as a means to cultivate conceptual change.  Specifically, the 
research addresses the prediction that patterns of students’ misconceptions will include 
more scientific conceptions after experiencing the curriculum than before.  More 
importantly, the design of the curricula provides a unique opportunity to examine the 
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diversity of conceptions students hold at a single point in time as they transfer their 
knowledge among similar circumstances.  
 
Chapter 4:  Seeing is believing: The impacts of nature film narratives on student 
understanding of evolution 
Purpose: To determine whether viewers incorporate the information presented in 
television shows into their conceptual understanding of evolution 
 How important are misconceptions perpetuated in broadcast television to 
knowledge construction? 
 Does prior knowledge, understanding of the nature of science, and/or personal 
epistemology affect the influence of wildlife and nature programs on evolution 
understanding? 
 
 Aldridge & Dingwall (2003) and Dingwall & Aldridge (2006) argue that wildlife 
film narratives may not necessarily espouse alternative theories to evolution, but they 
embrace an unexpectedly large number of teleological elements.  Because the narrative 
does nothing to convey the scientific account, viewers simply hear the narration with ut 
disrupting whatever prior framing they have brought to the viewing, eventually leding to 
an opening for creationism or “intelligent design” accounts of evolution.  Indeed, the 
video may serve as a powerful “virtual witnessing” event (Kirby, 2003), resulting in an 
epistemological impact difficult to overcome with controversial topics such as evolution.  
Although nature programs vary considerably in their structure, the ‘blue chip’ sub-genre 
focuses on the organism in an environment of visual splendor, using a dramatic story line 
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with a “grand” voice over, and marked by the absences of politics, people or historical 
reference points (Aldridge & Dingwall, 2003; Bousé, 2000).  Sadly, the magnificent 
photography in these programs is marred by the most egregious abuse of evolutionary 
science.  I use an experimental manipulation of one nature program to explore how this 
sub-genre of nature and science programs influences knowledge and knowledge 
retention, the prevalence of misconceptions, and the application of knowledge gained 
from broadcast. 
 Fatal Flower uses beautiful imagery in a traditional ‘blue-chip’ natural history 
film that explores how different species of orchids have adaptations that enablethem to 
be pollinated by specific pollinators (insects and birds).  These pollinators in turn have 
adaptations that allow them to extract the nectar from specific orchids that they are 
dependent on for food.  Thus, from an educational perspective, the film appears to be an 
excellent example of co-evolution and natural selection.  Unfortunately, the film is full of 
misconceptions (both intentional and inadvertent) and is a poor example of science in 
nature films (Dissertation Appendix 1).   
 Preliminary examination of the results from the curriculum suggested that the 
narration of Fatal Flower may indeed affect students’ understanding of evolution, but 
essential data were lacking.  I developed an experimental design that included 
manipulation of the films narrative and imagery coupled with pre- and post-assessment  
to determine the effects that poor presentation of evolution may have on students’ 
conceptions.  I predicted that a new version of the narrative that reflected an accurate 
presentation of evolutionary theory would enhance evolution understanding whereas the 
misconception-laden original would not.  In addition, I predicted that if the video 
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functioned as a virtual witnessing event, then the imagery would greatly affect people’s 
attention (both in terms of viewing and in terms of learning).  Reducing the films visual 
imagery to still images and/or less attractive imagery than the original version would 
partition the effects of visual and narrative effects on understanding.  As a result, the 
experimental design included four versions of the program (original, manipulated 
narration/original imagery, original narration/manipulated imagery, manipulated 
narration/manipulated imagery).   
 Chapter 4 presents the results from pre- and post-assessments of students 
watching different versions of Fatal Flower.  The chapter addresses whether narrative 
and imagery affected student conceptual understanding of evolution and explored the 
potential indirect effects these types of visual “experiences” had on schema construction.  
The chapter addresses a number of predictions: 
1. Well-produced nature films provide a “virtual witnessing” experience for 
viewers. 
1a. Viewers incorporate the narrative framing into their understanding of 
evolution (e.g., teleology, environment as the driving factor for 
change). 
1b. Viewers incorporate specific examples of imagery into their schema 
for understanding evolution. 
2. Poorly produced films (still imagery) will not serve as virtual witnessing 
events. 
3. Imagery and narrative interact in learning: viewers watching the revised 
narratives with the original imagery will be less likely to incorporate 
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misconceptions into their understanding of evolution than those watching the 
original version or either version with still images. 
4. Prior knowledge affects how the narrative framing is incorporated into 
conceptions;  
4a. Viewers with greater prior evolution knowledge will be less likely to 
incorporate misconceptions than those with little prior knowledge.  
4b. Viewers with an understanding of the Nature of Science (NOS) will be 
less likely to incorporate misconceptions than those with little prior 
knowledge.  
5. Viewers’ personal epistemology affects how the narrative framing is 
incorporated into conceptions; viewers that believe that knowledge is certain, 
is handed down from authority, or that knowledge is simple, not complex, will 
be more likely to incorporate misconceptions than viewers that understand 
NOS. 
5a. Incorporation depends on whether viewers believe they are viewing 
educational programs (addresses the importance of credibility in 
personal epistemology).  
5b. Incorporation depends on whether viewers believe they are viewing 
programs designed to be educational (addresses the importance of 
authority in personal epistemology).  
6. Viewers’ attitudes toward science and evolution affect how the narrative 
framing is incorporated into conceptions. 
18 
6a. Viewers that accept scientific inquiry as a way of thought will be more 
likely to incorporate misconceptions than viewers that do not. 
6b. Viewers that believe the age of the earth is less than 6000 years will be 
more likely to incorporate misconceptions than viewers that do not. 
 
Chapter 5:  What is “educational” in a free-choice science world?  Determining 
what audiences believe about the educational value of nature programs 
Purpose: To explore the goals and expectations audiences have coming into a free-choice 
learning opportunity. 
 Do audiences perceive wildlife and nature programs as educational, and if so, 
does that perception influence their interpretation? 
 
 Nature film narratives are often fraught with misconceptions about evolution 
(Aldridge & Dingwall, 2003; Dingwall & Aldridge, 2006), but they are afforded a leve  
of credibility as documentaries about the natural world (Bousé, 2000).  Unfortunately, 
individuals who are motivated to learn from these free-choice opportunities also are most 
likely to incorporate the broad knowledge messages that are communicated (Falk, 
Heimlich, & Bronnenkant, 2008; Maurer & Reinemann, 2006).  Research usually 
approaches free-choice learning experiences from the educator’s perspective; the 
underlying assumption is that these sources of science learning are good, quality so rces 
reflecting correct and current understanding.  From the audience’s perspective, defining a 
free-choice experience as “educational” is problematic because individuals mst either 
already possess the knowledge to assess the quality of the experience or rely on an 
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assessment applied by some other source.  In the “marketplace of ideas,” audiences are 
not necessarily always able to judge the true value of competing ideas, and to distinguish 
science from non-science.  Audiences must look to descriptors like “educational” as they 
consider free-choice learning experiences.  So, individuals motivated to learn about 
nature may assume that misconception-laden nature programs are providing an adequate 
explanation of important ecological processes, such as evolution. 
 Personal epistemology also may have an important role in the impact wildlife and 
nature programs have on the viewing public’s understanding of evolution.  Indeed, beliefs 
about knowledge play an essential role in learning.  If viewers believe knowledge is 
certain, then they may accept the information presented in wildlife films without 
question.  Similarly, if they believe knowledge is passed down from authority figures, 
they may be even less likely to question the authority of free-choice learning 
environments.  
 I surveyed potential wildlife film audiences to determine their understanding of 
the educational context of wildlife films (e.g., are they meant to be educational?  Are they 
credible sources of information?)  Missoula, Montana, is host to the International 
Wildlife Film Festival each spring.  Because the festival expends considerable ffort to 
engage the community, the likelihood that individuals have at least thought about wildlife 
and nature films should be higher than a random sample of all adults in the U.S.  My 
approach was to assess public literacy regarding nature programs, with the assumption 
that the sampled population would represent a slightly higher estimate of scientific 
literacy with respect to nature programs than the public at large.   
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 Whether an individual defines something as educational or not depends on the 
context.  The survey I developed operationalized educational through a series of 
questions designed to get at a specific context.  For example, if a participant believed a 
nature show was educational, then they might be more likely to believe it was accurate, 
that the content was reviewed/approved by scientists, it told a story that eally happened, 
it presented the most current scientific understanding, people should learn from watching 
it, it did not give wildlife human characteristics, and the content was reviewd/approved 
by other filmmakers.  In addition, if a wildlife/nature film was designed to be 
educational, then viewers would be likely to believe that the primary goal of theprogram 
was to teach about wildlife and nature, the program was written to explain and clarify 
what we know about wildlife and nature, and the producers had advanced knowledge 
about wildlife and natural sciences. 
 This chapter presents the results of a large-scale audience survey to determine 
how the interpretations the audience makes of programs fits or challenges their prior 
experiences and the role their knowledge may play in interpretation of the narratives in 
wildlife and nature programs (Livingstone, 1998).  Specifically, I predicte: 
1. nature film audiences believe they are viewing educational programs 
(addresses the importance of credibility in personal epistemology), and  
2. nature film audiences believe they are viewing programs designed to be 
educational (addresses the importance of authority in personal epistemology). 
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Chapter 6:  Sources and sentiment: How nature programs may be leading science 
literacy astray 
Purpose: To assess the science presented in nature and science programs. 
 If audiences do turn to wildlife and nature programs for educational content, what 
is the quality of the educational content?  
 
 Despite enlisting science consultants during production, many wildlife and nature 
programs incorporate misconceptions about the science, especially about evolution 
(Dingwall & Aldridge, 2006; Dissertation Appendix 1)  Misconceptions are one type of 
knowledge students bring into the classroom, and this prior knowledge clearly affects the 
outcomes of their learning experiences (Posner et al., 1982).  In fact, the misconceptions 
evident in nature programs are highly similar to students’ ideas about evolution, 
materializing as teleological and need-based misconceptions about this important theory 
(Bright et al., 2003).  Misconceptions can be especially egregious when they affect the 
public’s understanding of difficult and controversial topics, such as evolution.  The 
theory of evolution is central to teaching biology, and public misconceptions have 
considerable impact on the inclusion of evolutionary theory in educational curricula.  
Certainly, public misconceptions about science may have broader affects if they impact 
decision making about topics with scientific foundations (e.g., forest thinning, genetically 
engineered crops) and public support for the scientific enterprise. 
 In a preliminary study, I designed the Science and Nature Program (SNaP) 
assessment tool to elicit the prevalence of misconceptions in wildlife and nature
programming (Dissertation Appendix 1).  I developed quantifiable criteria to evaluate 
22 
whether or not nature films represent science and the scientific process acurately and 
whether or not they use relevant metaphors to explain and interpret key ecological 
concepts.  My goal was to create a rubric that could be used to analyze the scientific 
content of a broad selection of wildlife and nature programs.   
 Because SNaP permits quick and consistent assessment of the content available to 
viewers, it can be used to evaluate a large number of nature programs in short order.  This 
chapter explores the science content, especially related to evolution, of programs 
appearing on the most popular nature programming channels during a “sweeps” month.  
If viewers are choosing to watch nature programs, they may do so because of their 
perceived educational value.  “Educational” content that promotes misconceptions, 
especially about evolution, may significantly reduce the public’s understanding of 
evolution.  Therefore, science educators need to be aware of this potential influence on 
prior knowledge both for the classroom and for civic discussions that involve evolution.   
 
Chapter 7:  Clio the Scientist: Using narratives to broaden the impacts of inquiry 
Purpose: To determine the extent to which young children can be taught a complex 
subject such as the Nature of Science 
 If understanding the nature of the scientific endeavor is important to acceptance of 
evolutionary theory, how early can we begin to teach these important concepts? 
 
 Understanding the nature of the scientific endeavor is critical to understanding 
evolution and evaluating science in civil discourse.  The nature of the scientific process is 
very complex, however; even science teachers have difficulty grasping concepts such as 
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the tentative nature of conclusions and theory ladenness (Akerson, Abd-El-Khalick, & 
Lederman, 2000; Akerson et al., 2006; Lederman, 2006; Schwartz, Lederman, & 
Crawford, 2004).  Because of these perceived difficulties, the paradigm for teaching the 
nature of science focuses on teaching very young students relatively simplev ews of 
science that do not require abstract thinking (National Research Council, 2007).  Recent 
evidence indicates that children may be quite capable of sophisticated thinking, however, 
but most curricula do not reflect what is now known about younger children’s cognitive 
capabilities (National Research Council, 2007).  In fact, early instruction in scie ce can 
have lasting impacts (Novak & Musonda, 1991).  Chapter 5 reports on a scientific inquiry 
about insect vision I developed for elementary school teachers and parents to help 1st and 
2nd grade students explore issues related to the nature of science.  Inquiry is a learner-
oriented approach to scientific investigations designed to engage students in active 
learning.  This inquiry includes a take-home story designed around the inquiry’s theme; 
students read the story at home with their families and re-visit concepts they learned in 
school during the inquiry about what scientists know and can know about insect vision.   
 One component of the National Science Foundation (NSF) GK-12 graduate 
funding through the Ecologists, Educators, and Schools program required that 
participants complete an original education research project for publication.  This chapter 
not only fulfills that requirement, it provides valuable insight to how young children learn 
about the nature of the scientific endeavor. 
  
24 
Scientific Significance 
 This research will significantly advance our understanding of learning in the free 
choice/ informal science education sector.  Few definitive studies have addresse  how 
and when learning scientific concepts from television occurs, and attitude studies about 
perceptions of the environment after viewing nature programs do not examine the 
resulting scientific understanding of the environment or environmental processes ( .g., 
evolution) necessary for environmental, ecological, or scientific literacy.  Indeed, Kozma 
(1994) suggested that it is time to move beyond concern with “proving” that media 
“cause” learning and begin to ask what the actual and potential relationships between 
media and learning are.  My research will specifically examine what people learn about 
evolution from wildlife and nature programs.  Moreover, insight into the interaction of 
personal epistemology, knowledge of the nature of science, evolution understanding, and 
informal sources of learning will facilitate theoretical development and allow us to build 
more accurate models of how people construct knowledge in the free-choice science 
information sector.  Lastly, a more thorough understanding of how the public constructs 
knowledge about evolution will allow us to address this topic more thoughtfully in civic 
discourse. 
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CHAPTER 2.  
LITERATURE REVIEW:  
EVOLUTION IN EDUCATION AND DISCOURSE 
 
 Never before in history has understanding evolutionary science been so important 
to the survival of the human species.  Whether that understanding is directly related to 
our survival with issues such as antibiotic resistance, what have now come to be known 
as “super viruses”, and the struggle to understand and contain their influence – or less 
direct effects related to climate change and the impacts on biodiversity – a basic 
understanding of evolution is critical to civic and social decisions (Antolin & Herbers, 
2001).  These are broad topics where evolution plays a key foundational role.  For 
example, resistance requires understanding how modifications within a population of 
bacteria come about and how time-honored drugs act as strong selective agents 
(Genereux & Bergstrom, 2005).  Similarly, the outcomes of climate change may be 
extensive in terms of population variability and the ability to respond to new 
environmental conditions.  Recently, with the threat of a swine flu pandemic, civically 
engaged people may turn to informal and free-choice science education sources t learn 
the facts, issues, and policies associated with the subject.  Rarely will these sources 
address evolution, even though understanding the basic theory of evolution is a key 
element in solving and preventing outbreaks.  Understanding the basic tenets of 
evolutionary theory has to be developed during formal education.   
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“There is probably no other single subject within the discipline of biology that has 
engendered as much misunderstanding and mistrust as has the subject of 
evolution.”   
– Ehrle, 1960 (p. 276) 
 Antolin & Herbers (2001) report a case of a fundamentalist surgeon who 
unsuccessfully replaced a newborn’s heart with the heart of a baboon, without regard to 
evolutionary history, because it was the right size and shape.  Clearly, the implications of 
policies that do not promote a strong and rigorous understanding of evolution in our 
educational system can be great.  “Balanced treatment” legislation sets up a false 
dichotomy that implies only two viewpoints exist, despite mediating positions that have 
dominated evangelical academies for decades (Marsden, 1991).  Similarly, the strengths 
and weakness legislation that passed in Louisiana “to allow and assist teachers, 
principals, and other school administrators to create and foster an environment within 
public elementary and secondary schools that promotes critical thinking skills, logical 
analysis, and open and objective discussion of scientific theories being studied including 
evolution, the origins of life, global warming, and human cloning” is a Trojan horse 
designed to allow alternatives to methodological naturalism to enter the science 
classroom.  Critical thinking is already a requirement of scientific knowledge, and it 
brings an understanding and acceptance of a level of uncertainty about the kind of 
knowledge science generates.  As science and technology progress, the proportion f 
science-related discourses in our society is likely to increase (American Association for 
the Advancement of Science, 1990), ironically at the same time legislation is eroding the 
very principles that have permitted the success we all enjoy.   
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 Here, I examine both the ontological and epistemological commitments related to 
science and evolutionary knowledge in our society.  I begin by examining the legal 
threats to evolution and science education, especially the shift in creationist tactic  to 
redefine the nature and scope of scientific knowledge.  This strategic shift necessitates an 
understanding of science as an endeavor and why the knowledge derived from this 
materialistic approach is so respected.  As such, I explore the philosophical nature of 
science and the historical development of evolutionary theory in terms of ontological and 
epistemic assumptions.  The theory of evolution is a complex subject, however, and 
evolution educators have been examining how people learn about this important topic for 
a quarter century.  Obviously, understanding what educators know about how people 
understand evolution, the nature of science, and knowledge in general is important to 
putting this controversy in context.   
 Ultimately, it is a question of how the public understands science, however.  
Evolution is a socio-scientific issue (Sadler, Chambers, & Zeidler, 2004), and thus exists 
in an environment where knowledge can be idiosyncratic, and where free speech is the 
pre-requisite to “truth.”  The “marketplace of ideas” is a competitive assortment of free-
choice science education opportunities juxtaposed regularly with anti-evolution 
messages.  The opportunities for individuals motivated to learn about the controversy are 
not always “educational” in terms of current science understanding, however, and 
potential audiences must have sufficient knowledge to assess the sources themselves or 
rely on other assessments of quality.  As such, I conclude with an examination of one 
type of free-choice science learning opportunity afforded a high level of credibility as an 
educational resource, but whose contribution to science learning is highly questionable. 
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History of Fundamentalist Opposition 
 Formal public education in the U.S. arose out of a demand for access to education 
that was free and without regard to social class (Good, 1956).  By the turn of the 20th 
century, Dewey (1916) had formulated many of his ideas about democratic education, 
arguing that in advanced societies learning by direct sharing was increasi gly difficult as 
“much of what adults do is so remote in space and in meaning that playful imitation is 
less and less adequate.”  Learning in a formal environment became disembodied from its 
social context – it became an act in and of itself (Bruner, 1966).  Formal learning 
promoted ways of learning and thinking that were quite different from those nurtured in 
practical daily activities.  Learning the sciences involved moving outside of a natural 
context – for example, numbers became things separate from their function as to ls for 
determining length and no longer connected to that which was being measured (Scribner 
& Cole, 1973).  Indeed, the interface of democratic education and non-contextual 
learning has been at the heart of the debate about evolution education ever since Darwin’s
important treatise On the Origin of Species (by Means of Natural Selection, or the 
Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life).  Dewey – ironically born the 
year Darwin published this famous treatise – was influenced by Darwin’s approach to 
science and how that approach could apply to education.  He saw the battle to teach 
evolution as a matter of citizenship, overcoming opinion and emotion and taking a 
principled stand (Dewey, 1923).   
 Public education should help students overcome the fallacy of emotional 
argument and teach reason for making political and economic decisions (Dewey, 1924).  
Overcoming opinion and emotion is extremely difficult in science education.  Unlike 
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science, controversies in science education come from sources outside of the field and 
grow from non-scientific considerations (Hildebrand, Bilica, & Capps, 2008).  The clash
of creationism and evolution is, in effect, a struggle for the control of public education 
and cultural hegemony (Taylor & Condit, 1988).  It is a clash based on a fundamental 
criterion – the rise in methodological naturalism as an evidential requirement (Pennock, 
2003). 
 The Scopes “Monkey Trial” was the most infamous event highlighting 
fundamentalist opposition to evolution, and it represented the first of many clashes 
between those embracing a literal reading of the bible and the burgeoning evidence for 
organic evolution.  In 1925, Tennessee passed the Butler Act prohibiting teaching 
evolution in all schools, even Universities.  House Bill No. 185 (Public Acts of the Stat 
of Tennessee, Chapter 27) focused specifically on Man’s place in the creation as taught in 
the bible.  John Thomas Scopes volunteered to challenge the law using the textbook A 
Civic Biology: Presented in Problems, by George William Hunter, which included 
sections titled “Man’s place in Nature” and “Evolution of Man” (Hunter, 1914).  
Generally taking progressive stances in politics, William Jennings Bryan did not reject all 
of evolutionary biology, only human evolution (Larson, 1997).  Conflated by the tenets of 
Social Darwinism, however, Bryan believed “Darwinism” caused German militarism in 
World War I and threatened traditional religion and morality (Marsden, 1991).  Bryan 
typically joined movements in their final politicized stage (Larson, 2003), and the Scopes 
Trial was no exception.  He assisted the prosecutor A. Thomas Stewart, an Attorney 
General of Tennessee (R. Moore, 1998).  Although Scopes was found guilty (on the 
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insistence of Clarence Darrow), Darrow succeeded in casting doubt on strict ontological 
interpretations of the bible (R. Moore, 1998).   
 Evolutionists may have won in the court of public opinion, but not in the trenches 
of biology education.  Evolution all but disappeared from high school text books until the 
late 1930s when two texts, though not popular texts, included extensive treaties on the 
theory (Grabiner & Miller, 1974).  Unlike physics and chemistry, biology was considered 
a “soft” science, but in 1920, the Committee of Ten of the National Education 
Association recommended that biology be taught prior to chemistry and physics in high 
school curricula (McComas, 2007).  Organizations that advocated science teaching as a 
profession soon followed.  The National Association of Biology Teachers (NABT) was 
formed in 1938, in part, because of the inadequate place of biology in the curriculum in 
many schools and to facilitate the dissemination of biological knowledge (Riddle, 1938).  
In the next year, the Union of American Biological Societies, along with NABT, 
distributed a survey to biology teachers from across the US to determine the subjects 
related to biology that were taught.  Results indicated that less than 50% of teachers 
taught evolution as the “principle underlying plant, animal and human origin” (Riddle, 
1942).  Pressure from school officials often was cited as a reason for not including 
evolution in the curriculum (Riddle, 1942).  School administrators in Illinois, however, 
were more than happy to pressure students to attend “voluntary” classes in religio
(Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish faiths), however.  The common practice of mixing
religion and education in public schools was about to be challenged with the First 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. 
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 An earlier case about the expenditure of tax-raised funds related to Catholic 
instruction (Everson v. Board of Education 330 U.S. 1), had the court wrestling with the 
Establishment Clause in a 5-4 decision, but McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 
203 (1948) forced the U.S. Supreme Court’s resolution.  In McCollum, the 8-1 decision 
was clear:  
“This is beyond all question a utilization of the tax-established and tax-supported 
public school system to aid religious groups to spread their faith.  And it falls 
squarely under the ban of the First Amendment (made applicable to the States by 
the Fourteenth) as we interpreted it in.  There we said: 
‘Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.  Neither can pass 
laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.  
Neither can force or influence a person to go to or to remain away from church 
against his will, or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion.  No 
person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or 
disbeliefs, for church attendance or nonattendance.  No tax in any amount, large 
or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever 
they may be called or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion.  
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate n 
the affairs of any religious organizations or groups, and vice versa.  In the words 
of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to 
erect ‘a wall of separation between church and State’” (McCollum v. Board of 
Education, 333 U.S. 203, 1948). 
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 The use of public funds to support religion, as opposed to science, was an 
important condition.  As long as public monies were not involved, students were free to 
study religion (off of school grounds, and with their parents’ written permission; Zorach 
v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 1952).  Shortly thereafter, the launch of Sputnik I prodded 
fears of falling behind the Soviet Union technologically, and the U.S. government began 
providing federal money for new science textbooks – the Biological Sciences Curriculum 
Study (Grabiner & Miller, 1974).  Evolution returned to the precollege curriculum.  The 
fear of not being competitive in global science competition had cascading effects.  The 
Butler Act, Tennessee’s antievolution law, was finally repealed in 1967 (Public Acts of 
the State of Tennessee, Chapter No. 237, House Bill No. 48, 1967).  The first “pro-
evolution” case was soon to follow. 
 Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) distinguished between teaching 
religion and teaching evolution.  Arkansas had adopted an “anti-evolution” statute by 
voter referendum in 1928 that made it unlawful for a teacher in any state-supported 
school or university to teach or to use a textbook that teaches “that mankind ascended or 
descended from a lower order of animals” (Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97).  The 
U.S. Supreme Court recognized the State’s power to specify the public school curriculum 
but “the State’s undoubted right to prescribe the curriculum for its public schools does 
not carry with it the right to prohibit, on pain of criminal penalty, the teaching of a 
scientific theory or doctrine where that prohibition is based upon reasons that violate the 
First Amendment” (Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 1968). 
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A New Era: Religion as “Science” 
 Clearly creationists recognized the important distinction in the law; public monies 
could not be used to support religion.  A “scientific approach” to the tenets of the bible, 
however, represented a new direction that exploited the philosophical underpinnings of 
science itself.  Disillusioned by the BSCS to promote the theory of evolution in schools, 
Walter Lammerts began the Creation Research Society in 1963 to realign science based 
on theistic creation concepts and to publish creationist textbooks (Numbers, 2006).  
Lammerts promoted a strict interpretation of the six days of Genesis, and with great 
difficulty, finally found a textbook that served his ideology.  The preface by Henry M. 
Morris, current president of the Creation Research Society, included the first attempt to 
put the “doctrine of evolution” on the same ground as the “doctrine of special creation” 
(Numbers, 2006).  Despite its claims, however, the authors of Biology: A Search for 
Order in Complexity (by John N. Moore and Harold Slusher) chose “to discredit 
evolution rather than make any case for creation” (Thwaites, 1980).  Taking a similar
tack, Duane Gish, another charter member, wrote a letter to The American Biology 
Teacher, published by NABT, in 1970 to introduce the Creation Research Society as a 
group of “informed people” that do not accept that evolution is “a fact for which no 
further proof is needed.”  Shortly thereafter, Morris split from the Creation Research 
Society to found the Institute for Creation Research and cater to the elementary grades 
(Numbers, 2006).  In 1974, Morris published Scientific Creationism (Creation-Life 
Publishers, San Diego) that included his literal interpretation of Genesis (including a 
young Earth, global flood, and special creation of plants and animals) re-packaged as a 
scientific model (Numbers, 2006; Scott & Matzke, 2007). 
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 American Biology Teacher clearly did not endorse creationist views, but the 
repackaging of creation science ultimately warranted some debate.  Since its i ption, 
the journal had published articles about the teaching of evolution, the conceptual 
difficulties, and the challenges (e.g., Beers, 1938; Ehrle, 1960; Packard, 1950).  The 
renewed interest in creation science and the dispute it provoked regarding adoption of 
textbooks in California prompted editors of the American Biology Teacher to publish a 
variety of letters and articles related to creation science in the classroom.  The journal 
published a lengthy review of Biology: A Search for Order in Complexity (Aulie, 1972a; 
Aulie, 1972b) that attempted to expose the fundamentalist beliefs that interfere with 
scientific interpretation of evidence without discounting the relevance of religion.  
Theodosius Dobzhansky had just given his famous paper “Nothing in biology makes 
sense except in the light of evolution” at the 1972 convention, when the journal published 
“Evolution, creation, and the scientific method” by John Moore.  The editors included the 
disclaimer that “Although the views presented in this article are not acceptable to the 
majority of life scientists, the editorial staff feels that our membership ould be aware of 
the creationist position as described by John N. Moore” (J. N. Moore, 1973).  According 
to Moore, “scientific activity involves the search for facts that can be observed or 
demonstrated, and for laws that have been demonstrated also, by means of trustworthy 
methods of discovery” (p. 23).  He goes on to claim that repeatability, or reproducibility, 
is at the core of the method, and that evolutionary theory is not repeatable (presumably 
because no two species are identical).  Within this context, Moore clearly distingui hed 
two models, the general evolution model and the creation model, and put them on even 
ground as conceptual ontological and epistemological frameworks to explain origins.  
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The last major article in the issue was the official statement of NABT, who joined the 
“National Academy of Sciences, the American Association for the Advancement of 
Science, and other learned societies in urging the State Board of Education to reject 
inclusion of an account of special creation in State-approved science textbooks” 
(National Association of Biology Teachers, 1973). 
 The “two models” rhetoric came to a head in 1982 in McLean v. Arkansas Board 
of Education (529 F. Supp. 1255, 1258-1264).  Arkansas had enacted a law mandating 
“equal time” – the Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-Sc e ce Act 
(Act 590).  Plaintiffs included a number of churches, clergy, parents, and teachers that 
brought suit as a check of the Establishment Clause.  The judge ruled that creation 
scientists “...cannot properly describe the methodology used as scientific, if they start 
with a conclusion and refuse to change it regardless of the evidence developed during the 
course of the investigation.”  
 Five years later, a similar case, Edwards v. Aguillard (482 U.S. 578, 1987), was 
brought before the U.S. Supreme Court.  Louisiana had enacted a similar “balanced 
treatment” act, although this time in the guise of “academic freedom.”  Although the 
court ruled 7-2 that supernatural creation was a religious view and that the Louisiana 
legislature had violated the Establishment Clause by promoting it in public schools, t e 
dissenting Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Chief Justice William Rehnquist, indicated 
that academic freedom was a legitimate secular purpose.  Creationists had a loophole 
(Pennock, 2003). 
 The rise of “intelligent design” was heralded with the publication of Of Pandas 
and People by Percival Davis and Dean H. Kenyon in 1989.  The book was a thinly 
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disguised repackaging of creationist ideas, clearly documented by Barbara Forrest, 
immediately after Edwards v. Aguillard.  (In fact, Forrest discovered an editing error in 
one version of the manuscript where the “c” and “ists” from the word “creationists” were 
missed as “design proponents” was being substituted, leaving the passage to state 
“evolutionists think the former is correct, cdesign proponentsists accept the latter view;” 
Scott & Matzke, 2007.)  Nevertheless, in their promotion of the book the Foundation for 
Thought and Ethics, a group less tied to the literal interpretation of the bible, claimed to 
be developing a high school text book that presented plausible, scientific alternatives to 
conventional evolutionary theories: “[T]he book will not be subject to the major criticism 
of creation, that the supernatural lies outside of science, because its central statement is 
that scientific evidence points to an intelligent cause, but that science is silent a  to 
whether that intelligence is within or beyond the material universe.  So the book is not 
appealing to the supernatural” (Scott, 1990).   
 The scientific objections to Of Pandas and People were numerous and lengthy.  
In her review, Eugenie Scott, an anthropologist, was particularly disturbed by the
treatment of human evolution (Scott, 1990).  In addition, the book misrepresented 
variation and its role in natural selection, as well as mutation as a source of variation 
(Scott, 1990).  Similarly, Frank Sonleitner wrote “What’s wrong with Pandas?”, and 
according to the National Center for Science Education, the ongoing critique is now
longer than the actual book (http://ncseweb.org/creationism/analysis/sonleitners-whats-
wrong-with-pandas, last accessed 4/09).   
 Around the same time, the Discovery Institute was founded as a political think 
tank and the official home of the “intelligent design” movement.  From the Discovery 
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Institute, the Center for Renewal of Science and Culture (renamed Center for Science and 
Culture in 2002) developed the “wedge document” to pursue an aggressive public 
relations program that would create an opening for the supernatural in the public’s 
understanding of science and in the minds of policymakers (Forrest, 2007; Forrest & 
Gross, 2004).  Their success was apparent when President George W. Bush announced 
support for teaching “intelligent design” and Rick Santorum was able to add equal-time 
wording to the “No Child Left Behind” education bill (Pennock, 2003).  (The language 
was struck from the enrolled bill, however.) 
 The Discovery Institute was not prepared to test “intelligent design” in a court of 
law, however.  In October 2004, the Dover School Board in Pennsylvania passed a 
resolution that:  
“Students will be made aware of gaps/problems in Darwin’s theory and of other 
theories of evolution including, but not limited to, intelligent design. 
Note:  Origins of Life is not taught” 
(Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District, Case 4:04-cv-02688-JEJ, Document 342, 
2005).  One month later, the board announced that teachers would be required to read a 
disclaimer about the theory of evolution stating that the theory is not fact and significant 
gaps exist.  Furthermore, teachers were to state that “intelligent design” was a valid 
alternative theory and recommend reading Of Pandas and People for any student 
interested.  Apparently, the Discovery Institute urged the board to repeal the measure, 
fearing legal defeat (Forrest, 2007).   
 And a sound legal defeat it was.  In December 2005, a federal district court struck 
down the school district’s attempts, declaring the effort to be an unconstitutional 
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establishment of religion (Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District, 2005).  According to 
Judge Jones, “intelligent design” not only violated the Establishment Clause, it was not 
science.  Although the judge did not use the test established in McLean v. Arkansas, he 
invoked specific epistemological demarcation criteria.  Science did not include 
supernatural causes, and proponents of “intelligent design” could not change the 
definition of science.  Moreover, irreducible complexity was in fact testable and 
refutable.  Acceptance by the community of scientists also was an important 
consideration in which “intelligent design” had failed.  Nevertheless, a new strategy 
emerged – one that has come full circle – to use an argument of rhetoric to win in the 
public court of opinion. 
 The new tactic involved redoubling efforts at discrediting the evidentiary support 
for evolution and its acceptance by the scientific community.  These new efforts 
represented an argument for ontology based on epistemological detraction.  Their 
objective was not to provide new scientific explanations but to make empirical arguments 
to establish the limits of empirical science (Clark, Foster, & York, 2007).  By suggesting 
that the theory of evolution was not well supported with evidence, detractors argued that 
science education needed to be teaching critical thinking skills.  The implication was that 
by being taught to think critically, creationism would become an option in scientific 
discourse.  This tactic had been reproached in both Kitzmiller and McLean: 
“The court in McLean noted the ‘fallacious pedagogy of the two model approach’ 
and that [i]n efforts to establish ‘evidence’ in support of creation science, the 
defendants relied upon the same false premise as the two model approach ... all 
evidence which criticized evolutionary theory was proof in support of creation 
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science” (McLean v. Arkansas, 529 F. Supp. at 1267, 1269).  We do not find this 
false dichotomy any more availing to justify ID today than it was to justify 
creation science two decades ago.” 
Clearly, the approach resonated with the public, however.  Louisiana passed new 
“strengths and weaknesses” legislation just 25 years after the “balanced treatment” act 
had been rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court in Edwards v. Aguillard (482 U.S. 578, 
1987).   
“The State Board of Elementary and Secondary Education, upon request of a city, 
parish, or other local public school board, shall allow and assist teachers, 
principals, and other school administrators to create and foster an environment 
within public elementary and secondary schools that promotes critical thinking 
skills, logical analysis, and open and objective discussion of scientific theories 
being studied including, but not limited to, evolution, the origins of life, global 
warming, and human cloning”  (Louisiana Senate Bill 733, Section 1. R.S. 
17:285.1B, 2008). 
After a much heated debate, Texas soon followed with science standards that conjure 
“strengths and weaknesses” wording.  The Texas standards were more direct in th ir 
criticism of evolutionary theory, employing the discredited creationist idea that that 
“sudden appearance” and “stasis” in the fossil record somehow disprove evolution 
(National Center for Science Education press release, March 30th, 2009).  Now student  
were to “analyze and evaluate the sufficiency of scientific explanations concerning any 
data of sudden appearance, stasis and the sequential nature of groups in the fossil 
records” (Amendments Proposed for Science TEKS, Section 112.34(c) strike 7B, March 
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27, 2009).  Missouri, New Mexico, Florida, and Iowa have all introduced similar 
legislation without success. 
 
What Is this Thing Called Science?  
 Science is ill-defined; knowing what it is not may be easier to define than what it 
is.  McLean v. Arkansas was the first challenge to evolution that resulted in a precedent-
setting “test” to determine whether an enterprise should be considered science.  This test 
came with considerable input from Michael Ruse, a philosopher of science, and Ruse 
argued persuasively (the judge ruled that creation science was not science).  He 
maintained the most striking aspect of science was that it was an empirical enterprise 
about the real world of sensation – including unobservables – and a search for order (i.e., 
unbroken, natural regularities).  He added that laws affect explanation and prediction, and 
associated with explanation and prediction was the idea of testability – confirmation and 
falsification.  One major difference between science and non-science was that scientific 
explanations were tentative; scientists, as a community, give up on theories that fail o 
answer to new or reconsidered evidence (although he freely admitted that not all 
scientists give up their ideas).  Religious individuals tended to be dogmatic, reta ning 
their ideas despite the evidence (Ruse, 1982a).  But, Laudan argued that Ruse was 
perpetuating a view of science that simply was not true (Laudan, 1982).  He contended 
that very little demarcates science from the so-called pseudo-science of creation science 
(or any other).  Moreover, many philosophers of science have concluded that no 
universal, ahistorical, account is available that is capable of providing standards by which 
to judge science (Chalmers, 1999; Clark et al., 2007).  Nevertheless, a philosophical 
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grounding of the nature of the scientific endeavor is vital to evolutionary biologists and 
anyone interested in the creation-evolution controversy. 
 Alan Chalmers (1976, 1982, and 1999) asked a fundamental question about the 
scientific enterprise, not to challenge science, but to understand sincerely why the 
knowledge derived from science is so highly esteemed.  Although he subscribed to the 
concept that there is no general account of science that applies to all sciences at all stages 
in their development, he tried to capture the distinguishing features of science in the face 
of the philosophical challenges (Chalmers, 1999).  Indeed, philosophers have been 
debating the fundamental nature of science, including its epistemological, ontological, 
and axiological, commitments for decades.  The result has been a complex, and 
sometimes contentious, discussion that can be pooled into two overlapping issues 
(although by no means the only issues) related to public understanding.  Epistemological 
issues appeal to evidence and the nature of evidence used in science, and ontological 
issues deal with the kinds of things there are in the world and what we can know about 
them. 
 
Epistemology 
 Traditional views of science have centered on the production of facts, observation 
and experiment, and logical induction, but scientific knowledge cannot rest on such weak 
appeals.  Science cannot be derived from facts, as so many people assume, because facts 
are not directly given to careful unprejudiced observations via the senses.  Facts do not 
exist prior to or independent of theory; facts have to be practically constructed and are 
subject to revision and dismissal.  They do not provide a firm reliable foundation for 
49 
scientific knowledge.  Because of this fallibility, scientific knowledg can neither be 
conclusively proved nor disproved by appealing to observable facts (Chalmers, 1999).  
Experimental results also are fallible.  As with facts, results from experiments are not 
derived via the senses in a straightforward manner, and judgments about the adequacy of 
those results are dependent on theory.  More importantly, appealing to experimental 
results cannot settle a dispute between proponents of opposing theories because of this 
circular dependency (in order to judge the adequacy of experimental results, scientists 
appeal to theory, and those same experimental results are used as evidence for the 
theory).  Nevertheless, in a philosophical sense, if the experimental outcomes actually do 
reflect how the world works rather than just theoretical views about the world, then 
testing the adequacy of theories against experimental results has meaning (Chalmers, 
1999).  A recent philosophical realm has been exploring whether the reality of 
experimental effects can be established without recourse to large-scale theory, however. 
 Given these failings, science philosophers began to consider what Sir Karl Popper 
called the problem of demarcation (Popper, 1963).  The problem of demarcation rested in 
the idea that certain characteristics should be able to differentiate science from non-
science.  As Popper (1963) saw it, evidence could be twisted out of counter-evidence 
with ad-hoc interpretations to confirm theories, such as Freudian psychoanalysis and 
Alderian psychology, so that nothing distinguished one as better able to explain human 
behavior than the other.  As a result, he tried to draw a line “between statements, or 
systems of statements, of the empirical sciences, and all other statements – whether they 
are of a religious or of a metaphysical character, or simply pseudo-scientifi ” (p. 38).  
Popper claimed the criterion of falsifiability was the solution – statements or statement 
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systems must be capable of conflicting with possible, or conceivable observations; that is, 
in order to be scientific, a theory must take risks by predicting testable outcomes (Popper, 
1963).   
 Interestingly, Popper claimed that parts of the principle of natural selection, for 
example, were pseudo-science – that they failed to satisfy his falsifiabiity criterion (Curd 
& Cover, 1998).  In fact, Popper first claimed that “the survival of the fittest” was 
tautological (an idea picked up upon by the creation scientist, Henry Morris, that all of 
evolutionary theory is neither predictable nor testable).  Indeed, Popper changed his 
mind, but as he did, he himself illustrated how difficult his ideas could be to interpret.  
Popper had never condemned all of Darwin’s theory, even when he judged an important 
part could be falsified (Curd & Cover, 1998).  Thus, one problem was that observation 
might not lead to straightforward conclusive falsification of theories because of th  
possibility that some part of the complex test situation was responsible for an erroneous 
prediction (the Duhem-Quine thesis; Chalmers, 1999).  Moreover, history has shown that 
science does not “progress” based on this line of thinking; many important theories we e 
not rejected after falsification (e.g., Newton’s gravitational theory and the Copernican 
Revolution; Curd & Cover, 1998, Chalmers, 1999).  Testable consequences also were a 
very weak requirement – although they perhaps are a necessary condition for science
(Curd & Cover, 1998).  As a result, the weakness of the unqualified demarcation criteria 
was that many pseudo-sciences and non-sciences could make falsifiable claims, such as 
any literal interpretation of the bible would.  Creation science made empirical assertions 
fully capable of falsification (Laudan, 1982). 
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Ontology 
 Scientific knowledge claims depend on the kinds of things there are in the world 
and what scientists can know about those things.  One aspect of the truth in scientific 
knowledge deals with the extent to which a scientist prescribes to realism.  Realists 
assume that scientific knowledge informs about the nature of the world beyond what 
appears on the surface, even though it may not be directly observable.  Furthermore, not 
only does science give us knowledge of these unobservables, it has succeeded in doing so 
(Chalmers, 1999).  The line between supernatural and unobservable is razor thin, 
especially when examining the history of science, however.  Mayr (1997) argues that the 
demarcation between science and theology is easy because scientists do not invoke the 
supernatural to explain how the natural world works.  In this light, supernatural seems 
only to imply human-like deities, not imaginary concepts like “ether,” “factor,” or 
“gemmule.”  In point of fact, anti-realists counter that many of the entities postulated by 
past theories are no longer believed to exist (e.g., ether, Newton’s corpuscles, phlogi ton, 
and Darwin’s gemmules; Chalmers, 1999).  Similarly, Laudan (1981) provides exampl s 
of theories that were successful and their central explanatory terms did not refer, e.g. 
crystalline spheres of ancient astronomy, electromagnetic ether, and Mendel’s “genes” 
(Mendel was referring to entities that did not actually exist – “factors,” and assigned 
causal roles that have been divided up among other entities; Curd & Cover, 1998).  Even 
though these past theories were instrumental to the generation of current knowledge, 
many have since been rejected as false.  Therefore, the theoretical aspect of science is not 
securely established (Chalmers, 1999).  Many anti-realists argue that theories are merely 
instruments necessary for correlating and predicting the results of observation and 
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experiment; they are not appropriately interpreted as being true or false (Chalmers, 1999).  
One motivation for this anti-realism stance seems to be restricting science to claims that 
can be justified by scientific means (Chalmers, 1999).   
 Certainly, as a principle goal, scientists aim to accept true claims about the natural 
world and reject false ones (Curd & Cover, 1998).  Scientific value, however, relies on 
more than just statements of truth.  Curd and Cover (1998) provide the example of a 
scientist counting the number of hairs on a dog; without the context of a theory of a 
drug’s affect on the dog’s hair loss, simply knowing the hair count has no scientific 
value.  Scientists are interested in more than discovering mere truths about the world; 
they are interested in discovering i teresting truths.  Consequently, the judgments about 
what constitute interesting truths are based on criteria such as generality, predictive and 
explanatory power, and simplicity (Curd & Cover, 1998).  These constitutive values often 
compete, compromising the objectivity of science and undermining its rationality for 
theory choice (Longino, 1990).  So, even though truth may be the primary cognitive 
value, it is not independent of other cognitive values when deciding which theories are 
true.  Moreover, contextual values affect the way scientists do the science that drives 
these cognitive values.  Contextual values (norms, preferences, beliefs, and interests) 
vary with time and across cultures.  How scientists evaluate and judge evidence depends 
on contextual values, and objectivity is a matter of degree that depends less on 
methodological rules and more on the way the scientific community is organized 
(Longino, 1990).  Of particular importance is the way contextual values shape the 
formation of hypotheses in the context of scientific discovery (Okruhlik, 1994).  The 
production of scientific knowledge is always within a social context and related to other 
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practices with other aims, such as personal and professional intentions of scientist , the 
economic intentions of funding agencies, and the ideological intentions of religious 
groups (Chalmers, 1999).  In fact, Thomas Kuhn examined the history of science to claim 
that contextual values shape scientific judgments about theories so much so that scientific 
revolutions lack rationality and objective progress (Kuhn, 1970).   
 But progress is a hallmark by which many define the scientific enterprise.  Ind ed, 
the Ultimate Argument (van Frassen, 1980) states that the success of science can ot be 
explained unless these scientific theories have the virtues of verisimilitude (approximate 
truth) and reference.  According to van Fraasen, science can be explained without appeal 
to approaching truth using Darwinism, however; the success of scientific theories is a 
result of the survival of the fittest and not necessarily because of their verisimilitude.  In 
rebuttal, Brown (1985) outlines three features of successful scientific theories: their 
empirical adequacy (they explain and unify), their increasing adequacy (temporal 
increase in these abilities), and their novel predictions (predictions that turn out to be rue 
more often than guessing).  Van Fraasen’s Darwinian analogy cannot account for novel 
predictions (Brown, 1985). 
 Understanding the limits of scientific knowledge is vital to understanding the 
controversy surrounding religion and science.  Obviously, much uncertainty exists about 
the scientific enterprise, what exactly science is, what are its goal , the knowledge it 
produces, and what kind of certainty it can attach to its claims.  Chalmers (1999) suggest  
that comparing the kinds of knowledge claims that are sought, the kinds of methods 
available for establishing those knowledge claims, and the success that has been chi ved 
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should distinguish a science, such as biology, from a non-science, such as creation 
science.   
 
The Science of Evolution 
 Given that no universal, ahistorical, definition of science is available (Chalmers, 
1999; Clark et al., 2007), one has to ask about the history of evolutionary science; when 
did evolution become science?  Like so much of Western tradition, evolutionary thought 
was rooted in Greek philosophy.  Plato (ca. 427-347 BCE) argued that the gods created 
the world (an idea appropriated in the Christian interpretation of the bible; Futuyma, 
1998) and attend to it (Clark et al., 2007).  In that world, everything had a transcendent 
ideal form imperfectly imitated by its earthly counterpart (i.e., essentialism; Futuyma, 
2005).  Plato’s view of purposiveness resided in the gods (Ariew, 2007).  Aristotle (384-
322 BCE) was a biologist, however; he believed in an inner principle of teleological 
change – the cause responsible for reaching a preconceived ultimate goal came from 
within the organism (Ariew, 2007; Lombrozo & Carey, 2006; Mayr, 1961).   
 The materialist foundations of modern evolutionary science appeared with 
Epicurus (341-270 BCE).  He insisted that empirical investigation was the means to the 
best explanation, recognizing uncertainty and the limitations of observation (Clark et al., 
2007).  The gods were not excluded from Epicurus’ worldview, they just were not related 
to the material world (knowledge of the gods came through dreams; Clark et al., 2007) 
It was Epicurus’ contribution to modern day science, in general, that is eschewed most by 
anti-evolutionists (Clark et al., 2007). 
55 
 Early in the 19th century, however, evolutionary thought began to blossom.  
Naturalists approached the world looking for proof of an obviously intelligent designer 
(in that day they just admitted it was God), but the discovery of more and more fossils 
indicated an earth that had undergone radical changes in the diversity and kinds of 
organisms that existed (Larson, 2004).  Georges Cuvier employed the idea of 
“progressive catastrophism” to explain the sequence in the geologic record as suites of 
animals were wiped out allowing new and fertile ground for God’s next plan (Larson, 
2004).  Other naturalists struggled with explanations for the history of life that did not 
require omnipotent intervention.  In 1802, Jean Baptiste Pierre Antoine de Monet, 
Chevalier de Lamarck, published the first comprehensive theory of organic evolution 
(Larson, 2004).  He proposed the idea of transformationism – from spontaneous 
generation of the lowest forms, life progressed to the highest by the inherita c  of 
acquired traits (Kampourakis & Zogza, 2007; Larson, 2004).  In context, Lamarck’s 
contribution was one of many ideas being offered at the time (Corsi, 2005), but it piqued 
the interests of both believers and detractors.  No longer were kinds static; Lamarck 
offered a comprehensive theory to explain the history of animals, including man (Mayr, 
1982).  Whether scientists, naturalists, and the educated elite cared for the work or not, 
Lamarck clearly infected Victorian society with ideas about a theory of evolution (Corsi, 
2005).  Catastrophists, like Cuvier, countered that creation had been progressive, but lif 
forms did not progress (Futuyma, 1998; Larson, 2004).  Charles Lyell despised the 
Lamarckian thought of human transformation, but he disagreed with progressive stances
like Cuvier’s (Larson, 2004).  He argued for environmental change that was cyclical and 
consistent throughout the geologic record (Larson, 2004).  The absence of fossils to 
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support this idea just meant they had yet to be found (Larson, 2004).  Although he 
believed in special creation, Lyell was unwilling to attribute the natural to the 
supernatural (Larson, 2004).  He proposed that currently observable forces were 
responsible for shaping the earth’s features (Larson, 2004).  This uniformitarian approach 
to viewing the world was grounded in methodological naturalism, and methodological 
naturalism would become the nucleus in enlightenment thinking.   
 
The Enlightenment 
 As a signal of the new era of enlightenment thinking, during the 1830s the term 
“scientist” was coined to distinguish methodological naturalism from idealistic 
philosophies like romanticism (Futuyma, 1998; Larson, 2004).  Methodological 
naturalism was an epistemological belief (a belief about what knowledge is and how we 
can obtain it) and a procedural protocol (Forrest, 2000; Pennock, 1996).  It has often been 
conflated with philosophical naturalism, which operates in the realm of ontology (truth 
claims; Forrest, 2000; Pennock, 1996).  Although some authors (e.g., Forrest, 2000) have 
argued that philosophical naturalism is the logical extension of methodological 
naturalism, others have urged that science need only be committed to methodological 
naturalism, remaining neutral to philosophical naturalism and metaphysical beliefs 
(Pennock, 2003).  Charles Darwin also embraced methodological naturalism; in that light, 
natural selection was a logical extension of Malthusian economics and Llyell’s 
uniformitarianism (as well as utilitarianism, imperialism, and capitalism; Clark et al., 
2007; Larson, 2004).   
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 As the years past after Darwin’s legendary trip, relentless pursuit of evidentiary 
support for his theory caught him in a professional trap; he needed to present his thesis.  
Evolutionary ideas had been creeping into social acceptance, and a young naturalist, 
Alfred Wallace, soon approached Darwin with his own theory (Larson, 2004).  Where 
Darwin’s theory of natural selection emphasized individual competition (from his 
imperialist perspective), Wallace approached evolution as a result of the selective power 
of ecological forces (Wallace had grown up poor; Hull, 2005; Larson, 2004).  A year 
after both theories were presented to the Linnean Society in London, Darwin published 
On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured 
Races in the Struggle for Life (Larson, 2004).   
 Although immensely successful, the Origin of Species was not universally 
accepted and built into a unifying theory (Caton, 2007; Larson, 2004).  With no 
understanding of modern genetics, and therefore no mechanism for generating, let alone 
maintaining variation, evolution became a hotly debated topic.  Darwin had proposed the 
ill-fated idea of “gemmules” – tiny, unobservable entities – to carry heredita y 
information (Chalmers, 1999; Larson, 2004).  In addition, a new calculation put the age 
of the earth at only one hundred million years, too short a time frame for the slow process 
of natural selection (Larson, 2004).  Many scientists returned to idealist philosophies and 
the belief in a harmonious, transcendent order in nature guided by some mystical 
meaning or theological being (Futuyma, 1998).  Theistic evolution, Lamarckism, 
orthogenesis, and mutation theory eclipsed natural selection as viable pursuits in 
evolutionary science (Futuyma, 1998; Larson, 2004).  Even Darwin engaged Lamarckian 
ideas to speed the process by which change occurred (Larson, 2004).  In the early 1900s, 
58 
selection theory had all but disappeared from the scientific landscape, but no sufficient 
replacement had been found (Larson, 2004). 
 The discovery of Gregor Mendel’s important work in 1900 ushered in a new era 
to evolutionary science.  With genetics as a mechanism, Darwin’s ideas about n tural 
selection and adaptation were further marginalized for a time, however, even considered 
non-scientific because of the lack of rigorous laboratory experiments (Futuyma, 1998).  
Genetics disproved Lamarckian concepts of inheritance, but mutations, at the exclusion 
of natural selection, were given the primary role (Futuyma, 1998).  In the 1930s and 
1940s, Ronald A. Fisher, John B.S. Haldane, and Sewall Wright developed a 
mathematical theory that synthesized understanding of population genetics (Futuyma, 
1998).  Mutation was not an alternative to natural selection, but its raw material 
(Futuyma, 1998).  Darwin was vindicated.  Sergei Chetverikov and Theodosius 
Dobzhansky showed convincingly that populations were not uniform; genetic variation 
was prevalent, and mutations added to that variation (Futuyma, 1998).  Ernst Mayr in 
Systematics and the Origin of Species (1942) clarified the relationship between genetics 
and the evolution of species, and Julian Huxley (1942) used genetic principles to explain
the major patterns of evolution that had been described, in the process redefining 
evolutionary “progress” as a contingent factor (as opposed to a mystical, guided factor).  
In Tempo and Mode in Evolution (1944), George Gaylord Simpson resolved population 
genetics and paleontological data (Futuyma, 1998).  Methodological naturalism had 
proven to be highly successful, and a massive body of knowledge was directly 
attributable to its adoption (Forrest, 2000).   
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 The history of evolutionary science clearly indicated a path defined by context.  
Early evolutionists struggled with epistemological claims, but adopting the methodology 
of science permitted defensible pronouncements about what exists in the natural world 
(Forrest, 2000).  Indeed, with the establishment of methodological naturalism as a 
philosophical commitment, science could be defined by the kinds of knowledge claims 
being sought, and the uncertainty that came with that commitment (Pennock, 2003).  
Although creation science has a history of knowledge claims, it offers no methods, and it  
success has had more to do with power than an epistemological grounding (Forrest, 
2000).  Negative argumentation does not, as many creationists try to claim, count as 
positive evidence (Pennock, 1996).  Legal precedent has now defined evolutionary 
science as: (1) guided by natural law, (2) explanatory by reference to natural law, (3) 
testable against the empirical world, (4) reference to conclusions that are tentative, and 
(5) falsifiable (McLean v. Arkansas, 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1982; see also Ruse, 1982a).  
Although this definition is highly tenable to those concerned with the constitutional issue,
not all philosophers of science agree (e.g., Laudan, 1983).  Nevertheless, Ruse (1982b) 
argues, the U.S. Constitution does not bar teaching weak science in public schools, only 
religion. 
 Ultimately, however, concern lies with our current understanding of evolutionary 
theory.   The Modern Synthesis organized evolutionary theory and brought together a 
diversity of disciplines.  Indeed, Theodosius Dobzhansky contended that “nothing in 
biology makes sense except in the light of evolution” (Dobzhansky, 1973).  
Understanding this complex theory centers on several key concepts (D. L. Anderson, 
Fisher, & Norman, 2002; Nehm & Schonfeld, 2007): 
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1. Individuals within a population vary in their characteristics.   
2. Genetic variation is heritable.   
3. Mutation, recombination, and sexual reproduction are constant sources of 
variation within a population.   
4. Individuals have the capacity to reproduce at a very high rate.   
5. Natural resources are limiting (or become limiting).   
6. Limited resources bring about a struggle for existence.   
7. Survival in the course of this struggle is not random but related to the 
characteristics of the individual.   
8. The population changes with respect to the proportion of individuals with certain 
characteristics through the differential survival and reproduction of these 
individuals. 
As straightforward as these eight points may seem to educators and evolutionary 
biologists, however, each entails understanding a number of ideas that vary significantly 
in their conceptual abstractness.  Individuals’ “alternative conceptions” may interfere 
with understanding these points, and misconceptions must be overcome before 
conceptualizations of this complex theory can be said to approach those of the scientific 
community. 
 
Evolution Misconception Research 
 Constructivism is the idea that knowledge is actively constructed and constantly 
evolving over time (Driver, Asoko, Leach, Mortimer, & Scott, 1994).  Human 
constructivism  focuses on learning as a process of making meaning (Mintzes, 
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Wandersee, & Novak, 1997; Novak, 1993), and meaningful learning requires organized 
webs of interrelated propositions (Ausubel 1963).  Individuals come to learning situations 
with pre-existing ideas about how the world works, however (Ausubel, 1968; Clough & 
Wood-Robinson, 1985a; Driver & Easley, 1978; M. A. Johnson & Lawson, 1998; Wallin, 
Hagman, & Olander, 2000; Wandersee, Mintzes, & Novak, 1994).  This prior knowledge 
may or may not reflect current thinking – about scientific theories for example – and 
when it does not, has been termed misconceptions, alternative conceptions, non-scientific 
ideas, or limited or inappropriate propositional hierarchies, to name a few.   
 Misconceptions about evolutionary theory can be constructed from a variety of 
sources (Committee on Undergraduate Science Education, 1997; Mintzes et al., 1997).  
One common source relates to vernacular issues, where different connotations of 
important scientific phrases are misapplied in scientific settings.  For example, in 
everyday language “adapt” may refer to the ability of individuals to alter their form or 
behavior through their own efforts, and “fitness” may refer to physical strength (Bishop 
& Anderson, 1990).  “Theory” also is commonly thought of as a “guess” rather than a 
well-supported explanation that generates testable predictions (National Academy of 
Sciences, 1998).  Everyday experiences are another source of misconceptions.  The 
inheritance of family characteristics, such as grandpa’s baldness or cousin Martha’s cleft 
chin, may affect how individuals think about heritability, variation, and time.  Other 
important sources of misconceptions can be parents, television programs, news, websites, 
fiction, and religious and myth-based stories.  These informal sources can affect how 
individuals think about dinosaurs and the age of the earth, where lightning is likely to 
strike, or the possibility of obtaining warts from frogs.  Of pressing concern ar  the 
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misconceptions that arise in formal environments.  If new information is taught without 
confronting students’ preconceived notions and nonscientific beliefs, individuals may 
simply accommodate the new knowledge into old frameworks (Alters & Nelson, 2002; 
Committee on Undergraduate Science Education, 1997).  For example, teaching genetics 
does not necessarily teach students that genes are the mechanism by which populations 
change over time (Clough & Wood-Robinson, 1985b).  Without proper grounding, 
students may continue to believe that within an evolutionary context, mutations are only 
bad, yielding “hopeful monsters” that natural selection must “weed out” of the 
population. 
 Conceptual change is a mechanism for addressing misconceptions.  Traditional 
conceptual change research emphasizes major conceptual restructuring that results from a 
logical dissatisfaction with and abandoning of prior conceptions (Posner, Strike, Hewson, 
& Gertzog, 1982; Nussbaum, 1989).  As a result, meaningful learning can require the 
reconstruction of a significant segment of the learner’s conceptual and propositional 
framework to include more general and broadly inclusive concepts (Groves & Pugh, 
2002; Nicholls, 1999; Songer & Mintzes, 1994).  This kind of superordinate learning is 
rare, however, more characteristic of experts than students (Mintzes et al., 1997; Novak, 
1993; 2002).  Misconceptions may not be barriers to learning but important components 
of the learning process.  Hamza and Wickman (2008) suggest that misconceptions can be 
integral in the learning process as they are encountered and questioned (see also Lawson, 
Alkhoury, Benford, Clark, & Falconer, 2000; Taber, 2001).  In fact, students may hold 
theory-like conceptual frameworks – structures of relatively coherent domain-specific 
knowledge characterized by a distinct ontology and causality that give rise to prediction 
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and explanation (Vosniadou & Ioannides, 1998).  As a result, conceptual change may be 
a much slower revision than Posner et al. envisioned, through the gradual incorporati n 
of elements of currently accepted scientific explanations (Vosniadou & Ioannides, 1998).  
Restructuring these naïve theories requires addressing modes of learning and reaso ing, 
and the development of meta-conceptual awareness, intentionality, and epistemological 
sophistication (Vosniadou, Vamvakoussi, & Skopeliti, 2008).   
 Alternatively, naïve theories may be highly fragmented, displaying limited 
coherence.  To understand conceptual change, “knowledge in pieces” approaches 
generate questions about grain size of elements and their coherence and contextuality 
(diSessa, 2008).  In this view, conceptual change is a complex, multi-faceted process that 
takes time, multiple contexts, approaches to meta-cognition that require understaing 
personal epistemology, and assessments that address all the pieces (diSessa, 2008).  
Because conceptual ecologies lack coherence, students may bring both alternative and 
scientifically acceptable conceptions into play in response to different problem contexts 
(Kampourakis & Zogza, 2008b).  Some misconceptions may disappear on their own as 
individuals learn more about a specific topic, such as natural history (Evans, 2000, 2001).   
 Evolution is a complex theory, involving disciplines from geology to ecology and 
biology to behavior.  These disciplines entail structural concepts that can be classified 
according to different levels of abstraction, any of which can be stumbling blocks f r 
conceptual understanding.  Lawson, Abraham, & Renner (1989) and Lawson et al. (2000) 
describe four types of concepts, including apprehended, descriptive, theoretical, and 
hypothetical.  Apprehended concepts are concepts whose complete meaning can be 
derived from the internal or external environment, such as blue or hunger.  Descriptive 
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concepts are mentally constructed from readily available exemplars, such as chair, 
running, populations, and species.  Theoretical concepts are the most abstract because 
their defining attributes are not perceptible – their causal agents cannot be observed.  
Osmosis, genes (Lawson et al., 2000) and, most likely, probabilities, are all theoretical 
concepts.  Hypothetical or intermediate concepts exist between descriptive and 
theoretical concepts because they could derive meaning if not restricted to a normal 
observational time frame.  Natural selection, evolution, and convergent evolution, as well
as limiting factors, and even the process of fossilization, are hypothetical concepts 
(Lawson et al., 2000).  The level of abstraction of concepts may very well be linked to 
ease of understanding.  Descriptive concepts may be understood more readily especially 
by individuals that have not developed reasoning skills; hypothetical and theoretical 
concepts that require more abstract thinking may be more difficult to comprehend 
(Lawson et al., 2000).   
 Ontological misclassification may operate at a similar grain size within 
conceptual ecologies (Chi, 2008).  Family-resemblance categories are defin d by 
correlations among features in sets of similar memorized exemplars and allow inferences 
about the observable products of history, whereas classical categories of concepts are 
defined by formal rules that allow inferences within idealized law-governed systems 
(Pinker & Prince, 1996).  Entities and processes can be thought of as family-resemblance 
and classical categories, respectively, in mental models.  Events are bounded and 
sequential entities whereas equilibrations are ongoing, unbounded, and simultaneous 
processes (Ferrari & Chi, 1998).  If students misclassify the concept of evolution as an 
event rather than an equilibration, overcoming that ontological misclassification requires 
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creating the new process category or shifting concepts across categories.  In other words, 
evolution would be a theoretical concept (cf. Lawson et al., 2000) misclassified as a 
descriptive concept.   
 Major efforts to overcome misconceptions have met with equivocal results (e.g., 
Chinsamy & Plagányi, 2007; Crawford, Zembal-Saul, Munford, & Friedrichsen, 2005; 
Ingram & Nelson, 2006; Kampourakis & Zogza, 2008a; Nehm & Reilly, 2007; Nehm & 
Schonfeld, 2007; Scharmann, Smith, James, & Jenson, 2005; Verhey, 2005/2006).  
Research has shown that even after significant coursework students retain serious 
misconceptions about the process of evolution (Brumby, 1984; Nehm & Reilly, 2007; 
Wandersee et al. 1994).  In general, students believe that the environment causes 
individuals to change, all individuals change simultaneously, and traits gradually change 
rather than changing proportions of individuals with those traits (Bishop & Anderson, 
1990).   
 Several researchers have suggested that students’ explanations of natural 
phenomena resemble theories offered by previous generations of scientists and natural 
philosophers (Mintzes et al., 1997; Novak, 1993, Shtulman, 2006; but see Kampourakis 
& Zogza, 2007).  For example, Shtulman (2006) explored the possibility that modern 
naïve theories paralleled early “transformational” theories of evolution.  He argued that 
because students embraced essentialist ideals (i.e., each biological kind has an underlying 
essence that makes it what it is; see also Evans, 2008), they were predisposed to think 
about evolution as a transformation of essences, just like early naturalists.  Kampourakis 
& Zogza (2007) argue that this type of characterization may be historically incorrect; 
examination of Lamarck’s theory indicates student explanations are actually q ite 
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different.  Therefore, although teaching the history of science may be a valuable tool for 
overcoming some misconceptions (Wandersee, 1986), the similar patterns are more likely 
related to the language of shared experiences with the natural world (Driver & Bell, 
1986) and developmental constraints (Evans, 2008; Sinatra, Brem, & Evans, 2008).   
 Intuitive cognitive biases are part of a developmental framework and may act s
conceptual barriers to evolutionary thinking (Evans, 2008; Sinatra et al., 2008).  
Essentialism, teleology, and intentionality are found in all age and cultures and result 
from intuitive beliefs about the way the world works (Evans, 2008).  Indeed, as 
individuals grow and learn, thinking shifts from a naïve psychological world to a naïve 
biological world (Evans, 2008).  The shift to a richer, more coherent knowledge structure 
that includes abstract concepts related to evolutionary theory may be age-related, but not 
age-dependent (Evans, 2008).  In fact, these developmental constraints may be an 
underlying factor in studies where students differentially apply concepts among varying 
problem contexts (see Kampourakis & Zogza, 2008b).   
 If developmental constraints are a factor in understanding evolution, innovative 
techniques and strategies for teaching this important theory are necessary.  Clearly, 
educators need to consider new insight into the development of cognitive capabilities.  
Recent evidence indicates that children may be quite capable of sophisticated thinking, 
but most curricula do not reflect what is now known about younger children’s cognitive 
capabilities (National Research Council, 2007).  In fact, early instruction in scie ce can 
have lasting impacts on science concept learning (Novak & Musonda, 1991).  Indeed, 
Nussbaum (1989) suggests that if conceptual change is an evolutionary process, 
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educators should start exposing students to scientific ideas, such as evolution, much 
earlier than is customary to allow for the development process.   
 
Overcoming Misconceptions Using the NOS Framework 
 Because of the complexities of evolutionary theory, conceptual change 
approaches often incorporate the philosophical nature of science (NOS) as a conceptual 
framework (National Academy of Sciences, 1998; Alters & Nelson, 2002).  The NOS 
framework emphasizes the process of science as inquiry by addressing the durable but 
tentative character of scientific knowledge; that scientific knowledge reli s heavily, but 
not entirely, on observation, experimental evidence, rational arguments, and skepticism; 
methods in science vary; science explains natural phenomena only; laws and theories 
have different roles (hierarchy of terminology); diversity in science; the clear and open 
reporting of new scientific knowledge; accurate record keeping, peer review, and 
replicability; that observations are theory-laden; science is creative; the history of 
science; science is a part of culture; the role of technology in society; and the social 
implications of results (American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1990; 
National Academy of Sciences, 1998; Zeidler, Walker, Ackett, & Simmons, 2002), 
although these criteria are not necessarily consistent among educators or within the 
philosophical realm (Alters, 1997; Eflin, Glennan, & Reisch, 1999).   
 While this approach is appealing, the impact of incorporating NOS concepts on 
learning is not straightforward.  Socioscientific issues are public issues wh re both social 
and scientific factors play central roles in the debate (Sadler, 2004).  Ideally, these issues 
are well-suited to examine the impacts NOS understanding has on individuals’ decision 
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making.  In addition, creationists have been quite successful in making teaching evolution 
a socioscientific issue.  In his review of the research, Sadler (2004) concludes that NOS 
conceptualizations are indeed related to the decisions individuals make about 
socioscientific issues, perhaps not directly, but related in some way to reasoning and 
evaluation of evidence.  The public may recognize the importance of scientific vidence, 
but they also may rely more often on informal evidence (i.e., common sense, 
circumstantial evidence, and personal experience) as a means to bridge scientific or 
technical assertions with their own personal, political, and practical understandings 
(Tytler, Duggan, & Gott, 2001).  If individuals do not understand what constitutes 
scientific data (Sadler et al., 2004), however, a tendency to rely on informal evidence, as 
opposed to scientific evidence, may not be that surprising.  One problem with 
socioscientific issues as a metric of the influence of NOS understanding is the implicit 
assumption that NOS should carry weight with all issues.  For example, Bell & Lederman 
(2003) show that the decision making of university professors with and without well-
grounded understandings of NOS is not necessarily related to NOS issues.  A 
socioscientific issue such as fetal tissue implantation does not, and should not, necessarily 
elicit questions about science-related knowledge in decision-making (Bell & L derman, 
2003).   
 With regards to academic disciplines, however, NOS may be a very appropriate 
means to helping students learn.  NOS understanding is clearly related to accepting 
evolution (R. L. Johnson & Peebles, 1987), as well as improvements in understanding 
(Crawford et al., 2005; Scharmann, 1990; Scharmann & Harris, 1991).  In fact, measures 
of student acceptance of evolution also may be highly correlated with NOS 
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understanding, even after the effects of general interest in science and past science 
education are controlled (Lombrozo, Thanukos, & Weisberg, 2008).  Courses designed to 
teach evolution by including NOS can be very effective at helping teachers overcome 
misconceptions and understand evolutionary principles (e.g., Nehm & Schonfeld, 2007; 
Scharmann & Harris, 1992).  Improved understanding of the NOS may not affect belifs
about teaching alternatives to evolution, however (Nehm & Schonfeld, 2007).   
 Nevertheless, research indicates that both teachers and students hold a range of 
conceptions about NOS (Lederman, 1992; Sadler et al., 2004; Zeidler et al., 2002).  Like 
conceptual ecologies of evolution, students may hold a variety of conceptions about NOS 
and apply them in different contexts (Sandoval & Morrison, 2003).  Overcoming these 
misconceptions requires multiple contexts and approaches (diSessa, 2008).  Teachers’ 
understanding of NOS likely affects students’ understanding, yet treatments d signed to 
affect teacher understanding typically range from a few hours to a few days (Abd-El-
Khalick & Lederman, 2000).  Given these approaches to teaching NOS, outcomes that 
show little gains are perfectly understandable.  In addition, NOS understanding is 
difficult to measure.  A number of instruments are available, but emphases vary and 
questions exist about whether the instruments are actually addressing epistemological 
NOS, methodological NOS, or simply attitudes and beliefs (Lederman, 2007). 
 Indeed, the NOS approach also is confounded by two questions, those related to 
teaching the process of science as inquiry, and those related to teaching the epistemology 
of science.  Moreover, inquiry can be a pedagogical approach, a way of organizing the 
classroom.  How it is implemented can directly affect the epistemologica ideas students 
develop (Sandoval, 2005).  Scientific inquiry involves the process of doing science (se 
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Barrow, 2006), but NOS refers to the epistemological underpinnings of the activities of 
science and the characteristics of the resulting knowledge (Lederman, 2006, 2007).  
Delineating the process of science and the resulting body of knowledge is important, 
especially when considering the relationships between understanding NOS and evolution.  
Scientific inquiry alone does not necessarily enhance conceptions of NOS (Schwartz, 
Lederman, & Crawford, 2004).  Several authors emphasize that explicit teaching 
strategies, rather than “doing” science, are necessary to change NOS views (Abd-El-
Khalick & Lederman, 2000; Akerson, Abd-El-Khalick, & Lederman, 2000; Bell, 
Lederman, & Abd-El-Khalick, 2000; A. R. Irwin, 2000; Khishfe & Lederman, 2006; 
Sandoval & Reiser, 2004; Scharmann et al., 2005; Schwartz et al., 2004).  Although 
epistemology is one part of the NOS framework, it more accurately reflects th  goals of 
science education (Sandoval, 2005).  Indeed, the purpose of science education should be 
to get students to question the nature of science, understand the kind of questions science 
can and cannot answer, and the kinds of evidence that can and cannot be used to support 
propositions – the primary goal should be effective citizens, not scientists (Smith & 
Scharmann, 1999). 
 
Understanding Knowledge – Personal Epistemology 
 If NOS understanding is the goal, personal epistemology may be a valuable 
metric for examining how well people understand tenets such as the weight of evidence, 
the tentative nature of scientific conclusions, and the context and credibility of scientifi  
claims.  Personal epistemology is a branch of psychology that examines the beliefs and 
theories that individuals come to hold about knowledge and knowing (Hofer, 2004).   
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Numerous models are available that address the relationships among beliefs about the 
nature of knowledge and learning (Duell & Schommer-Atkins, 2001).  These models 
examine a variety of overlapping dimensions that can be grouped into two broad 
categories related to epistemology (Hofer, 2004): 
1. the nature of knowledge (what one believes knowledge is), including dimensions 
of certainty of knowledge and simplicity of knowledge; and  
2. the nature or process of knowing (how one comes to know), including dimensions 
such as source of knowledge and justification for knowing (a dimension specific 
to the Reflective Judgment Model that describes how individuals evaluate 
knowledge; King & Kitchener, 1994). 
 An important distinction among models, however, is the approach to the 
developmental relationship among the dimensions included.  Multi-dimensional models 
assume dimensions develop independently of one another (Duell & Schommer-Atkins, 
2001).  For example, in their multi-dimensional models, Schommer (1990) and Schraw et 
al. (2002) characterize personal epistemology along five axes: (1) the stability of 
knowledge, ranging from unchanging knowledge to tentative knowledge; (2) the sourc
of knowledge, ranging from omniscient authority to reason and empirical evidence; (3) 
the structure of knowledge, ranging from isolated bits and pieces to integrated concepts; 
(4) the speed of learning, ranging from quick to not-at-all; and (5) the ability to learn, 
ranging from fixed at birth to improvable.  As a result, education can predict bel efs about 
the structure and stability of knowledge, whereas age can predict beliefs about the ability 
to learn (Schommer, 1998). 
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 In contrast, uni-dimensional models assume the various epistemological 
dimensions develop concurrently (Duell & Schommer-Atkins, 2001).  The Reflective 
Judgment Model is a stage model that describes epistemological growth as people 
become better able to evaluate knowledge claims and to explain and defend views on 
controversial issues (King & Kitchener, 1994; King & Kitchener, 2004).  King & 
Kitchener outline seven stages grouped into three levels: pre-reflective, quasi-reflect ve, 
and reflective thinking.  The earliest stage is pre-reflective thinking, chara terized by 
judgments that knowledge is certain and single correct answers exist that usually come 
from authority figures.  Later, individuals develop quasi-reflective thinking, 
understanding that knowledge is an abstraction and that it is constructed – not simply 
accepted from others.  Individuals recognize different types and rules of evidence and 
that uncertainty is part of the process of knowing.  Their judgments, however, indicate a 
tenuous relationship between gathering evidence and drawing conclusions, resulting in 
idiosyncratic views of knowledge claims.  The transition to reflective thinking is marked 
by a clear understanding of the role of evidence across contexts and that evaluated 
opinions of reputable others can be known and compared to one’s own thinking.  
Reflective thinkers consistently use evidence and reason.  The model clearly stresses the 
relationship between development and cognition; people’s ways of making meaning 
changes predictably over time (King & Kitchener, 1994).   
 Regardless of the model used to assess personal epistemology, researchers 
generally agree that these beliefs play an important role in learning.  For example, if 
people believe knowledge is certain and passed down by authority figures, they are l ss 
likely to question authority in the classroom (Schommer-Aikins, 2004).  This can be 
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particularly worrisome with regards to controversial or socioscientific issue  (issues that 
require consideration of societal interest, effect, and consequent; Sadler, 2004) because, 
like many ecological issues, these are issues that cannot be solved with a high degree of 
certainty (i.e., “ill-structured” cf. King & Kitchener, 1994).  For example, 
epistemological beliefs may be important in the interpretation of evidence r garding 
controversial topics, such as the relationship between human immunodeficiency virus and 
the syndrome (Kardash and Scholes 1996), animals used in research (Zeidler et al. 2002), 
global climate change (Sadler et al. 2004), and evolution (Sinatra, Southerland, 
McConaughy, & Demastes, 2003).   
 In the U.S., public acceptance of evolution is clearly an ill-structured problem.  
King & Kitchener (1994) report the results of international comparisons of stages 
achieved by individuals of different ages.  One question based on evolution and used 
successfully in interviews with people in the U.S. could not be used in Germany, 
however, because Germans do not perceive evolution to be ill-structured.  Miller et al. 
(2006) indicate a similar trend with their survey of public acceptance of evolution; the 
U.S. is ranked near last in the proportion of people accepting evolution and Germany 
ranked much higher.  The public debate in the U.S. centers around the consequences of 
evolutionary processes, especially in relation to the special position of humans, 
confounded by a persuasion campaign to create uncertainty and dissonance toward the 
science.  In fact, research conducted by Sinatra et al. (2003) relates students’ 
epistemological beliefs to human evolution only, and not to the general acceptance of 
animal evolution or even photosynthesis. 
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 Sadly, these results may reflect the state of an education system tha does not 
adequately address complex thinking, presentation of arguments, and critically analyzing 
claims.  Indeed, results from extensive assessment of U.S. college students using the 
Reflective Judgment Model indicates that Freshman operate at a stage level ranging from 
3 to 4, and Seniors operate at a stage level ranging from 3 to 5 (King & Kitchener, 1994). 
Although the consistent progression in scores across class levels provides encouragi g 
evidence for the benefits of college education, few Seniors demonstrate an understanding 
of the role of evidence in making interpretations (stage 5) or critical evaluation of 
judgments (stages 6-7).  Indeed, one could argue that the misconception “I don’t believe
in evolution because I don’t believe that people came from apes” is indicative of a stage 3 
thinker, one who still believes knowledge is absolutely certain or only temporarily 
uncertain.  Clearly then, by the time adults finish college, they are unable to evaluat  
scientific uncertainty and the ill-structured problems at the center of the creation-
evolution controversy.  The fact that evolution is not an ill-structured issue in Germany 
(King & Kitchener, 1994) supports the need for explicit teaching about the nature of 
scientific knowledge and reasoning (see also Hofer, 2000).   
 Learning to think about evolution, the nature of science, and the nature of 
knowledge occurs within a broader context than just formal education, however.  
Preparing students to become citizens capable of participation in a democratic society is 
one of the founding principles of our education system.  When average citizens cannot 
comprehend the bodies governing society, public affairs will no longer be under lay 
control and cease to be public (Prewitt, 1983).  Within this broader public understanding 
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of science is a complex relationship between knowing science and knowing about 
science-related situations in a democratic society (Roberts, 2007).   
 
Public Understanding of Science 
 The importance of science in our society has garnered interest from science 
educators, public opinion researchers, sociologists, and informal science educators 
(Laugksch, 2000).  The resulting body of research generally falls into three broad realms: 
basic literacy, public understanding of science, and science and society (Bauer, Allum, & 
Miller, 2007).  Early research addressed basic literacy issues – what do people kn w 
about science and the scientific process and why (Ziman, 1992).  Whether it be strictly 
fact-based understanding, as in some recent papers about climate change (e.g., Spellman, 
Field, & Sinclair, 2003; Unger 2000; Wilson K. M. Wilson, 2000a, 2000b), or a focus on 
the misunderstanding of “how science works” (e.g., Durant, Evans, & Thomas, 1989; 
Miller, 1983), this research examined the knowledge gap between current expert’s and 
the public’s understanding.   
 Focusing on a knowledge deficit, however, raises questions about the breadth of 
knowledge expected from the public, let alone the certainty of scientific knowledge, and 
the nature of the scientific endeavor (Ziman, 1992).  In fact, to distinguish science as a 
way of knowing requires serious consideration of goals, methods, and knowledge claims 
(Chalmers, 1999).  Indeed, scientists are not particularly well equipped to discuss the 
nature and status of science because they can’t articulate what scientific progress is 
despite their own progress (Chalmers, 1999).  Moreover, the production of scientific 
knowledge is always within a social context and related to other practices with other 
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aims, such as personal and professional intentions of scientists, the economic intentions 
of funding agencies, and the ideological intentions of religious groups (Chalmers, 1999).  
 As a result of these boundary issues, research began to examine the “public 
understanding of science”, focusing instead on attitudes and the relationship between 
attitudes and knowledge (Bauer et al., 2007).  Attitudes are either a product of 
information processing with a positive relationship between knowledge and attitude 
(normative-rationalist view), or value-loaded relations with the world confounded by the 
complexities of values, emotions, cognition, and rationality (realist-empiricist view; 
Bauer et al., 2007).  Attitudes and knowledge are difficult to segregate, however.  
Knowledge is clearly an important determinant of attitudes toward science, but the 
relationship is not a straightforward linear main effect.  Other domains of knowledge 
“contextualize” attitudes adding to an already positive influence (Sturgis & Allum, 2004).  
In fact, science is viewed more favorably when individuals understand the intricacies of 
scientific knowledge development and the political landscape (Sturgis & Allum, 2004).   
 Indeed, recent models of the interface between science and society have 
broadened the focus from an absolute assessment of science literacy to more s cial and 
philosophical viewpoints, focusing instead on who is engaging with what (e.g., A. Irwin 
& Wynne, 1996c).  These models challenge the notion of science as an isolated body of 
knowledge, recognizing its socially constructed nature (A. Irwin & Wynne, 1996b).  
Members of society clearly do not place the same emphases on different ways of 
knowing, and public understanding models should avoid any assumptions about defining 
all knowledge based on the epistemological commitments of science (A. Irwin & Wynne, 
1996a).  Rational choice and contextual models incorporate utilitarian and affective 
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approaches (Ziman, 1992; Sturgis & Allum, 2004; Wynne, 1992b).  Rational choice 
models ask what people need to know in order to be good citizens, and when the public 
has to make practical decisions, what knowledge is relevant (Ziman, 1992).  Prewitt
(1983) considers this approach scientific “savvy.”   
 Science educators have identified socioscientific issues as issues at th  interface 
of science and society, dilemmas where both social and scientific factors are cucial 
(Bingle & Gaskell, 1994; Sadler, 2004).  Although scientific literacy for citizenship is 
often identified as an outcome, understanding and evaluating knowledge claims play a 
central role in the discussion (Bingle & Gaskell, 1994; Kolstø, 2001; Sadler et al., 2004).  
In fact, an important component of epistemological understanding with these dilemmas is 
understanding the differences between ready-made science and science-in-the-making 
(Latour 1987) and the gray area between them (Kolstø, 2001).  At the extremes, ready-
made science – that of text books – are areas in science where consensus has been 
broadly achieved (for example, that organisms share a common ancestry), and science-in-
the-making are areas at the forefront of research where debatable claims are still subject 
to revision (for example, whether anthropogenic changes in the environment are affecting 
the natural selection of resistance in human pathogens; Eldredge, 2008; Martínez, 2008).   
 Contextual models argue that the public understanding of science must consider 
more diverse, independent, and context-sensitive sources of scientific information th n 
just institutionalized science (Wynne, 1991).  Social identity explains responses to 
science (Wynne, 1996).  Knowledge can become idiosyncratic in these democratic 
contexts, however, with debates about what constitutes expertise and how local 
knowledge held by diverse publics can be equally valid.  For example, Davison, Barns, & 
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Schibechi (1997) argue that some people with little specific knowledge of formal 
biological concepts and processes often have a great deal of everyday knowledge.  
Nevertheless, everyday knowledge of natural selection and evolution may be highly 
essentialist, intentional, and teleological (Evans, 2008), thus representing a mis-
conceptual barrier to consensus on issues related to this important theory.  Likewise, 
although the public understands some level of uncertainty and risk (A. Irwin & Wynne, 
1996a; Wynne, 1992a), NOS research clearly indicates that the public does not 
understand uncertainty in the philosophical sense.  Uncertainty in the sense of risk is an 
epistemological factor, whereas the tentative nature of conclusions is ontological.  Thus, 
contextual models of public understanding of science and science literacy focus on 
models of the public and models of science from fundamentally different directions 
(Locke, 1999).   
 Ultimately, models of the interaction of science in society vary depending on (1) 
the absolute nature of the literacy component and (2) the extent of social consideration 
(Laugksch, 2000).  In essence, public understanding models segregate along axes that r  
concerned with the role of knowledge and the role of “truth” in a democratic society.  
Indeed, in a two-dimensional space, the literacy component can be thought of in terms of 
epistemological considerations and the social component can be thought of in terms of 
ontological considerations.  The research areas can then be mapped onto the axes to 
describe the extent of each of these considerations in the agenda (Figure 2.1).  For 
example, science and society models emphasize ontological considerations more than 
epistemological considerations.  Epistemology is certainly important, but these models 
tend to weigh trust and credibility heavily.  Citizen science programs that emphasize 
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collective praxis are clearly more interested in coming to some social “truth” than 
questions about methodological naturalism.  Certainly, within the science literacy 
program, emphasis is more often on the methodology of science and the kind of 
knowledge that methodology generates specific to the scientific enterprise.  In addition, 
each of the three realms may include different literacy components, for example science 
literacy, the literacy of democracy, or institutional knowledge (cf. Wynne, 1991).  
Ideally, teaching for public understanding finds some intermediate in these positions, 
grounded in an understanding that different sources of information have different 
epistemological and ontological commitments that yield very different outcomes.   
 
Marketplace of Ideas 
 Clearly, creationists have been extremely successful in bringing their anti-
evolution campaign to the public arena.  In fact, the irony of the First Amendment is tha  
it both restricts creationist ideas from entering the science classroom and defends their 
rights to a forum.  In the United States, that forum is broadly protected as the 
“marketplace of ideas.”  The concept of a marketplace where ideas compete is attributed 
to Oliver Wendell Holmes in his dissent of Abrams v. United States, (250 U.S. 616, 
1919).  He argued that “when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, 
they may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own 
conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best 
test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of he 
market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried  
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Figure 2.1.  The relative importance of epistemological and ontological considerations in 
public understanding of science (PUS) research programs.  Where these programs 
converge serves as an optimal goal for science educators concerned with developing 
effective citizens. 
 
 
out.”  Two theoretical perspectives combine to idealize the marketplace as a source of 
competitive, efficient, and unregulated ideas highly sensitive to consumer pref rences 
that yields informed decision-making and a well-functioning democracy (Napoli, 1999).  
The economic perspective of this free-speech model focuses on maximizing consumer 
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welfare and competition, whereas the democratic theory perspective focuses n the 
marketplace as a source of maximum idea exchange in the context of effectiv  s lf-
government (Napoli, 1999).  Although the marketplace concept may be too broadly 
applied in jurisprudence (Hopkins, 1996), the metaphor is useful in the context of 
consumers’ and citizens’ rights to receive information (Sweeney, 1984 in Napoli, 1999).  
More important criticisms of the marketplace of ideas metaphor focus on the issues of 
ontology associated with the “truth” to which Judge Holmes refers, cognitive dissonance 
(Ingber, 1984; Baker, 1989), and epistemology. 
 Within the marketplace, then, the truth claims of creationists can be weighed 
equally with the truth claims of evolutionary science.  Simply because public knowledge, 
as a body of shared knowledge, by definition may not be democratic does not argue 
against the democratic standing of all ways of knowing (e.g., Smith & Scharmann, 1999).  
Stephen Jay Gould (Gould, 1997) enlists the ideas of non-overlapping magisteria, or 
ways of knowing, to distinguish what can be known with science and what can be known 
in other ways.  For example, religion and science are two distinct ways of knowing with 
very different approaches to truth and evidence.  In public discourses, even scientist may 
step away from methodological naturalism and frame their personal worldviews in terms 
of different ways of knowing (Smith & Scharmann, 1999).  Nevertheless, few but the 
most highly educated experts can understand all of the intricacies of the various 
disciplines that contribute to the modern synthesis of evolution.  To complicate matters, 
science proceeds by managing the uncertainty associated with the knowledge it generates.  
These uncertainties are manifest in misconceptions about human evolution and 
discomfort with regard to human’s place in the universe.  Additional uncertainty develops 
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when people confuse the science of evolution with the consequences of evolution, and 
methodological naturalism with philosophical naturalism.  Without basic understanding 
of fundamentals of evolution, however, people have to have “faith” in evolution in a 
manner that equates easily with “teaching the controversy” and alternativ  theories.  It is 
within this misconception framework that persuaders create cognitive imbalance and 
dissonance in the marketplace to alter beliefs, attitudes, and intentions (Ilardo, 1981) 
about evolutionary theory.   
 
Rhetoric of the “Controversy” 
 Cognitive dissonance is a model of human behavior based on consistency theory 
that describes how people behave when faced with new information that conflicts with 
current beliefs or notions (Festinger, 1957).  Humans act predictably when exposed to 
dissonance-producing messages: they avoid the conflicting attitude or behavior, reduce 
the importance, or acquire new beliefs that change the balance (Festinger, 1957).  In fact, 
substantial evidence indicates this model reasonably predicts the future outcomes of 
messages.  Purveyors of messages often use discrepant or inconsistent informatio  with 
the purpose of bringing about attitude change (Baker, 1989).  Fleming and Goodall 
(2002) suggest the goal of such communications is to produce true believers not true 
skeptics and intellectual honesty. 
 Although evolutionary science is misused by anti-evolutionists, persuasion 
science is not.  Those with strongly held fundamentalist views want to persuade the 
“uncertain” public to question the fundamentals of evolution, and even science as a 
whole.  Ultimately, the goal is to return our society to its fundamentalist roots star ing 
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with the removal of evolution education (and perhaps all of science education) from the 
public schools.  The Wedge Strategy is a carefully calculated strategy develop d by the 
Discovery Institute designed to “defeat scientific materialism and its estructive moral, 
cultural and political legacies and to replace materialistic explanations with the theistic 
understanding that nature and human beings are created by God” (Center for the Renewal 
of Science & Culture, 1999; also see Forrest & Gross, 2004) through a deliberat attack 
on the public opinion-making process in the marketplace of ideas.   
 The persuasive campaign targets the public’s attitudes toward evolution and 
science.  Inducements are both logical and non-logical (Ilardo, 1981).  Logical 
inducements include chains of reasoning (usually based on the misuse of evolutionary 
science) refuting the evidence supporting evolution, and emotional proofs, such as the 
need for morals and values in society.  Anti-evolutionists want to maintain the public
misconception that people came from apes because it fits with their persuasive rhetoric; 
because scientists agree that people did not comefrom apes, evolution must not be true.  
They impart information that implies skepticism and fair treatment, elevating the 
contestability of the discrepant information.  Fear appeals, such as the misguided Social 
Darwinist argument (see Figure 2.2 below), heighten dissonance through non-logical 
inducement.  The false dichotomies persuaders establish require choice on the part of the 
public; choosing evolution means denying God (see also Marsden, 1991).  Indeed, the 
campaign purposively ignores any middle ground.  For example, the American Scientific 
Affiliation, founded prior to the Creation Research Society (Numbers, 2006), is a 
Christian fellowship of “men and women of science and disciplines that can relate to 
science who share a common fidelity to the Word of God and a commitment to integrity 
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in the practice of science” (http://www.asa3.org).  Anti-evolutionists consider any notion 
of theistic evolution an apostate affiliation (Numbers, 2006).  Their position is clear: th  
choice may be free, but the punishment will be great.   
 These tactics magnify dissonance and leave the public subject to the persuasive 
messages championed by opponents of evolution, such as “teach the alternatives,” 
“balanced treatment,” and “critical analyses” legislation.  Those with strongly held 
fundamentalist views want to persuade the “uncertain” public to question the 
fundamentals of evolution and science as a whole (Clark et al., 2007; Scott & Matzke, 
2007).  Moreover, opponents of evolutionary biology cast doubt on the credibility of 
scientists and the knowledge generated by such diverse disciplines as chemistry, geology, 
biology, and social science (Clark et al., 2007).  Although casting doubt on high-
credibility sources reduces persuasive effects, people tend to disassociate urces and 
their opinions over time, especially with low-credibility sources (see Severin & Tankard, 
2001).  One final part of the persuasion strategy includes the tactic of arguing for “equal 
time” in the guise of “it’s only fair”.  More than any other, this strategy appe ls to 
people’s sense of reciprocation (Cialdini, 1993).  It also plays well with journalists trying 
to meet some semblance of “balance”, and the appeal to “fairness” creates additional 
uncertainty by casting doubt on the credibility of anyone who won’t “play by the rules” 
(Taylor & Condit, 1988).  As a result, dissonance purveyors with a message perceived as 
strong by the uncertain public may be treated with the same respect as a sientist in time.   
 Ultimately, the anti-evolution persuasion campaign is designed to alter behavior.  
Messages are intended to change public attitudes about teaching evolution, especially 
those that influence behavior in terms of casting appropriate votes.  The relationship 
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between attitude change and behavioral intentions is complex, however; behavior is not a 
simple function of attitude.  In fact, Cialdini (1993) suggests that attitude is not even a 
factor when social proof is operating.  Social proof is a means for determining the correct 
behavior based on other people’s behaviors; in the face of uncertainty, look to and accept 
the actions of others as correct.  Cialdini (1993) even suggests that social proof underlies 
the strengthening of cultist beliefs after the inevitable failure of their prophecies: the 
greater the number of people who find any idea correct, the more the idea will be correct.  
If this tenet of social proof holds, the persuasive messages designed to generate 
uncertainty about science, scientists, and evolution teaching could lead to a majority 
acceptance of anti-evolutionism simply through the ever-increasing numbers of people
looking to others to determine the correct course of action.  Indeed, the more people 
intending to vote to include evolution “alternatives” in the science classroom, the ore 
likely the uncertain public will find a strong role model and model their behavior towards 
that role model.  Therefore, the small step of accepting the teaching of evolution 
“alternatives” may be the first leading to serious consequences for the science lassroom.  
Past behavior is a strong predictor of future intentions to behave.  Whether the 
relationship is caused by behavioral consistency (Cialdini 1993) or increased cognitive 
accessibility of behaviors (i.e., priming; Trafimow & Borrie, 1999), the implications for 
the future of evolution education may rest on that first step. 
 The success of the anti-evolutionist campaign is apparent in surveys addressing 
public acceptance of evolution.  A recent survey of Louisiana residents indicates th  
40% do not believe evolution is well-supported by evidence or generally accepted within 
the scientific community (Baton Rouge Advocate, April 14, 2009).  Similarly, Miller, 
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Scott, & Okamoto (2006) show that the proportion of adults accepting the idea of 
evolution has declined over the past 20 years (from 45 to 40%), but the proportion of 
rejecting evolution also decreased from 48% to 39% (see also Pew Research Cnter for 
the People & the Press, 2009).  Perhaps the persuasive campaign is creating a dissonance 
“backlash” in fundamentalists.  Indeed, acceptance of evolution may be directly rela ed to 
the proportion of anti-evolution and pro-evolution messages to which people are exposed 
(Brem, Ranney, & Schindel, 2003).  Nevertheless, the fact that the proportion of U.S. 
adults accepting evolution is one of the lowest in the world does not bode well for the 
future of evolution education and research without radical intervention by educators.  If 
uncertainty is the metric of imbalance in cognitive dissonance, the campaign waged by 
the anti-evolutionists is clearly affecting the public arena. 
 
Media Effects in the Marketplace 
 The media may play a powerful role in the delivery of messages in the 
marketplace.  Both the language and the visual images used add a sense of certainty to 
evidence; the auditor/observer is experiencing the evidence “first hand” (Kirby, 2003).  In 
fact, the effects of these experiences may outlast the sources.  Metaphors are one of the 
more powerful language tools available; their ability to evoke concrete images can help 
make complex issues understandable to the public and foster debate (Väliverronen & 
Hellsten, 2002).  Especially in television news environments, metaphors can add the 
context needed by the audience in a fairly quick and precise manner (Rowan, 1992).  In 
addition, metaphors can be used to promote certain political interests or reinforcing 
scientific and professional authority.  For example, Väliverronen and Hellsten (2002) 
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found that metaphors helped scientists define the biodiversity issue by likening it to a 
“library of life”.  These metaphors, if used as part of transformative explanations, can 
help audiences recognize, test, and overcome lay theories (i.e., alternative conceptions; 
Rowan, 1992).  Stephen Jay Gould (1977) specifically enlisted the “bush metaphor” to 
help the public discourse of evolution move beyond the search for “missing links”.   
 Visual representations also have a powerful communicative value because they 
allow the viewer to “witness” the phenomena.  Images evoke certainty, and can serve a  
highly persuasive inducements.  They can be very effective in persuasive campaigns 
(Figure 2.2).  In addition, visual elements, such as photographs and television images, can 
help conceptualize abstract problems (Väliverronen & Hellsten, 2002).  Indeed, images 
enhanced viewer recall in television news through the “explanation” and “emotional 
bond” they add (Graber, 1990; see also Zhou, 2005).  In the History Channel’s From Ape 
to Man, a documentary about human evolution, the producers used graphic representation 
to effectively represent the generations involved in speciation.  The camera whizzed by 
thousands of individuals representing one branch of the evolutionary tree/bush.  Another 
visual aid had a scientist drawing out the branching tree along a long stretch of beach.  
The camera stayed fixed as he moves farther and farther away from the common 
ancestor.  Both images leave the viewer with a concept of time that more closely matches 
the scientific understanding.  Even fictional images, such as those in movies, affect 
acceptance of scientific concepts.  Padian (1987) found that these images didn’t 
necessarily correspond with reality, but they were plausible.  In addition, popular images 
can be powerful determinants of perceptions in science – by scientists – more so than
scientific evidence (Padian, 1987).  According to Padian, “a picture is not only worth a  
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Figure 2.2.  Social Darwinism and the effects of imagery.  The text uses irony to mock 
the supposed consequences of accepting evolutionary theory and setting up a false 
dichotomy (http:// www.answersingenesis.org). 
 
 
thousand words; however inaccurate, it may be worth a wealth of well-documented 
evidence to the contrary” (p. 76). 
 Audio and video can have unintended consequences with equally persistent 
effects.  Metaphors can create uncertainty if they are overused or vague, or establish false 
dichotomies if they are apocalyptic, such as “the battle over nature” (Väliverronen & 
Hellsten, 2002).  Despite the “permanency” of images, they too can be misinterpreted.  
Indeed, history has been manipulated by photographers both intentionally and 
unintentionally.  Pictures tell stories, and those stories are interpreted and re-interpreted 
by viewers; without input from the author, they take on the story of the viewer whether it 
was the author’s intent or not (Sandweiss, 2002).  Indeed the depiction of different 
hominid species was likely designed to show similarity (Figure 2.3).  Its recent use has 
been on creationist websites to discredit the notion that man descended from apes.   
 Because television includes both strong visual and audio messages, it is the 
subject of much criticism and review.  Television has a long history of viewing audiences 
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Figure 2.3.  Unintended consequences: images that may 
have been developed to represent the character evolution 
of Homo sapiens may instead encourage the “people 
came from apes” misconception.  
 
 
as passive receptacles of the medium’s account of the world (T. Wilson, 1993).  In fact,
Gerbner, Gross, Morgan, & Signorielli (1986) suggest that as passive viewers, the more 
people watch television, the more they think the real world is like the world portrayed on 
television.  First, persuasive processes may encourage or discourage people to believe 
that television messages are an accurate reflection of the world, and second, the 
availability heuristic posits that people infer the prevalence of a construct from the ease 
with which an example is retrieved (i.e., its accessibility from memory; Shrum, 1999).  
Television viewers are not necessarily passive vessels, however; activity is evident in 
people’s utility, intention, selectivity, and involvement with the media (Blumler, 1979).  
Still, cultivation may result as audiences actively compare the probability of events 
through cognitive rationalizing (Potter, 1991; Potter, Pashupati, Pekurny, Hoffman, & 
Davis, 2002).  In fact, the elaboration likelihood model explains how people can fluctuate 
in the extent to which they rationalize judgments through both passive and active 
mechanisms (Schroeder, 2005).  The likelihood of elaboration, “issue-relevant” thinking, 
or critical evaluation of the messages being received depends on whether the m ssages 
are processed through (1) a central route that entails extensive elaboration, or (2) a 
peripheral route, where little elaboration occurs and viewers rely on heuristics (Petty & 
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Cacioppo, 1986).  Indeed, several social scientists suggest that the negative images of 
science on television serve as heuristics that ultimately lead either to reservations about 
the discipline (Gerbner, 1987; Nisbet et al., 2002) or the promise of science (Nisbet et al., 
2002).   
 Other models of media effects examine audiences as active communicators, 
motivated, selective, and involved in their communication choices (Rubin & Perse, 
1987).  The models explore how people use media to gratify their needs, understanding 
the motives for media behavior, and identifying the consequences that follow from these 
needs, motives, and behaviors (Rubin, 2004).  Media effects, such as perception of 
scientists and science, may be heavily influenced by individual characteristi s such as 
social and psychological circumstances (Rubin & Rubin, 1982), science knowledge 
(Nisbet et al., 2002), and motivation (Perse, 1990; Rubin, 1983; Rubin & Perse, 1987). 
Indeed, cognitive motivation may facilitate information gain (Blumler, 1979).   Learning, 
therefore, is a clear, positive, outcome of uses and gratifications research. 
 Narrative likely plays an important role in the effect of television content as well.  
Indeed, narratives can affect the public’s understanding of science both positively (e.g., 
Lowe et al., 2006) and negatively (e.g., Barnett et al., 2006).  Narratives also are 
powerful persuasive tools and can interact with ideology in discussions of controversial 
public policies (Slater, Rouner, & Long, 2006), like teaching evolution.  After all, 
narratives positively affect memory (Graesser, Hauft-Smith, Cohen, & Pyles, 1980; 
Shapiro & Fox, 2002) and can increase the plausibility and persuasiveness of informat on 
presented (Voss, Wiley, & Sandak, 1999).  Because the narrative is the predominant form 
taught for teaching and reading, the “narrative experience” of our lives may make it 
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easier to comprehend and recall content then expository texts much less related to ife 
experiences (Norris, Guilbert, Smith, Hakimelahi, & Phillips, 2005).  We relate to 
narratives.  Indeed, “transportation into a narrative world” may be a key mechanism of 
narrative impact (Green & Brock, 2000).   
 Audiences are actively making sense of narratives (Livingstone, 1998).  As they 
interact with different media, they process three types of realism: fictionality, external 
realism (matching with external reality), and narrative realism (coherence within a story) 
(Busselle & Bilandzic, 2008).  External realism, however, is not necessarily the most 
essential.  Audiences make judgments about the consistency of narratives constructed 
from a narrative experience (i.e., story world, character models, and situation models) in 
relation to their own experiences (Busselle, Ryabovolova, & Wilson, 2004).  The result is 
that instead of being concerned with verisimilitude (i.e., the “truth”), audience members 
are concerned with coherence and logic within a particular fictional context (Busselle & 
Bilandzic, 2008; Busselle et al., 2004).  Enjoyment is not dependent on how well a 
television program, for example, reflects real-world truth (Green, Brock, & Kaufman, 
2004).  In fact, readers, and television viewers, that are “highly transported” maintain 
beliefs that are consistent with the stories, regardless of their realism (Green, 2004).  
Perceived realism is highly correlated with the perceived “typicality” of the narrative 
event, however; audiences use some commonsense plausibility criterion (Busselle & 
Bilandzic, 2008) and generate a relative realism (Shapiro & Fox, 2002).  Unfortunately, 
prior knowledge and experience affect transportation (Green, 2004) in a counter-intuitive 
manner, at least with regards to science.  More experience yields a greater likelihood of 
transportation (Green, 2004) rather than any kind of skepticism.  Engagement with a 
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story may leave viewers with the sense that that story was authentic (Busselle & 
Bilandzic, 2008), whether it accurately reflects the current understanding of science and 
evolution or not. 
 Media effects models provide valuable insight to the influence of educational 
television.  One model of learning from television incorporates the theoretical construct 
of “mental capacity” with three components: processing of the narrative, processing of 
educational content, and distance (how integral the educational content is to the narrative; 
Fisch, 2000).  Indeed, comprehension of educational content is greater when the distanc  
between narrative and educational content is small than when it is large (Fisch et al. 1995 
in Fisch 2000).  Although prior knowledge, in this model, reduces the demands of 
processing (Fisch, 2000), television producers have no metric of audiences’ general
understanding.  Production ultimately yields to the least common denominator.   
 A number of studies support the notion that television is an environment for 
learning.  The Public Broadcasting Service (1987) examined the appeal, learning, nd 
emotional impact of television programs watched by a random sample of 2000 adults 
using logging diaries similar to the Nielson ratings system.  Science and nature programs 
scored high on the appeal and learning scales.  The “CSI effect” has resulted in a 
significant increase in the numbers of students pursuing degrees in forensic science  at 
universities (Houck, 2005).  Television programming that combined entertainment with 
education also was used to direct social change (e.g., Comstock & Scharrer, 1999; 
Singhal & Rogers, 1991).  More specifically, research has shown that children do learn 
scientific content information from television series designed to teach science and 
mathematics (Chen, 1983; Johnston & Luker, 1983).  In addition, adults learned about 
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health and nutrition from watching a single program (Chew, Palmer, & Kim, 1995), and 
Frey & Wolsky (2006) developed a television format that reinforced key lessons ab ut 
engineering and engaged audiences.  Fortner (1985) found that watching nature programs 
increased knowledge that was retained at a level equal to the same information presented 
in lecture format, but attitude changes were apparent only in the television treated group.  
Furthermore, exposure to science through films and other media outside of classroom 
settings has had positive impacts on science learning by individuals in school (Bitg od, 
Serrell, & Thompson, 1994; Chen, 1994; Dhingra, 2003; Wright et al., 2001).  Other 
research has shown that viewing educational television results in significant gains in 
children’s general academic knowledge and skills (D. R. Anderson, 1998; Fisch, 2005; 
Salomon, 1979; Southwell, 2005).  Television learning was shown to extend into symbol 
systems, teaching unique cognitive skills not taught in school (Salomon, 1979).  Children 
who watched educational programs tended to have better grades in high school than those 
that watched strictly entertainment programs (Wright et al., 2001).  And despite 
innuendo, little evidence has been found to indicate that watching television has negative 
effects on learning (including reading) except in extreme cases (Wartella, 1987).  In this 
light, television can be classified as a free-choice science education opportunity.   
 
Free-choice Science Learning 
 Most commonly referred to as informal learning, free-choice science ducation 
advocates that the process of learning is the same outside of the classroom a  it is in the 
classroom (Falk, 2001).  As a lifelong learning process, however, free-choice learning is 
typically characterized as being self-directed, voluntary, and motivated mainly by 
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intrinsic interests, curiosity, exploration, and social interaction (Dierking, Falk, Rennie, 
Anderson, & Ellenbogen, 2003; Falk & Dierking, 2000).  Motivational factors (Falk, 
2006), rather than testing drives learning in the free-choice world.  The marketplace of 
ideas is full of competing ideas all vying for some competitive grasp of the public’s idea 
of “truth.”  In the marketplace, the learning process may be the same as formal learning 
environments, but marketplace influences, not standards-based influences, visibly 
dominate.  As a result, not all of the competing ideas are of equal “educational” value.  
 Individuals looking for educational opportunities in the marketplace of ideas are 
faced with truly educational opportunities, as well as many opportunities unintentio ally, 
or even purposefully, masking themselves as opportunities to learn about science and 
evolution.  For example, All About Science (http://www.allaboutscience.org/) is a website 
hosted by AllAboutGod.com.  Although ostensibly describing Darwin’s Theory of 
Evolution, the site quickly turns to “intelligent design” rhetoric outlining the “crisis” in 
evolutionary understanding that irreducible complexity poses.  The site comes plete 
with a literature cited section, (including only Darwin, and Michael Behe and Michael 
Denton [intelligent design proponents]).   
 The issue of educational content is not limited to the vast amount of material on 
the internet, however; resources considered traditional sources for science education may 
or may not promote standards-based (e.g., National Science Education Standards) content 
in the marketplace.  The Glendive Dinosaur and Fossil Museum is situated at the 
highway exit for Makoshika State Park, a park devoted to the preservation of the 
Montana Badlands and the Hell Creek Formation.  The Hell Creek Formation dates back 
65 million years and is the site of several important paleontological discoveries.  The 
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museum is operated by the Foundation Advancing Creation Truth and is not a sanctioned 
member of the Montana Dinosaur Trail, a product of the Montana Tourism Advisory 
Council (the Makoshika Dinosaur Museum in Glendive is).  It offers similar fare,
however, including fossil digs used to promote the literal truth of the bible and an 
interpretation of the fossil record from a creationist perspective 
(http://www.ultimatemontana.com/businessdirectory/buspages/sec01/glendivedi omus.ht
ml).  Unlike the transparent mission of the Creation Museum in Petersburg, Kentucky, 
sponsored by Answers in Genesis (Slack, 2008), the mission of the Glendive Dinosaur 
and Fossil Museum is hidden from unsuspecting consumers.   
 Less clear are free-choice opportunities often considered “educational” by 
convention.  Wildlife and nature programs have the potential to engage and teach large 
audiences about the natural world in free-choice learning environments, but they also 
may be implicit in the public’s misunderstanding of evolution.  Both Mitman (1999) and 
Bousé (2000) have clearly endorsed embracing a highly skeptical view of reality
presented in wildlife films, warning that this genre is driven by the need for compelling 
story lines rather than scientific accuracy.  More recently, Dingwall and Aldridge (2006) 
suggest that nature film narratives implicitly endorse creationist accounts of life on earth, 
especially in the “blue-chip” sub-genre, with their high production values and strong 
visual appeal.  Obviously, these programs tend to be designed and developed with the 
producer’s best interests in mind, not necessarily the learner’s (Chen 1994).  Wildlife and 
nature films that present evolutionary science poorly may be particularly harmful if 
audiences perceive the genre as educational because genre experiences are critical in 
textual readings and interpretation (Livingston 1998).  In fact, the narrative story of many 
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wildlife films imply evolution is driven by some purpose, and watching may actually 
increase the differences in understanding of evolution between the general public and 
biological scientists (Dingwall & Aldridge, 2006).  Narration that incorporates teleology 
as a mechanism may not directly promote alternative “theories” to evolution, such as 
“intelligent design” (Dingwall and Aldridge 2006), but it promotes alternative 
conceptions nonetheless.   
 In essence, learning from wildlife and nature films is a cultivation effect.  
Cultivation theory posits that television portrayals systematically distort reality, and long-
term viewing of these distortions is likely to have an effect on audiences (Gerbner et al., 
1986).  Poor presentation of natural processes, like evolution, in these visually stunning 
“virtual witnessing” events (Kirby, 2003) may affect evolution understanding through 
both active and passive routes.  Because the educational content is integral to the 
narrative (i.e., explanations of evolution that include design and advancement that 
individuals can relate to), the parallel mental processes responsible for comp ehending 
narrative and educational content complement each other (Fisch, 2000).  Moreover, 
individuals motivated to learn are most likely to elaborate and incorporate the broad 
knowledge messages communicated through free-choice venues (Blumler, 1979; Falk, 
Heimlich, & Bronnenkant, 2008; Maurer & Reinemann, 2006); motivated learners (i.e., 
those most likely to engage in science and society debates) may learn incor ect 
conceptions about this key ecological processes.  In addition, being transported int he
narrative world of nature programs may have considerable consequences related to 
viewers’ emotional connections with characters (Green, Brock, & Kaufman, 2004).  
Recalling the triumphant return of an orphaned lion cub to become head of the pride 
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surpassing all odds does not represent an evolutionary process, but a teleological process.  
These kinds of teleological misconceptions easily can lead to “intelligent design” 
considerations (see also Dingwall & Aldridge, 2006), especially if the “witnessed” events 
serve as heuristics when making civic decisions about teaching evolution and creationism 
in the science classroom (Busselle & Bilandzic, 2008; Shapiro & Fox, 2002; Shrum, 
1999).   
 Because the learning process is the same as formal environments, science 
educators in the free-choice marketplace should expect schema construction hat s based 
on prior knowledge and conceptual frameworks that may be coherent or in pieces.  
Intuitive theories that act as developmental biases (Evans, 2008) combined with highly 
abstract concepts (Lawson et al., 2000) make teaching for conceptual change in formal 
environments difficult, let alone once individuals have left the classroom.  A single 
experience can change an individual’s understanding if it appeals to need or interest, 
engages prior knowledge, and the conceptual relationship is evident (Stocklmayer & 
Gilbert, 2002).  In fact, images may be more memorable than a science course 
(Aikenhead, 1988) or a lab experiment (Barnett et al., 2006).  Moreover, interest in the 
topic is an important factor related to recall of, and learning from, narrative texts 
(Schiefele, 1998).  Knowledge constructed from poor sources obtained in the marketplace 
of ideas can lead to misconceptions that can be very difficult to alter (Wandersee et al., 
1994), especially in free-choice learning environments.  The key is distinguishing 
fictional science from non-fiction (Nowotny, 2005).  Despite their largely fictional 
content, nature programs are considered by many to be highly educational opportunities.  
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Clearly, this disconnect can have profound effects on the public understanding of 
evolution, especially given the current climate of rhetoric.  
 
Conclusions 
 The science concepts held by individuals are the result of a combination of the 
formal explanations learned in school, their personal experiences and observations, the 
culture, and language (Wandersee et al., 1994).  Understanding the theory of evolution is 
complex, however, and misconceptions may be influenced by other ways of knowing 
than just science understanding.  Teaching about the epistemological commitments of the 
NOS framework may help individuals grasp the kind of knowledge science generates and 
ultimately influence how people think about the epistemological and ontological 
underpinnings of the knowledge they use when engaging in civil discourses.   
 In the marketplace of ideas, formal and free-choice science learning interact to 
affect public understanding of evolution.  Scientists and creationists present diffrent 
versions of the world in rhetorical terms of competing logoi (the reasoning of an 
argument); they use similar argumentative modes and techniques (Locke, 1999).  The 
messages may be different, but they are all designed to persuade.  Persuasive messag s 
about evolution can interact with individuals and their personal epistemology through the 
free-choice learning environment.  Audience experiences with media may affect how 
they approach different sources as well as their motivation to learn about science.  They 
may use descriptors such as “educational” to make their choices, unaware that th  source 
they believe is credible does not actually reflect current understanding of evolution at all.  
Personal epistemology, or the beliefs an individual holds about knowledge and its 
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production, may provide the theoretical grounding to predict media influences, and more 
broadly, the learning outcomes about science in the marketplace of ideas.  Specifically, 
personal epistemology may be closely tied to the kind of knowledge viewers use when 
understanding wildlife and nature programs.  The result is a web of inter-related factors 
that affects how the public understands evolution as a science and how the public 
responds to decisions about evolution and creationism in civic decisions (Figure 2.4).  In 
this free-for-all marketplace, acceptance and rejection of messages depend on 
individuals’ levels of understanding, their experiences, their culture, and the rhetorical 
organization that influences their responses to authoritative knowledge (Locke, 1999).   
 In general, the knowledge individuals have is practically inadequate, incoherent, 
inconsistent, and incredible (Ziman 1992). In other words, what evolution knowledge 
individuals do use from their formal education in regards to important civic issues, such 
as the N1H1 virus, antibiotics, and biodiversity, represents only one small element in a 
complex and varied response; little of what they do retain from school is actually 
supplemented by free-choice sources later on; contradictions are resolved using bits and 
pieces of formal science within a system of different ways of knowing; and the credibility 
of sources depends on their perceived interest in these situations (Ziman 1992). Clearly, 
the literature strongly indicates a need for more insight into the complex relationships 
among how people learn about evolutionary theory – what they learn, when they learn it, 
and from where that knowledge comes.  Evolution educators must be aware of the web of 
knowledge contributing to citizen’s understanding and focus and enrich educational 
opportunities that will help overcome misconceptions about this important theory. 
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Figure 2.4.  The formal and informal influences on public understanding of evolution.  Some influences influ nce understanding 
directly, while others act indirectly. 
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CHAPTER 3.   
FATAL FLOWER FRAILTIES: USING NATURE FILMS TO HELP ADDRESS 
MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 
 
Abstract:  
 Evolution is a central underlying concept to a significant number of discourses in 
civilized society, but the complexity of understanding basic tenets of this important 
theory is just now coming to light.  A number of misconceptions have been described, 
including the process of developing new traits, the role of variation, and the 
transformation of species.  Research into strategies to overcome these misconceptions has 
been equivocal, however.  As part of a curriculum that used a nature program as a 
surrogate to help students explicitly recognize their cognitive illusions, we dev loped 
specific teaching tools that elicited the diversity of concepts held by individuals.  One 
tool required students respond to four incorrect prepared alternative statements about the 
co-evolution of orchids and their pollinators.  Students’ responses indicated they 
simultaneously held a number of misconceptions, proximate conceptions, and 
evolutionary conceptions.  Indeed, students’ “conceptual ecologies” were highlyd verse, 
diversity that scaled with the abstract nature of the concepts associated w th evolutionary 
theory.  Students with more evolutionary conceptions included fewer misconceptions in 
their responses than students with few or no evolutionary conceptions.  The composition 
of conceptual ecologies suggested that students may shift to a conceptual ecology
dominated by proximate conceptions prior to incorporating evolutionary conceptions, 
then return to an ecology that incorporates both misconceptions and proximate 
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conceptions as they begin to grasp evolutionary concepts.  As a result, the broad 
misconceptions that confound pedagogical strategies may reflect the way students’ 
struggle as they incorporate new concepts into their pre-existing schema.  Teaching 
strategies that explicitly address misconceptions may be one effective approach to bring 
forth conceptual change. 
 
Keywords:  evolution misconceptions, nature programs, conceptual change 
 
 Over the past two decades, science educators have been struggling with how to 
improve evolution education.  Misconceptions (also known as alternative conceptions, 
non-scientific ideas, or limited or inappropriate propositional hierarchies [LIPH’s cf. 
Novak, 2002]), persist despite research and innovative teaching practices.  Indeed, 
specific interventions designed to help teachers and students overcome misconceptions 
about the theory of evolution have shown encouraging, but equivocal results (e.g., 
Chinsamy & Plagányi, 2007; Crawford, Zembal-Saul, Munford, & Friedrichsen, 2005; 
Ingram & Nelson, 2006; Kampourakis & Zogza, 2008a; Nehm & Reilly, 2007; Nehm & 
Schonfeld, 2007; Scharmann, Smith, James, & Jenson, 2005; Verhey, 2005/2006).   
 Part of the problem may stem from how we treat misconceptions.  
Misconceptions may be a part of a coherent framework analogous, perhaps, to a scientific 
theory (Vosniadou, Vamvakoussi, & Skopeliti, 2008), or they may be fragments that exist 
among other fragments of knowledge that are combined based on the context of the 
situation (J. P. Smith, III, DiSessa, & Roschelle, 1993; diSessa, 2008).  Traditional 
conceptual change research emphasizes major conceptual restructuring that results from a 
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logical dissatisfaction with and abandoning of prior conceptions (Posner, Strike, Hewson, 
& Gertzog, 1982; Nussbaum, 1989).  New concepts are linked to concepts already 
present in the learner’s cognitive structure through progressive differentiatio  and 
integrative reconciliation as learners delineate similarities and differences among existing 
concepts, ultimately resulting in a more cohesive and integrated framework (Ausubel, 
1963, 1968, 2000; Ausubel, Novak, & Hanesian, 1978).  In this view, misconceptions can 
be a barrier that must be overcome to attain scientific understanding (Groves & Pugh, 
2002; Hamza & Wickman, 2008; Nicholls, 1999; J. P. Smith, III et al., 1993; Songer & 
Mintzes, 1994).  Unfortunately, this kind of superordinate learning is rare, more 
characteristic of experts than students (Mintzes, Wandersee, & Novak, 1997; Novak, 
1993; Novak, 2002).   
 The conceptual ecologies of students may be much less theory-like, however, 
gradually evolving to include more scientific understanding as new pieces of knowledge 
are added and assimilated in different contexts (J. P. Smith, III et al., 1993).  For 
example, integrated within a learner’s conceptual ecology (intellectua ecology; cf. 
Toulmin, 1972) are epistemological commitments, anomalies, metaphors, analogies, 
metaphysical beliefs, alternative conceptions, knowledge from outside of the field 
(Demastes, Good, & Peebles, 1995), and heuristics (Schroeder, 2005).  Indeed, in a very 
Darwinian approach, Toulmin (1972) argues that variation and selection exist at all these 
levels of concept use.  So if the conceptual ecologies learners are building are not
coherent, theory-like frameworks, then examining the structural elements and the context 
of their use (grain size) may provide valuable insight to construction and reconstruction 
of knowledge (diSessa, 2008).   
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 Whether conceptual change is thought of as a revision of a conceptual system as 
elements of the currently accepted scientific explanations are gradually included 
(Nussbaum, 1989; Taber, 2001; Vosniadou & Ioannides, 1998), or as pieces of 
knowledge invoked contextually (diSessa, 2008), misconceptions may be commonly 
included in conceptual ecologies (Clough & Driver, 1986; Demastes, Good, & Peebles, 
1996; Hamza & Wickman, 2008; Kampourakis & Zogza, 2008b; Lawson, Alkhoury, 
Benford, Clark, & Falconer, 2000; Metz, 1991; D. H. Palmer, 1999).   
Depending on the context of the problem, students may use misconceptions or 
scientifically acceptable conceptions when queried (diSessa, 2008; Kampourakis & 
Zogza, 2008b; Tytler, 1998; Welzel & Roth, 1998).  In fact, Hamza and Wickman (2008) 
suggest that misconceptions can be integral in the learning process as they are
encountered and questioned (see also Lawson et al., 2000; Taber, 2001).  Clearly, 
individuals vary in their employment of different aspects of their conceptual ecologies, as 
well as the logical and affective considerations for doing so (Demastes et al., 1995; 
Tytler, 1998).  Some elements of misconceptions may disappear on their own, as 
individuals learn more natural history, for example (Evans, 2000, 2001).  Therefore, what 
we expect at the end of instruction may either be (1) complete adoption of a new and, 
hopefully, more evolutionary perspective if misconceptions are cohesive fram works; or 
(2) a mixed assemblage of scientifically sound concepts and misconceptions that exist in 
different frequencies than prior to instruction if the misconceptions are transitional, 
contextual frameworks. 
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Identifying Misconceptions in Evolution  
 Exploring elements of coherence and grain size requires a methodological 
approach that is sensitive to both sub-conceptual structure and integration (diSessa, 
2008).  Evolutionary theory is complex and includes a variety of disciplines, each of 
which may interact in a complex way with prior knowledge to produce the conceptions 
individuals hold.  In their influential work, Bishop and Anderson (1990) describe three 
ways that student conceptions about evolution differ from scientific conceptions: (1) 
students fail to distinguish between appearance of traits and survival over time (the 
environment causes traits to change over time); (2) students do not consider the role of 
variation (evolution is seen as a process that changes the entire species simultaneously); 
and (3) students do not see evolution as the changing proportions of individuals with 
traits (they see gradual changes in the traits themselves).  Considering misconceptions in 
this broad classification may mask any understanding of smaller, more discte, less 
abstract concepts that students may hold and use to build their understanding.  Indeed, 
misconception research often has focused on discrete issues, such as adaptation (D. 
Palmer, 1996; Renner, Brumby, & Shepherd, 1981) and genetics (Clough & Wood-
Robinson, 1985; Demastes in Good et al., 1992; Halldén, 1988), that may influence 
overall interpretations of student understanding.  Integrating scales of interpretation that 
include broad and discrete, topic-oriented conceptions may permit a snapshot of 
conceptual change from a transformational perspective, however.   
 Darwinian evolution has been characterized by a number of authors (e.g., 
Anderson, Fisher, & Norman, 2002; Nehm & Schonfeld, 2008) as incorporating several 
different levels of abstraction.  For example, evolution can be broadly summarized as 
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follows: random variation exists within species, certain traits are he itable, individuals 
differ in survival rates, individuals differ in reproductive rates, and changes accumulate 
over many generations (from Ferrari & Chi, 1998).  The structural concepts that form the 
building blocks of these principles can serve as major stumbling blocks for conceptual 
understanding and, indeed, within each of these principles are concepts that can be 
classified according to different levels of abstraction.  Lawson, Abraham, & Renner 
(1989) describe a general classification of concepts into apprehended, descriptive, and 
theoretical.  Apprehended concepts are those whose complete meaning can be derived 
from the internal or external environment, such as blue or hunger.  Descriptive concepts 
can be mentally constructed when readily available exemplars exist, such as a ch ir or 
running.  Theoretical concepts are those whose defining attributes are not perceptibl  – 
their causal agents cannot be observed directly (osmosis and time, for example).  Within 
this framework, concepts related to evolution understanding such as population and 
species can be considered descriptive; genes (Lawson et al., 2000), time (Dodick & 
Orion, 2003), and probabilities (Slovic, 1987; Nicholls, 1999) can be considered 
theoretical concepts.  Lawson et al. (2000) suggest that evolution, natural selection, and 
convergent evolution, as well as limiting factors, and even the process of fossilization, 
should be considered hypothetical concepts – intermediate between descriptive and 
theoretical – because these concepts could derive meaning if not restricted to a normal 
observational time frame.  Whether theoretical or hypothetical, however, evolution 
clearly represents an abstract conceptual understanding that is beyond a descriptive 
framework. 
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 Similarly, Ferrari & Chi (1998) suggest that evolution can be considered one of 
two types of process categories: events and equilibrations.  Events are bounded and 
sequential (like a baseball game; Ferrari & Chi, 1998), and may be analogous t  
descriptive concepts with readily available exemplars (cf. Lawson et al., 2000).  
Equilibrations are ongoing, unbounded, and simultaneous (Ferrari & Chi, 1998), and as 
such, are more abstract hypothetical or theoretical concepts (cf. Lawson et al., 2000).  
Indeed, students often consider evolution as an event rather than an equilibration (Ferrari 
& Chi, 1998), employing a descriptive conceptual understanding as opposed to a more 
abstract process. 
 Vernacular issues common to many misconceptions and interpretations, such as 
how individuals define “adapt,” “theory,” and “fitness” (Bishop & Anderson, 1990; 
Bizzo, 1994), also can be considered in terms of their level of abstraction.  Outside of 
their scientific application, “adaptations” frequently are considered responses to changing 
environmental conditions, i.e., individuals alter their form, function, or behavior by their 
own efforts.  This conception is descriptive; for example as a verb “adapting,” like 
running, is a mental construction derived from experience.  In the scientific form, the 
concept is hypothetical and abstract; as a noun, an adaptation is a concept only indirectly 
testable.  Similarly, “fitness” in reference to an individual’s health, strength, or 
intelligence (Bishop & Anderson, 1990) is descriptive, but the scientific application is 
abstract and theoretical. 
 Causal explanations also can be classified along different levels of abstraction.  
Biological philosophers maintain that two types of causal explanation in evolution ex st.  
Ernst Mayr distinguishes proximate- from ultimate-cause explanations based on the 
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differentiation of immediately versus historically derived functions (Mayr, 1961).  Ariew 
(2003) argues that Mayr’s proximate causes are more precisely individual-level causal 
explanations and are very different from statistical evolutionary explanations.  In fact, 
ultimate causes are concretely evolutionary, requiring sophisticated knowledge of 
probabilities (Ariew, 2003).  The distinction is important in that it translates dirctly into 
classification of conceptual explanations of evolution offered by students.  Concepts that 
address individual-level phenomena are not necessarily misconceptions.  These 
proximate, individual-based concepts may be less abstract than evolutionary population-
based concepts, however.   
  Clearly, understanding evolution as a broad theory and offering evolutionary 
explanations involves conceptually deep levels of abstraction.  Individuals may have an 
easier time understanding concepts that are descriptive, especially if they have not 
developed reasoning skills; hypothetical and theoretical concepts that require more 
abstract thinking may be more difficult to comprehend (Lawson et al., 2000).  In addition, 
most people have considerable difficulty understanding uncertainty and probabilistic 
properties (Slovic, 1987; Nicholls, 1999).  In fact, cognitive illusions develop from 
difficulties in quantifying and dealing with probabilities, uncertainty, and risk (Nicholls, 
1999).  Like optical illusions, misperceptions at such an abstract scale can lead to errors 
in judgment, for example, about climate predictions (Nicholls, 1999) and ozone depletion 
(Groves & Pugh, 2002).  It follows that cognitive illusions may interfere with developing 
evolutionary causal explanations.  Deeply abstract concepts may interact with less 
abstract, descriptive concepts within an individual’s conceptual ecology, resulting in he 
complex patterns of conceptual change that have been observed (e.g., Demastes et al., 
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1996).  If a student is struggling with misconceptions about mutations (for example, 
mutations can only be beneficial), the net effect may be an overall misconcepti  of 
directed evolution rather than differential survival and reproduction.  (Of course, 
mutations in and of themselves may be considered abstract, theoretical concepts if th y 
are defined as cascading effects of sequence alteration.)  Kampourakis & Zogza (2008b) 
consider three types of causal explanations that differ based on a philosophical approch 
to answering “how” and “why” questions: (a) evolutionary explanations include the 
historical development of species, (b) proximate explanations relate the current 
characteristics of individuals to evolution, and (c) final cause explanations suggest 
predestined outcomes.  Because the focus is broad – how students explain evolution – 
this system does not allow examination of the specific conceptual structure (the “grain 
size”) within students’ explanations, however.  Using a continuum that characterizes 
concepts from descriptive to abstract within a similar system may function in classifying 
many of the issues surrounding evolution misconceptions.  Indeed, this descriptive-
abstract continuum may be a valuable framework for describing student conceptions and 
exploring conceptual grain size (Figure 3.1). 
 
Teaching for Conceptual Change 
 Several teaching approaches have been developed that help students overcome 
some of their misconceptions about evolution, including historically rich presentations 
and paired problem-solving instructional strategies (Jensen & Finley, 1996), emphasizing 
the Nature of Science (Johnson & Peebles, 1987; Scharmann, 1990; Scharmann & Harris, 
1991, 1992; Farber, 2003; Khishfe & Lederman, 2006; Sandoval & Morrison, 2003),  
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Figure 3.1.  The descriptive-abstract continuum for describing conceptions about 
evolution.  Misconceptions can be related to any kind of concept, whereas concepts 
related to evolution can be proximate (incorporating relatively descriptive concpts) or 
evolutionary (incorporating relatively more abstract concepts). 
 
 
incorporating technology and inquiry-based tasks (Crawford et al., 2005), using the 
learning cycle and developing reasoning skills (Lawson et al., 1989), active learning 
courses (Nehm & Reilly, 2007), and teaching sequences (Kampourakis & Zogza, 2008a).  
Broad misconceptions are tenacious, however, and often persist even after coursework 
(Nehm & Reilly, 2007; Wandersee, Mintzes, & Novak, 1994).  Traditional conceptual 
change research has suggested that changing conceptual ecologies requirthat learners 
recognize where their concept/propositional frameworks are limited, inappropriate, or 
poorly organized into hierarchies (Novak, 2002), and as discussed above, this logical 
approach is not the only pathway to learning a concept (Demastes et al., 1996).  
Conceptual change strategies require educators consider the knowledge students bring to 
the classroom and design instruction that helps students begin down some pathway of 
descriptive abstract 
TYPES OF CONCEPTS 
misconceptions 
proximate 
conceptions 
evolutionary 
conceptions 
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cognitive restructuring (National Research Council, 2007; Nelson, 2007).  Directly 
engaging prior conceptions can be very effective (Verhey, 2005).  If, as Sinatra et l. 
(2008) suggest, students are reluctant to alter their misconceptions because those 
misconceptions fit their understanding of the world, then activities that help students see 
those misconceptions as errors may be one approach to initiating conceptual change.  
Clearly, calling attention to students’ personal understanding is inappropriate, but finding 
an appropriate surrogate that employs equivalent errors may function to highlight errors 
indirectly.  We developed a curriculum plan using a nature program as a surrogate for 
individuals to identify with commonly held misconceptions to help students deal with 
their own misconceptions and recognize the errors. 
 
Nature Programs and Misconceptions 
 Nature programs provide an incredible opportunity to share the wonders and awe 
of the natural world with students.  In fact, nature films may be an important source of 
free-choice learning outside of school.  For example, a single viewing of a nature 
program featuring Jacques Cousteau can affect knowledge gains and attitudes about 
marine mammals at least as well as comparable material presented in a scie ce classroom 
(Fortner, 1985).  Unfortunately, few definitive studies address how and when learning 
evolutionary concepts from television occurs, and attitude studies about perceptions of 
the environment after viewing nature programs do not examine the resulting scientific 
understanding necessary for environmental, ecological, or scientific literacy.  In fact, 
recent analyses of nature program content reveal a serious problem explaining 
evolutionary processes.  Narratives are often filled with “design” rheto ic, emphasizing 
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the perfect fit of an organism to its environment (Aldridge & Dingwall, 2003; Dingwall 
& Aldridge, 2006), as well as need-based and purposive misconceptions (Dissertation 
Appendix 1).  Indeed, Dingwall & Aldrich (2006) contend that the manner in which 
scientific issues are portrayed in wildlife and nature programs may actually enhance, 
rather than diminish, the differences in understanding between biologists and the rest of 
society.  Moreover, video images designed to enhance these narratives may serve as a 
powerful “virtual witnessing” events for viewers (Kirby, 2003; see also Graber, 1990), 
resulting in an epistemological impact difficult to overcome, especially with socially 
controversial topics such as evolution.   
 Fatal Flower (Natural World, BBC), is a visually stunning nature program about 
the co-evolution of orchids and their pollinators replete with misconceptions about 
evolution.  For example, the narrator explains: 
“The crucifix orchid also tries to be something that it is not; it copies other plants 
nearby which have clusters of yellow and red flowers.  The color guides the 
butterflies to the nectar, which is produced in the yellow parts of the flower heads.  
The crucifix orchid seems to know this, and its flower heads have the same color 
pattern, too.  Some of the flowers are dark red, while the freshest are orange and 
yellow.  But there, the similarity ends, as this orchid is a cheat.  It may look like 
the others, but its flowers are empty.  There is no nectar reward at all, so the 
butterflies are fooled into pollinating it for free.  Orchids really are the femme 
fatale of the natural world.  They’ve made cheating an art form, using it get 
exactly what they need from the creatures that fall for their many and varied 
charms” (emphases added). 
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Although this passage may appear as simple story telling, it builds on the narratio  for the 
entire program, potentially leaving the viewer with the understanding that evolution is an 
individual-based phenomena (versus population-based) that occurs because an organism 
needs to change, and that changes an individual makes (like changing the color of one’s 
hair) will be passed to offspring.  The imagery in the program is spectacular nd may 
offer the kind of natural history experiences to viewers that resonate with prior 
knowledge and add to misconceptions. 
 Fatal Flower served as an ideal proxy for students in an introductory biology 
course to recognize their own conceptions about evolution as they critically scrutinized 
the narration for incorrect conceptions, and by reflection as they were prompted to 
compare their own conceptions with the misconceptions they identified as errors in the 
program.  Although the goal of the curriculum was to help students overcome 
misconceptions about evolution, the format of one of the tools developed also provided a 
unique approach to framing evolution understanding.  As a result, this research represents 
a shift from a traditional pedagogical approach to a “knowledge in pieces” approach (cf. 
diSessa, 2008; Figure 3.2).   
 By assessing student responses to four very similar prepared statements that 
included alternative conceptions, I was able to examine whether students conceptions 
were logically related (Greene, 1990).  In particular, the exercise permitted examining the 
multiple levels of misconceptions students may hold at one time as they transferred th ir 
reasoning to new situations.  Therefore, I was able to examine the following questions: 
(1) Can a curriculum of explicit conceptual teaching help students overcome 
misconceptions about evolution? 
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(2) Do students hold a diversity of misconceptions about the theory of evolution that 
includes both scientifically sound concepts and misconceptions and apply them in 
different contexts? 
(3) If student’s concepts are logically related, then are misconceptions related to 
evolutionary explanations in a predictable fashion? 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2.  The shift in the approach to conceptual change using the Fatal Flower 
curricula.  The flow diagram on the left signifies how students’ prior knowledge is 
confronted, proved unsatisfactory, and altered to reflect evolution understanding.  The 
flow diagram on the right represents an approach that predicts misconceptions are part of 
a conceptual ecology but they shift in number and importance as a result of instruction. 
Traditional Approach 
evolution 
understanding 
 prior 
knowledge 
curriculum 
Knowledge in “Pieces” 
prior 
knowledge 
new 
knowledge 
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Methods 
 The curriculum was developed to help students overcome misconceptions about 
evolution using a poorly crafted nature program about the co-evolution of orchids and 
their pollinators as a surrogate for their thinking.  Fatal Flower was a striking example of 
excellent footage of orchids and their pollinators with a script that was fraught with 
misconceptions about the evolutionary process.  Indeed, its science content scored a mer  
18% using the Science and Nature Program Assessment Tool (Dissertation Appendix 1).  
This approach allowed students to criticize the narrative without targeting students’ 
personal beliefs directly.  In each of two introductory biology courses, students watched 
the program and were directed through a series of exercises that included group and 
individual work, lectures, and reading.   
 The curriculum was implemented in two different semesters of introductory 
biology at The University of Montana.  Implementation differed in the application of 
these exercises in the curriculum to examine how the role of time spent on the material 
and individual versus group work affected student understanding (Figure 3.3).  The goal 
was to compel students to confront their personal misconceptions about evolution 
through the surrogate narrator of Fatal Flower.  Student conceptions were identified in 
the first step of the Full Curriculum.  After viewing the program, students were asked to 
describe how Darwin would have explained the evolution of this relationship using 
examples from the program.  The second step required students to recognize 
misconceptions they held personally.  Using “someone else’s” explanations (i.e., 
explanations that mirrored their own naïve conceptions) allowed the students to be 
critical without forcing them to publicly acknowledge their own naïve personal beliefs.  
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Figure 3.3.  Instructional models used to help students confront their misconceptions 
about evolution. 
Step 1: 
Step 2: 
Step 3: 
Step 4: 
Step 5: 
Step 6: 
Full Curriculum 
View Fatal Flower Film 
Abridged Curriculum 
Individuals propose explanation for a Scenario developed from 
the film: 
As you have seen in the film, The Fatal Flower, there are many 
species of orchids that have adaptations that enable them to be 
pollinated by specific pollinators (insects and birds). These 
pollinators in turn have adaptations that allow them to extract 
the nectar from specific orchids that they are dependent on for 
food. How would Darwin explain this example of co-evolution 
between orchids and pollinators from a natural selection point 
of view? (Give specific examples based on the film.) 
Groups review four explanations  
for Scenario that all have a 
misconception and critique each 
from point of view of an 
evolutionary biologist. 
Individuals review four explanations 
for Scenario that all have a 
misconception and critique each 
from point of view of an 
evolutionary biologist. 
Understanding tested with the following exam question:  
Fossil evidence suggests that the ancestor of the modern-day bat resembled a 
shrew or mouse and could not fly. How can the evolution of bat wings from the 
paws of shrew-like ancestors be explained? 
Instructor lectures about evolutionary theory, and provides scientifically  
accurate critiques for explanations provided in Step 2. 
Groups compare explanations for 
the Scenario; new group 
consensus explanation proposed. 
Individuals re-examine their 
explanations from Scenario in  
Step 1 and refine their response. 
Groups propose explanation for 
observation described in Scenario. 
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After recognition and deconstruction of students’ misconceptions, lectures and discussion 
groups were used to help students incorporate accurate information into their conceptions 
of evolution.  This step was reinforced by having students either re-examine their original 
explanation of the co-evolution problem (Full Curriculum) or using group dynamics to 
critique the written explanations they been critiquing as individuals (Abridged 
Curriculum).  A question on the final exam (weeks after the curriculum) served as a 
longitudinal measure of the effect of the curriculum on students’ understanding. 
 A major component of the curriculum involved having students respond to four 
prepared statements that answered the initial question and were purposely craft d to 
include specific misconceptions about the evolutionary process.  One alternative includ d 
need-based purpose to evolution, a second included environmental cause for evolution, a 
third addressed complexity arguments common to intelligent design rhetoric, and a fourth 
included Lamarckian misconceptions (Table 3.1).  Students were asked whether an 
evolutionary biologist would agree or disagree with the alternative, and why they 
believed as they did.  These crafted alternatives provided a unique opportunity to 
examine the diversity of conceptions held simultaneously by individual students.  
Because the misconceptions written into the alternative statements served to prompt 
student thinking, I predicted that comparing student responses across all four alternatives 
should elicit responses that reflected the total diversity of concepts held by individuals.  
For example, students with a good command of the theory of evolution would be 
expected to respond with consistently scientifically accepted conceptualiza ions of 
evolutionary theory.  Responses of those with a poor command of the theory should 
reflect the misconceptions elicited in the four alternatives, and most importantly, he  
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Table 3.1  
Alternative explanations provided to students to draw out their understanding of 
evolutionary theory.  Students were asked whether an evolutionary biologist would agree 
or disagree with each alternative and why. 
Alternative 1 – Need based:   
 Orchids would be better adapted if they had a means to ensure that their pollen 
would be carried to other plants of the same species, so they gradually developed 
complex structures that would trap or attract insects and attach the pollen to the insect as 
it came into contact with the flower.  The orchids in each generation had better and more 
effective means of attracting or trapping the insects than their parents did.  In turn, insects 
needed to extract the nectar from the flowers so they became adept at getting th  nectar 
from specific flowers.  
Alternative 2 – Environment caused:   
 Because the environment of tropical birds favored species that could sip nectar 
from deep within the flowers of abundant orchids, mutant individuals arose that had long 
beaks.  Natural selection favored these individuals (hummingbird-like ancestors) and 
eventually there were many birds that had these adaptations.  Repeating this process led 
ultimately to modern day hummingbirds.  Orchids that were successfully pollinated by 
these birds were also favored by the environment.  
Alternative 3 – Intelligent design:  
 The existence of structures as complex as orchids and their relationship to animal 
pollinators cannot be explained by traditional evolutionary theory because structures and 
relationships like these are too complex to arise by chance.  
Alternative 4 – Lamarckian:  
 Birds in search of nectar needed to reach the nectar deep within the petals of 
flowering orchids.  Their beaks grew longer as they needed to reach deeper and deeper 
pockets to obtain the nectar.  The next generation of birds had even longer beaks.  This 
eventually led to modern day hummingbirds.  The “lips” or petals of orchids that acted as 
landing pads or contact places for pollinators became elongated and shaped differently 
from so much contact by pollinators.  The next generation had larger and more complex 
lip petals.  Eventually they evolved into the intricate and complex orchid structures we 
see today.  
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diversity of scientifically sound concepts and misconceptions held simultaneously by an 
individual.  
 The analyses were designed to investigate understanding, and student responses 
were examined using a combination of qualitative analysis techniques.  Content analysis 
identified and classified the use of concepts related to language, such as “adapt”, but it 
did not function to investigate the breadth of student conceptions well.  As a result, 
responses were classified using microanalysis techniques to address the understanding 
inherent in student responses (Corbin & Strauss, 2008).  Initially, I developed a pool of 
concepts from all responses to the four alternatives looking for words and phrases t at 
identified the concepts students addressed.  I identified and classified broader concepts 
based on in-depth analysis of the conceptual understanding students employed when 
including the concepts (Corbin & Strauss, 2008).  This broader coding scheme was 
rooted in the results of previous analyses of student conceptions, such as Bishop and 
Anderson (1990).  I categorized concepts to reflect misconceptions that were prompted, 
misconceptions particular to student explanations, level of abstraction of those 
misconceptions, and correct conceptions.  Sub-categories within each category could then 
be further refined based on the level of abstraction of the concepts employed.   
 Following Kampourakis & Zogza (2008b), I organized the concepts into 
proximate and evolutionary conceptions, however I based the distinction specifically on 
students’ less abstract, individual-level, causal reference and more abstract, statistical-
level, evolutionary reference (Ariew, 2003; also see Figure 3.1).  Each category was 
counted only once per response even though a student may have employed the concept 
several times in that response.  I explored the effects of the curriculum and the impact of 
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the narrative surrogate using responses from the Full Curriculum.  Only the Abridged 
Curriculum included individual student responses to the four alternatives, so that 
curriculum served as the primary source of data for analyses.  However, group responses 
were included as points of comparison where appropriate.   
 The goal of both curricula was to help students recognize and overcome 
misconceptions about evolution using the nature program as a surrogate that could be 
criticized with less personal ramifications.  Exploring specific student conceptions was 
not part of the curriculum development, and the two curricula took different approaches 
to group and individual work.  As a result, different phases of the two curricula were used 
to examine different effects.  The effect of the curriculum itself was exmined using the 
Full Curriculum model; 41 students completed both an initial assessment (response to the 
Scenario) and a final assessment (final exam question).  The Abridged Curriculum did 
not ask for individual responses to the original Scenario, only group responses, but their 
responses to the final assessment provided valuable insight to the generality of 
conclusions (Figure 3.3).  The Abridged Curriculum was used to examine student 
conceptions for cohesion, however, because only the Abridged Curriculum included 
individual responses to the four alternatives used to examine the contextual application of 
concepts (n = 42 per alternative).  Clearly, the group responses in the Full Curriculum did 
not accurately reflect individual students’ conceptual diversity, but the 13 group 
responses provided interesting points of comparison.   
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Results 
Concept Analyses 
 The most difficult aspect of this analysis was that not all students used all 
concepts; there was no “right” answer that included all concepts.  The coding scheme that 
developed included categories that represented both scientific conceptions and 
misconceptions that could be grouped into various levels of abstraction.  Time, for 
example, was considered abstract when considering the millions of years neces ary for 
some evolutionary changes to occur.  “Generations” was a much less abstract concep ion 
of time, as most students know grandparents and even great grandparents (see also 
Renner et al., 1981).  Students’ conceptions of the effects of time frame of “generations” 
ranged from the development of traits to the development of species.  Two examples of 
student responses illustrated the nature of their thinking related to time frame:  
Student #1d: “The whole idea of natural selection is that certain favorable traits 
that are necessary for survival get passed on and change over generations, not just 
over one generation.  Some changes may occur during a short period of time, but 
most of the major ones that involve natural selection occur over many 
generations;” 
Group #29b: “It went through years and years of changes and many generations 
before it became the hummingbird that we know today.” 
Moreover, these responses showed variation in the thinking from abstract to descriptive; 
Student #1d separated the trait from the whole being, whereas Group #29b apparently 
considered evolution affecting the entire being. 
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 Other categories that included different levels of abstract thinking were organized 
around heredity, favor, and variation.  Heredity was evident in concepts in student 
responses related to the passing of traits from parent to offspring.  Genes were often 
identified as the currency of heredity, especially in response to Alternative #4 (Table 3.1), 
but not necessarily in relation to the genetic underpinnings of traits.  As a result, g netic 
concepts may or may not have been discussed in relation to heredity and were included in 
a separate category.  For example, one student wrote: 
 Student #33d: “they pass on their genetics,” 
in response to Alternative #4 (Lamarckian misconception), indicating a conception of 
heredity and the mechanism of genetics (as opposed to phenotypic changes) representing 
two different concepts.  Genes, as a concept, were quite abstract.  Lawson et al. (2000) 
described the concept of genes as “theoretical,” that is a concept that functions as an 
explanation for an event that needs a cause but for which there are no observable 
exemplars.  Knowing that genes are the root of heredity may have been less abstract than 
the differential concept of understanding the consequences of meiosis and the 
relationship to traits, however.  Subcategories of concepts classified under heredity 
included the wholesale passing of traits to the next generation, wholesale passing of traits 
to an individual’s offspring, or the differential production and variable genetic 
contributions to offspring. 
 “Favor” was an in vivo concept suggesting the influence of the trait – how 
individuals fared in the world because they possessed the attribute.  Subcategories 
focused on influence as an outcome; possession of a “favorable” trait either enhanced the 
ability to survive and/or reproduce, or it was perceived in the abstract as a stati tical 
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effect of natural selection.  Some individuals were simply “better” becaus of the trait 
(“the orchids that had the best adaptive traits would survive...” [Student #54p]), implying 
that evolution was progressing or moving along some trajectory toward perfect 
adaptation.  Categorization of these concepts was often, but not necessarily, based on the 
use of the word “favored,” especially in responses to Alternatives #1 and #2.  For 
example: 
Student #48a: “An evolutionary biologist would argue that orchids with more 
complex pollinating systems were favored more, and therefore passed on these 
traits to their offspring, and so on.” 
Student #23a: “The environment favors the genetic mutation and those individuals 
with the mutations are better able to survive and produce offspring.” 
Student #24b: “The orchids that were most successful at attracting pollinators 
were able to pass on their traits to future generations.” 
 Stochasticity was specifically addressed in Alternative #3, but the idea of 
variation among individuals and random processes was worth considering in all 
responses because of the important role it plays in evolutionary theory (Clough & Wood-
Robinson, 1985).  As a result, variation became a category with two subcategories 
addressing different levels of abstraction: the variation among individuals within a 
population (1) within a specific time frame and (2) across generations (“Transfo mation” 
as discussed above).  Understanding the variation associated within the population that 
led to differential survival and reproduction was an abstract concept. 
152 
Student #8c: “With a greater number of offspring, an organism would be able to 
have a better chance to evolve because there is a possibility of more genetic
mutations, which are a random occurrence after all.” 
The evolutionary concept of variation was more common in responses to the original 
scenario of the Full Curriculum (see below) than in response to the four alternatives in 
the Abridged Curriculum, however. 
 Misconceptions were classified based on purpose.  Subcategories included those 
concepts that (1) fulfilled some life requirement specific to that individual, (2) those that 
were strategic, gaining relative access to those resources or life requirements, (3) 
“symbiotic” becoming a better fit to each other, and (4) catastrophic – adaptor die.  
Natural selection and the role of the environment were initially distinct categories with 
two levels of abstraction, proximate and evolutionary.  Responses indicated that students 
often believed natural selection was an actor, a cause of the outcome, rather than a 
process, so the causal concept was re-classified as a misconception.   
Student #61p: “The more extreme the orchid mutations became, the more 
extremely the pollenators [sic] were selected.” 
Other well-defined conceptualizations of natural selection in student respons were 
covered by other proximate and evolutionary categories.  Likewise, if students indicated 
that the environment caused the animal to change as opposed to being the context for the 
process, then that conception was considered non-scientific – a misconception.   
 Two conceptual classifications were more related to how students thought in 
general than to evolution understanding in particular.  The “reason” for both sides of th  
co-evolutionary relationship was often an important factor students used to assess the 
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quality of the four alternatives.  If the alternative did not explain enough of why the 
relationship formed, including both sides of the co-evolution event (e.g., both the orchid 
and the insect), the explanation was deemed inappropriate.  A subcategory addressed 
whether the alternative adequately explained why the organism “evolved.”  Clearly, many 
individuals believed that adequate answers foremost had to address all sides of the 
relationship; the conceptual underpinning of the explanation was secondary.  
“Completeness” was especially important for Alternatives #1 and #2.   
 The definition of evolution also was a frequent concept given in student 
responses, especially in response to the prepared alternatives.  The absolutenes of this 
definition was consistent:  
Student #36p: “The orchids have change through time.” 
Student #21a: “I think an evolutionary biologist would agree to this answer 
because it states the fact of change through time.” 
Student #40a: “Evolutionary biologists believe in evolution, which is defined as 
change through time.” 
“Change through Time” is a common characterization of evolution in educational 
contexts, but as a metaphor, it may not fit well with complex conceptual ecologies where 
simultaneous misconceptions and proximate conceptions may affect overall conceptual 
understanding.  For example, the metaphor does not exclude need-based misconceptions 
or even some elements of design.  Some students indicated a dominant position for this 
concept in their understanding, however, especially when defending the stochasticity of 
the evolutionary process. 
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Student #35c: “I disagree with this answer.  I do believe that the existence of the 
complex structures of the orchid species can be explained by the definition of 
evolution, which is change over time.  Though it would be a lengthy and complex 
explanation that you would have to derive, it is still explainable.” 
 Most of the categories that developed were not mutually exclusive, nor were they 
additive; they could not be summed across categories or subcategories.  For example, 
“generations,” “universal,” and “transformation” all referred to wholesale adoption of 
traits in the next timeframe.  “Generations” was a time-centered concept and implied 
wholesale adoption of a trait in the next generation, whereas “universal” was a statement 
about heredity, not time, that involved wholesale adoption (the trait was passed on to 
everyone), and “transformation” referred to a general, slow transformati n of a species 
across generations.  Although these concepts appear similar, separating them into distinct 
categories accounted for the context of their use. “Generations” could be compared to 
longer (“Eons”) or shorter timeframes (“Personal” the time it takes for an individual to 
change).  “Universal” could be compared to concepts that accounted for differences in 
reproductive effort.  “Transformation” could be compared to population variation.  
“Genetics” and “Heredity” represent another example of non-additive response 
categories.   
 A variety of studies have examined the use of the word “adapt” and noted 
significant differences in how students and scientists apply the term (Brumby, 1984; 
Halldén, 1988; Renner et al., 1981).  “Adapt” was flagged wherever it was used in 
responses and categorized as either an active use of the word (i.e., the verb “to adapt”), a 
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description of a characteristic (i.e., a “trait”), or a broader, more abstract con ept 
implying the outcome of natural selection (i.e., an adaptation”).   
 
The Effect of the Curriculum 
 Initial Conceptions.  The Full Curriculum included an initial assessment of 
students’ conceptual ecologies; students were asked to explain the co-evolution of 
orchids and their pollinators seen in Fatal Flower the way they believed Darwin would 
explain it.  Need-based misconceptions were common in students’ responses to the co-
evolution scenario.  In fact, nearly half (48%) included a concept related to “Life 
Requirements,” that is the individual needed food (nectar) to be pollinated to survive:   
Student #56p: “Birds need the nectar in the flowers to survive, so birds with 
characteristics that make it easier to reach nectar are favored (i.e., long beaks) by 
natural selection.” 
Similarly, the co-evolution was often addressed as a “symbiotic” relationsh p where each 
species was ensuring the survival of the other; 23% of students included this concept in 
their response.  For example: 
Student #33p: “Without one another, the bees and the orchids would be unable to 
reproduce and survive.”   
As with all concepts, the inclusion of these two categories was not mutually exclusive.  
Many students argued that the “Life Requirements” enabled the “Symbiosis.”  About a 
fifth (18%) of students included concepts that referenced Lamarckian development as the 
individual changed within its lifespan.  In addition, the conception that individuals that 
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did not adapt would die off was common in student responses to the scenario.  This 
concept also was linked quite often to concepts of need, as in this example: 
Student #8p: “The flower will die if it is not pollinated the insect or bird will die if 
it is not fed.  An example is how the humming bird adapted to the specific flower 
but the fly got out of pollinating the same flower by eating through the ovum.  In 
this case the flower adapted to the bird but not the insect.  So therefore the flower 
may go extinct if it cannot evolve to meet the needs of both the humming bird and 
the fly or find a means of repelling the fly.” 
 Natural selection was frequently (28% of responses) considered the actor in the 
relationship between organism and environment, actively weeding out or favoring certain
individuals.  Likewise, the environment caused individuals to change; 23% of responses 
included concepts related to environment-caused misconceptions.  Although evolutionary 
concepts were far less common than misconceptions, the concept that individuals differ 
from each other within a population appeared in one fourth of these initial responses.  
Proximate concepts, such as better ability as a result of the trait and wholesale pa sing of 
traits to offspring also were relatively common (>20%).   
Student # 57p: “This genetic trait is selected for and more individuals that have it 
are present in the population.” 
 One third of individuals’ responses to the original scenario in the Full Curriculum 
included the use of “adapt” as a verb; only two individuals referred to “traits” as 
“adaptations.”  Of these, every single student response that used “adapt” to imply an 
individual changes in response to the environment also was classified as including a 
need-based or environment-caused misconception, not surprising considering the 
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frequency of misconceptions in student responses.  Over a third of the responses were 
classified as incorporating Lamarckian elements.  Evolutionary concepts w re not 
completely absent in responses from students using the verb form of “adapt;” three 
responses (6%) included concepts of time that extended beyond “Generations.” 
 
 The Effect of the Surrogate.  Based on the examples students included, the 
narration in Fatal Flower appeared to have been an adequate surrogate for student 
conceptions.  Not all students included examples, nor did they include the same 
examples.  Three examples were popular, however; the bucket orchid and its euglossine 
bee pollinator, Hexisia and its hummingbird pollinator, and the bee-mimicking orchids 
were included in 10 or more responses (approximately 25%; other examples were 
included in only one or two responses).  This frequency permitted cursory exploratory 
comparisons of the kinds of conceptual ecologies associated with each example.   
 In the program, Fatal Flower, the narration regarding the bucket orchid includes 
several references to need-based evolution.  The orchid excretes a scented oil that attracts 
male bees.  According to the narration, “the males need this strange oil to make a 
perfume to attract their own females.”   In addition, the segment emphasizes the flower’s 
devious trap and its need to be pollinated.   
 The narration surrounding Hexisia and its hummingbird pollinator emphasizes the 
perfect design of the flower: 
“This little orchid is called Hexisia, and each of its flowers is designed to be 
operated by the tip of a hummingbird’s beak.  A dark splotch shows the bird 
where the nectar tube is.” 
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The narrator goes on to say that the lip serves as a place for the hummingbird to rest its 
bill while it feeds.   
 The narration used to describe the bee-mimicking orchids does not include 
explicit need-based references.  The male bee is simply fooled by the flower’s imitation 
of virgin female bees with whom to mate.   
 Use of the bucket orchid example was associated with need-based misconceptions 
more so than the other two examples; 85% of students using this example employed 
need-based misconceptions (versus 42% of students including the hummingbird as an 
example and 50% of students including the bee mimic).  In addition, students often 
referred to how “fit” a bee had to be to get through that trap, enlisting a somewhat 
Lamarckian element in their response.  
Student # 14p: “At the same time the bee was evolving to where it could still get 
what it came for as well as surviving the trap and retain its desire for nectar 
again.” 
 Not surprisingly, the misconception that individuals “adapt or die” also was more 
common in responses where students included the bucket orchid example (62% versus 
10% with the bee mimic and 42% with the hummingbird).  A frequent use of the “adapt 
or die” concept associated with the hummingbird example reflected students belief that 
hummingbirds needed the food supplied by the nectar.  On the other hand, students 
incorporating the bucket orchid example included concepts of “symbiosis” less frequently 
(23%) than students including the bee-mimic example (33%) or the hummingbird 
example (50%), this approach likely reflected an incongruity between the harmony of 
“symbiosis” and the difficulties through which male euglossine bees must go once they 
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have become trapped in the bucket of slimy goop (bees end up squeezing through a 
tunnel formed from the throat of the flower where the pollen sacs come in contact with 
the bees thorax).  Although few in number, more proximate and evolutionary concepts 
were associated with students response that included the bee mimic example:   
Student #2p: “In those instances, the flower that had evolved the most to look like 
the insect they needed would have the best luck being pollinated and would 
therefore survive the longest.” 
Although this response included a need-based concept, it also incorporated some 
understanding of the variation among individuals and the relative frequency of 
pollination and survival associated with having the trait.  Apparently, the “need” to have 
sex did not fit with “Adapt or Die” and “Symbiosis” concepts.  Clearly, the use of 
examples in students’ responses was likely more correlative with their prior conceptions 
than causative, and the narration cannot be completely blamed for the outcome.  
However, the fact that these examples did resonate with students indicates that narration 
from these types of programs in combination with exquisite visual imagery may affect 
their conceptual ecologies resulting in a poor understanding of evolution. 
 
 Outcomes of the Curriculum.  A question designed to assess the overall impact of 
the curricula was included on the final exam for both the Full Curriculum and the 
Abridged Curriculum (Figure 3.3).  The question was shorter, included less explanation, 
and students had less time to respond.  Nevertheless, 65% and 71% of students in the Full 
and Abridged curricula, respectively, recognized the central misconception in he 
question’s statement.  In fact, some students read more than one misconception in the 
160 
statement, usually a combination of recognizing need-based and goal-based 
misconceptions.   
 In addition, most students in the Full Curriculum (82%) included relatively fewer 
misconceptions in their response to the question on the final exam than in their original 
response to the Scenario.  (The Abridged Curriculum did not include individual responses 
to the Scenario.)  Similarly, 78% of students included more evolutionary concepts in their
response to the final question than they included in their original response to the 
Scenario.  Proximate concepts also decreased relative to the Scenario responses; only 
36% of students included a greater proportion of proximate concepts in their final 
response than in their original response to the Scenario.   
 The use of the term “adapt” was relatively absent from responses to the final in 
both curricular approaches: 16% in the Full Curriculum versus 5% in the Abridged 
Curriculum.  Both curricular approaches seem to have been effective at assisting students 
in beginning the transition from misconception-laden ecologies to ecologies that include 
more scientifically acceptable concepts.  The Abridged Curriculum seemed to b  equally 
effective; 87% of students disagreed with the statement provided in the final exam 
question and 71% noted the inclusion of a misconception.  Students may not have 
developed a full command of the complexity of evolutionary theory, but they knew how 
to recognize incorrect arguments. 
 
Drawing out the Pieces of Conceptual Ecologies 
 The most basic way to determine contextual use of concepts and the application 
of reasoning patterns was to compare students’ outright agreement or disagreement with 
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the four misconception-laden alternatives.  I predicted that students with an 
understanding of evolution should have at least recognized the misconception in the 
alternative statement.  The details of both the need-based and environment-caused 
explanations in Alternative #1 and Alternative #2 (Table 3.1) were often overlooked by 
both individuals (Figure 3.4) and groups (Figure 3.5) however, and the majority of 
students agreed with both alternatives in both curricula.  Lamarckian references in 
Alternative #4 were detected a bit more often than other misconceptions, and more often 
in the Abridged Curriculum than in the Full Curriculum.  A strong majority of students 
completing the curriculum (regardless of version) disagreed with the intelligent design 
explanation in Alternative #3. 
 This analysis illustrated that students did indeed hold misconceptions about 
evolution but suggested that their conceptual understanding was not uni-dimensional.  
Quite often students included an assortment of proximate and evolutionary concepts as 
they re-interpreted an alternative with which they stated an evolutionary biologist would 
agree.  Similarly, students often identified the misconception and then repeated, rath r 
than refuted, the concepts.  This exercise allowed analysis of the diversity of concepts 
held simultaneously by individuals, however.  In their responses, students included 
different arrays of concepts as they transferred their knowledge from one situation to the 
next.  Responses were grouped first by alternative, and then by individual. 
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Figure 3.4  Proportion of students in the Abridged Curriculum indicating that they agreed 
with the need-based, environment-caused, intelligent-design, or Lamarckian alternative. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5.  Proportion of groups in the Full Curriculum indicating that they agreed with 
the need-based, environment-caused, intelligent-design, or Lamarckian alternative. 
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 Alternative #1 – Need-based Explanation:  As would be expected from the 
previous analysis, only 17% of individuals in the Abridged Curriculum included some 
recognition of the need-based misconception; over half of individuals actively included 
or reiterated a need-based misconception in their response.  In the Full Curriculum, 
however, 54% of groups recognized the inclusion, and 54% of groups included some 
need-based explanation in their response.  Again, these categorizations are not mutually 
exclusive; individual students or groups could have included recognition of the need-
based misconception but then included a need-based explanation at some other point in 
their response: 
Student #34a: “Although the statements are correct about the flower and the 
insects adapting to each organisms specific needs, I think that the statemen is not 
totally true about how the adaptations came about.  I don’t think that the 
organisms could purposely adapt themselves to the environment...” 
The need-based conceptions tended to focus on the life requirements (need for food or to 
reproduce; “Life Requirement”) of individuals or their need to ensure their survival or 
reproduction (“Strategy”).  “Life requirement” needs were more common than “Strategy” 
needs in the Abridged Curriculum whereas strategies to ensure survival and reproduction 
were more common in the Full Curriculum (Table 3.2).  These two types of needs were 
often represented as a single concept of “symbiosis” – the relationship between the orchid 
and the pollinator arose because each needed the other and to ensure survival.  
“Symbiosis” appeared slightly more often in groups in the Full Curriculum than in the 
Abridged Curriculum.  Apparently, the idea of the co-evolution of two species elicits
some need-based relationship between them. 
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Table 3.2.  
The proportion of concepts enlisted by individuals and groups experiencing the Abridged and Full curricu a, respectively.   
 
Concept 
Alternative #1  Alternative #2  Alternative #3  Alternative #4 
Abridgeda Fullb  Abridged Full  Abridged Full  Abridged Full 
Misconceptions 
           
Life Requirement 24% 8%  17% 0%  15% 8%  10% 15% 
Strategy 15% 31%  12% 23%  5% 8%  2% 15% 
Selfish 0% 0%  0% 8%  0% 0%  0% 0% 
Symbiosis 12% 15%  12% 23%  5% 8%  17% 31% 
Adapt or Die 2% 0%  0% 8%  0% 0%  0% 8% 
Actor 15% 15%  24% 23%  5% 23%  20% 23% 
Cause 27% 23%  5% 38%  5% 0%  12% 8% 
Lamarckian 10% 8%  2% 0%  0% 0%  7% 0% 
Proximate Conceptions 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Better 17% 15%  10% 8%  2% 0%  7% 8% 
Opportunity 17% 15%  17% 15%  2% 0%  0% 23% 
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Concept 
Alternative #1  Alternative #2  Alternative #3  Alternative #4 
Abridgeda Fullb  Abridged Full  Abridged Full  Abridged Full 
Universal 5% 8%  5% 23%  12% 0%  12% 31% 
Offspring 20% 8%  7% 8%  0% 0%  2% 8% 
Generations 29% 15%  10% 23%  7% 15%  27% 31% 
Transformation 12% 8%  7% 8%  5% 0%  10% 15% 
Evolutionary Conceptions 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Mutation 7% 15%  7% 15%  17% 0%  2% 0% 
Variation 12% 0%  10% 8%  7% 8%  10% 8% 
Weighting 10% 8%  15% 8%  10% 8%  5% 8% 
Differential 7% 0%  0% 0%  2% 8%  0% 8% 
Eons 10% 0%  2% 0%  7% 8%  0% 0% 
Other Concepts 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Adapt 59% 77%  24% 38%  22% 23%  32% 8% 
Completeness  22% 31%  27% 15%  0% 0%  10% 15% 
a n = 41. 
b n = 13. 
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 Alternative #1 also included subtle wording that could have affected student 
responses, wording such as “the orchids in each generation” and “better and more 
effective means.”  These two statements consisted of three non- evolutionary c cepts: 
generation as a timeframe, the transformation of species, and evolution progressing to 
something better.  So, the responses should have reflected these non-evolutionary 
concepts if students were incorporating these words from the alternative.  Almost a 
quarter of students’ responses included time in terms of generations, and “Generations” 
as a concept was identified more often than any other concept for this alternative (T ble 
3.2).  “Transformation” was not as commonly included in responses though, but the 
similar hereditary concept of wholesale passing of traits to offspring (“Offspring”) was 
slightly more common.  Likewise, the idea that organisms get “better” ove tim  was 
included frequently in responses to Alternative #1. 
 Other unprompted misconceptions common in responses to Alternative #1 
focused on the process of evolution.  Natural selection often took an active role in 
weeding out or favoring certain individuals; 15% of responses in both curricula included 
natural selection as an “Actor” in the process (Table 3.2).  Similarly, the environment 
“Caused” individuals to change in 27% of responses in the Abridged Curriculum and 
23% of responses in the Full Curriculum.  For example: 
Group #9a: “Yes, the biologists would probably agree with this answer because 
the orchids and the insects coevolved and so if one changes the other will 
probably change to adapt to the new environmental circumstances.” 
 “Completeness” was an important classification element for Alternative #1.  Two 
examples illustrate how important this apparent rule of thumb for explanations was to
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students.  Some students were satisfied that the alternative adequately discussed both 
sides of the co-evolutionary relationship, whereas others were not: 
Student #10a: “I think an evolutionary biologist would agree to this statement 
because it shows both causes for the evolution to take place...” 
Student #2a: “This explanation would be agreeable in general to an evolutionary 
biologist’s way of thinking, but it does not necessarily answer the question 1 – 
gives some explanation on the orchids side of the coevolution, but not much 
elaboration on the side of the insects.” 
 Alternative #1 specifically used the word “adapted” but the context was 
intentionally vague: “Orchids would be better adapted...” could have referred to 
individuals or populations (in spite of the implication that evolution progresses toward 
something better).  Clearly, the use of the word elicited similar responses from tudents 
(Table 3.2).  In the Abridged Curriculum, all of the individuals’ responses that used 
“adapt” as a verb (that is to indicate an organism responded to the environment) were 
recorded as need-based or caused by the environment, and none recognized the need-
based misconception included in the alternative.  In addition, 20% included a Lamarckian 
element.  Nearly 40%, however, interpreted the concept as a trait or an adaptation in their 
responses; two thirds of these students recognized the misconception in the alternative, 
but half used another misconception in their re-interpretation.  The verb “adapt” appeared 
in 46% of the group responses in the Full Curriculum, but only half of those responses 
were classified as including need-based misconceptions.  The other 50% recognized the 
misconception in the alternative.  Nearly a third of the groups interpreted the concept as 
an “adaptation” or a “trait.”  “Generations” as the concept of time, and even Lamarckian, 
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elements also were common classifications associated with the use of “adapt” as  verb.  
One individual included the evolutionary concept of genetic variation, however. 
 
 Alternative #2 – Environment-caused Explanation:  Alternative #2 included the 
misconception that the environment caused the organism to change, indicating that the 
environment “favored” certain traits of species.  The alternative also included the phrase 
“natural selection favored” – a subtle difference in terms of classifying short student 
responses and separating conceptual understanding from misunderstanding.  In addition, 
the use of the word “mutant” likely had consequences in terms of students’ responses.   
 Not surprisingly, only 7% of responses included some recognition of the 
environment-caused misconception in this alternative.  Nevertheless, “Cause” was not 
nearly as common in individual responses as in response to Alternative #1 (Table 3.2).  
Groups apparently responded differently to the alternative; over a third of groups 
included the idea that the environment caused the individuals to change.  Natural 
selection as the actor, rather than the process, however, appeared in about one quarter of 
both individual and group responses.  The word “favored,” on the other hand, appeared 
often in student responses, but the concept was applied with some proximate level of 
understanding of the evolutionary process.  Students reframed the concept to refer to the 
enhanced opportunity the trait provided in terms of survival and/or reproduction in the 
environment.  This “Opportunity” was the most common concept included in the 
individual responses in the Abridged Curriculum (Table 3.2).  In addition, nearly as many 
individuals recognized that the ability to survive or reproduce relative to other individuals 
was an important factor.  In the Full Curriculum, 15% of group responses included the 
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enhanced ability to survive or reproduce as a result of the trait, but few groups recogniz d 
any kind of differential success.   
 As expected, the word “mutant” affected how students incorporated concepts 
about mutations.  Nearly one third of individuals (n = 13), and over one third of groups (n 
= 5) included the concept in their responses.  As a result, the concept was split in the 
analyses to explore how students viewed mutations: as only harmful or beneficial, as 
potentially harmful or beneficial, or with no reference to harm or benefits.  Despite the 
potential negative connotation of the word “mutant,” only one individual and one group 
indicated that mutations were harmful, however.  Rather, students incorporating the 
concept of mutation gave no indication of benefit or harm (54% of individuals in the 
Abridged Curriculum) or indicated some sense of random occurrence of both potentially 
beneficial and harmful mutations (60% of groups in the Full Curriculum).  For example: 
Student #28b: “I agree with this statement, because it shows evolution as a 
process resulting from genetic mutations and natural selection.” 
Group #42b: “Mutations are random, and don’t necessarily benefit the species.” 
 Clearly, this alternative, with all of its good points, elicited more proximate and 
evolutionary concepts from students and groups than the more misconception-laden 
Alternative #1 (Table 3.2).  However, many individuals and groups were concerned about 
the adequacy of the alternative at explaining the evolution of the orchids.  Indeed, many 
indicated want of a more complete explanation (“Completeness”; Table 3.2): 
Student #13b: “This answer does not really explain how the orchids evolved in 
tune with the hummingbirds.  This answer basically shows that the hummingbirds 
evolved while the orchids stayed the same.” 
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 Alternative #2 used the word “adaptation” (a noun form) rather than the verb form 
as in Alternative #1.  In their reinterpretations of the alternatives, however, only 15% (n = 
6 students) used the word “adapt” as a verb, and only one of those included an 
environment-caused misconception.  Instead, half of these students were classified  
using natural selection as an actor that weeded out the less fortunate organisms.  
Interestingly, two of the four students that incorporated “adaptation” into their responses 
also enlisted natural selection as an actor. 
 Alternative #3 – Intelligent Design:  Alternative #3 was targeted directly at 
student understanding of the limits of science.  The alternative used the intellige  design 
movement’s argument of irreducible complexity.  As a result, the alternative should have 
elicited comments about stochasticity or chance.  Indeed, a relatively large proportion of 
individuals in the Abridged Curriculum included the concept that mutations represented 
chance occurrences (Table 3.2).  Although this concept was the most common concept 
identified in the individual responses, it was non-existent in the group responses of the 
Full Curriculum.  The diversity of concepts groups included in response to this alternativ  
was low, however; only eight different concepts were included in responses.  
Nevertheless, of the concepts identified, groups included the time in which this 
relationship could develop, whether that was the more proximate concept of generations 
or the more evolutionary concept of eons.  Groups also included concepts associated with 
differential survival and reproductive success more than responses to any other 
alternative.   
 The “complexity of the relationship” was addressed directly; both individuals and 
groups argued that the relationship was not too complex to arise by chance (Table 3.2).  
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Despite these encouraging results, approximately one quarter of responses included a 
need-based misconception in their re-interpretation of the development of the 
relationship.  For example: 
Student #8c: “While the relationship between orchids and animals is complex, it 
started out simplistically and kept evolving in order to achieve a greater 
reproductive success.” 
 
 Alternative #4 – Lamarckian:   The Lamarckian element in Alternative #4 was 
quite obvious.  The focus of the alternative was on the individual bird’s ability to grow a 
longer beak to reach deep into the flower.  As noted above, however, just over half of 
individuals and groups disagreed with the alternative.  The students’ misunderstanding 
about the evolutionary process was evident as they re-interpreted the alternative in their 
responses.  In the Abridged Curriculum, 37% of individuals recognized the Lamarckian 
element, but three of these individuals still included the concept of individual changes 
being heritable in their responses.  In the Full Curriculum, 54% of groups recognized the 
Lamarckian conception of evolution.  Moreover, the alternative elicited references to 
genes as the mechanism for heritability, as would be expected given this alternative 
(Table 3.2):   
Student # 12d: “It is true that the landing pads of the orchid could have changed 
shape through so much use but the change would be environmental not genetic 
and so would not be passed on to its offspring.” 
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Group #46d: “As for the petals of orchids getting stretched out and elongated, this 
could happen, but if it did this stretching is not a genetic trait and so the longer 
petals would not be passed on to the next generation.” 
 Indeed, group work may have been influential with responses to this alternative.  
Besides identifying the Lamarckian element, groups in the Full Curriculum more often 
included concepts related to the influence of the trait on reproduction, heredity, and time 
(although usually in terms of generations) than individuals in the Abridged Curriculum.  
Interestingly, though, groups included references to need-based misconceptions more 
often than individuals (Table 3.2).  The idea that the two species needed each other and 
were becoming more adapted to each other to ensure each of their survival (“Symbiosis”) 
also was appealing to students, especially to the groups in the Full Curriculum: 
Group #42d: “This is a form of natural selection where these two organisms co-
evolved to better each other and ensure their own survival at the same time.” 
 Although this alternative did not include concepts about adaptation, over one 
fourth of individuals in the Abridged Curriculum incorporated the verb form of “adapt” 
into their re-interpretations.  Of those, half included a need-based misconception, and 
another third included an environment-caused misconception.  One student’s use 
provided especially valuable insight to how the vernacular use could be interpreted: 
Student #18d: “The growing of beaks to reach the nector [sic] is adapting, but that 
doesn’t mean they will pass this trait on.” 
Adapting, by definition, is changing, but phenotypic change is not synonymous with 
genotypic change.  Only one group in the Full Curriculum used “adapt” as a verb, and 
they incorporated a need-based misconception in their response. 
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Diversity of Concepts Held by Individuals 
 Examining the diversity of responses across all alternatives for each individual 
and group indicated that students indeed held a variety of scientific, proximate, and 
incorrect conceptions simultaneously.  Two examples illustrate this diversity, one with 
few evolutionary concepts and one with many evolutionary concepts.  In response to the 
four alternatives, Student #28 includes one evolutionary concept along with two instances 
of misconceptions and four proximate concepts.  Student #28 disagrees with the need-
based statement in Alternative #1 but includes need-based statements in response to 
Alternatives #2 and #3.  Cleary, the student understands genes as the mechanism of 
inheritance and the stochastic nature of mutations (an evolutionary concept).  
Nevertheless, Student #28 misses the Lamarckian element in Alternative #4, the 
alternative that specifically elicited responses that included genetics more than any other 
alternative.   
Alternative 1 – Need-based Explanation (agrees): “An evolutionary biologist 
would not agree with this statement for one huge reason.  The statement makes it 
sound like these advantages were developed because of the benefits they create, 
yet, in reality, these advantages came from a random mutation....” 
Alternative 2 – Environment-caused Explanation (agrees): “...These long beaks 
probably did develop over time in order to help the birds drink nectar....” 
Alternative 3 – Intelligent Design Explanation (disagrees): “...Organisms adapt 
and change in order to benefit from these relationships.  Evolution definitely 
explains how orchids developed into their current form in order to better assist 
itself in pollination....” 
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Alternative #4 – Lamarckian Explanation (disagrees): “...Genetic mutation leads 
to changes over generations, and this statement exemplifies this....” 
Clearly, this student’s developing conceptual ecology is inconsistent, at one point argu g 
against need-based mechanisms, and at another, arguing for them. 
 Similarly, Student #30 includes multiple evolutionary concepts in the responses to 
the four alternatives, such as variation among members of a population, differential 
survival, and time as a concept that extends beyond generations.  In addition, a few 
proximate concepts are apparent, including enhanced survival and reproduction of 
individuals as a result of the trait, and natural selection as a process.  The appearance of a 
need-based conception with a design element in response to Alternative #3 is surprising, 
however: 
Alternative 1 – Need-based Explanation (agrees): “...Adaptations occur as 
mutations and through some genetic recombination.  The offspring might possibly 
have a productive mutation that would enable them to reproduce more effectively 
allowing them to spread more of their genes until they dominate the landscape.  
These genetic mutations, however, occur over long periods of time and it would 
be hard to see a huge change from parent to daughter organisms.” 
Alternative 2 – Environment-caused Explanation (agrees): “An evolutionary 
biologist would agree with this answer because it explains how the mutation 
might have come about, how long it might have taken, and a reason for its 
dominance in the environment being favored by natural selection....” 
Alternative 3 – Intelligent Design Explanation (disagrees): “...It seemed as if the 
orchids and the animals were complexly suited for each organism’s specific 
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needs.  The pollination methods, for example, are almost perfectly adapted for 
both the flower and the insect.  This could be explained only through adaptation 
and natural selection and not by pure chance.” 
Alternative #4 – Lamarckian Explanation (disagrees): “An evolutionary biologist 
would disagree with this statement because it is not probable that physical 
changes caused by the environment could be passed down to the next generation 
simply because they are not part of the genetic code of that organism....” 
 The relative blend of misconceptions and proximate and evolutionary conceptions 
within individual and group conceptual ecologies is apparent in plots of evolutionary 
versus proximate conceptions and misconceptions (Figures 3.4 and 3.5).  As responses 
transition to conceptual understanding of evolution more in line with scientific thinking, 
the presence of misconceptions included in responses appears to decrease.  Indeed, both 
need-based and process-based misconceptions are incorporated into student responses 
less often as the use of evolutionary concepts increases, at least in the Abridged 
Curriculum (Figure 3.6).  The relationships are not as clear in the Full Curriculm (Figure 
3.7), however, likely a result of the group dynamic.  Obviously, the group responses in 
the Full Curriculum are influenced by a variety of individuals, some more dominant in 
the conversation than others, which likely masks effects.  In both curricula, proximate 
conceptions seem to remain relatively stable and may reflect students’ incomplete grasp 
of concepts as they attempt to elaborate in their responses.   
 Similarly, when the proportion of evolutionary, proximate, and mis- conceptions 
per individual were examined, an interesting trend appeared.  Individuals offering a 
greater proportion of evolutionary conceptions across the four alternatives included fewer 
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misconceptions (Figure 3.8).  The proportion of proximate conceptions peaked, however, 
in the transition between misconceptions and evolutionary concepts.  Again, responses 
from the Full Curriculum were masked by the difficulties examining group work creates, 
but this relationship is evident in the distributions of concepts across groups as well 
(Figure 3.9). 
 
Discussion 
Effects of the Curriculum 
 Students enrolling in an introductory biology course pursue one of two paths in 
their college careers: they continue on in the life sciences or they do not.  If they continue 
on in the life sciences curricula, they enroll in additional courses that broaden their 
understanding of evolution, such as genetics and evolution courses.  If they do not pursue 
a life sciences degree, an introductory biology course may be the only exposure to 
evolutionary science in their adult life.  Therefore, it is imperative that science educators 
across levels (pre-college and college) help students develop a conceptual framewo k that 
allows them to assess future information in terms of correct application and iterpretation 
of evolutionary theory.  Our results suggest that a curriculum designed to explicitly 
address misconceptions may help students begin to deal with the complexities of 
evolutionary theory and construct more accurate conceptual understanding. 
 A vast majority of students that experienced this curricular approach were abl  to 
recognize major misconceptions about evolution at the end of the semester.  Indeed, the 
curriculum may have altered the diversity of the conceptual ecologies held by in ividuals 
toward a more evolutionary perspective than they had early in the course.  Jensen & 
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Figure 3.6.  The presence of both misconceptions and alternative conceptions displayed 
by individuals in the Abridged Curriculum as they responded to the four diverse 
misconception-laden alternatives. 
 
 
Figure 3.7.  The presence of both misconceptions and alternative conceptions displayed 
by groups in the Full Curriculum as they responded to the four diverse misconception-
laden alternatives. 
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Figure 3.8.  Proportion of misconceptions, proximate conceptions, and evolutionary 
conceptions held by individuals in the Abridged Curriculum.  Each bar represents the 
total concepts held across all four alternatives for a single individual. 
 
 
Figure 3.9.  Proportion of misconceptions, proximate conceptions, and evolutionary 
conceptions held by groups in the Full Curriculum.  Each bar represents the total 
concepts held across all four alternatives for a single group. 
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Finley (1996) also found that students justified responses by indicating that a statement 
would be considered incorrect by biologists.  In our analysis, however, students had to 
single out their problem with the alternative in addition to agreeing or disagreein  that an 
evolutionary biologist would find the statement acceptable.   
 Nevertheless, recognizing and understanding misconceptions are entirely different 
issues.  Understanding evolution requires a thorough grasp of some very complex and 
abstract topics, topics that may comprise an entire discipline.  Most introductory biology 
courses only treat evolution as one unit among a number of other topics (Farber, 2003), 
although more and more faculty are embracing evolution as a unifying theme in their
instructional design (e.g., Flammer, 2006; Nickels, Nelson, & Beard, 1996; Wilson, 
2005).  Moreover, there may be some logical progression of the influence of 
misconceptions, proximate conceptions, and evolutionary conceptions in students’ 
conceptual ecologies (cf. Greene, 1990).  That shift may be influenced by cognitive 
maturation.  Indeed, several evolutionary psychologists have suggested that 
developmental constraints (essentialist, teleological, and intentionality) may lead to 
intuitive cognitive biases that affect sub-concepts differentially depending on the abstract 
nature of the concept being employed (Sinatra, Brem, & Evans, 2008).  Similarly, the 
correlated issues of scientific reasoning ability and development may affect the 
conceptual understanding of evolution (Kwon & Lawson, 2000).  The curricula employed 
in the introductory biology courses at The University of Montana actively and explicitly 
compelled students to recognize misconceptions, which may be a valuable first stp in a 
cascade of developmental and educational sequences leading to broader understanding of 
evolution. 
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 I discovered several distinct concepts that warranted specific attention.  For 
example, the use of the verb “adapt” was significant in student responses to the original
scenario.  Like other studies, these students used the word as part of their environment-
caused misconceptions (Bishop & Anderson, 1990; Clough & Wood-Robinson, 1985; 
Kampourakis & Zogza, 2008b; D. Palmer, 1996; Renner et al., 1981).  Specific language 
in our curriculum influenced student use of the concept, however.  A large portion of 
students included “adapt” in response to Alternative #1, the one alternative that included 
the word adapt (as well as the word “adept”, which was distasteful to some student).  
Language in Alternative #4, the alternative including the Lamarckian-lade 
misconception, also apparently elicited the use of the verb form of “adapt”, but 
Alternative #2 (the environment-caused misconception) did not.  Alternative #2 was a 
fairly acceptable explanation of evolution (except for the environment-caused 
misconception), but it included the word “adaptation”.  Perhaps students in their re-
interpretation did not use the word “adapt” because the language used in this alternative 
adequately explained the co-evolution of orchids and pollinators to them.  Similarly, time 
was an issue for most students.  Rarely was the concept of time longer than gener tions, 
even hundreds of generations.  Clearly, most were missing major conceptual 
understanding of the abstract, random appearance of traits, their survival within the 
population, and the quantity of time necessary for those changes to take place. 
 
Diversity of Students’ Conceptual Ecologies 
 Teasing apart what students “know” and how they express what they know is 
difficult from interview data, let alone short answer questions.  The responses to four
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alternative explanations of a particular phenomena allowed us to examine how students 
transferred their thinking to different, but highly similar, situations and, in effect, to 
examine the grain size of working conceptual ecologies.  Several recent studies highlight 
that students provide different types of explanations for the same evolutionary processes 
when asked to respond to different tasks with different content (Kampourakis & Zogza, 
2008b; Nehm & Reilly, 2007; D. H. Palmer, 1999).  Because our approach required 
students to respond to four alternative explanations of the same evolutionary event, we 
were able to examine the contextual application of concepts at a grain size that reflected 
understanding and coherence (diSessa, 2008).  Our results indicate that students’ 
conceptual ecologies are diverse, and they include both a variety of non-scientific and 
scientific conceptions.  These pieces of knowledge can be applied differently in different 
contexts, even when they are very small transfer events.  Nevertheless, this curriculum 
may produce new insights to how students progress in their conceptual understanding; 
students with at least a grasp of some of the more abstract evolutionary concepts 
associated with evolutionary theory were less likely to include misconceptions in their 
responses.  Indeed, students’ conceptual ecologies may experience a fundamental shift in 
the relative frequency of misconceptions and proximate explanations as they begin to 
grasp evolutionary explanations.   
 Demastes et al. (1996) describe four patterns of conceptual change within a 
cohesive framework approach (cascade, wholesale, incremental, and dual constructi ), 
each of which could be an outcome given the relationships we found.  In fact, dual 
constructions are an obvious possibility in our approach.  The nature program served as a 
surrogate, and students were asked specifically to respond in terms of what they believed 
182 
an evolutionary biologist would think of explanations for phenomena depicted in the 
program.  Considering conceptual ecologies as fluid bodies engaging different pices of 
knowledge in different contexts also may explain the conceptual diversity of students’ 
response to highly similar explanations for natural phenomena, however.  Therefore, 
based on our results and evidence in the literature, a transitional, contextual framewo k 
may be the most applicable approach to teaching for conceptual change.   
 
Using Nature Films as a Tool 
 A number of science educators have developed curricula using nature programs to 
help students understand the biological sciences, recognizing the poor representation of 
the science.  Their approaches have involved addressing the plausibility of the narrative 
(Rose, 2003) or deconstructing the video (B. K. Smith & Resier, 1997).  Our approach 
was to embrace the narrative as a surrogate for poor quality explanations of evolutionary 
processes.  Not only are evolutionary concepts abstract, the language used to represent 
them is distinct.  For example, explaining differential survival requires langu ge that 
refers to rates (which are inherently population characteristics), and not just t  
opportunity (increased survival of an individual).  In addition, terms such as “adaptation” 
and “fitness” have an everyday and a scientific meaning (Bishop & Anderson, 1990), and 
their casual use by evolutionary biologists or nature program narratives may confound 
understanding (Sinatra et al., 2008).  Just as it is important that students understand wha 
a theory in science is (versus its everyday use), so it also is important to understa  how 
the language we use about evolution can lead to misconceptions about the theory, how 
evolution functions, and its role in understanding many of the problems our societies face 
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(e.g., antibiotic resistance).  This conceptual change may begin simply by promoting an 
understanding of the various meanings associated with words such as “need,” “adapt,” 
and “theory.” 
 Narrative stories fit well with personal motivations, and as such, they may be easy 
to retain (especially if they come with incredible imagery).  Although 
anthropomorphizing evolution may arouse student interest, it also may push students 
toward attributing the similarities of organisms to some sense of kinship among them 
(Kampourakis & Zogza, 2008b).  It is not surprising that students often give purposeful 
explanations to animals and plants, whereas humans become more selfish, racist, less 
spiritual, and with less purpose as a result of evolution (Brem, Ranney, & Schindel, 
2003).  Fatal Flower is not unique in its poor treatment of evolutionary concepts 
(Dingwall & Aldridge, 2006; Dissertation Appendix 1).  Nature programs can provide 
opportunities for students to recognize misconceptions without feeling attacked for their 
personal understanding.  After all, the goal is to help students dispel cognitive illusions 
by recognizing the inherent errors of their current understanding. 
 When students leave academic institutions they are exposed to a variety of 
messages about evolution, some that are purposefully misleading, but some that may 
indirectly affect understanding by reinforcing misconceptions.  As John Ziman so 
eloquently wrote “the public receives and uses scientific knowledge that is incoherent, 
practically inadequate, incredible, and inconsistent” (Ziman, 1992).  If, as science 
educators, we do not address the language used to represent evolution and how it fits with 
lay theories, we may not be preparing students to adequately navigate these experiences.  
As adults grapple with creationist and evolutionist ideas, they rely on mental 
184 
representations that result from both interpreting and internalizing public or cultu al 
representations and those that result from inferential reasoning (Evans, 2001).  As 
knowledge is constructed and reconstructed in the free-choice learning environment, 
partially constructed ecologies may “revert” or be re-constructed when constantly 
exposed to the poor-quality messages delivered in nature programs and other free-choic  
science education resources. 
 
Implications 
 Today, evolution may be considered a socio-scientific issue (Sadler, 2004), but 
understanding evolution is vital for citizens to navigate the complex biological world they 
encounter in democratic societies.  There are differences between understanding and 
accepting evolution, however.  Misconceptions arise from several sources: (1) those 
rooted in experience, (2) those that are taught and learned through informal surces 
(including religious and myth-based sources), (3) those that result from vernacular issues 
(e.g., definitions of “theory” and “adaptation”), and (4) those that are constructed by 
accommodating new knowledge into prior misconceptions (Committee on Undergraduate 
Science Education, 1997).  This classification represents different levels of ab traction 
that may exist simultaneously in a learner’s mind.  These sources can be addresse  
through practices that consider the different levels of abstraction using nature programs in 
the classroom.  For example, vernacular issues can be dealt with in a straightforward way 
by exploring word denotations and connotations used in the narrative.  Likewise, students 
can be taught that the virtual experiences we have with media are not always a basi on 
which to judge evidence.  Indeed, broadening the curriculum to include explicit 
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instruction related to the Nature of Science (e.g., Scharmann et al., 2005) could be a 
valuable complement to examining nature program narratives.  The complexities of 
dealing with informal sources and conceptual change strategies require that studen s 
develop abstract levels of thinking, such as an understanding of deep time and 
probability.  These abstract concepts are the basis of ultimate causes of evolution (cf. 
Mayr, 1997), but vernacular issues can easily derail evolutionary thinking (cf. Ariew, 
2003) resulting in teleological (purposeful) explanations.  Nevertheless, conceptual 
change takes time, learning experiences in many contexts, and assessments that addresses 
the diversity of conceptions each individual may hold and apply in different contexts 
(diSessa, 2008).  Explicit discussion of and reflection on common misconceptions may be 
a useful tool for helping students recognize their own errors as errors and reveal some 
cognitive illusions.   
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CHAPTER 4.  
SEEING IS BELIEVING: THE IMPACTS OF NATURE FILM NARRATIVES ON 
STUDENT UNDERSTANDING OF EVOLUTION 
 
Abstract: 
 Informal, or free-choice, science education resources may contribute to 
individuals’ understanding of evolution, but direct effects are rarely examined.  Despite 
the incredible appeal of wildlife and nature programs, evolutionary theory is often treated 
poorly, promoting creationist accounts of ecological relationships such as “intelligent 
design”.  The combination of spectacular footage and poor quality narratives may be 
particularly damaging to evolution understanding as viewers “witness” individual 
organisms overcoming all odds to survive and reproduce.  I examined the effects of 
imagery and narrative by revising the narrative of one nature program to more accurately 
reflect current scientific understanding.  The footage, including incredible clos -ups of a 
euglossine bee squeezing through the throat of a bucket orchid during pollination, was 
replaced by still images and by repeating some of the more generalized scenery from the 
original version.  I used standardized metrics to assess attitudes, beliefs, and knowledge, 
and I revised one measure to reflect the organisms from the nature program f r use in the 
post-assessment.  Generally, evolution understanding scores decreased between pre-
assessment and post-assessment, the version of the nature program had very little effect, 
and the relationships between attitudes, beliefs, and understanding were complex.  When 
students with a moderate understanding of evolution were examined alone, the effects of 
different versions of the nature program reflected predictions, but the effects w re not 
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significant.  Responses to short-answer questions indicated that students believed the 
imagery was important to their understanding, and broadly characterizing students 
according to this factor contributed to understanding outcomes.  These results indicated 
that nature programs may be contributing to the poor public understanding of evolution. 
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 Basic understanding of evolution is critical to civic and social decisions (Antolin 
& Herbers, 2001).  Antibiotic resistance, gene therapy, disease, food production, 
environmental quality, and biotechnology are all areas of active biological research where 
evolution is a fundamental process.  Yet many Americans hold serious misconceptions 
about evolution and the process of science.  Indeed, the majority of the public (61%) may 
accept that humans and other living organism have evolved over time, but only 32% 
believe this evolution was due to natural processes (Pew Research Center for the Pe ple 
& the Press, 2009).  The issue of whether and how evolution is taught in public schools is 
highly contentious (National Science Foundation, 2006).  “Balanced treatment” and 
“strengths and weakness” legislation are invading public school systems across the 
country.  Both Louisiana and Texas have passed laws that not only erode science 
teaching, they provide loopholes to advance creationist teaching in the science classroom 
(National Center for Science Education, http://ncseweb.org/).  Under the guise of 
increasing critical thinking, these bills challenge the kinds of knowledge science 
generates and the methodological naturalism so important to its epistemology.  Science 
198 
classes taught without evolution will not only impact future citizenship but a future 
workforce in biological research as well.  Ironically, at the same time legislation is 
eroding the very principles that have permitted the success we all enjoy, the proportion of 
science-related discourses in our society is likely to increase (American Association for 
the Advancement of Science, 1990). 
 The theory of evolution is highly complex encompassing disciplines from 
anthropology to zoology.  Understanding each of these disciplines entails understanding a 
host of concepts that can be fairly descriptive (e.g., conceptualizing a population or a 
species) or highly abstract (e.g., conceptualizing genes or probabilities; Law on, 
Alkhoury, Benford, Clark, & Falconer, 2000).  When these conceptions do not match 
scientific conceptions about evolution, for example, they are referred to as 
misconceptions, alternative conceptions, non-scientific ideas, or limited or inappropriate 
propositional hierarchies (cf. Novak, 2002).  Students may hold highly systematic 
misconceptions about evolution (Cummins, Demastes, & Hafner, 1994), but whether this 
knowledge exists as a coherent framework (Vosniadou, Vamvakoussi, & Skopeliti, 2008) 
or as pieces that can be switched in and out of conceptual ecologies (diSessa, 2008) is 
unclear.  Nevertheless, three broad trends in student thinking about evolution exist: (1) 
students tend to believe the environment causes traits to change over time (students fail to 
distinguish between appearance of traits and survival over time); (2) students see 
evolution as a process that changes the entire species simultaneously (students do not 
consider the role of variation); and (3) students see gradual changes in the traits 
themselves (students do not see evolution as the changing proportions of individuals with 
traits; Bishop & Anderson, 1990).  These misconceptions can be tenacious, remaining 
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part of students’ conceptual ecologies even after significant coursework (Brumby, 1984; 
Nehm & Reilly, 2007; Wandersee, Mintzes, & Novak, 1994). 
 Informal resources for learning science outside of school, including museums, 
science centers, newspapers, magazines, the internet, and television, also may be 
important to evolution understanding.  Certainly, these resources affect the knowl dge 
students bring into the science classroom (Alters & Nelson, 2002), but they may be 
important in shaping conceptual ecologies once students have left formal schooling as 
well.  Although the learning process is the same outside of the classroom, the social 
context and underlying motivation of the learner are important factors (Dierking, Falk, 
Rennie, Anderson, & Ellenbogen, 2003; J. H. Falk, 2001; J. H. Falk & Dierking, 2000; 
Rennie, 2007).  Indeed, “free-choice” may be a more appropriate term than “informal” to 
describe the unique, intrinsic needs and interests of the learner outside of formal settings 
(J. H. Falk, 2001).   
 The role of informal sources in the construction of misconceptions about 
evolution is unclear.  Even with museums, one of the most well-studied free-choice 
learning environments, relatively little is known about how resources influence 
conceptual change (Diamond & Evans, 2007).  For example, science museums may base 
exhibits on the National Science Education Standards, employ scientists and science
educators, and consider exhibit design and flow to provide an experience close to the 
scientific explanation of human evolution (see Diamond & Scotchmoor, 2006).  Prior 
knowledge (Mintzes, Wandersee, & Novak, 1997) and intuitive biases (Evans, 2008) that 
visitors bring to the exhibit affect their interpretation and the learning outcome, however.  
Moreover, visitors are choosing what they want to learn about, perhaps bypassing 
200 
anything that does not fit into their conceptual framework or requires more cognitive 
resources than they are willing to expend at that moment (J. Falk & Storksdieck, 2005; J. 
H. Falk, Moussouri, & Coulson, 1998; Rennie & Johnston, 2004).  Learning from 
museums, and other informal science education resources, also may be vulnerable to the 
effect of other individuals within a social group (Gleason & Schauble, 1999).  To be sure, 
some misconceptions have been categorized as “taught and learned” – these types of 
misconceptions are the unscientific “facts” that may be taught informally by parents and 
others (Alters & Nelson, 2002).  Nevertheless, individuals have different identity-related 
motivations for their free-choice learning opportunities, and these motivations can predict 
learning outcomes (J. H. Falk, Heimlich, & Bronnenkant, 2008).  If viewers distinguish 
between educational and entertainment value, they may approach the knowledge 
presented differently, being more open to learning from programs that are considered 
“educational.”   
 Nature and wildlife programs are considered “educational” by convention, and 
must be considered a source of free-choice science understanding.  Whether these 
television programs contribute to evolution understanding or misunderstanding is 
unknown, however.  Because the genre is driven by the need for compelling story lines 
rather than scientific accuracy, several authors suggest embracing a h ghly skeptical view 
of the reality presented in wildlife films as well (Bousé, 2000; Mitman, 1999).  For 
example, the nature programs on the Discovery Channel may provide factual information 
about animals, but they present the information in moral and normative terms that engage 
viewers on a dramatic and emotional level (Pierson, 2005).  Narratives individualize the 
“struggle for existence” and humanize the dramas (the orphan that struggles to survive 
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and returns victorious to breed), misleading viewers to teleological and Lamarckian 
conceptions about evolution.  Indeed, references to evolution in nature programs are often 
teleological – they imply evolution is driven by some purpose (Aldridge & Dingwall, 
2003; Dingwall & Aldridge, 2006).  The result is that nature programs may implictly 
endorse creationist accounts of life on earth, especially the “blue-chip” sub-genre (a sub-
genre with high production values and strong visual appeal, often without a host – the 
narration is voiced over the production; Dingwall & Aldridge, 2006).   
 Nature film narratives, therefore, may have a dramatic effect on the public
understanding of evolution.  Narratives affect memory (Graesser, Hauft-Smith, Cohen, & 
Pyles, 1980; Shapiro & Fox, 2002), and they can increase the plausibility and 
persuasiveness of information presented (Voss, Wiley, & Sandak, 1999).  We relate to 
narratives.  Because the narrative is the predominant form taught for teaching nd 
reading, the “narrative” experience of our lives may make it easier to comprehend and 
recall content then expository texts much less related to life experiences (Norris, Guilbert, 
Smith, Hakimelahi, & Phillips, 2005).  Indeed, “transportation into a narrative world” 
may be a key mechanism of narrative impact (Green & Brock, 2000).   
 Although audiences process fictionality, external realism (matching with external 
reality), and narrative realism (coherence within a story) (Busselle & Bilandzic, 2008), 
external realism may not be essential.  Audiences make judgments about the consist ncy 
of narratives constructed from a narrative experience (i.e., story world, character models, 
and situation models) in relation to their own experiences (Busselle, Ryabovolova, & 
Wilson, 2004).  The result is that instead of being concerned with verisimilitude (i.e., the 
“truth”), audience members are concerned with coherence and logic within a particular 
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fictional context (Busselle & Bilandzic, 2008; Busselle et al., 2004).  Enjoyment is not 
dependent on how well a television program, for example, reflects real-world truth 
(Green, Brock, & Kaufman, 2004).  In fact, readers, and television viewers, that are 
“highly transported” maintain beliefs that are consistent with the storie, regardless of 
their realism (Green, 2004).  Prior knowledge and experience affect transportation 
(Green, 2004) in a counter-intuitive manner, with regards to science.  Experience with the 
relevant themes within the narrative results in a greater likelihood of transportation 
(Green, 2004) rather than any kind of skepticism.  So people with some experience 
overcoming obstacles, perhaps a sibling that has survived a devastating disease, may b  
more transported into nature film narratives that portray evolution as an individual 
struggle.  Moreover, “perceived realism” is highly correlated with how typical the event 
is perceived to be, leading to a “relative” realism (Shapiro & Fox, 2002).  Unfortu ately, 
engagement with a story may leave viewers with the sense that that story was authentic 
(Busselle & Bilandzic, 2008), whether it accurately reflects the current understanding of 
evolution , or not. 
 Likewise, video images designed to enhance nature programs may serve as 
powerful “virtual witnessing” events for viewers (Kirby 2003, see also Graber, 1990), 
resulting in an epistemological impact difficult to overcome, especially with socially 
controversial topics such as evolution.  The imagery not only alters concepts of time, 
specific imagery is used to enhance the relationship with the viewer, such as including 
scenes with eye-contact (Bousé, 2000).  Even scientists fall prey to the power of the 
moving image.  Padian (1987) suggests that scientific reconstructions of bat-winged 
pterosaurs were influenced by “plausibility” of pictorial images.  He notes, “a picture is 
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not only worth a thousand words; however inaccurate, it may be worth a wealth of well-
documented evidence to the contrary” (p. 76).  Indeed, research into the effects on 
learning from one beautifully crafted nature film suggests that the misconceptions 
presented in the narration affect undergraduate students’ understanding of evolution 
(Bright et al., abstract; Chapter 3; Dissertation Appendix 1). 
 Therefore, despite their standing as “educational” programming, nature films 
actually may enhance the differences in understanding of evolution between biological 
scientists and the general public (Dingwall & Aldridge, 2006).  Because the educational 
content is integral to the narrative (i.e., explanations of evolution that include design and 
advancement that individuals can relate to), the parallel mental processes rponsible for 
comprehending narrative and educational content complement each other (Fisch, 2000), 
enhancing the likelihood of developing misconceptions about evolution.  The spectacular 
footage, so often associated with series like Th Blue Planet and Planet Earth, may add a 
level of synergism to the effect.  Dingwall and Aldridge (2006) note “it is highly 
questionable whether wildlife and nature programming is making an appropriate 
contribution to the preparedness of civil society to deal with key issues in biological and 
environmental sciences.” 
 Nevertheless, the relationship between viewing a nature program and evolution 
understanding is complex, so I designed an experiment that specifically addresse  the 
factors related to knowledge about this important theory (Figure 4.1).  In this large-scale 
design, I examined the effects of nature program narrative and imagery to di ectly assess 
the influence of these programs on evolution understanding.   I also attempted to control 
for characteristics of the students related to attitudes toward science, attitude toward 
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evolution, understanding the nature of the scientific endeavor, and beliefs about 
knowledge.  I predicted that misconceptions in nature film narratives were a sourceof 
viewer misconceptions.  Viewer characteristics, such as positive attitudes toward 
evolution and science, beliefs about knowledge (personal epistemology) as well
understanding the nature of science, should alter that relationship, however.  In addition, 
narrative alone should have the greatest impact on understanding; imagery should only 
serve to enhance the effect.   
 
Methods 
Manipulating a Movie 
 Fatal Flower (BBC’s Natural World series 1998) uses beautiful imagery in a 
traditional natural history film that explores the adaptations of different species of orchids 
that lure insect and bird pollinators.  These pollinators in turn have adaptations that allow 
them to extract the nectar from specific orchids that they are dependent on for resources.  
Thus, from an educational perspective, the film appears to be an excellent example of co-
evolution and natural selection.  Unfortunately, the film is full of misconceptions (both 
intentional and inadvertent) about the evolutionary process and is a poor example of 
science in nature films (Dissertation Appendix 1).  Indeed, other work suggests that the 
misconceptions in the narration may affect students’ understanding of evolution.  
Misconceptions about the goals of evolution and transmission of adaptive traits appeared 
frequently in students’ written responses to questions after watching the program (see 
Chapter 3).  Therefore, I revised the narration to explain the co-evolutionary relationship 
more accurately than the misconception-laden original.  I enlisted the assistance of a local 
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Figure 4.1.  Determining the impact of nature program narratives and imagery on students’ underta ing of evolution.  Heavy lines 
indicate the proposed factors addressed within the experimental design. 
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television personality to narrate the revised version and re-voice the original version to 
avoid confounding the effects of the narration with the differences in narrators.  Because 
visual experiences may affect evolution understanding through the combined effects of 
narrative and imagery, I wanted to separate the visual effects on understanding from the 
narrative effects.  I reduced the films visual imagery to still images and/or repeated video 
segments that did not include the stunning close-ups of actual pollination events.  As a 
result, the experiment had the following treatments:  
 original version of the video (re-voiced) 
 revised narration to enhance the presentation of evolutionary theory 
 original version with revised imagery 
 revised narration with revised imagery. 
 
Assessment Instruments 
 I developed pre- and post-assessments from previously published tools addressing 
Attitudes toward Science, Personal Epistemology, Attitude toward Evolution, Nature of 
Science (NOS) Understanding, and evolution knowledge (Chapter Appendix 1).  I was 
looking to explore changes in evolution knowledge as the result of watching one version 
of Fatal Flower and how these changes were influenced by these variables.   
 Attitude has always been a difficult concept to assess; its presence can only be
detected through the behaviors it manifests (Mueller, 1986).  Indeed, Thurstone’s first 
formulation of the concept was “the sum total of a man’s inclination and feelings, 
prejudice and bias, preconceived notions, ideas, fears, threats, and convictions about any 
specified topic” (Thurstone, 1928).  Because attitudes toward evolution may carry more 
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emotional weight than attitudes toward science, a combination of tools was necesary to 
address this variable.   
 The Test of Science Related Attitudes (TOSRA) was developed by Fraser (1981)
and modified and refined by Adolphe (2002).  The multi-dimensional scale measured 
seven science-related attitudes, including Attitude to Scientific Inquiry, Adoption of 
Scientific Attitudes, and Social Implication of Science using a number of paired negative 
and positive statements.  Adolphe (2002) recorded moderately high to high reliability 
among students in two different countries for three of the sub-scales (Career Inter st in 
Science: Cronbach’s alpha = 0.74-0.77; Attitude toward Scientific Inquiry: Cronbach’s 
alpha = 0.71-0.75; Normality of Scientists: Cronbach’s alpha = 0.59-0.66), as did Joyce 
& Farenga (1999; Adoption of Scientific Attitudes: Cronbach’s alpha = 0.61; Career 
Interest in Science: Cronbach’s alpha = 0.90; Enjoyment of Science Lessons: Cr bach’s 
alpha = 0.93; Attitude toward Scientific Inquiry: Cronbach’s alpha = 0.78; Leisure 
Interest in Science: Cronbach’s alpha = 0.89; Social Implications of Science; Cronbach’s 
alpha = 0.83; and Normality of Scientists: Cronbach’s alpha = 0.72).  Responses to all 47 
items were recoded prior to analyses to reflect similar directions. 
 Personal epistemology (PE), or students’ underlying beliefs about knowledge and 
knowing, was operationalized using a modified version of Schommer’s Beliefs about 
Knowledge and Learning Test, a test with both high validity and reliability (0.74 test-
retest and 0.63-0.85 inter-item correlations for items within each belief factor; Duell & 
Schommer-Atkins, 2001).  The test was modified by Schraw, Bendixen, & Dunkle (2002) 
to create a more efficient instrument that reflected Schommer’s five ub-scales (Innate 
Ability, Omniscient Authority, Quick Learning, Certain Knowledge, and Simple 
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Knowledge).  The Epistemic Belief Inventory, as it came to be called, had higher test-
retest reliability than the original and better predictive ability when correlated with 
reading comprehension (Schraw et al., 2002).  In addition, the five sub-scales reflected 
the original dimensions of personal epistemology hypothesized by Schommer (1990).  
Responses to all items were recoded prior to analyses to reflect similar directions. 
 Attitudes toward evolution suffer from similar difficulties, especially given the 
perceived threat evolution poses toward religion.  Several similar surveys have been 
developed to evaluate evolution attitudes.  Most recently, Ingram & Nelson (2006) 
modified Brian Alter’s survey measuring student acceptance of evolution and used that 
scale to assess attitudes toward creationism and evolution.  The 12-item scale was highly 
reliable (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.87-0.88) and used very similar statements to the 
Measurement of Acceptance of the Theory of Evolution (MATE).  MATE also was a 
particularly reliable scale (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.98) but included 20 items (Rutledge & 
Warden, 1999).  Because of the high correlation between the two scales (Ingram & 
Nelson, 2006), I used the scale finalized by Ingram & Nelson (2006) to assess students’ 
acceptance of evolution.  Items from this survey included both positive and negative 
Likert-scale statements such as “over billions of years all plants and animals on Earth 
(including humans) descended (evolved) from a common ancestor (e.g., a one-celled 
organism)” (a positive statement) and “there is no real evidence that humans evolved 
from other animals” (a negative statement).  Responses to all items were recod d prior to 
analyses to reflect similar directions. 
 NOS Understanding was conceptualized as the level of understanding about the 
process of science, including the role of evidence, terminology, certainty, and tentative 
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nature of results.  Assessing students’ views of the NOS has been difficult, especially 
using standardized tests with closed questions (Aikenhead, 1988; Lederman, Wade, & 
Bell, 1998).  Nevertheless, open-ended questions, such as those developed by Lederman, 
Abd-El-Khalick, Bell, & Schwartz (2002), were not logistically feasible for this research.  
As a result, I used the Views of Science-Technology-Society (VOSTS) develop d by 
Aikenhead & Ryan (1992).  VOSTS is a series of closed questions, the validity of which 
arises from development of options grounded in student views (Aikenhead & Ryan, 
1992).  VOSTS, therefore, was a multiple-choice assessment that presented a vari ty of 
different viewpoints that likely included most students’ conceptualizations without 
resorting to written explanations.  The original VOSTS questionnaire was quite long, 
however, and included topics not necessarily appropriate in this research.  Therefore, I 
reduced the 114 questions from the original test to 15 questions I believed addressed the 
kind of NOS knowledge that may influence evolution understanding and media literacy.   
 None of these variables was expected to change between pre- and post-
assessments.  For example, although personal epistemology has been found to change 
over time (King & Kitchener, 1994), these changes take years.  Furthermore, change 
requires formidable effort (Schommer, 1990).  Understanding NOS also was unlikely to 
change in such a short timeframe; it too, requires explicit instruction to change 
conceptions (Akerson, Morrison, & McDuffie, 2006).   
 Prior evolution understanding was determined using the Conceptual Inventory of 
Natural Selection (CINS; Anderson, Fisher, & Norman, 2002).  CINS was a multiple 
choice test designed with answers known as “distracters” intended to assess the 
prevalence of misconceptions (Anderson et al., 2002).  The assessment focused on 10 key 
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concepts related to evolution, each with two questions: biotic potential, population 
stability, natural resources, limited survival, variation within a population, variation 
inheritable, differential survival, change in a population, origin of species, origin f 
variation.  Previous uses of CINS produced reliable results (Kuder-Richardson 20 = 0.58-
0.64) and internal validity (Anderson et al., 2002).  
 Because the pre- and post-assessments were to be given in close proximity (within 
two hours of each other originally), I did not want the test questions addressing evolution 
understanding to be identical.  CINS included two questions for each concept and could 
have been split into pre- and post-assessments.  I wanted to maintain maximum 
reliability, however, because I was looking for as sensitive a tool as possible.  In addition, 
I wanted to use organisms with which students had just had a visual experience.  If 
students had personal experience with the subject, they may have been more interest d in 
answering the questions honestly in the face of testing fatigue during the post-asse sment.  
In addition, using subjects from Fatal Flower may have added sensitivity to the 
experiment as students transferred knowledge about evolution to organisms they were 
familiar with after watching the program.  Therefore, I substituted organisms n the 
original CINS questions using subjects similar to those addressed in the nature program 
Fatal Flower.  The wording of the questions in all cases was kept nearly identical to the 
original CINS questions; only slight modifications were necessary to accommodate the 
new organisms.  The series of questions related to Canary Island Lizards was 
reformulated around hummingbirds foraging in the Andes (where mountain tops can act 
as islands), the Venezuelan Guppies questions were replaced with questions referri g to 
Costus plants (pollinated by hummingbirds or bees depending on the species), and the 
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Galapagos Finch questions were replaced with questions relating to MiamiBlue 
Butterflies (whose populations have been so isolated by development in Florida that they 
essentially exist on islands).   
 Open-ended questions were added to the online versions of the assessments to 
examine some of the complexity associated with individual’s understanding.  The pre-
assessment included two questions.  The first was a widely adopted question from a
instrument developed by Bishop & Anderson (1986):  
“Cheetahs (large African cats) are able to run faster than 60 miles per hour w en 
chasing prey.  How would a biologist explain how the ability to run fast evolved 
in cheetahs, assuming their ancestors could run only 20 miles per hour?” 
The second question came from an instrument developed by the Environmental Literacy 
Project at Michigan State University (MSU) by C. W. Anderson and others:   
“Squirrels have claws that they use to help them climb the bark of trees and jump 
from branch to branch.  They had ancestors that did not have good claws, so they 
were not as good at climbing and jumping. Explain how modern day squirrels 
have claws that are good for climbing and jumping even though their ancestors 
did not.” 
 The post-assessment included a single open-ended question similarly designed but 
using an example from Fatal Flower:   
“The program showed how some orchids have structures that seem to mimic the 
females of a species of wasp. Males are attracted to this structure and tryto mate 
with it, and they inadvertently pollinate the flower.  How would an evolutionary 
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biologist explain this type of mimicry, assuming that the orchids’ ancestors did 
not have these structures?” 
In addition, the post-assessment included three questions designed to elicit general 
information about the interaction of the program with evolution understanding: 
• What did watching the video do for your understanding of evolution? 
• Was the story particularly important to your understanding?  Give specific 
examples. 
• Was the imagery particularly important to your understanding?  Give specific 
examples. 
Questions used in the assessments are given in Chapter Appendices 1 and 2. 
 
Implementation 
 Pre-assessments may sensitize participants and thereby influence how individuals 
respond to treatments and/or post-assessments.  For example, a pre-assessment that 
focuses on evolution may alert students to cues in the nature program that focus their 
attention and affect how they respond to the post-assessment follow-up questions 
addressing evolution understanding.  The Solomon four-group design is a quasi-
experimental design that permits testing for the effects of the pre-assessment on post-
assessment outcomes (Table 4.1).  The design can test for effects of the pre-assessment 
and test for interaction effects between the pre-assessment and treatment that differ from 
the treatment alone (assuming sensitization did not occur; Frey, Botan, & Kreps, 2000).   
Indeed, the Solomon four-group design is one of the most powerful experimental designs 
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in social research, but it clearly requires large sample sizes to isolate causal effects (Frey 
et al., 2000).   
 The requisite large sample sizes were obtained by enlisting students from 
introductory biology courses from several universities in the north and west.  Initially, the 
assessments were designed as paper-and-pencil tests accompanied by a DVD version of 
the nature program (where applicable).  I enlisted the assistance of the professo  f the 
designated non-majors biology course at The University of Montana (UM); 244 student 
were ultimately enrolled in 12 laboratory sections associated with the lecture.  During the 
fall semester of 2008, I assigned lab sections randomly to one of the treatment groups 
(two sections each were assigned to groups 1 and 2).  Students completed the entire 
exercise during the course of the 2-hour lab period for extra credit. 
 The time requirement to conduct the experiment in class was a barrier for many 
other professors’ participation, however.  In addition, logistics for dealing with the large 
volume of paper required and the distances between universities necessitated a different
methodological approach.  The assessments were converted to online surveys using 
Survey Gizmo software (http://www.surveygizmo.com/), and the qualitative questions 
were added.  The four different versions of Fatal Flower also were made available 
online, each with its own, unique web address.  Because some of the treatments did not 
require pre-assessments and the class sizes of interested professors were small, the plan 
was to assign different universities treatments with pre/post-assessment  or post-
assessments only.  Unfortunately, the post-assessment only classes did not participate, but 
students from introductory biology courses at Eastern Washington University (EWU; Fall 
2008) and Michigan State University (MSU; Spring 2009) provided valuable additions to 
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Table 4.1.  
Assignment of treatment groups according to the Solomon four-group design. 
Group Pre-assessment Treatment Post-assessment 
1    X 
2  X  X 
3original   X X 
4original X X X 
5new images  X X 
6 new images X X X 
7 new narrative  X X 
8new narrative X X X 
9narration/images  X X 
10narration/images X X X 
 
 
the sample sizes within the pre/post-assessment cells (Table 4.2).  In spring 2009, 
students from the designated major’s introductory biology course at UM permitted 
sampling within the remaining cells, however.  I designed the survey to randomly assign 
each student to one version of Fatal Flower and provide the appropriate web address 
once the student had completed the pre-assessment or pre-assigned students by lab 
section to a version for those in the post-assessment only cells.   
 Because I revised the CINS assessment, I also compared the two versions (the 
original CINS questions versus the modified CINS questions) using students from the 
Fall 2008 Introduction to Human Form & Function course at UM.  Human Form & 
Function was a beginning biology course, primarily for pre-medical students.  As uch, 
these students had a clear interest in biology but were not addressing biological  
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Table 4.2.  
Realized fulfillment of the Solomon four-group design based on participating classes. 
Pre-
assessment 
Treatmenta 
Post-
assessment 
Participating classes 
  X UM Non-majors, UM Majors 
X  X UM Non-majors, UM Majors 
 X X UM Non-majors, UM Majors 
X X X UM Non-majors, UM Majors, EWU, MSU 
a Treatment includes watching one of four versions of Fatal Flower. 
 
processes, such as evolution.  Students were offered extra credit to complete one of the 
two versions of the full assessment, including the personal epistemology, attitudes, an  
NOS understanding questions.   
 All procedures were reviewed and certified by UM’s Institutional Review Board.  
All participants were over 18 years of age.  Paper and pencil tests followed standard 
confidentiality procedures, and online participation was anonymous. 
 
Analyses 
Attitudes and Beliefs Scales 
 Two of the knowledge scales were complex, and the data derived from this 
experiment did not necessarily reflect the published measures of constructs related to 
attitudes and beliefs.  Discarding items from scales that represented theoretical constructs 
implied that the reliability was a characteristic of the scale rathe  than the sample (Helms, 
Henze, Sass, & Mifsud, 2006), so I took two approaches to these problems.  For the first 
approach, I used all the items in previously identified sub-scales unless that set of i ems 
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could not be reduced to a single factor with Principle Components Analysis (PCA).  For 
the second approach, I used Principle Axis Factoring (PAF) and the Promax oblique 
rotation to examine the variance common to multiple variables and identify related items 
(Kahn, 2006).  The oblique rotation allowed assessment of factors that were correlated; 
for uncorrelated factors, the rotation was equivalent to an orthogonal rotation (Kah , 
2006).  My goal was to identify factors that may have predicted the effects of different 
versions of the nature programs on understanding and not necessarily to devise new lat nt 
constructs.  Therefore, once I identified new combinations of variables, I used PCA with 
Varimax rotation to maximize the information retained in the components describing 
these new factors (Kahn, 2006).   
 
Evolution Understanding 
 I examined the CINS scores in several forms: (1) total scores from either the Pre-
assessment CINS or the Post-assessment CINS, (2) individual score differences b tween 
post-assessment and pre-assessment (Differences), (3) the proportion of answers o  items 
that changed between pre-assessment and post-assessment for each individual (Changed 
Answers), and (4) whether those changes moved in the direction toward more correct 
answers on the post-assessment than on the pre-assessment (Correction Scale).  
Correction Scale was calculated as a scale where 1 = correct answer on pr-assessment, 
changed answer on post-assessment; 2 = incorrect answer on pre-assessment, changed 
answer (but still incorrect) on post-assessment; 3 = incorrect answer on pre-assessment, 
correct answer on post-assessment; and 4 = correct answer on pre-assessment, correct 
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answer on post-assessment.  Responses were summed across individuals and 
standardized based on the total possible. 
 Testing for the effects of the different versions of the nature program on evolution 
understanding required several different analyses.  I began analyses by examining the 
descriptive statistics of variables, as well as their inter-correlations.  I used t-tests to 
examine the differences between scores on the two versions of the evolution 
understanding tool (CINS).  To test for the effects of the pre-assessment on the pos -
assessment, I used two-way ANOVA to compare evolution understanding at the end of 
the experiment among those taking the pre-assessment versus those not taking it and the 
UM biology class (non-majors v. majors).   
 Using only individuals that experienced both the pre-assessment and the post-
assessment, I compared CINS scores among classes using two-way ANOVA.  Because 
the other CINS metrics related post-assessment to pre-assessment, I examined the 
differences among classes using Welch’s variance-weighted ANOVA to account for 
unequal error variances coupled with unequal sample sizes (Garson, 2009). 
 I examined the effects of the different treatments (versions of Fatal Flower) using 
ANCOVA on the post-assessment scores with the pre-assessment scores a  a covariate 
control.  I also used one-way ANCOVA to examine the effects of the covariates 
describing attitudes and beliefs on the three differences metrics. 
 
Results 
 Over 700 students participated in the experiment.  The average age of students 
was shy of 21 years old, but ages differed among the classes (Table 4.3).  Generally, 
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students at MSU were younger than students in other classes.  The majority of students 
were either freshmen or sophomores.  In addition, the number of biology courses students 
had taken prior to the current course ranged from none to more than six.  This question 
did not specify whether these courses were in college or elsewhere, however, and 
students at EWU were not asked the question.  Nevertheless, students in the consistency 
test (Human Form & Function) and UM Non-majors Biology reported taking more 
classes than UM Majors Biology students and students at MSU (Table 4.3). 
 
 
Table 4.3.  
Descriptive statistics for classes participating in the experimental examination of nature 
films on evolution understanding. 
   Agea  Biology coursesb 
Class n  Mean SE  Mean SE 
UM Human Form & Function  71  21.2  0.50  2.49 0.12 
UM Non-majors Biology 210  20.7  0.24  2.00 0.06 
UM Majors Biology 257  21.0  0.25  1.39 0.09 
EWU 49  20.9 .75  ---c --- 
MSU 126  19.4  0.15  1.01 0.08 
a F = 252.42; 4, 708 df; p = 0.001. 
b F = 43.498; 5, 537 df; p < 0.001). 
c Students were not asked how many biology course they had taken. 
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 Attitudes toward Science. – Almost all of the seven sub-scales from the published 
Attitudes toward Science multi-dimensional scale were reliable metrics.  Items within 
each sub-scale generally were reduced to a single linear combination with very little 
modification.  Three sub-scales proved highly reliable and were reduced easily to single 
components: Career Interest in Science, Enjoyment of Science Lessons, and Leisure 
Interest in Science (Table 4.4).  The single component generated to represent Care r 
Interest in Science explained 59% of the variance of the original items (Table 4.5), the 
component generated to represent Enjoyment of Science Lessons explained 62% of the 
variance (Table 4.6), and the component generated to represent Leisure Interest i  
Science explained 48% of the variance of the original items (Table 4.7).   
 
 
Table 4.4.  
Reliability metrics of the seven sub-scales measuring students’ Attitudes toward Science. 
Sub-scale n 
No. of 
items 
Cronbach’
s alpha 
Mean SD 
Career Interest in Science 655 6 0.86 19.34 5.469 
Enjoyment of Science Lessons 647 6 0.88 21.78 5.018 
Leisure Interest in Science 648 7 0.82 22.33 5.773 
Adoption of Scientific Attitudes 666 6 0.75 24.45 3.375 
Attitude toward Scientific Inquiry 654 6 0.73 21.41 3.914 
Social Implications of Science 541 10 0.81 38.76 5.444 
Normality of Scientists 566 4 0.53 15.29 2.500 
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Table 4.5.  
Factor coefficients for items in the Career Interest in Science sub-scale. 
Items Component 1 
I would like to be a scientist when I leave school. 0.871 
I would dislike being a scientist after I leave school.a 0.855 
When I leave school, I would like to work with people who make 
discoveries in science. 
0.779 
A career in science would be dull and boring.a 0.762 
I would like to teach science when I leave school. 0.653 
I would dislike becoming a scientist because it needs too much 
education.a 
0.646 
Eigenvalue 3.520 
Note.  n = 655. 
a Reverse keyed. 
 
 
 Items within the Adoption of Scientific Attitudes sub-scale proved fairly reliable 
measures of this construct (Table 4.4) but were slightly more difficult to reduce to a 
single component.  Originally, two components with Eigenvalues > 1.0 were defined, but 
the second component explained a relatively small amount of the variation and was 
highly correlated with the first (Table 4.8).  Therefore, the second component was 
eliminated, leaving a single Adoption of Scientific Attitudes component that explained 
45% of the variance of the original items.  
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Table 4.6.   
Factor coefficients for items in the Enjoyment of Science Lessons sub-scale. 
Items Component 1 
I dislike science lessons.a 0.854 
Science is one of the most interesting school subjects. 0.821 
Science lessons are fun. 0.812 
I would enjoy school more if there were no science lessons.a 0.805 
The material covered in science lessons is uninteresting.a 0.741 
School should have more science lessons each week. 0.668 
Eigenvalue 3.707 
Note.  n = 647. 
a Reverse keyed. 
 
 
 Two items were deleted from the Attitude toward Scientific Inquiry sub-scale 
after the paper and pencil test because a number of students commented on the 
redundancy of questions.  All of the items refer to the value of conducting experiments 
versus other forms of discovering information, so two items (one positive and one 
negative) were deleted in the subsequent online assessments.  The reduced sub-scale was 
still a fairly reliable metric (Table 4.4), however, and a single linear combination 
described 44% of the variation (Table 4.9). 
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Table 4.7.  
Factor coefficients for items in the Leisure Interest in Science sub-scale. 
Items Component 1 
Listening to talk about science on the radio would be boring.a 0.766 
I dislike reading books about science during my vacations.a 0.740 
I would enjoy visiting a science museum at the weekend. 0.717 
I would like to belong to a science club. 0.708 
I would like to be given a science book or a piece of scientific 
equipment as a present. 
0.679 
I get bored when watching science programs on TV at home.a 0.613 
I dislike reading newspaper articles about science.a 0.604 
Eigenvalue 3.352 
Note.  n = 648. 
a Reverse keyed. 
 
 
 The Social Implications of Science sub-scale was highly reliable (Table 4.4) but 
could not be reduced to a single component using PCA.  The second component (Table 
4.10) was primarily related to a single item (whether public funds for science have been 
used wisely in the last few years).  This item was removed from the scale, improv ng both 
the reliability of the sub-scale (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.81, mean = 35.89, SD = 5.159, 9 
items) and the number of components that were generated.  The resulting single 
component explained 42% of the variation in the remaining nine items (Eigenvalue = 
3.764).  
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Table 4.8.  
Rotated factor loadings for items in the Adoption of Scientific Attitudes sub-scale. 
 
Component 
Items 1 2 
I find it boring to hear about new ideas.a 0.770 0.199 
I dislike listening to other people’s opinions.a 0.708 -0.181 
I like to listen to people whose opinions are different from mine. 0.701 -0.471 
I am curious about the world in which we live. 0.617 0.424 
Finding out about new things is unimportant.a 0.603 0.551 
I enjoy reading about things that disagree with my previous ideas. 0.590 -0.490 
Eigenvalue 2.68 1.02 
Rotated loading 1.874 1.822 
Note.  n = 666. 
a Reverse keyed. 
 
 
 Lastly, the Normality of Scientists sub-scale was much less reliable than other 
sub-scales (Table 4.4).  In addition, PCA could not calculate a single component for the 
set of items (Table 4.11).  Because the second component explained only slightly more of 
the variance than a single item, only the scores from the first component were saved. 
 The saved regression scores for the sub-scales describing Attitudes toward 
Science were highly correlated (Table 4.12), indicating a high degree of overlap in the 
underlying constructs within this sample.  PAF also indicated significant correlations 
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Table 4.9.  
Factor coefficients for items in the Attitude toward Scientific Inquiry sub-scale. 
Items Component 1 
I would rather agree with other people than do experiments and find out 
for myself.a 
0.750 
It is better to ask the teacher the answer than to find out by doing 
experiments.a 
0.731 
I would rather solve a problem by doing an experiment than be told the 
answer. 
0.715 
I would rather find out about things by asking an expert than by doing an 
experiment.a 
0.654 
I dislike repeating experiments to check that I get the same results.a 0.543 
I would prefer to do experiments than to read about them. 0.542 
Eigenvalue 2.63 
Note. n = 654. 
a Reverse keyed. 
 
 
among factors and items (Table 4.13).  The high correlations between Career Interest i  
Science, Enjoyment of Science Lessons, and Leisure Interest in Science wre apparent in 
Component 1 of the structure matrix.  Items associated with the Social Implications of 
Science, Attitudes toward Inquiry, and Adoption of Scientific Attitudes appeared to load 
strongly on single components, whereas items describing the Normality of Scientists did 
not.  Therefore, I removed items with high inter-correlations, items that loaded heavily on 
more than one factor, and items that did not load on any factor.  The final structure ma rix  
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Table 4.10.  
Rotated factor coefficients for items in the Social Implications of Science sub-scale. 
 
Component 
Items 1 2 
Science is man’s worst enemy.a 0.680 0.040 
Money used on scientific projects is wasted.a 0.643 0.322 
Scientific discoveries are doing more harm than good.a 0.638 0.152 
This country is spending too much money on science.a 0.612 0.458 
Too many laboratories are being built at the expense of the rest of 
education.a 
0.583 0.045 
Science helps to make life better. 0.450 0.506 
Science can help to make the world a better place in the future. 0.426 0.559 
Money spent on science is well worth spending. 0.342 0.701 
The government should spend more money on scientific research. 0.193 0.700 
Public money spent on science in the last few years has been used 
wisely. 
-0.165 0.675 
Eigenvalue 3.826 1.083 
Rotated loading 2.563 2.346 
Note.  n = 541. 
a Reverse keyed. 
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Table 4.11.  
Rotated factor coefficients for items in the Normality of Scientist sub-scale. 
 
Component 
Items 1 2 
Scientists are about as fit and healthy as other people. 0.868 0.032 
Scientists are just as interested in art and music as other people are. 0.806 0.143 
Scientists are less friendly than other people.a 0.015 0.831 
Scientists do not have enough time to spend with their families.a 0.139 0.694 
Eigenvalue 1.586 1.032 
Rotated loading 1.423 1.194 
Note. n = 566. 
a Reverse keyed. 
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Table 4.12.  
Pearson correlations for the saved regression scores for sub-scales describing Attitudes oward Science. 
Sub-scale 
Career 
Interest in 
Science 
Enjoyment 
of Science 
Lessons 
Leisure 
Interest in 
Science 
Adoption of 
Scientific 
Attitudes 
Attitude toward 
Scientific 
Inquiry 
Social 
Implications 
of Science 
Normality 
of Scientists 
Career Interest in 
Science 
 0.776** 0.732** 0.317** 0.412** 0.443** 0.292** 
Enjoyment of Science  
Lessons 
  0.738** 0.403** 0.424** 0.540** 0.339** 
Leisure Interest in 
Science 
   0.417** 0.393** 0.470** 0.310** 
Adoption of Scientific 
Attitudes 
    0.363** 0.520** 0.318** 
Attitude toward 
Scientific Inquiry 
     0.339** 0.303** 
Social Implications of 
Science 
      0.454** 
Normality of Scientists        
** p < 0.001. 
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Table 4.13.  
Factor structure matrix for coefficients of all items in the Attitudes toward Science scale and the sub-scale (SS) to which they had been 
assigned in the literature. 
 
 
Component 
Item SSb 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Science is one of the most interesting school subjects. E 0.791 
 
0.430c 
     
I dislike science lessons.b E 0.784 0.502c 
      
Science lessons are fun. E 0.784 
  
0.435c 
    
I would like to be a scientist when I leave school. CI 0.779 
       
A career in science would be dull and boring.b CI 0.768 0.540c 
 
0.502c 
    
I would like to belong to a science club. LI 0.765 
       
I would dislike being a scientist after I leave school.b CI 0.741 
       
I would enjoy school more if there were no science lessons.b E 0.735 0.566c 
 
0.446c 
    
When I leave school, I would like to work with people who 
make discoveries in science. 
CI 0.682 
       
The material covered in science lessons is uninteresting.b E 0.633 0.511c 
      
School should have more science lessons each week. E 0.620 
       
I dislike reading books about science during my vacations.b LI 0.619 
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Component 
Item SSb 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Listening to talk about science on the radio would be boring.b LI 0.619 
       
I would enjoy visiting a science museum at the weekend. LI 0.599 
       
I would like to be given a science book or a piece of scientific 
equipment as a present. 
LI 0.592 
       
I would like to teach science when I leave school. CI 0.583 
       
positive - I would dislike becoming a scientist because it needs 
too much education.b 
CI 0.528 0.458c 
 
0.404c 
    
positive - I dislike reading newspaper articles about science.b LI 0.510 
       
This country is spending too much money on science.b SI 0.421c 0.651 0.566 0.513c 
    
Money used on scientific projects is wasted.b SI 
 
0.599 0.503 0.573c 
    
Science is man’s worst enemy.b SI 
 
0.536 
      
Scientists are less friendly than other people.b N 
 
0.534 
      
Too many laboratories are being built at the expense of the rest 
of education.b 
SI 
 
0.485 
      
Scientific discoveries are doing more harm than good.b SI 
 
0.406 
      
Scientists do not have enough time to spend with their families.b N 
 
0.404 
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Component 
Item SSb 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Money spent on science is well worth spending. SI 0.463c 
 
0.662 
     
The government should spend more money on scientific 
research. 
SI 0.452c 
 
0.656 
     
Science can help to make the world a better place in the future. SI 
  
0.648 0.475 
    
Science helps to make life better. SI 
  
0.620 0.429c 
    
Public money spent on science in the last few years has been 
used wisely. 
SI 
        
I find it boring to hear about new ideas.b A 
 
0.528c 
 
0.712 
    
I dislike listening to other people’s opinions.b A 
   
0.686 
    
I like to listen to people whose opinions are different from mine. A 
   
0.637 
    
I enjoy reading about things that disagree with my previous 
ideas. 
A 
   
0.452 
    
I would rather solve a problem by doing an experiment than be 
told the answer. 
I 
    
0.647 
   
It is better to ask the teacher the answer than to find out by 
doing experiments.b 
I 
 
0.468c 
  
0.645 
   
I would rather agree with other people than do experiments and 
find out for myself.b 
I 
 
0.511c 
 
0.487c 0.623 
   
I would rather find out about things by asking an expert than by 
doing an experiment.b 
I 
    
0.568 
   
I would prefer to do experiments than to read about them. I 
    
0.482 
   
231 
 
 
Component 
Item SSb 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Scientists are about as fit and healthy as other people. N 
     
0.629 
  
Scientists are just as interested in art and music as other people 
are. 
N 
     
0.484 
  
I am curious about the world in which we live. A 
  
0.439c 0.528c 
    
I get bored when watching science programs on TV at home.b LI 0.513c 0.454c 
      
Finding out about new things is unimportant.b A 
 
0.438c 
 
0.493c 
    
I dislike repeating experiments to check that I get the same 
results.b 
I 
        
Eigenvalue  12.512 3.657 2.151 1.759 1.563 1.354 1.313 1.109 
Note. n = 451.  Factor coefficients less than 0.400 are not shown.   
a SS: CI = Career Interest in Science, E = Enjoyment of Science Lessons, LI = Leisure Interest in Science, SI = Social Implications of 
Science, I = Attitude toward Scientific Inquiry, A = Adoption of Scientific Attitudes. 
b Reverse keyed. 
c When the correlations among factors was controlled, relationship between item and factor close to 0. 
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yielded five factors with high item correlations when the correlation among factors was 
controlled.   
 I named the first factor General Interest because it included a combination of 12 
items from Career Interest in Science, Enjoyment of Science Lessons, and Leisure 
Interest in Science.  The combination explained the majority of the variance in the 
sample, and the 12 items were highly reliable (Table 4.14).  The remaining factors 
mirrored sub-scales from the original Attitudes toward Science scale (Social Implications 
of Science, Adoption of Attitudes, and Attitudes toward Inquiry), each with fewer items.  
Therefore, I gave the factors new names to reflect these relationships: Factor 2 = New 
Implications, Factor 3 = New Attitudes, and Factor 4 = New Inquiry.  The remaining two 
factors were excluded from further analyses because they contributed little in terms of 
explaining the variance or interpretation. 
 
 Personal Epistemology. – Students beliefs about knowledge also were difficult to 
classify according to published sub-scales.  Previous researchers had identified five 
independent sub-scales (Schommer, 1990, Schommer-Aikins, 2004, and Schraw et al., 
2002), yet this sample yielded low reliability estimates.  Three of the sub-scales (Innate 
Ability, Omniscient Authority, and Quick Learning) had relatively minor issues to 
overcome for this analysis.  Using the published items, the reliability of the Innate Ability 
sub-scale was lower than generally considered acceptable (Table 4.15).  In addition, 
describing the variation with this combination of items required more than one factor 
(Table 4.16).  One item seemed to negatively affect the sub-scale (whether individuals 
are born with special gifts and talents).  When this item was not included, reliability 
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Table 4.14.  
Coefficients and reliability for new factors describing Attitudes toward Science derive  f om the sample. 
Factor Eigenvalue % variance Rotated loading % variance n Items Cronbach’s alpha Mean SD 
1 7.985 28.5 5.994 21.4 618 12 0.91 37.18 10.031 
2 2.342 8.4 2.834 10.1 581 5 0.72 18.07 3.108 
3 1.843 6.6 2.792 10.0 671 4 0.72 15.49 2.562 
4 1.546 5.5 2.097 7.5 672 4 0.67 14.59 2.794 
5 1.275 4.6 ---a      
 
6 1.142 4.1 ---a      
 
a Factors excluded from further analyses.
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increased to an acceptable level (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.71, mean = 17.82, SD = 3.689, 5 
items), and the remaining five items combined to a single component that described 47% 
of the variation (Eigenvalue = 2.331).  Reliability of the Omniscient Authority sub-scale 
with all four original items also was moderately unacceptable (Table 4.15).  PCA 
effectively reduced these items to a single component, however, that explained 50% of 
the variation in the original items (Table 4.17).  Similarly, when using all of the items 
from the published sub-scale designed to describe Quick Learning, reliability was below 
that considered acceptable for a construct (Table 4.15).  Nevertheless, PCA was able to 
extract a single component describing 39% of the variation in the five items (Table 4.18). 
 
 
Table 4.15.  
Reliability metrics for the five sub-scales measuring students’ beliefs about knowledge. 
Sub-scale n 
No. of 
items 
Cronbach’s 
alpha 
Mean SD 
Innate Ability 651 6 0.67 19.56 3.888 
Omniscient Authority 661 4 0.65 12.47 3.071 
Quick Learning  677 5 0.57 20.24 2.890 
Certain Knowledge 553 6 -0.16 20.33 2.558 
Simple Knowledge 610 7 0.48 24.63 3.332 
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Table 4.16.  
Rotated factor coefficients for items in the Innate Ability sub-scale. 
 
Component 
Items 1 2 
Smart people are born that way.a 0.763 0.161 
People’s intellectual potential is fixed at birth.a 0.722 -0.195 
How well you do in school depends on how smart you are.a 0.686 -0.073 
Really smart students don’t have to work as hard to do well in 
school.a 
0.640 0.306 
Some people just have a knack for learning and others don’t.a 0.543 0.378 
Some people are born with special gifts and talents.a -0.031 0.924 
Eigenvalue 2.356 1.082 
Rotated loading 2.279 1.159 
Note.  n = 651. 
a Reverse keyed. 
 
 
 Both the Certain Knowledge and Simple Knowledge sub-scales indicated more 
complex relationships in this sample than had been published previously.  The reliability 
estimate for Certain Knowledge, based on items from the literature, was negative (T ble 
4.15), due specifically to negative correlations between the items (despite recoding s  
that all items measured the same direction).  Schraw et al. (2002) identified a sub-set of 
three of the six original items to describe this construct using PAF, but isolating that sub-
set with this sample did not improve reliability (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.09).  Nor did it 
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Table 4.17.  
Factor coefficients for items in the Omniscient Authority sub-scale. 
Items Component 1 
People should always obey the law.a 0.798 
When someone in authority tells me what to do, I usually do it.a 0.772 
People shouldn’t question authority.a 0.770 
Children should be allowed to question their parents’ authority.  0.429 
Eigenvalue 2.011 
Note.  n = 661. 
a Reverse keyed. 
 
Table 4.18.  
Factor coefficients for items in the Quick Learning sub-scale. 
Items Component 1 
If you don’t learn something quickly, you won’t ever learn it.a 0.752 
Working on a problem with no quick solution is a waste of time.a 0.673 
If you haven’t understood a chapter the first time through, going back 
over it won’t help.a 
0.663 
If a person tries too hard to understand a problem, they will most likely 
end up being confused.a 
0.528 
Students who learn things quickly are the most successful.a 0.481 
Eigenvalue 1.968 
Note.  n = 677. 
a Reverse keyed. 
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yield a single principle component.  In fact, this sub-set of three items resulted in two 
components with relatively evenly distributed Eigenvalues (1.07, 1.01, 0.91, 
respectively), each representing about a third of the variance found in the original three 
items of the sub-set.  PCA highlighted the complex nature of the sub-scale with this 
sample; the original items represented three linear components that explained 61% of the 
variation.  The rotated matrix indicated that these components split the items into a 
component that could be considered an idiosyncratic approach to knowledge certainty, a 
component that isolated the negative relationship between two factors defining “truth”, 
and a component that identified the role of parents (Table 4.19).  Removing the two items 
that yielded negative correlations and the item comprising the majority of the third 
component resulted in a single component that described 45% of the variation in the 
remaining items (Eigenvalue = 1.347).  Not surprisingly, the reliability of these three 
items was low (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.38, mean = 12.00, SD = 1.941, 3 items). 
 Simple Knowledge also was a poor characterization of students’ understanding 
(Table 4.15).  The complexity was clear when attempting to reduce the sub-scale to a 
single linear combination of the items (Table 4.20).  PCA identified three components in  
this one sub-scale that explained 59% of the original variance: the first component 
described the role of theories in science explanations, the second component describe  
the ease of science knowledge, and the third component described the complexity of 
knowledge.  Although the two items comprising the bulk of the third component were 
both strong contributors (> 0.70), the component only described slightly more variation 
than a single item.  In addition, “the more you know about a topic, the more there is to 
know” contributed positively and “the best ideas are often the most simple” contributed  
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Table 4.19.  
Rotated factor coefficients for items in the Certain Knowledge sub-scale. 
 
Component 
Items 1 2 3 
What is true today will be true tomorrow.a 0.744 0.030 0.109 
If two people are arguing about something, at least 
one of them must be wrong.a  
0.724 -0.008 -0.006 
Absolute moral truth does not exist.  -0.236 0.665 0.182 
Sometimes there are no right answers to life’s big 
problems.  
0.381 0.546 -0.372 
What is true is a matter of opinion.a -0.118 -0.747 -0.006 
Parents should teach their children all there is to 
know about life.a 
0.131 0.088 0.919 
Eigenvalue 1.477 1.142 1.027 
Rotated loading 1.310 1.307 1.028 
Note.  n = 553. 
a Reverse keyed. 
 
 
negatively (despite recoding).  By removing these two items and the single item 
negatively correlated with the first component, I was able to reduce the remaining items 
to a single factor that described 49% of the variation in the remaining items (Eigenvalu  
= 1.753).  Reliability was relatively low, however (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.57, mean = 
14.66, SD = 2.557, 4 items).  Nevertheless, these four items encompassed the sub-set of 
items identified by Schraw et al. (2002) (they did not include “things are simpler than  
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Table 4.20.  
Rotated factor coefficients for items in the Simple Knowledge sub-scale. 
 
Component 
Items 1 2 3 
Too many theories just complicate things.a 0.772 0.053 0.089 
Things are simpler than most professors would have 
you believe.a 
0.689 -0.094 -0.019 
Instructors should focus on facts instead of theories.a 0.592 0.432 -0.074 
Science is easy to understand because it contains so 
many facts.a 
-0.182 0.849 -0.141 
Most things worth knowing are easy to understand.a 0.356 0.601 0.250 
The more you know about a topic, the more there is 
to know.  
0.171 0.155 0.707 
The best ideas are often the most simple.a 0.158 0.175 -0.748 
Eigenvalue 1.874 1.211 1.041 
Rotated loading 1.634 1.335 1.156 
Note.  n = 610. 
a Reverse keyed. 
 
 
most professors would have you believe” in their sub-set), indicating some consistency 
within this theoretical construct. 
 Because the Personal Epistemology sub-scales identified in the literature were 
less than ideal for use with these data, I used PAF to explore the relationships among 
items and to identify new related factors.  Although seven factors were identified, the 
final two contributed little to the overall analysis (Table 4.21).  The first factor described  
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Table 4.21.  
Factor structure matrix for coefficients of all items in the Personal Epistemology scale and the sub-scale (SS) to which they had been 
assigned in the literature. 
 
 
Components 
Item SSb 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Working on a problem with no quick solution is a waste of time.b QL 0.674 
      
Too many theories just complicate things.b SK 0.639 
      
If you don’t learn something quickly, you won’t ever learn it.b QL 0.598 0.421c 
    
-0.488 
Most things worth knowing are easy to understand.b SK 0.583 
      
If you haven’t understood a chapter the first time through, going back 
over it won’t help.b 
QL 0.577 
      
Instructors should focus on facts instead of theories.b SK 0.553 
      
If two people are arguing about something, at least one of them must 
be wrong.b 
CK 0.474 
      
Smart people are born that way.b IA 
 
0.699 
     
Really smart students don’t have to work as hard to do well in school.b IA 
 
0.596 
     
Students who learn things quickly are the most successful.b QL 
 
0.580 
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Components 
Item SSb 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
How well you do in school depends on how smart you are.b IA 
 
0.576 
     
People’s intellectual potential is fixed at birth.b IA 0.420c 0.544 
     
Some people just have a knack for learning and others don’t.b IA 
 
0.487 
     
People should always obey the law.b OA 
  
0.726 
    
When someone in authority tells me what to do, I usually do it.b OA 
  
0.655 
    
People shouldn’t question authority.b OA 0.441c 
 
0.651 
    
Sometimes there are no right answers to life’s big problems.  CK 
   
0.560 
   
The more you know about a topic, the more there is to know.  SK 
   
0.404 
   
What is true is a matter of opinion.b CK 
    
0.513 
  
Things are simpler than most professors would have you believe.b SK 
       
Science is easy to understand because it contains so many facts.b SK 
     
0.496 
 
Parents should teach their children all there is to know about life.b CK 
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Components 
Item SSb 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Some people are born with special gifts and talents.b IA 
      
0.489 
Absolute moral truth does not exist.  CK 
       
The best ideas are often the most simple.b  SK 
       
Children should be allowed to question their parents’ authority.  OA 
       
If a person tries too hard to understand a problem, they will most 
likely end up being confused.b 
QL 
       
What is true today will be true tomorrow.b CK 
       
Eigenvalue  4.986 2.294 1.901 1.626 1.428 1.113 1.041 
Note. n = 476.  Factor coefficients less than 0.400 are not shown.   
a SS: IA = Innate Ability, OA = Omniscient Authority, QL = Quick Learning, CK = Certain Knowledge, SK = Simple Knowledge. 
b Reverse keyed. 
c When the correlations among factors was controlled, relationship between item and factor close to 0. 
 
  
243 
Table 4.22.  
Coefficients and reliability for new factors describing Personal Epistemology derive  from the sample. 
Factor Eigenvalue % variance Rotated loading % variance Items Cronbach’s alpha Mean SD 
1 4.986 17.807 3.452 12.330 7 0.75 28.30 3.911 
2 2.294 8.194 2.889 10.319 6 0.74 21.32 4.352 
3 1.901 6.789 2.127 7.597 3 0.72 9.32 2.628 
4 1.626 5.809 1.652 5.900 2 0.34 7.66 1.538 
5 1.428 5.102 1.526 5.449 2 0.31 6.75 1.645 
6 1.113 3.977 1.431 5.110 ---a   
 
7 1.041 3.718 1.314 4.691 ---a   
 
a Factors excluded from further analyses. 
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Quick & Easy Knowledge.  Factor 1 included seven items uncorrelated with other factors
with loadings > 0.4 that represented a combination of the original Quick Learning and the 
Simple Knowledge sub-scales from the literature.  The reliability of this new sub-scale 
was relatively high (Table 4.22).  Factors 2 and 3 were nearly identical to the two sub- 
scales describing Innate Ability and Omniscient Authority, respectively.  Variable names, 
New Innate and New Omniscient, were designated to reflect this similarity.  The 
reliability of items comprising these two factors also was acceptable.  Th fourth factor, 
Complex Knowledge, included items that caused difficulties in the previous analyses, but 
with only two items comprising the component, reliability was low.  The last factor 
considered was Idiosyncratic Knowledge, which also yielded fairly low reliability for the 
two items.  Scores from a PCA were saved for these five factors. 
 
 Attitudes toward Evolution. – The scale describing students’ acceptance of 
evolution was highly reliable (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.90, 12 items, mean = 46.73, SD = 
9.118,  n = 474), but one item was problematic.  One third of students did not answer the 
item that stated “The Second Law of Thermodynamics shows that evolution could not 
have happened.”  On the paper and pencil version, many students commented that they 
did not even know what the law was, so this item was excluded from analyses.  The final 
sub-scale was still highly reliable (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.89, 11 items; mean = 42.74, SD 
= 8.587, n = 520) and reduced to a single component (Table 4.23) that explained 49% of 
the variation in the original items. 
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Table 4.23.  
Factor coefficients for items in the Attitudes toward Evolution scale. 
Items Component 1 
A supreme being (e.g., God) created humans pretty much in their present 
form; humans did not evolve from other forms of life (e.g., fish and/or 
reptiles).a 
0.840 
There is no real evidence that humans evolved from other animals.a 0.825 
There is no fossil evidence supporting that humans and apes evolved 
from a common ancestor.a 
0.782 
The Earth is not old enough for evolution to have taken place.a 0.762 
Over billions of years all plants and animals on Earth (including humans) 
descended (evolved) from a common ancestor (e.g., a one-celled 
organism). 
0.718 
Scientists who believe in evolution do so mainly because they want to, 
not because of any evidence.a 
0.685 
There is scientific evidence supporting that humans were supernaturally 
created.a 
0.621 
Mutations are never beneficial to animals.* 0.477 
It is statistically impossible that life arose by chance.a 0.467 
Eigenvalue 5.41 
Note: n = 520. 
a Reverse keyed. 
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 NOS Understanding. – NOS Understanding was measured with multiple choice 
answers that reflected a variety of students’ ideas.  Although a single choic ould be 
made for each question that reflected how most educators would view the NOS, several 
questions had numerous choices that indicated partial understanding of the topic and not 
necessarily a misunderstanding.  I scored each “correct” answer with one point and each 
partial answer with 0.5 points.  I summed points across all 15 questions.  The resulting 
variable appeared relatively normally distributed (Figure 4.2), however Shapiro-Wilk 
indicated it was not (W = 0.990; 713 df; p < 0.001).  The difference was due to the right 
skew (mean + SE: -0.194 + 0.092) and somewhat leptokurtotic distribution (mean + SE: 
0.019 + 0.183).   Standard transformations failed to improve normality issues, however. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2.  Distribution of students’ NOS Understanding scores (n = 714). 
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Consistency of the Two Versions of CINS 
 I examined the mean total scores for the two versions of CINS (the original and 
the post-assessment version that had been modified with new organisms) to look for 
consistency between the two measures of evolution understanding using students not 
involved in the experimental manipulation.  The distribution of scores indicated that the 
two versions might not be comparable metrics (Figure 4.3).  In fact, the mean score for 
students taking the original CINS assessment was higher than the mean scor for students 
taking the modified CINS assessment (10.9 + 0.53 [mean + SE] v. 9.4 + 0.56; t = 1.985; 
67 df; p = 0.05).   
 
 
 
Figure 4.3.  Distribution of CINS scores for the original version of the CINS tool and the 
new, revised version used in the post-assessment (original: n = 36; modified: n = 33). 
  
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
P
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
 o
f 
st
u
d
e
n
ts
CINS score
original
modified
248 
Effects of the Pre-assessment 
 The Post-assessment CINS scores did not differ among individuals taking the pre-
assessment and individuals taking the post-assessment only (Table 4.24).  Scores of UM 
Non-majors Biology students taking the post-assessment only were lower than those that 
had taken both the pre-assessment and post-assessment, as would be predicted if the pre-
assessment had a positive priming effect.  Conversely, the scores of UM Majors Biol gy 
students were opposite of that predicted given a positive priming effect.  Although the 
error variances were not equal among the groups (Levene’s statistic = 8.142; 3, 452 df; p
< 0.001), the ratio of the largest to smallest variance was less than 3:1 and two-way 
ANOVA is less sensitive to issues of heterogeneity of variance than one-way ANOVA 
(Garson, 2009).   
 
 
Table 4.24.  
Mean post-assessment Total Scores of evolution understanding for individuals 
experiencing both the pre- and post-assessments versus the post-assessment only. 
 
 
Pre-/Post-Assessment 
  
Post-Assessment only 
Class n Mean SE 
 
n Mean SE 
UM Non-majors Biology 99 10.3 0.39  109 9.6 0.31 
UM Majors Biology 127 10.1 0.43  121 10.5 0.36 
Note.  F = 0.983; 3, 452 df; p = 0.401. 
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Effects of Fatal Flower on Evolution Understanding 
 Treatment Effects:  With the Solomon four-group design, some students taking 
both the pre-assessment and the post-assessment in classes at UM did not view any 
version of Fatal Flower.  ANCOVA using Pre-assessment CINS scores as the covariate 
indicated that treatment did indeed have an effect (F = 2.444; 4, 420 df; p = 0.048; Table 
4.25).  Students not watching any version of Fatal Flower had higher Post-Assessment 
CINS scores than those watching all versions of the nature program except for the New 
Imagery version.  Parameter estimates indicated that both No Treatment and New 
Imagery had significant effects on the model, but the observed power was lower than the 
0.80 considered acceptable to avoid a Type II error (0.714 and 0.615, respectively). 
 I also examined the three difference metrics using one-way ANOVA becaus  pre-
assessment and post-assessment scores were highly correlated ( = 0.904).  Although 
differences (post-assessment score - pre-assessment score) did not differ (Table 4.26), the 
proportion of Changed Answers and the Correction Scale did vary among students 
experiencing the different treatments of Fatal Flower.  These differences were driven by 
students watching the New Narrative/Imagery version who tended to change answers 
more often and to less correct responses more often than students watching other versions
or none at all. 
 
 Differences among Classes: For students taking both the pre-assessment and the 
post-assessment, Pre-assessment and Post-assessment CINS scores differed among 
classes (assessment: F = 4.227; 1, 776; p = 0.040; class: F = 35.726; 3, 776; p < 0.001).  
The differences were due to lower scores on the post-assessment than on the pre- 
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Table 4.25.  
Estimated marginal means of Post-Assessment CINS using Pre-Assessment CINS as a 
covariate for each of the five treatments examining the effect of Fatal Flower on evolution 
understanding.  
 
 
  
95% confidence interval 
Treatment n Mean SE Lower bound Upper bound 
No Treatment 37 11.12 0.532 10.07 12.17 
Original 48 10.39 0.467 9.47 11.31 
New Narrative 48 9.70 0.468 8.78 10.63 
New Imagery 43 10.82 0.499 9.83 11.80 
New Narrative/Imagery 50 9.28 0.458 8.38 10.18 
 
 
assessment, and higher scores on both assessments for the class at MSU than other 
classes (Figure 4.4).  The effect of class also was significant when examining the 
difference scores (Table 4.27).  Likewise, the proportion of changed answers between 
pre- and post-assessments differed among classes, as did the Correction Scale (Table 
4.27).  Students in UM Majors Biology tended to have a higher proportion of changed 
answers between the pre- and post-assessment, and students in the MSU class a lower 
proportion, than students in either UM Non-majors Biology or the EWU class.  Despite 
changing answers frequently, UM Majors Biology students generally did not change to 
correct responses in the post-assessment; MSU students generally changed to correct 
answers (Table 4.27).  
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Table 4.26.  
Mean Difference, Changed Answers, and Correction Scale for tests of evolution 
understanding of students experiencing both the pre-assessment and the post-assessment 
and different versions of Fatal Flower. 
  
Differencea  
Changed 
Answersb 
 Correction 
Scalec 
Class n Mean SE  Mean SE 
 
Mean SE 
No Treatment 37 0.27 0.440  0.35 0.029  0.72 0.018 
Original 48 -0.38 0.494  0.45 0.034  0.68 0.020 
New Narrative 48 -1.02 0.453  0.48 0.029  0.65 0.018 
New Imagery 43 -0.26 0.580  0.39 0.037  0.72 0.022 
New Narrative/Imagery 50 -1.52 0.467  0.51 0.032  0.64 0.018 
a F = 1.969; 4, 221; p = 0.100. 
b F = 3.617; 4, 221; p = 0.007. 
c F = 3.359; 4, 221; p = 0.011. 
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Figure 4.4.  Evolution understanding for each class as measured by CINS scores on the 
pre-assessment and post-assessment. 
 
 
 Differences among Versions:  No differences among versions were detected when 
Post-assessment CINS scores were examined using ANCOVA and Pre-assessment 
Scores as the covariate (F = 0.609; 3, 338 df; p = 0.610).  Classes differed significantly, 
however (F = 3.992; 3, 338 df; p = 0.008).  Graphing the estimated marginal means 
indicated that indeed evolution understanding may have been changing differently among 
classes (Figure 4.5).  MSU students scored better on the Post-assessment CINS after 
watching the versions with new narrative and poorer after watching versions with the 
original narrative.  Students at UM, however, seemed to perform better on the Post-
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Table 4.27.  
Mean Difference, Changed Answers, and Correction Scale for tests of evolution 
understanding of students experiencing both the pre-assessment and the post-assessment. 
  
Differencea  
Changed  
Answersb 
 Correction  
Scalec 
Class n Mean SE  Mean SE 
 
Mean SE 
UM Non-majors Biology 99 -0.4 0.28  0.39 0.018  0.69 0.012 
UM Majors Biology 127 -0.8 0.33  0.48 0.022  0.67 0.013 
EWU 49 -1.2 0.37  0.43 0.029  0.69 0.018 
MSU 117 -0.1 0.23  0.29 0.017  0.79 0.011 
a Welch’s statistic = 2.807; 3, 173.042; p > 0.041. 
b Welch’s statistic = 16.710; 3, 170.026; p > 0.001. 
c Welch’s statistic = 19.849; 3, 170.080; p > 0.001. 
 
 
and New Narrative/Imagery).  Students at EWU scored higher after watching any of the 
revised versions of the program than the original version.   
 Using the difference metrics with two-way ANOVA supported the idea that class 
was differentially affecting evolution understanding.  Differences between the two 
assessments for each individual did not vary among class or version (class: F = 2.033; 3, 
339 df; p = 0.109; version: F = 0.486; 3, 339 df; p = 0.692), but the proportion of 
Changed Answers was lower (F = 16.984; 3, 339 df; p < 0.001; Figure 4.6) and the 
Correction Scale was higher (F = 19.535; 3, 339 df; p < 0.001; Figure 4.7) for students at 
Michigan State than in other classes.  Homogeneity of variances was an issue w th these  
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Figure 4.5.  Estimated marginal means of Post-assessment CINS scores for each class 
and version of Fatal Flower. 
 
 
Figure 4.6.  Estimated marginal means of Changed Answer scores for each class and 
version of Fatal Flower. 
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Figure 4.7.  Estimated marginal means of Correction Scale scores for each class and 
version of Fatal Flower. 
 
 
analyses, but the ratio of the largest to smallest variance was relatively small in all cases 
(Garson, 2009). 
 
Effects of Attitudes and Beliefs 
 The covariates addressing attitudes and beliefs affected outcomes of the 
experimental treatments differently.  The class at MSU was examined separately because 
previous analyses indicated students may have been responding differently there than in 
the other classes.  Difference metrics for students from the class at MSU rarely were 
influenced by any of the attitudes and beliefs scales, however.   
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 Attitudes toward Science:  Neither the original Attitudes toward Science sub-
scales (Table 4.28) nor the sub-scales derived from the data (Table 4.29) were significant 
predictors of evolution understanding for students at MSU.  For students in the other 
classes, variation was evident.  Career Interest was a significant predicto  of Difference 
scores between post-assessment and pre-assessment scores, and Adoption of Attitudes 
was a significant predictor of both the proportion of Changed Answers and Correction 
Scale (Table 4.30), as were General Interest, New Implications, and New Attitudes from 
the sub-scales derived from the data (Table 4.31).  In addition, these covariates affec d 
the outcomes of the different versions of the nature program.  Difference scores became 
more positive for students watching the New Imagery version and more negative for 
students watching other versions, indicating a decrease in post-assessment scores from 
pre-assessment scores (Table 4.32).  The effect was similar when the sub-scales derived 
from the data were used as covariates (Table 4.33).  Correction Scale of students 
watching the version New Narrative/Imagery version increased after adjustment for the 
derived attitudes toward science sub-scales, whereas scores of students watching other 
versions decreased (Table 4.34). 
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Table 4.28.  
Results of ANCOVA using the Attitudes toward Science sub-scales to predict difference metrics for evolution understanding for 
students in the MSU class taking both the pre-assessment and the post-assessment. 
 Difference  Changed Answers  Correction Scale 
Sub-scale r2 F p  r2 F p  r2 F p 
Career Interest 0.021 0.959 0.333  0.001 0.055 0.816  0.011 0.509 0.480 
Enjoyment 0.065 3.075 0.086  0.002 0.079 0.780  0.040 1.843 0.182 
Leisure Interest 0.002 0.073 0.788  0.034 1.535 0.222  0.007 0.308 0.582 
Adoption of Attitudes 0.017 0.772 0.384  0.000 0.021 0.885  0.000 0.001 0.972 
Attitudes toward Inquiry 0.012 0.514 0.477  0.006 0.251 0.619  0.005 0.200 0.657 
Social Implications 0.008 0.341 0.562  0.070 3.332 0.075  0.034 1.557 0.219 
Normality of Scientists 0.033 1.487 0.229  0.001 0.046 0.831  0.003 0.121 0.730 
Version 0.088 1.409 0.253  0.067 1.048 0.381  0.054 0.832 0.484 
Note. 1, 44 df. 
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Table 4.29.  
Results of ANCOVA using the sub-scales derived from the data describing attitudes toward science to predict difference metrics for 
evolution understanding for students in the MSU class taking both the pre-assessment and the post-ass ssment. 
 Difference  Changed Answers  Correction Scale 
Sub-scale r2 F p  r2 F p  r2 F p 
General Interest 0.000 0.023 0.880  0.002 0.119 0.731  0.010 0.572 0.453 
New Implications 0.020 1.160 0.286  0.008 0.439 0.510  0.015 0.870 0.355 
New Attitudes 0.001 0.037 0.849  0.017 0.950 0.334  0.052 3.081 0.085 
New Inquiry 0.045 2.627 0.111  0.002 0.088 0.767  0.002 0.130 0.719 
Version 0.055 1.090 0.361  0.017 0.315 0.815  0.062 1.224 0.310 
Note. 1, 56 df. 
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Table 4.30.  
Results of ANCOVA using the Attitudes toward Science sub-scales to predict difference metrics for evolution understanding for 
students at UM and EWU classes taking both the pre-assessment and the post-assessment. 
 Difference  Changed Answers  Correction Scale 
Sub-scale r2 F p  r2 F p  r2 F p 
Career Interest 0.043 5.728 0.018  0.016 2.142 0.146  0.027 3.507 0.063 
Enjoyment 0.009 1.194 0.277  0.002 0.206 0.651  0.004 0.554 0.458 
Leisure Interest 0.005 0.605 0.438  0.002 0.252 0.616  0.000 0.004 0.949 
Adoption of Attitudes 0.000 0.001 0.970  0.103 14.682 <0.001  0.061 8.309 0.005 
Attitudes toward Inquiry 0.000 0.025 0.876  0.001 0.090 0.764  0.000 0.063 0.802 
Social Implications 0.006 0.819 0.367  0.001 0.137 0.712  0.001 0.154 0.696 
Normality of Scientists 0.011 1.370 0.244  0.011 1.410 0.237  0.011 1.407 0.238 
Version 0.075 3.469 0.018  0.042 1.873 0.137  0.048 2.129 0.100 
Note. 1, 128 df. 
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Table 4.31.  
Results of ANCOVA using the sub-scales derived from the data describing attitudes toward science to predict difference metrics for 
evolution understanding for students at UM and EWU classes taking both the pre-assessment and the post-ass ssment. 
 Difference  Changed Answers  Correction Scale 
Sub-scale r2 F p  r2 F p  r2 F p 
General Interest 0.008 1.046 0.308  0.038 5.462 0.021  0.063 9.311 0.003 
New Implications 0.001 0.110 0.741  0.052 7.495 0.007  0.050 7.319 0.008 
New Attitudes 0.002 0.278 0.599  0.090 13.687 <0.001  0.053 7.676 0.006 
New Inquiry 0.000 0.042 0.838  0.002 0.256 0.614  0.002 0.261 0.610 
Version 0.069 3.384 0.020  0.046 2.234 0.087  0.065 3.184 0.026 
Note. 1, 138 df. 
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Table 4.32.  
Unadjusted and estimated marginal means adjusted by the Attitudes toward Science sub-
scales for Difference scores for students in classes at UM and EWU. 
 
 Unadjusted    Adjusted 
Version n      Mean      SE       Mean      SE 
Original 40 -0.750 0.619  -0.889 0.518 
New Narrative 34 -1.029 0.507  -1.007 0.559 
New Imagery 24 1.083 0.586  1.359 0.685 
New Narrative/Imagery 41 -1.195 0.442  -1.240 0.505 
 
 
 
Table 4.33.  
Unadjusted and estimated marginal means adjusted by the sub-scales derived from the 
data describing attitudes toward science for Difference scores for students in classes at 
UM and EWU. 
 
 Unadjusted    Adjusted 
Version n      Mean      SE       Mean      SE 
Original 40 -0.683 0.597  -0.720 0.503 
New Narrative 34 -1.250 0.465  -1.244 0.536 
New Imagery 24 0.962 0.556  0.985 0.630 
New Narrative/Imagery 41 -1.395 0.447  -1.380 0.488 
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Table 4.34.  
Unadjusted and estimated marginal means adjusted by the sub-scales derived from the 
data describing attitudes toward science for Correction Scale for students in classes at 
UM and EWU. 
 
 Unadjusted    Adjusted 
Version n Mean SE  Mean SE 
Original 40 0.664 0.020  0.662 0.018 
New Narrative 34 0.669 0.018  0.667 0.019 
New Imagery 24 0.746 0.023  0.745 0.023 
New Narrative/Imagery 41 0.671 0.021  0.675 0.018 
 
 
 Personal Epistemology:  The Personal Epistemology sub-scales derived from the 
literature generally were not important predictors of evolution understanding for students 
in the MSU class (Table 4.35).  The Simple Knowledge sub-scale was related to 
Correction Scale, however.  Quick Learning affected Difference scores for students in the 
classes at UM and EWU, and Simple Knowledge was an important predictor for Changed 
Answers and Correction Scale (Table 4.36).  
 Moreover, several of the Personal Epistemology sub-scales interacted with the 
factor Version.  For example, Innate Authority had a steeper slope when examining 
Correction Scale scores of students at UM and EWU watching the New Narrative version 
than other versions.  The difference was relatively small, however, and was likely not 
reflected in the full factorial ANCOVA.  This type of interaction was more common 
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using the sub-scales for personal epistemology derived from the data, and several had to 
be examined independently.   
 The sub-scales describing personal epistemology that were derived from the 
sample data were not important predictors of Difference scores for students from MSU 
(Table 4.37) nor UM and EWU (Table 4.38).  Quick & Easy Knowledge was an 
important predictor for both the proportion of Changed Answers and Correction Scale for 
both the class at MSU and classes at UM and EWU, but with the MSU sample, this 
covariate violated assumptions about the homogeneity of regression slopes among 
versions of the nature program.  Regression using the Quick & Easy Knowledge sub-
scale indicated a more positive relationship with Changed Answers for students at MSU 
watching the New Narrative/Imagery version than with other versions.  Those students 
changed answers more frequently than students watching other versions (Table 4.39), 
indicating that the more they accepted that knowledge was not quickly and easily 
obtained, the more likely they were to change answers given a correct presentation of 
evolution.  Correction Scale scores also were more positively related to the Quick & Easy 
Knowledge sub-scale for versions including the new narrative, indicating more advanced 
thinking about knowledge for both New Narrative and New Narrative/Imagery than 
versions with the old narrative (Table 4.40).  Although ANCOVA indicated New Innate, 
New Omniscient, and Certain Knowledge interacted significantly with Version, they 
were not important in the full factorial model and their slopes were not significant when 
examined separately. 
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Table 4.35.  
Results of ANCOVA using the Personal Epistemology sub-scales to predict difference metrics for evolution understanding for students 
at MSU classes taking both the pre-assessment and the post-assessment. 
 Difference  Changed Answers  Correction Scale 
Sub-scale r2 F p  r2 F p  r2 F p 
Innate Ability 0.013 1.009 0.319  0.004 0.295 0.589  0.005 0.344 0.559 
Omniscient Authority 0.006 0.440 0.509  0.007 0.537 0.466  0.009 0.645 0.424 
Quick Learning 0.001 0.077 0.782  0.026 1.962 0.165  0.021 1.574 0.214 
Certain Knowledge 0.014 1.059 0.307  0.000 0.012 0.914  0.003 0.211 0.647 
Simple Knowledge 0.029 2.183 0.144  0.017 1.315 0.255  0.075 6.025 0.016 
Version 0.018 0.440 0.725  0.022 0.556 0.646  0.036 0.924 0.434 
Note. 1, 74 df 
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Table 4.36.  
Results of ANCOVA using the Personal Epistemology sub-scales to predict difference metrics for evolution understanding for students 
in classes at UM and EWU taking both the pre-assessment and the post-assessment. 
 Difference  Changed Answers  Correction Scale 
Sub-scale r2 F p  r2 F p  r2 F p 
Innate Ability 0.002 0.350 0.555  0.001 0.147 0.702  0.001 0.121 0.729 
Omniscient Authority 0.000 0.063 0.802  0.000 0.014 0.907  0.002 0.428 0.514 
Quick Learning 0.029 5.392 0.021  0.014 2.456 0.119  0.002 0.295 0.588 
Certain Knowledge 0.001 0.232 0.631  0.006 1.135 0.288  0.009 1.621 0.205 
Simple Knowledge 0.011 2.029 0.156  0.031 5.724 0.018  0.036 6.675 0.011 
Version 0.038 2.373 0.072  0.009 0.555 0.645  0.027 1.617 0.187 
Note. 1, 178 df. 
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Table 4.37.  
Results of ANCOVA using the sub-scales derived from the data to describe personal epistemology to predict difference metrics for 
evolution understanding for students at MSU classes taking both the pre-assessment and the post-ass ssment. 
 Difference  Changed Answers  Correction Scale 
Sub-scale r2 F p  r2 F p  r2 F p 
Quick & Easy Knowledge 0.019 1.086 0.302  0.160 10.471a 0.002  0.285 21.916 a <0.001 
New Innate 0.000 0.005 0.944  0.002 0.097 0.756  0.000 0.000 0.998 
New Omniscient 0.007 0.360 0.551  0.015 0.842 0.363  0.000 0.001 a 0.972 
Certain Knowledge 0.028 1.561 0.217  0.045 2.583 0.114  0.019 1.037 a 0.313 
Idiosyncratic Knowledge 0.010 0.566 0.455  0.008 0.442 0.509  0.001 0.050 0.824 
Version 0.023 0.430 0.732  0.011 0.212 0.887  0.003 0.048 0.986 
Note. 1, 55 df. 
a Significant covariate-factor interaction. 
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Table 4.38.  
Results of ANCOVA using the sub-scales derived from the data to describe personal epistemology to predict difference metrics for 
evolution understanding for students in classes at UM and EWU taking both the pre-assessment and th  post-assessment. 
 Difference  Changed Answers  Correction Scale 
Sub-scale r2 F p  r2 F p  r2 F p 
Quick & Easy Knowledge 0.016 2.470 0.118  0.111 19.178 <0.001  0.075 12.491 0.001 
New Innate 0.001 0.226 0.635  0.004 0.588 0.445  0.002 0.302 a 0.583 
New Omniscient 0.001 0.103 0.749  0.024 3.837 0.052  0.037 5.808 0.017 
Certain Knowledge 0.001 0.145 0.704  0.003 0.409 0.523  0.003 0.487 0.487 
Idiosyncratic Knowledge 0.001 0.144 0.705  0.024 3.827 0.052  0.016 2.444 0.120 
Version 0.035 1.830 0.144  0.024 1.254 0.292  0.033 1.749 0.159 
Note. 1, 178 df. 
a Significant covariate-factor interaction. 
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Table 4.39.  
Regression analysis using Quick & Easy Knowledge to predict Changed Answer scores 
for students in the MSU class. 
Version F df  p r2 
Original 0.163 1, 17 0.692 0.010 
New Narrative 3.432 1, 13 0.089 0.222 
New Imagery 2.777 1, 17 0.115 0.148 
New Narrative/Imagery 6.057 1, 13 0.030 0.335 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.40.  
Regression analysis using Quick & Easy Knowledge to predict Correction Scale scores 
for students in the MSU class. 
Version F df p r2 
Original 2.332 1, 17 0.146 0.127 
New Narrative 5.859 1, 13 0.032 0.328 
New Imagery 4.453 1, 17 0.051 0.218 
New Narrative/Imagery 11.794 1, 13 0.005 0.496 
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 Attitude towards Evolution:  As with other covariates, Attitude toward Evolution 
did not seem to affect Difference scores for either the MSU class or the UM and EWU 
classes (Table 4.41).  Attitude towards Evolution was an important predictor for both the 
proportion of Changed Answers and the Correction Scale for students in the MSU class, 
however.  Similarly, for students in classes at UM and EWU, this scale also was 
important for Changed Answers and Correction Scale, but not for Difference scores.  In 
addition, the covariate influenced the relationships between Correction Scale scores and 
version.  Post-assessment evolution understanding scores were more incorrect for 
students watching the New Imagery version than for other versions (Table 4.42). 
 
 NOS Understanding:  Likewise, NOS Understanding was not an important 
predictor for Difference scores for either set of classes, but served to predict both 
Changed Answers and Correction Scale for students in both the MSU class and students 
in classes at UM and EWU (Table 4.43).  Adjusting for the covariates did not affect the 
influence of Version on student understanding, however. 
 
Open-ended Questions and Evolution Understanding 
 Responses to the open-ended evolution questions were classified according to a 
framework developed by Perkins (unpubl., see Chapter 3).  Students’ answers were often 
quite short and usually represented a single concept.  Not all students answered all 
questions, nor did they necessarily include similar concepts among questions.  As a 
result, analysis was limited to broad generalizations designed to provide some insight to 
student thinking.   
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Table 4.41.  
Results of ANCOVA using the Attitude toward Evolution scale to predict difference metrics for evolution understanding for students in 
classes taking both the pre-assessment and the post-assessment. 
 Difference  Changed Answers  Correction Scale 
Class F df p r2  F df p r2  F df p r2 
MSU 2.013 1, 58 0.161 0.034  12.881 1, 58 0.001 0.182  19.657 1, 55 <0.001 0.263 
UM & EWU 0.531 1, 170 0.467 0.003  15.672 1, 170 <0.001 0.084  16.634 1, 170 <0.001 0.089 
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Table 4.42.  
Unadjusted and estimated marginal means adjusted by Attitude towards Evolution for 
Correction Scale for students in classes at UM and EWU. 
 
   Unadjusted  Adjusted 
Version n Mean SE  Mean SE 
Original 40 0.665 0.019  0.675 0.019 
New Narrative 34 0.671 0.019  0.668 0.019 
New Imagery 24 0.751 0.021  0.740 0.021 
New Narrative/Imagery 41 0.667 0.020  0.669 0.018 
 
 
 The open-ended evolution questions indicated that students held a diversity of 
concepts about the evolutionary process, including misconceptions, proximate 
conceptions (less abstract, individual-level concepts), and evolutionary concepts (more 
abstract, population-level concepts; see Chapter 3 for more details).  Generally, a greater 
number of each kind of concept, on average, was included in response to the post-
assessment question related to Fatal Flower than the literature-based pre-assessment 
questions (Table 4.44).  Misconceptions increased between pre- and post-assessment for 
all individuals, but evolutionary conceptions seemed to increase more for students that 
watched the new narrative version of the program than other versions.   
 In addition to the open-ended evolution questions, students were asked whether 
the imagery or story had a particular effect on their understanding.  Broadly grouping 
individuals into “yes” and “no” permitted another approach to determining the effect of 
272 
Table 4.43.  
Results of ANCOVA using the NOS Understanding scale to predict difference metrics for evolution understanding for students in 
classes taking both the pre-assessment and the post-assessment. 
 Difference  Changed Answers  Correction Scale 
Class F df p r2  F df p r2  F df p r2 
MSU 1.658 1, 112 0.201 0.015  15.563 1, 112 <0.001 0.122  21.305 1, 112 <0.001 0.160 
UM & EWU 3.790 1, 233 0.053 0.016  46.126 1, 233 <0.001 0.165  45.480 1, 233 <0.001 0.163 
273 
viewing on evolution understanding.  Students’ responses to the effect of imagery 
significantly contributed to the model of evolution understanding (F = 4.258; 1, 269 df; p
= 0.040).  In addition, students that believed the imagery helped their understanding 
tended to have higher assessment scores than those who did not. 
 
Discussion 
Attitudes and Beliefs 
 Clearly, examining attitudes, beliefs, and understanding is a complex process n t 
easily addressed with standardized instruments.  My goal was not to develop scales, but 
to use previously published metrics addressing attitudes and beliefs about science.  
Nevertheless, this research provides some insight to the consistency of several m trics 
important in the literature, the relationships among these metrics, and their valu  as 
predictors related to evolution understanding.  These scales are not without their 
criticism, especially the examination of NOS Understanding (e.g., Aikenhead, Ry n, & 
Fleming, 1989; Lederman & O’Malley, 1990).  The means used to construct scales are 
critical to their validity (Aikenhead, 1988).  Because these scales are supposed to 
describe theoretical constructs, part of the intrigue of using tried and teste metrics in 
educational research is to predict outcomes of experimental treatment, not just t  de cribe 
student thinking.   
 This research supported several theory-bound scales but highlighted difficulties 
with others.  Helms et al. (2006) urged that items from theoretical constructs be dropped 
only after careful consideration because dropping items implies that reliability is a 
characteristic of the scale rather than the sample, and it encourages heavy reliance on  
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Table 4.44.  
The mean number of misconceptions, proximate conceptions (less abstract individual-level concepts), and evolutionary concepts 
(more abstract, population-level concepts) found in students’ short answers to standard open-ended qu stions about the evolutionary 
process.  
 Misconceptions  Proximate Conceptions  Evolutionary Conceptions 
Treatment n Pre Post Difference  Pre Post Difference Pre Post Difference 
Original 70 0.8 1.0 0.2  1.2 1.8 0.6  1.3 1.5 0.2 
New Narrative 61 0.7 1.1 0.3  1.3 1.8 0.5  0.9 1.5 0.6 
New Imagery 69 0.6 1.0 0.5  1.4 1.8 0.4  1.4 1.6 0.2 
New Narrative/Imagery 69 0.8 1.0 0.2  1.2 1.7 0.5  1.3 1.4 0.2 
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these point estimates of reliability in judging the data’s worthiness.  As a re ult, I took 
two approaches to scale analyses.  The first used the scales and sub-scales as they were 
originally described.  The second examined the relationships within this particular 
sample.   
 Several scales describing Attitudes toward Science, Personal Epistemology, 
Attitudes toward Evolution, and NOS Understanding were employed to examine the 
effects of watching a nature program on subsequent evolution understanding.  The scales 
served to characterize students participating in the experiment based on the assumption 
that these characteristics would not change during its short duration.  The Attitudes 
toward Science (Adolphe, 2002; Fraser, 1981) and its seven sub-scales proved quite 
dependable (one sub-scale was not), with generally high reliability and strog uites of 
items that could be reduced to a single component fairly easily.  These components wer 
highly intercorrelated, and PAF indicated that the broad, general theoretical constructs 
were the same, but their detection was somewhat different for this sample.  Indeed, three 
of the seven constructs (Career Interest, Enjoyment of Science, and Leisure Interest) were 
effectively reduced to a single sub-scale.  Other sub-scales constructed from the sample 
mirrored the original constructs but with fewer items. 
 The Personal Epistemology scale was not reliable with this sample.  Few of the 
sub-scales describing Personal Epistemology as originally described seemed to 
consistently measure their intended constructs.  The subsets of items measuring Innate 
Ability and Omniscient Authority were fairly reliable, however, and lost very little 
cohesiveness when the items from all five sub-scales were exposed to PAF.  Other 
authors have attempted to resolve issues with the theoretical constructs of these personal 
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epistemology sub-scales.  In fact, one aspect of Schraw et al.’s (2002) efforts with the 
Epistemic Belief Inventory had been to remove ambiguity from the Omnisciet Authority 
sub-scale.  The three sub-scales addressing Quick Learning, Certain Knowledge and 
Simple Knowledge were totally inadequate metrics for this sample.  In fact, defining any 
components that described the data related to items from these sub-scales was difficult.  
 Ironically, students’ responses toward two theoretical scales, Quick & Easy (a 
derived sub-scale of personal epistemology) and Attitude toward Evolution (a previously 
published scale), may have been a function of popular discourses.  One noticeable 
influence during the construction of the Personal Epistemology sub-scales seemed to be 
items that used the word “theory”.  Understanding that knowledge does not come in neat 
little packets called “facts” is important to the Simple/Complex Knowledge component of 
most Personal Epistemology research, let alone the nature of scientific knowledge.  After 
all, the theory of evolution is one of the most important organizing principles in biology.  
In this study, students’ beliefs about knowledge primarily scaled along a quick-and-easy 
to slow-and-complex axis, largely affected by how they responded to the influence of 
theories.  In fact, PAF indicated that the relatively high loadings (> 0.55) associ ted with 
the two items that included the word “theory” were important components of the first 
factor of the Personal Epistemology sub-scale derived from the data.  Indeed, recnt 
arguments to challenge evolution have stressed that evolution is “just a theory”.  
Formerly, the fashionable persuasive campaign to “disprove” evolution addressed the 
“failure” of the 2nd Law of Thermodynamics to explain how “order” could be an outcome 
of evolution.  In this application, the item related to the 2nd Law of Thermodynamics in 
the Attitude toward Evolution scale (Ingram & Nelson, 2006) had to be deleted because 
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so few students understood its meaning.  Therefore, the older scale construction that 
reflected historic arguments against evolution may need to be revised to reflect the ffects 
of current rhetorical tactics on attitudes toward knowledge and evolution. 
 Not surprising, then, NOS Understanding was clearly an important covariate in 
the analyses, despite the crude measure using only a fraction of the original VOSTS scale 
items (Aikenhead & Ryan, 1992).  Numerous authors have argued for enhancing NOS 
knowledge as a means to increase understanding and acceptance of evolutionary concepts 
(Abd-El-Khalick & Lederman, 2000; Alters & Nelson, 2002; Scharmann, Smith, James, 
& Jenson, 2005).  Results of studies designed to improve the relationship have been 
equivocal, however (e.g., Akerson et al., 2006; Johnson & Peebles, 1987; Sadler, 
Chambers, & Zeidler, 2004), because of the complexity of teaching both the 
philosophical NOS and evolutionary theory.  Results from the experimental manipulation 
of Fatal Flower indicated that NOS Understanding played a central role in the outcomes 
of evolution understanding assessments.  Even though the effect was indirect, it strongly
advocates teaching NOS to enhance understanding of evolution. 
 
Effects of Modifying CINS 
 The Conceptual Inventory of Natural Selection (CINS; Anderson et al., 2002) was 
developed as a tool for describing evolution understanding.  The multiple-choice 
assessment used distracters (or commonly held misconceptions) to gain insight to 
students’ complex conceptual diversities.  Although the value of the type of informati n 
gained through CINS may be of some concern (Nehm & Schonfeld, 2008), the reliability 
was important if I hoped to find effects given the experimental design.  CINS consisted of 
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only 20 questions, and despite arguments that the paired questions for the 10 key 
concepts could be separated, I chose to modify the tool and maintain 20 questions in both 
the pre- and post-assessments.  Unfortunately, the modified tool may have confounded 
the results of the study because an unrelated sample of students scored lower on the 
modified version than on the original version.  The impact on evolution understanding of 
changing organisms with very minor changes in wording raised interesting questions 
about revisiting the Disney Effect (Jensen, Settlage, & Odem, 1996), knowledge transfr, 
and evolution understanding, however. 
 
Effects of Fatal Flower on Evolution Understanding 
 The experimental design to determine the impact of viewing a nature program on 
evolution understanding was complex by necessity.  Understanding what students know 
is not a simple and straightforward task (see Pellegrino, Chudowsky, & Glaser, 2001), 
especially on a large scale, but the attitudes and beliefs sub-scales were includ d to 
account for at least some of the variance among individuals.  Moreover, significant 
results were expected after a single viewing.  Stocklmayer & Gilbert (2002) suggested 
that for a one-time event, such as viewing a nature program, to have an effect required the 
following conditions were important: (1) an intrinsically engaging component, either 
through appeal, need, or interest; (2) drawing powerfully on prior experiences; and (3) 
demonstrating an apparent relationship to the viewer.  Obviously, viewing in this case 
had an intrinsically engaging component (course credit of some kind) and, perhaps, built 
on prior experiences in the classroom.  It is possible that many participating students did 
not see an apparent relationship to themselves.  Furthermore, most students participated 
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online, viewing the nature program at their leisure in their own personal environment.  
The original experimental design intended viewing in the classroom to control for a suite 
of effects associated with leisure television viewing (Chen, 1994).  In addition, the strong 
difference between students in the MSU class and other students was unexpected.  
Partitioning classes, therefore, affected sample size and likely, effect siz s.  Nevertheless, 
the trends apparent in the experiment suggested some disturbing results.   
 Evolution understanding was relatively low overall; MSU students scored just 
under 70%, and UM and EWU students scored 55% – essentially “C”s and “F”s.  
Although the differences among treatments with the MSU students were not significant, 
these were the individuals influenced by the different versions of the nature program in 
the manner predicted.  The revised narrative appeared to positively affect evolution 
understanding, and the original, misconception-laden narrative seemed to negatively 
influence understanding, especially when it was coupled with poor imagery.  Differences 
in CINS assessments were not an influence because MSU student scores differed very 
little on the original and modified assessments (13.8 + 0.34 [mean + SE] and 13.7 + 0.37, 
respectively).  The lack of consistent patterns in the outcomes for students in the UM and 
EWU classes likely reflected guesswork associated with their very poor unde standing of 
evolution.   
 The timing of the assessments relative to the presentation of evolution in the 
classroom may have played a role in the observed differences.  Because this wasa 
voluntary experiment, professors participated when they felt participation would be 
appropriate.  MSU had just completed a discussion of evolution (at least comments from 
students indicated that was the case), whereas students at UM had completed their 
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evolution unit weeks prior to the experiment.  As a result, students at MSU may have 
seen the relevance of the assignment to their own understanding more so than students a  
the other universities.  Although purely speculative at this stage of research, the issue of 
relevance and the influence of poor presentation of science may be profoundly important 
as interested viewers seek out free-choice science education opportunities (Chapter 5). 
 Adding the covariates to the models rarely influenced the effect of the 
experimental treatments.  Nor were the influences of particular attitudes and beliefs 
scales consistent across classes or variables.  Attitude toward Evolution and NOS 
Understanding were strongly related to Changed Answers and Correction Scales, 
however.  Students with a more positive attitude toward evolution were likely to change 
more answers between the pre- and post-assessments, and those answers were more 
likely to be correct in the post-assessment.  NOS Understanding had a similar influence 
on post-assessment evolution understanding.  These relationships were consistent 
whether students had a generally better understanding of evolution (MSU class) or a 
generally poorer understanding of evolution (UM and EWU classes). 
 In sum, this experiment indicates that free-choice science learning opportunities 
indeed influence evolution understanding (Figure 4.8).  The outcomes, however, may 
depend more upon knowledge development in a broad sense.  Evolution understanding is 
clearly influenced by attitudes toward science and evolution, as well as beliefs about 
knowledge and the kinds of knowledge science produces.  These factors may dampen any 
influence a single viewing of a nature program, for example, may have.  In addition, 
other factors, such as the rhetoric of the marketplace of ideas, may have indirect
influences on the relationship between free-choice opportunities and understanding.   
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Figure 4.8.  Outcomes of the experimental manipulation of a nature program on evolution understanding.  Heavy lines indicated 
consistent, significant relationships.
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 Unfortunately, effect sizes likely were too small to detect differences because of 
the sample size partitioning.  Although the logistics of a large-scale assessment may seem 
daunting, that kind of sample size may be necessary to adequately determine the 
relationships between attitudes and beliefs and knowledge acquisition from nature 
programs. 
 
The Fate of Fatal Flower 
 Research with science fiction movies has found negative impacts on science 
understanding with single-viewing events (Barnett et al., 2006).  Whether viewing the 
different versions of Fatal Flower resulted in long-term conceptual change, for better or 
worse, is unknown.  Any patterns could result from shifting relevance of concepts in the 
learners’ mind or increased access to concepts as a result of viewing (Keil & Newman, 
2008).  The effect ultimately depends on elaboration by students.  For example, if 
elaboration is minimal, effects may reflect priming and a shift in relevance.  More 
engaged students motivated to learn may experience greater elaboration (Dole & Sinatra, 
1998; Keil & Newman, 2008), especially as they apply principles of evolution, NOS 
Understanding, and beliefs about knowledge, thereby representing something closer to a 
conceptual change.  Indeed, the qualitative data lend support to potential differences in 
engaged students (those that found the narrative and/or imagery important to their 
understanding) versus those less inclined.  Fatal Flower, and other blue-chip nature 
programs, incorporate striking and memorable imagery.  In fact, these images y be 
more memorable than science courses and lab experiments (Aikenhead, 1988; Barnett et 
al., 2006).  Indeed, recall of television news is related to images through “explanation” 
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and the “emotional bond” they add (Graber, 1990; Zhou, 2005).  If “the experience is 
everything” (Stocklmayer & Gilbert, 2002), this research indicates that nature programs 
may in fact be doing more harm to evolution understanding than good. 
 Poor presentation of science is common in nature programs (Chapter 6; 
Dissertation Appendix 1).  In addition, evolution is rarely treated accurately (Aldridge & 
Dingwall, 2003; Dingwall & Aldridge, 2006; Dissertation Appendix 1)  The results from 
this experiment suggest that students leaving universities with an “average” 
understanding of evolution (like students from MSU) are likely to be negatively 
influenced by these poor presentations of nature; students with even less of a grasp of the 
theory may be influenced by these programs interacting with the dominant discourse in 
popular deconstructions of evolution.  MSU is a hub for research in science teaching and 
likely represents an upper bound for evolution understanding by non-majors.  The 
outcome for public understanding of evolution is bleak given that the great majority of 
students is not exposed to that level of teaching and experience a very limited numberof 
biology courses in general. 
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Appendix 1.  The Knowing the Natural World Pre-assessment. 
 
KNOWING THE NATURAL WORLD 
 
How many courses have you taken that included biology, ecology, or the natural 
sciences, not counting this course? 
 none 
 1-2 
 3-4 
 5-6 
 More than 6 
 
How old are you?     years 
Year in school:  
 Freshman  
 Sophomore  
 Junior  
 Senior  
 Other/Please specify:     
 
Who is your professor for this course?      
 
Circle the number that represents your belief on a scale from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = 
strongly agree. 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
   
Strongly 
Agree 
I would prefer to do experiments 
than to read about them. 
1 2 3 4 5 
I would like to be given a science 
book or a piece of scientific 
equipment as a present. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Too many laboratories are being 
built at the expense of the rest of 
education. 
1 2 3 4 5 
I dislike reading newspaper 1 2 3 4 5 
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 Strongly 
Disagree 
   
Strongly 
Agree 
articles about science. 
Scientists who believe in evolution 
do so mainly because they want 
to, not because of any evidence. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Scientists are less friendly than 
other people. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Science is man’s worst enemy 1 2 3 4 5 
I dislike reading books about 
science during my vacations. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Absolute moral truth does not 
exist. 
1 2 3 4 5 
The material covered in science 
lessons is uninteresting. 
1 2 3 4 5 
The Second Law of 
Thermodynamics shows that 
evolution could not have 
happened. 
1 2 3 4 5 
I would rather find out about 
things by asking an expert than by 
doing an experiment. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Mutations are never beneficial to 
animals. 
1 2 3 4 5 
There is scientific evidence 
supporting that humans were 
supernaturally created. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Things are simpler than most 
professors would have you 
believe. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Scientific discoveries are doing 
more harm than good. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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 Strongly 
Disagree 
   
Strongly 
Agree 
People should always obey the 
law. 
1 2 3 4 5 
When someone in authority tells 
me what to do, I usually do it. 
1 2 3 4 5 
People shouldn’t question 
authority. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
For the following questions, some of the answers are grouped.  Read all the possibilities, 
and circle the answer that best fits your thinking. 
When developing new theories or laws, scientists need to make certain assumptions 
about nature (for example, matter is made up of atoms).  These assumptions must be 
true in order for science to progress properly.  Your position, basically (please read 
from A to I, and then choose one): 
Assumptions MUST be true in order for science to progress: 
A. because correct assumptions are needed for correct theories and laws.  Otherwise 
scientists would waste a lot of time and effort using wrong theories and laws. 
B. otherwise society would have serious problems, such as inadequate technology and 
dangerous chemicals. 
C. because scientists do research to prove their assumptions true before going on with 
their work. 
D. It depends.  Sometimes science needs true assumptions in order to progress.  But 
sometimes history has shown that great discoveries have been made by disproving a 
theory and learning from its false assumptions. 
E. It doesn’t matter.  Scientists have to make assumptions, true or not, in order to get 
started on a project.  History has shown that great discoveries have been made by 
disproving a theory and learning from its false assumptions. 
F. Scientists do not make assumptions.  They research an idea to find out if the idea is 
true.  They don’t assume it is true. 
G. I don’t understand. 
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H. I don’t know enough about this subject to make a choice. 
I. None of these choices fits my basic viewpoint. 
 
 
For this statement, assume that a gold miner “discovers” gold while an artist “invents” 
a sculpture.  Some people think that scientists discover scientific THEORIES.  Others 
think that scientists invent them.  What do you think?  Your position, basically (please 
read from A to I, and then choose one): 
Scientists discover a theory: 
A. because the idea was there all the time to be uncovered. 
B. because it is based on experimental facts. 
C. but scientists invent the methods to find the theories. 
D. Some scientists may stumble onto a theory by chance, thus discovering it.  But other 
scientists may invent the theory from facts they already know. 
Scientists invent a theory: 
E. because a theory is an interpretation of experimental facts which scientists have 
discovered. 
F. because inventions (theories) come from the mind — we create them. 
G. I don’t understand. 
H. I don’t know enough about this topic to make a choice. 
I. None of these choices fits my basic viewpoint. 
 
 
When scientists classify something (for example, a plant according to its species, an 
element according to the periodic table, energy according to its source, or a star 
according to its size), scientists are classifying nature according to the way nature 
really is; any other way would simply be wrong.  Your position, basically (please read 
from A to I, and the choose one): 
Classifications match the way nature really is, 
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A. since scientists have proven them over many years of work. 
B. since scientists use observable characteristics when they classify. 
C. Scientists classify nature in the most simple and logical way, but their way isn’t 
necessarily the only way. 
D. There are many ways to classify nature, but agreeing on one universal system allows 
scientists to avoid confusion in their work. 
E. There could be other correct ways to classify nature, because science is liable to 
change and new discoveries may lead to different classifications. 
F. Nobody knows the way nature really is.  Scientists classify nature according to their 
perceptions or theories.  Science is never exact, and nature is so diverse.  Thus, 
scientists could correctly use more than one classification scheme. 
G. I don’t understand. 
H. I don’t know enough about this subject to make a choice. 
I. None of these choices fits my basic viewpoint. 
 
 
Scientific ideas develop from hypotheses to theories, and finally, if they are good 
enough, to being scientific laws.  Your position, basically (please read from A to H, and 
then choose one): 
Hypotheses can lead to theories which can lead to laws: 
A. because an hypothesis is tested by experiments, if it proves correct, it becomes a 
theory.  After a theory has been proven true many times by different people and has 
been around for a long time, it becomes a law. 
B. because an hypothesis is tested by experiments, if there is supporting evidence, it’s a 
theory.  After a theory has been tested many times and seems to be essentially 
correct, it’s good enough to become a law. 
C. because it is a logical way for scientific ideas to develop. 
D. Theories can’t become laws because they both are different types of ideas.  Theories 
are based on scientific ideas which are less than 100% certain, and so theories can’t 
be proven true.  Laws, however, are based on facts only and are 100% sure. 
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E. Theories can’t become laws because they both are different types of ideas.  Laws 
describe things in general.  Theories explain these laws.  However, with supporting 
evidence, hypotheses may become theories (explanations) or laws (descriptions). 
F. I don’t understand. 
G. I don’t know enough about this subject to make a choice. 
H. None of these choices fits my basic viewpoint. 
Some cultures have a particular viewpoint on nature and man.  Scientists and scientific 
research are affected by the religious or ethical views of the culture where the work is 
done.  Your position, basically (please read from A to J, and then choose one): 
Religious or ethical views DO influence scientific research: 
A. because some cultures want specific research done for the benefit of that culture. 
B. because scientists may unconsciously choose research that would support their 
culture’s views. 
C. because most scientists will not do research which goes against their upbringing or 
their beliefs. 
D. because everyone is different in the way they react to their culture.  It is these 
individual differences in scientists that influence the type of research done. 
E. because powerful groups representing certain religious, political or cultural beliefs 
will support certain research projects, or will give money to prevent certain research 
from occurring. 
Religious or ethical views do NOT influence scientific research: 
F. because research continues in spite of clashes between scientists and certain 
religious or cultural groups (for example, clashes over evolution and creation). 
G. because scientists will research topics which are of importance to science and 
scientists, regardless of cultural or ethical views. 
H. I don’t understand. 
I. I don’t know enough about this subject to make a choice. 
J. None of these choices fits my basic viewpoint 
 
Circle the number that represents your belief on a scale from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = 
strongly agree. 
 
Scientists do not have enough 
time to spend with their families.
Students who learn things quickly
are the most successful. 
School should have more science 
lessons each week. 
I dislike science lessons. 
If you don’t learn something 
quickly, you won’t ever learn it.
If a person tries too hard to 
understand a problem, they will 
most likely end up being 
confused. 
Really smart students don
to work as hard to do well in 
school. 
I would dislike being a scientist 
after I leave school. 
When I leave school, I would like 
to work with people who make 
discoveries in science. 
 
 
The Canary Islands are seven islands just west of the 
African continent.  The islands gradually became 
colonized with life: plants, lizards, birds, etc.  Three 
different species of lizards found on the islands are 
similar to one species found on the African continent 
(Thorpe & Brown 1989).  Because of this, scientists assume that the lizards traveled 
from Africa to the Canary Islands by floating on tree trunks washed out t
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Strongly 
Disagree 
  
 
1 2 3 
 
1 2 3 
1 2 3 
1 2 3 
 
1 2 3 
1 2 3 
’t have 
1 2 3 
1 2 3 
1 2 3 
Canary Island Lizards 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
4 5 
4 5 
4 5 
4 5 
4 5 
4 5 
4 5 
4 5 
4 5 
o sea. 
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Choose the answer that best reflects how an evolutionary biologist would answer. 
Lizards eat a variety of insects and plants.  Which statement describes the availability 
of food for lizards on the Canary Islands? 
a. Finding food is not a problem since food is always in abundant supply. 
b. Since lizards can eat a variety of foods, there is likely to be enough food for all of the 
lizards at all times. 
c. Lizards can get by on very little food, so the food supply does not matter. 
d. It is likely that sometimes there is enough food, but at other times there is not 
enough food for all of the lizards. 
 
What do you think happens among the lizards of a certain species when the food 
supply is limited? 
a. The lizards cooperate to find food and share what they find. 
b. The lizards fight for the available food and the strongest lizards kill the weaker ones. 
c. Genetic changes that would allow lizards to eat new food sources are likely to be 
induced. 
d. The lizards least successful in the competition for food are likely to die of starvation 
and malnutrition. 
 
Populations of lizards are made up of hundreds of individual lizards.  Which statement 
describes how similar they are likely to be to each other? 
a. All lizards in the population are likely to be nearly identical. 
b. All lizards in the population are identical to each other on the outside, but there are 
differences in their internal organs such as how they digest food. 
c. All lizards in the population share many similarities, but there are differences in 
features like body size and claw length. 
d. All lizards in the population are completely unique and share no features with other 
lizards. 
 
Which statement could describe how traits in lizards pass from one generation of 
lizards to the next generation? 
a. Lizards that learn to catch a particular type of insect will pass the new ability to 
offspring. 
b. Lizards that are able to hear but have no survival advantage because of hearing, will 
eventually stop passing on the “hearing” trait. 
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c. Lizards with stronger claws that allow for catching certain insects have offspring 
whose claws gradually get even stronger during their lifetime. 
d. Lizards with a particular coloration and pattern are likely to pass the same trait on to 
offspring. 
 
Fitness is a term often used by biologists to explain the evolutionary success of certain 
organisms.  Below are descriptions of four fictional female lizards.  Which lizard might 
a biologist consider to be the “most fit”? 
 Lizard A Lizard B Lizard C Lizard D 
body length 20 cm 12 cm 10 cm 15 cm 
offspring surviving 
to adulthood 
19 28 22 26 
age at death 4 years 5 years 4 years 6 years 
comments Lizard A is very 
healthy, 
strong, and 
clever 
Lizard B has 
mated with 
many lizards 
Lizard C is dark 
colored and 
very quick 
Lizard D has 
the largest 
territory of all 
the lizards 
a. Lizard A 
b. Lizard B 
c. Lizard C 
d. Lizard D 
 
According to the theory of natural selection, where did the variations in body size in 
the three species of lizards most likely come from? 
a. The lizards needed to change in order to survive, so beneficial new traits developed. 
b. The lizards wanted to become different in size, so beneficial new traits gradually 
appeared in the population. 
c. Random genetic changes and sexual recombination both created new variations. 
d. The island environment caused genetic changes in the lizards. 
 
What could cause one species to change into three species over time? 
a. Groups of lizards encountered different island environments so the lizards needed 
to become new species with different traits in order to survive. 
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b. Groups of lizards must have been geographically isolated from other groups and 
random genetic changes must have accumulated in these lizard populations over 
time. 
c. There may be minor variations, but all lizards are essentially alike and all are 
members of a single species. 
d. In order to survive, different groups of lizards needed to adapt to the different 
islands, and so all organisms in each group gradually evolved to become a new lizard 
species. 
 
 
Circle the number that represents your belief on a scale from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = 
strongly agree. 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
   
Strongly 
Agree 
If two people are arguing about 
something, at least one of them 
must be wrong. 
1 2 3 4 5 
The more you know about a topic, 
the more there is to know. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Scientists are just as interested in 
art and music as other people are. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Sometimes there are no right 
answers to life’s big problems. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Science helps to make life better. 1 2 3 4 5 
The Earth is not old enough for 
evolution to have taken place. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Listening to talk about science on 
the radio would be boring. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Too many theories just complicate 
things. 
1 2 3 4 5 
If you haven’t understood a 
chapter the first time through, 
going back over it won’t help. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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 Strongly 
Disagree 
   
Strongly 
Agree 
Scientists are about as fit and 
healthy as other people. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Parents should teach their 
children all there is to know about 
life. 
1 2 3 4 5 
I enjoy reading about things that 
disagree with my previous ideas. 
1 2 3 4 5 
I dislike repeating experiments to 
check that I get the same results. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Some people are born with special 
gifts and talents. 
1 2 3 4 5 
I would rather agree with other 
people than do experiments and 
find out for myself. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
For the following questions, some of the answers are grouped.  Read all the possibilities, 
and circle the answer that best fits your thinking. 
Good scientific theories explain observations well.  But good theories are also simple 
rather than complex.  Your position, basically (please read from A to I, and then 
choose one): 
A. Good theories are simple.  The best language to use in science is simple, short, direct 
language. 
B. It depends on how deeply you want to get into the explanation.  A good theory can 
explain something either in a simple way or in a complex way. 
C. It depends on the theory.  Some good theories are simple, some are complex. 
D. Good theories can be complex, but they must be able to be translated into simple 
language if they are going to be used. 
E. Theories are usually complex.  Some things cannot be simplified if a lot of details are 
involved. 
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F. Most good theories are complex.  If the world was simpler, theories could be 
simpler. 
G. I don’t understand. 
H. I don’t know enough about this subject to make a choice. 
I. None of these choices fits my basic viewpoint. 
 
 
For this statement, assume that a gold miner “discovers” gold while an artist “invents” 
a sculpture.  Some people think that scientists discover scientific LAWS.  Others think 
that scientists invent them.  What do you think?  Your position, basically (please read 
from A to H, and then choose one): 
Scientists discover scientific laws: 
A. because the laws are out there in nature and scientists just have to find them. 
B. because laws are based on experimental facts. 
C. but scientists invent the methods to find those laws. 
D. Some scientists may stumble onto a law by chance, thus discovering it.  But other 
scientists may invent the law from facts they already know. 
E. Scientists invent laws, because scientists interpret the experimental facts which they 
discover.  Scientists don’t invent what nature does, but they do invent the laws 
which describe what nature does. 
F. I don’t understand. 
G. I don’t know enough about this topic to make a choice. 
H. None of these choices fits my basic viewpoint. 
 
 
Science rests on the assumption that the natural world CANNOT be altered by a 
supernatural being (for example, a deity).  Your position, basically (please read 
from A to H, and then choose one): 
Scientists assume that a supernatural being will NOT alter the natural world: 
A. because the supernatural is beyond scientific proof.  Other views, outside the realm 
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of science, may assume that a supernatural being can alter the natural world. 
B. because if a supernatural being did exist, scientific facts could change in the wink of 
an eye.  BUT scientists repeatedly get consistent results. 
C. It depends.  What scientists assume about a supernatural being is up to the 
individual scientist. 
D. Anything is possible.  Science does not know everything about nature.  Therefore, 
science must be open-minded to the possibility that a supernatural being could alter 
the natural world. 
E. Science can investigate the supernatural and can possibly explain it.  Therefore, 
science can assume the existence of supernatural beings. 
F. I don’t understand. 
G. I don’t know enough about this topic to make a choice. 
H. None of these choices fits my basic viewpoint. 
 
 
If scientists find that people working with asbestos have twice as much chance of 
getting lung cancer as the average person, this must mean that asbestos causes lung 
cancer.  Your position, basically (please read from A to H, and then choose one): 
A. The facts obviously prove that asbestos causes lung cancer.  If asbestos workers have 
a greater chance of getting lung cancer, then asbestos is the cause. 
The facts do NOT necessarily mean that asbestos causes lung cancer: 
B. because more research is needed to find out whether it is asbestos or some other 
substance that causes the lung cancer. 
C. because asbestos might work in combination with other things, or may work 
indirectly (for example, weakening your resistance to other things which cause you 
to get lung cancer). 
D. because if it did, all asbestos workers would have developed lung cancer. 
E. Asbestos cannot be the cause of lung cancer because many people who don’t work 
with asbestos also get lung cancer. 
F. I don’t understand. 
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G. I don’t know enough about this subject to make a choice. 
H. None of these choices fits my basic viewpoint. 
 
 
Scientists should NOT make errors in their work because these errors slow the 
advance of science.  Your position basically (please read from A to H, and then choose 
one): 
Errors slow the advance of science:  
A. because misleading information can lead to false conclusions.  If scientists don’t 
immediately correct the errors in their results, then science is not advancing. 
B. because new technology and equipment reduce errors by improving accuracy and so 
science will advance faster. 
Errors CANNOT be avoided: 
C. so scientists reduce errors by checking each others’ results until agreement is 
reached. 
D. some errors can slow the advance of science, but other errors can lead to a new 
discovery or breakthrough.  If scientists learn from their errors and correct them, 
science will advance. 
E. Errors most often help the advance of science.  Science advances by detecting and 
correcting the errors of the past. 
F. I don’t understand. 
G. I don’t know enough about this subject to make a choice. 
H. None of these choices fits my basic viewpoint. 
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Galapagos Finches 
Scientists have long believed that the 14 species on the 
Galapagos Islands evolved from a single species of finch 
that migrated to the islands one to five million years ago 
(Lack 1940).  Recent DNA analyses support the 
conclusion that all of the Galapagos finches evolved 
from the warbler finch (Grant et al. 2001; Petren et al. 
1999).  Different species live on different islands.  For 
example, the medium ground finch and the cactus finch 
live on one island.  The large cactus finch occupies another island.  One of the major 
changes in the finches in their beak sizes and shapes, as shown in this figure. 
 
Choose the one answer that best reflects how an evolutionary biologist would answer. 
What would happen if a breeding pair of finches was placed on an island under ideal 
conditions with no predators and unlimited food so that all individuals survived?  
Given enough time 
a. the finch population would stay small because birds only have enough babies to 
replace themselves. 
b. the finch population would double and then stay relatively stable. 
c. the finch population would increase dramatically. 
d. the finch population would grow slowly and then level off. 
 
Finches on the Galapagos Islands require food to eat and water to drink. 
a. When food and water are scarce, some birds may be unable to obtain what they 
need to survive. 
b. When food and water are limited, the finches will find other food sources, so there 
is always enough. 
c. When food and water are scarce, the finches all eat and drink less so that all birds 
survive. 
d. There is always plenty of food and water on the Galapagos Islands to meet the 
finches’ needs. 
 
Once a population of finches has lived on a particular island for many years, 
a. the population continues to grow rapidly. 
b. the population remains relatively stable, with some fluctuations. 
c. the population dramatically increases and decreases each year. 
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d. the population will decrease steadily. 
 
In the finch population, what are the primary changes that occur gradually over time? 
a. The traits of each finch within a population gradually change. 
b. The proportions of finches having different traits within a population change. 
c. Successful behaviors learned by finches are passed on to offspring. 
d. Mutations occur to meet the needs of the finches as the environment changes. 
 
Depending on their beak size and shape, some finches get nectar from flowers, some 
eat grubs from bark, some eat small seeds, and some eat large nuts.  Which statement 
best describes the interactions among the finches and the food supply? 
a. Most of the finches on an island cooperate to find food and share what they find. 
b. Many of the finches on an island fight with one another and the physically strongest 
ones win. 
c. There is more than enough food to meet all the finches’ needs to they don’t need to 
compete for food. 
d. Finches compete primarily with closely related finches that eat the same kinds of 
food, and some may die from lack of food. 
 
How did the different beak types first arise in the Galapagos finches? 
a. The changes in the finches’ beak size and shape occurred because of their need to 
be able to eat different kinds of food to survive. 
b. Changes in the finches’ beaks occurred by chance, and when there was a good 
match between beak structure and available food, those birds had more offspring. 
c. The changes in the finches’ beaks occurred because the environment induced the 
desired genetic changes. 
d. The finches’ beaks changed a little bit in size and shape with each successive 
generation, some getting larger and some getting smaller. 
 
What type of variation in finches is passed to the offspring? 
a. Any behaviors that were learned during a finch’s lifetime. 
b. Only characteristics that were beneficial during a finch’s lifetime. 
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c. All characteristics that were genetically determined. 
d. Any characteristics that were positively influenced by the environment during a 
finch’s lifetime. 
 
What caused populations of birds having different beak shapes and sizes to become 
distinct species distributed on the various islands? 
a. The finches were quite variable, and those whose features were best suited to the 
available food supply on each island reproduced most successfully. 
b. All finches are essentially alike and there are not really fourteen different species. 
c. Different foods are available on different islands and for that reason, individual 
finches on each island gradually developed the beaks they needed. 
d. Different lines of finches developed different beak types because they needed them 
in order to obtain the available food. 
 
 
Circle the number that represents your belief on a scale from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = 
strongly agree. 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
   
Strongly 
Agree 
There is no fossil evidence 
supporting that humans and apes 
evolved from a common ancestor. 
1 2 3 4 5 
I would rather solve a problem by 
doing an experiment than be told 
the answer. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Finding out about new things is 
unimportant. 
1 2 3 4 5 
People’s intellectual potential is 
fixed at birth. 
1 2 3 4 5 
It is statistically impossible that 
life arose by chance. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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 Strongly 
Disagree 
   
Strongly 
Agree 
A supreme being (e.g., God) 
created humans pretty much in 
their present form; humans did 
not evolve from other forms of 
life (e.g., fish and/or reptiles). 
1 2 3 4 5 
Money used on scientific projects 
is wasted. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Some people just have a knack for 
learning and others don’t. 
1 2 3 4 5 
This country is spending too much 
money on science. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Science is one of the most 
interesting school subjects. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Money spent on science is well 
worth spending. 
1 2 3 4 5 
What is true today will be true 
tomorrow. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Over billions of years all plants 
and animals on Earth (including 
humans) descended (evolved) 
from a common ancestor (e.g., a 
one-celled organism). 
1 2 3 4 5 
I like to listen to people whose 
opinions are different from mine. 
1 2 3 4 5 
How well you do in school 
depends on how smart you are. 
1 2 3 4 5 
I would enjoy school more if there 
were no science lessons. 
1 2 3 4 5 
I would enjoy visiting a science 
museum on the weekend. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
There is no real evidence that 
humans evolved from other 
animals. 
I dislike listening to other people
opinions. 
I find it boring to hear about new 
ideas. 
 
 
Guppies are small fish found in streams in Venezuela.  Male guppies 
are brightly colored, with black, red, blue and 
spots.  Males cannot be too brightly colored or they will be seen 
and consumed by predators, but if they are too plain, females will 
choose other males.  Natural selection and sexual selection push in opposite directions.  
When a guppy population lives in a stream in the absence of predators, the proportion 
of males that are bright and flashy increases in the population.  If a few aggressive 
predators are added to the same stream, the proportion of bright
decreases within about five months (3
guppy coloration have been studied in artificial ponds with mild, aggressive, and no 
predators, and by similar manipulations of natural stream environments (Endler 1980).
 
Choose the one answer that best reflects how an evolutionary biologist would answer.
A typical natural population of guppies consists of hundreds of guppies.  Which 
statement best describes the guppies of a single species in an isolated population?
a. The guppies share all 
b. The guppies share all of the essential characteristics of the species; the minor 
variations they display don
c. The guppies are all identical on the inside, but have many diffe
d. The guppies share many essential characteristics, but also vary in many features.
 
Fitness is a term often used by biologists to explain the evolutionary success of certain 
organisms.  Which feature would a biologist consider to be most important in 
determining which guppies were the 
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Strongly 
Disagree 
  
1 2 3 
’s 
1 2 3 
1 2 3 
Venezuelan Guppies 
iridescent (reflective) 
-colored males 
-4 generations).  The effects of predators on 
of the same characteristics and are identical to each other.
’t affect survival. 
rences in appearance.
“most fit”? 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
4 5 
4 5 
4 5 
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a. Large body size and ability to swim quickly away from predators. 
b. Excellent ability to compete for food. 
c. High number of offspring that survived to reproductive age. 
d. High number of matings with many different females. 
 
Assuming ideal conditions with abundant food and space and no predators, what 
would happen if a pair of guppies was placed in a large pond? 
a. The guppy population would grow slowly, as guppies would have only the number of 
babies that are needed to replenish the population. 
b. The guppy population would grow slowly at first, then would grow rapidly, and 
thousands of guppies would fill the pond. 
c. The guppy population would never become very large, because only organisms such 
as insects and bacteria reproduce in that manner. 
d. The guppy population would continue to grow slowly over time. 
 
Once a population of guppies has been established for a number of years in a real (not 
ideal) pond with other organisms including predators, what will likely happen to the 
population? 
a. The guppy population will stay about the same size. 
b. The guppy population will continue to rapidly grow in size. 
c. The guppy population will gradually decrease until no more guppies are left. 
d. It is impossible to tell because populations do not follow patterns. 
 
In guppy populations, what are the primary changes that occur gradually over time? 
a. The traits of each individual guppy within a population gradually change. 
b. The proportions of guppies having different traits within a population change. 
c. Successful behaviors learned by certain guppies are passed on to offspring. 
d. Mutations occur to meet the needs of the guppies as the environment changes. 
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For the following questions, some of the answers are grouped.  Read all the possibilities, 
and circle the answer that best fits your thinking. 
Even when people use mathematics accurately in science and engineering, they can 
only predict what will probably happen.  They can never conclude with 100% 
certainty.  Your position, basically (please read from A to G, and then choose one): 
Predictions are never 100% certain: 
A. because there is always measurement error or human error. 
B. because there are always unknown or unforeseen events which will affect a result. 
C. Predictions with mathematics are usually 100% certain, because they are based on 
tested results. 
D. Predictions with mathematics are always 100% certain because mathematics itself is 
certain. 
E. I don’t understand. 
F. I don’t know enough about this subject to make a choice. 
G. None of these choices fits my basic viewpoint. 
 
 
In spite of their knowledge and training, scientists and technologists can be fooled by 
what they see on TV or read in newspapers.  Your position, basically (please read from 
A to H, and then choose one): 
Scientists and technologists CAN BE fooled by the media: 
A. because they are so open-minded and always accept new ideas. 
B. because their special knowledge doesn’t help them detect errors in the media. 
C. because they are only human. Like everyone, they are influenced by the media 
(except when the topic is in their field of specialization). 
Scientists and technologists are NOT fooled by the media: 
D. because they know the facts. Knowledge of science tells them what is correct. 
E. because they are trained to look at things logically.  They know the correct 
information or they know how to check it out. 
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F. I don’t understand. 
G. I don’t know enough about this subject to make a choice. 
H. None of these choices fits my basic viewpoint. 
 
 
Even when making predictions based on accurate knowledge, scientists and engineers 
can tell us only what probably might happen.  They cannot tell what will happen for 
certain.  Your position basically (please read from A to H, and then choose one): 
Predictions are NEVER certain: 
A. because there is always room for error and unforeseen events which will affect a 
result.  No one can predict the future for certain. 
B. because accurate knowledge changes as new discoveries are made, and therefore 
predictions will always change. 
C. because a prediction is not a statement of fact.  It is an educated guess. 
D. because scientists never have all the facts.  Some data are always missing. 
E. It depends.  Predictions are certain, only as long as there is accurate knowledge and 
enough information. 
F. I don’t understand. 
G. I don’t know enough about this subject to make a choice. 
H. None of these choices fits my basic viewpoint. 
 
 
Many scientific models used in research laboratories (such as the model of heat, the 
neuron, DNA, or the atom) are copies of reality.  Your position, basically (please read 
from A to J, and then choose one): 
Scientific models ARE copies of reality: 
A. because scientists say they are true, so they must be true. 
B. because much scientific evidence has proven them true. 
C. because they are true to life.  Their purpose is to show us reality or teach us 
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something about it. 
D. Scientific models come close to being copies of reality, because they are based on 
scientific observations and research. 
Scientific models are NOT copies of reality: 
E. because they are simply helpful for learning and explaining, within their limitations. 
F. because they change with time and with the state of our knowledge, like theories 
do. 
G. because these models must be ideas or educated guesses, since you can’t actually 
see the real thing. 
H. I don’t understand. 
I. I don’t know enough about this subject to make a choice. 
J. None of these choices fits my basic viewpoint. 
 
 
Even when scientific investigations are done correctly, the knowledge that scientists 
discover from those investigations may change in the future.  Your position, basically 
(please read from A to G, and then choose one): 
Scientific knowledge changes: 
A. because new scientists disprove the theories or discoveries of old scientists.  
Scientists do this by using new techniques or improved instruments, by finding new 
factors overlooked before, or by detecting errors in the original “correct” 
investigation. 
B. because the old knowledge is reinterpreted in light of new discoveries.  Scientific 
facts can change. 
Scientific knowledge APPEARS to change: 
C. because the interpretation or the application of the old facts can change.  Correctly 
done experiments yield unchangeable facts. 
D. because new knowledge is added on to old knowledge; the old knowledge doesn’t 
change. 
E. I don’t understand. 
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F. I don’t know enough about this subject to make a choice. 
G. None of these choices fits my basic viewpoint. 
 
 
Circle the number that represents your belief on a scale from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = 
strongly agree. 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
   Strongly 
Agree 
I would dislike becoming a 
scientist because it needs too 
much education. 
1 2 3 4 5 
What is true is a matter of 
opinion. 
1 2 3 4 5 
The government should spend 
more money on scientific 
research. 
1 2 3 4 5 
The methods used to determine 
the age of fossils and rocks are 
not accurate. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Science is easy to understand 
because it contains so many facts. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Instructors should focus on facts 
instead of theories. 
1 2 3 4 5 
A career in science would be dull 
and boring. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Science lessons are fun. 1 2 3 4 5 
The best ideas are often the most 
simple. 
1 2 3 4 5 
It is better to ask the teacher the 
answer than to find out by doing 
experiments. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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 Strongly 
Disagree 
   Strongly 
Agree 
Public money spent on science in 
the last few years has been used 
wisely. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Science can help to make the 
world a better place in the future. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Working on a problem with no 
quick solution is a waste of time. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Most things worth knowing are 
easy to understand. 
1 2 3 4 5 
I would like to belong to a science 
club. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Smart people are born that way. 1 2 3 4 5 
There is fossil evidence supporting 
that animals, including humans, 
did not evolve. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Children should be allowed to 
question their parents’ authority. 
1 2 3 4 5 
I would like to teach science when 
I leave school. 
1 2 3 4 5 
I would like to be a scientist when 
I leave school. 
1 2 3 4 5 
I get bored when watching science 
programs on TV at home. 
1 2 3 4 5 
I am curious about the world in 
which we live. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Cheetahs (large African cats) are able to run faster than 60 miles per hour when chasing 
prey. How would a biologist explain how the ability to run fast evolved in cheetahs, 
assuming their ancestors could run only 20 miles per hour? 
 
 
 
 
 
Squirrels have claws that they use to help them climb the bark of trees and jump from 
branch to branch. They had ancestors that did not have good claws, so they were not as 
good at climbing and jumping. Explain how modern day squirrels have claws that are 
good for climbing and jumping even though their ancestors did not. 
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Appendix 2.  The Knowing the Natural World Post-assessment.   
[Note.  These questions were substituted for the original CINS questions in the pre-
assessment for students completing the post-assessment only] 
 
KNOWING THE NATURAL WORLD 
 
Hummingbirds 
Hummingbirds are small birds with long, thin beaks.  They are 
known for their ability to hover in mid-air by rapidly flapping 
their wings from 15-80 times per second! Hummingbirds feed 
on nectar and insects.  The long thin beak allows birds to feed 
on nectar stored deep within flowers.  The beak also can be 
opened wide, and the lower half has the ability to flex 
downward to create an even wider opening, which facilitates 
the capture of flying insects.  Hummingbirds are native only to the Americas, with more 
species of hummingbirds found in the tropical Andes Mountains of South America than 
any other place.   
Choose the answer that best reflects how an evolutionary biologist would answer. 
Hummingbirds eat insects as well as nectar.  Which statement describes the 
availability of food for hummingbirds in the Andes? 
a. Finding food is not a problem since food is always in abundant supply. 
b. Since hummingbirds can eat a variety of foods, there is likely to be enough food for all 
of the hummingbirds at all times. 
c. Hummingbirds can get by on very little food, so the food supply does not matter. 
d. It is likely that sometimes there is enough food, but at other times there is not 
enough food for all of the hummingbirds. 
 
What do you think happens among the hummingbirds of a certain species when the 
food supply is limited? 
a. The hummingbirds cooperate to find food and share what they find. 
b. The hummingbirds fight for the available food and the strongest hummingbirds chase 
the weaker ones away. 
c. Genetic changes that would allow hummingbirds to eat new food sources are likely to 
be induced. 
d. The hummingbirds least successful in the competition for food are likely to die of 
starvation and malnutrition. 
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Populations of hummingbirds are made up of hundreds of individual hummingbirds.  
Which statement describes how similar they are likely to be to each other? 
a. All hummingbirds in the population are likely to be nearly identical. 
b. All hummingbirds in the population are identical to each other on the outside, but 
there are differences in their internal organs such as how they digest food. 
c. All hummingbirds in the population share many similarities, but there are differences 
in features like body size and bill length. 
d. All hummingbirds in the population are completely unique and share no features with 
other hummingbirds. 
 
Which statement could describe how traits in hummingbirds pass from one generation 
of hummingbirds to the next generation? 
a. Hummingbirds that learn to nectar from a particular type of orchid will pass the new 
ability to offspring. 
b. Hummingbirds that are able to hear, but have no survival advantage because of 
hearing, will eventually stop passing on the “hearing” trait. 
c. Hummingbirds with longer bills that allow for obtaining nectar from certain orchids 
have offspring whose bills gradually get even longer during their lifetime. 
d. Hummingbirds with a particular coloration and bill length are likely to pass the same 
trait on to offspring. 
 
Fitness is a term often used by biologists to explain the evolutionary success of certain 
organisms.  Below are descriptions of four fictional male hummingbirds.  Which 
hummingbird might a biologist consider to be the “most fit”? 
 Hummingbird A Hummingbird B Hummingbird C Hummingbird D 
beak length 20 cm 12 cm 10 cm 15 cm 
offspring 
surviving to 
adulthood 
19 28 22 26 
age at death 4 years 5 years 4 years 6 
comments 
Hummingbird A is 
very healthy, 
strong, and clever
Hummingbird B 
has mated with 
many 
hummingbirds 
Hummingbird C 
has a long bill and 
is very quick 
Hummingbird D 
has the largest 
territory of all the 
hummingbirds 
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a. Hummingbird A 
b. Hummingbird B 
c. Hummingbird C 
d. Hummingbird D 
 
According to the theory of natural selection, where did the variations in Andean 
species of hummingbirds most likely come from? 
a. The hummingbirds needed to change in order to survive, so beneficial new traits 
developed. 
b. The hummingbirds wanted to eat different foods, so beneficial new traits gradually 
appeared in the population. 
c. Random genetic changes and sexual recombination both created new variations. 
d. The environment of the Andes caused genetic changes in the hummingbirds. 
 
What could cause one species to change into so many species over time? 
a. Groups of hummingbirds encountered different mountain environments so the 
hummingbirds needed to become new species with different traits in order to 
survive. 
b. Groups of hummingbirds must have been geographically isolated from other groups 
and random genetic changes must have accumulated in these hummingbird 
populations over time. 
c. There may be minor variations, but all hummingbirds are essentially alike and all are 
members of a single species. 
d. In order to survive, different groups of hummingbirds needed to adapt to the 
different types of flowers, and so all organisms in each group gradually evolved to 
become a new hummingbird species. 
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Costus 
Many flowers can be classified as having either a bee- or 
hummingbird-pollination syndrome based on distinct suites of floral 
characters.  For example, flowers of bee-pollinated Costus (ginger 
plants) have broad, pale tubes that are white or yellow and often 
striped with red or purple, and the floral bracts are green.  Flowers 
of hummingbird-pollinated species have a 
narrow, tubular form, and the floral bracts 
are yellow, orange, or red.  Flowers in both 
pollination categories are odorless and 
diurnal, and they produce relatively large 
quantities of nectar.  Geological uplift in the Andes Mountains 
caused range shifts and occasionally isolated populations of 
Costus, resulting in “islands” of this rich food resource.  Bees are 
less active in the cool, wet weather that is common at higher 
elevations in the tropics and are rarely found above 2000 m. 
Choose the one answer that best reflects how an evolutionary biologist would answer. 
What would happen if several Costus were placed on a mountain in the Andes under 
ideal conditions with no predators and unlimited light and water so that all individuals 
survived?  Given enough time 
a. the Costus population would stay small because plants only have enough babies to 
replace themselves. 
b. the Costus population would double and then stay relatively stable. 
c. the Costus population would increase dramatically. 
d. the Costus population would grow slowly and then level off. 
 
Costus in the Andes Mountains require cross-fertilization (pollen from other 
individuals) to produce vigorous offspring. 
a. When bees are scarce, some Costus may be unable to obtain the pollinators they 
need to reproduce. 
b. When bees are limited, the Costus will attract other pollinators, so there is always 
enough. 
c. When bees are scarce, the Costus all reproduced less so they all survive. 
d. There are always plenty of bees in the Andes to meet the Costus’ needs. 
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Once a population of Costus has lived in a particular area for many years, 
a. the population continues to grow rapidly. 
b. the population remains relatively stable, with some fluctuations. 
c. the population dramatically increases and decreases each year. 
d. the population will decrease steadily. 
 
In the Costus population, what are the primary changes that occur gradually over 
time? 
a. The traits of each Costus within a population gradually change. 
b. The proportions of Costus having different traits within a population change. 
c. Successful behaviors learned by Costus (such as cheating) are passed on to 
offspring. 
d. Mutations occur to meet the needs of the Costus as the environment changes. 
 
Depending on their tube size and shape, some Costus are pollinated by bees, some by 
gnats, and some by hummingbirds.  Which statement best describes the interactions 
among the Costus and their pollinators? 
a. Most of the Costus in the Andes cooperate to find pollinators. 
b. Many of the Costus in the Andes compete with one another for pollinators and the 
strongest ones win. 
c. There are more than enough pollinators to meet all the Costus’ needs so they don’t 
need to compete for pollinators. 
d. Costus compete primarily with closely related species that require the same kinds 
of pollinators, and some may not reproduce from lack of pollinators. 
 
How did the different tube types first arise in the Andean Costus? 
a. The changes in the Costus’ tube size and shape occurred because of their need to 
be able to attract different kinds of pollinators to reproduce. 
b. Changes in the Costus’ tube occurred by chance, and when there was a good match 
between tube structure and available pollinators, those Costus produced more 
seeds. 
c. The changes in the Costus’ tube occurred because the environment induced the 
desired genetic changes. 
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d. The Costus’ tube changed a little bit in size and shape with each successive 
generation, some getting larger and some getting smaller. 
 
What type of variation in the bees is passed to the offspring? 
a. Any behaviors that were learned during the bee’s lifetime. 
b. Only characteristics that were beneficial during a bee’s lifetime. 
c. All characteristics that were genetically determined. 
d. Any characteristics that were positively influenced by the environment during the 
bee’s lifetime. 
 
What caused populations of Costus having different flower shapes and sizes to 
become distinct species distributed on the various mountains of the Andes? 
a. The Costus were quite variable, and those whose features were best suited to the 
available pollinators on each mountain reproduced most successfully. 
b. All Costus are essentially alike and there are not really different species. 
c. Different pollinators are available on different mountains and for that reason, 
individual Costus on each mountain gradually developed the tubes they needed to 
attract pollinators. 
d. Different lines of Costus developed different tube types because they needed them 
in order to attract pollinators. 
 
 
Miami Blue Butterflies 
The Miami Blue, Cyclargus thomasi bethunbakeri, is a small, 
brightly colored butterfly endemic to Florida; additional 
subspecies occur in the Bahamas and Hispaniola.  The 
butterfly inhabits tropical hardwood hammocks (closed 
canopy forests) and their associated margins, beachside 
scrub and tropical pine rocklands.  Once widespread and 
locally abundant, the Miami blue has been eliminated from 
much of its former range due to ever-expanding urbanization 
and the associated loss of coastal habitat. It is now one of 
Florida’s most endangered insects with a single remaining 
extant population supporting less than 100 individuals. 
Choose the one answer that best reflects how an evolutionary biologist would answer. 
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A typical natural population of butterflies consists of hundreds of butterflies.  Which 
statement best describes the butterflies of a single species in an isolated population? 
a. The butterflies share all of the same characteristics and are identical to each other. 
b. The butterflies share all of the essential characteristics of the species; the minor 
variations they display don’t affect survival. 
c. The butterflies are all identical on the inside, but have many differences in 
appearance. 
d. The butterflies share many essential characteristics, but also vary in many features. 
 
Fitness is a term often used by biologists to explain the evolutionary success of certain 
organisms.  Which feature would a biologist consider to be most important in 
determining which butterflies were the “most fit”? 
a. Large body size and ability to fly quickly away from predators. 
b. Excellent ability to compete for food. 
c. High number of offspring that survived to reproductive age. 
d. High number of matings with many different females. 
 
Assuming ideal conditions with abundant food and space and no predators, what 
would happen if a pair of Miami Blues were placed on an island off the coast of 
Florida? 
a. The Miami blue population would grow slowly, as butterflies would have only the 
number of babies that are needed to replenish the population. 
b. The Miami blue population would grow slowly at first, then would grow rapidly, and 
thousands of butterflies would fill the hammock. 
c. The Miami blue population would never become very large, because only organisms 
such as weeds and bacteria reproduce in that manner. 
d. The Miami blue population would continue to grow slowly over time. 
 
Once a population of butterflies has been established for a number of years in a real 
(not ideal) tropical hardwood hammock with other organisms including predators, 
what will likely happen to the population? 
a. The butterfly population will stay about the same size. 
b. The butterfly population will continue to rapidly grow in size. 
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c. The butterfly population will gradually decrease until no more butterflies are left. 
d. It is impossible to tell because populations do not follow patterns. 
 
In butterfly populations, what are the primary changes that occur gradually over time? 
a. The traits of each individual butterfly within a population gradually change. 
b. The proportions of butterflies having different traits within a population change. 
c. Successful behaviors learned by certain butterflies are passed on to offspring. 
d. Mutations occur to meet the needs of the butterflies as the environment changes. 
 
 
What did watching the video do for your understanding of evolution?  
 
Was the story particularly important to your understanding? Give specific examples.  
 
Was the imagery particularly important to your understanding? Give specific examples.  
 
The program showed how some orchids have structures that seem to mimic the females 
of a species of wasp. Males are attracted to this structure and try to mate with it, and 
they inadvertently pollinate the flower. How would an evolutionary biologist explain this 
type of mimicry, assuming that the orchids’ ancestors did not have these structures?  
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CHAPTER 5.  
WHAT IS “EDUCATIONAL” IN A FREE-CHOICE SCIENCE WORLD?  
DETERMINING WHAT AUDIENCES BELIEVE ABOUT THE EDUCATIONAL 
VALUE OF NATURE PROGRAMS 
 
Abstract:  
 Wildlife and nature programs have the potential to engage and teach large 
audiences about the natural world in free-choice learning environments, but they also 
may be complicit in the public’s misunderstanding of basic scientific principles such as 
evolution.  Theory suggests that epistemological beliefs and cognitive dispositions affect 
when and what individuals learn, especially for socio-scientific topics su h as evolution.  
As a result, audiences may look to descriptors like “educational” as they consider free-
choice learning experiences without any prior knowledge of the content value.  This 
paper reports on a study conducted to determine what audiences believe to be the 
“educational value” of wildlife and other nature films.  Results indicated that 95.9% (n = 
294) of respondents believed nature films were “educational,” while slightly fewer 
(87.4%) agreed that the primary goal for these programs is to teach about nature.  Indeed, 
the more respondents believed nature programs were designed to be educational, the 
more they believed that both the science (p < 0.001) and nature (p < 0.001) were 
portrayed accurately.  In terms of the public understanding of science, audiences clearly 
treat nature programs as credible and authoritative sources of information, a s g ificant 
issue given that they are expecting to learn from a source that often provides inaccurate 
and misleading explanations of important processes such as evolution. 
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 How educational are free-choice science learning opportunities?  This question is 
difficult to answer because it first requires a definition of “educational” i  an out-of-
school context.  From the perspective of those who produce science information for the 
public, the question may seem relatively straightforward.  An “educational” pportunity 
would be one that is specifically designed to teach about a subject and is grounded in 
some disciplinary standards.  In fact, key formal education resources, including Project 
2061 (American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1990) and the National 
Science Education Standards (NSES; National Research Council, 1996), can be used to 
assess the adequacy of the information presented in resources outside of formal 
environments (Bybee, 2001).  For example, Yager & Falk (2007) showcase a variety of 
successful examples of how the NSES can and should be applied to learning 
opportunities outside of school.   
 Educators differ about the labels applied in these environments, however; non-
formal, informal, and free-choice have all been used to describe the distinction from 
structured school environments.  According to Falk (2001), the term “informal” (and 
similarly non-formal) implies a difference in the process of learning as a function of the 
physical setting.  On the other hand, “free-choice” implicates the social context and 
underlying motivation of the learner; a free-choice learning environment describes the 
unique, intrinsic needs and interests of the learner (Falk, 2001).  In a free-choice context, 
therefore, individuals are free to choose when, where, and what they want to learn, and 
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those choices may or may not include resources guided by the NSES, for example.  
Obviously, examinations or other tests of understanding are not a component of the free-
choice environment.  Moreover, in free-choice contexts learners are not segregatd by 
age or achievement like they may be in formal environments, and opportunities to learn 
science are generally designed for broad audiences.  So, by assuming the actual l arning 
process is the same across environments, defining “educational” from a producer’s 
perspective in a free-choice context may overlook the diversity and motivation of 
individuals approaching these educational opportunities.  This paper explores the 
educational value of science knowledge in the free-choice environment from the 
perspective of the consumer. 
 From a consumer’s perspective, the free-choice science world is full of learning 
opportunities, including museums, zoos, local parks, science centers, news, 
documentaries, science- and non-science-fiction films, popular television, and the i tern t 
(Bates, 2005; Falk, Storksdieck, & Dierking, 2007).  It is a “marketplace of ideas,” to 
borrow a metaphorical model of free-speech (see also Bartley III, 1987) which, in theory, 
allows for the open sharing of diverse ideas that leads ultimately to “truth.”   Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, when he coined the metaphor, argued that “the best test of truth is the 
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market” (Abrams v. 
United States, 250 U.S. 616, 1919).  From a democratic theory perspective, the 
marketplace focuses on maximum idea exchange in the context of effective self-
government, whereas the economic perspective of this free-speech model focuses on 
maximizing consumer welfare and competition (Napoli, 1999).  These two theoretical 
perspectives combine to idealize the marketplace as a source of competitive, efficient, 
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and unregulated ideas, highly sensitive to consumer preferences, that yields informed 
decision-making and a well-functioning democracy (Napoli, 1999).  In fact, the 
marketplace of ideas metaphor is most often used in the context of consumers’ and 
citizens’ rights to receive information (Sweeney, 1984 in Napoli, 1999), but it is 
criticized for its unwarranted broad application in jurisprudence (Hopkins, 1996).  
Criticisms also have focused on issues of ontology associated with the “truth” to w ich 
Holmes refers, as well as cognitive dissonance (Ingber, 1984; Baker, 1989), but can just
as easily include epistemology.  Nevertheless, the metaphor serves as a useful mod l to 
begin exploring how consumers approach educational opportunities related to science
outside of formal school contexts. 
 Why should science educators be concerned about the consumer’s perspective for 
defining resources as “educational”?  In the marketplace of ideas, the learning process 
may be the same as formal learning environments, but marketplace influences, not 
standards-based influences, visibly dominate.  The marketplace is full of competing id as 
all vying for some competitive grasp of the public opinion of “truth.”  Consumers must 
choose among competing claims, but acceptance and rejection is rarely straightforward 
(Locke, 1999); the processing of these diverse experiences is complex (Bates, 2005).  As 
Locke (1999) noted, the degree of acceptance and rejection of claims is a balance of 
specific circumstances, experience, and other possible sources of assumed authoritative 
knowledge.  Therefore, the rhetorical organization of scientific discourse in the 
marketplace of ideas may have a huge affect on consumer’s perspectives.   
 However, not all of the competing ideas in the free-choice marketplace are of 
equal “educational” value.  Knowledge constructed from poor sources obtained in the 
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marketplace can lead to misconceptions that can be very difficult to alter (Wandersee, 
Mintzes, & Novak, 1994), especially when adults are no longer influenced by formal 
learning environments.  In addition, individuals motivated to learn are most likely to 
incorporate the broad knowledge messages communicated through free-choice venues 
(Falk, Heimlich, & Bronnenkant, 2008; Maurer & Reinemann, 2006).  So, if messages 
that portray science poorly are common in the marketplace, motivated learners (i.e., those 
most likely to engage in science and society debates) will learn incorrect conceptions 
about key scientific processes, such as evolution.   
 Science educators need to understand all of the opportunities available to 
consumers of science as we address the public understanding of science and sci nce 
literacy because both science in general, and evolution in particular, are being challenged 
in the marketplace for their “truth” value.  Although philosophical discussions about 
ontology, axiology, and epistemology are enormously fruitful in a “metacognitive” sense, 
ultimately we need to return to an understanding of shared, public knowledge and its role 
in the scientific enterprise (Chalmers, 1999).  For example, antibiotic resistance, gene 
therapy, disease, food production, environmental quality, and biotechnology are all areas 
of active biological research at the interface with society.  While they are topics that 
clearly involve multiple ways of knowing, truly understanding the science underlying 
these topics requires a fundamental understanding of the theory of evolution (Antolin & 
Herbers, 2001).  Knowing that antibiotics affect only bacteria, not viruses, is one level of 
understanding; understanding that time-honored drugs are no longer effective, perhapsa 
result of the overuse of antibiotics in everyday life, is another level of understanding; and 
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understanding that antibiotics are strong selective agents that act on the incomplete 
eradication of populations is yet another.   
 In the marketplace of ideas, scientists and non-scientists (e.g., creationists) present 
different versions of the world in rhetorical terms of competing reasoning of an
argument; they use similar argumentative modes and techniques (Locke, 1999).  
Purveyors of messages in the marketplace often use discrepant or inconsistent 
information with the purpose of bringing about attitude change (Baker, 1989).  
Consumers may be unaware that museums, websites, and nature programs may be 
misused by groups with a particular agenda who manipulate these different media to 
compete for some “truth” value or credibility.  For example, creationists may want to 
persuade the “uncertain” public to question the fundamentals of evolution, and science as 
a whole (Clark, Foster, & York, 2007; Scott & Matzke, 2007).  Their goal is to return our 
society to its fundamentalist roots – to “defeat scientific materialism and its destructive 
moral, cultural and political legacies and to replace materialistic explanations with the 
theistic understanding that nature and human beings are created by God” 
(www.antievolution.org, also see Forrest & Gross, 2004) through a deliberate attack in 
the marketplace of ideas.  Indeed, one part of their persuasion strategy includes the tactic 
of arguing for “equal time” for the “alternative theory” of intelligent design (Forrest, 
2007).   
 More than any other, this strategy to invoke “equal time” appeals to people’s 
sense of reciprocity (Cialdini, 1993).  It also plays well with journalists trying to meet 
some semblance of “balance,” and the appeal to “fairness” creates additional uncertainty 
by casting doubt on the credibility of anyone who will not “play by the rules.”  As a
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result, dissonance purveyors with a message perceived as strong by the uncertain 
consumer in the marketplace may be afforded the same credibility as an evolutionary 
scientist despite differences in information and knowledge provided.   In this free-for-all 
marketplace of ideas, acceptance and rejection depend on consumers’ levels of 
understanding, their experiences, their culture, and the rhetorical organization th t 
influences their responses to authoritative knowledge (Locke, 1999).   
 This is particularly true with media, like wildlife and nature programs, already 
considered “educational” by convention.  While nature programs have the potential to 
engage and teach large audiences about the natural world in free-choice learning 
environments, they also may be complicit in the public’s misunderstanding of evolution.  
Both Mitman (1999) and Bousé (2000) clearly have endorsed embracing a highly 
skeptical view of reality presented in wildlife films, warning that this genre is driven by 
the need for compelling story lines rather than scientific accuracy.  Dingwall & Aldridge 
(2006) suggest that nature film narratives implicitly endorse creationist accounts of life 
on earth, especially in the “blue-chip” sub-genre, a sub-genre with high production values 
and strong visual appeal, often without a host – the narration is voiced over the 
production.   
 The producers of these programs clearly represent different worldviews, but the 
information they add to the marketplace of ideas calls into question how to navigate 
through resources that have different connotations of “educational.”  Ironically, a learner 
motivated to seek a free-choice science learning experience may have little information to 
assess the quality of the experience sought.  From a consumer’s perspective, individuals 
must either already possess the knowledge to assess the quality of the experience or r ly 
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on an assessment applied by some other source.  Yet, awards and the credibility of the 
awarding institutions, accreditation, and sponsorships may not always be obvious, or 
straightforward characteristics. 
 
Theoretical Underpinning and Research Questions 
Television Audiences 
 Understanding how audiences approach free-choice science learning opportunities 
begins with new conceptualizations of these important consumers.  Communication is not 
a linear model.  No longer are studies of mass communication based on content-analysis 
(an assessment from producers’ perspectives) assuming a linear flow of information that 
audiences acquire (see Bates, 2005).  For example, visitors to museums actively engage 
prior experiences in their interpretation of exhibits (Stocklmayer & Gilbert, 2002).  
Television, on the other hand, has a long history of considering audiences as passive 
receptacles of the medium’s account of the world (Wilson, 1993), but free-choice 
audiences do not just passively consume materials they find in the marketplace.  Indeed,
recent media-effects models incorporate audience engagement, using prior knowledge as 
a predictor of how media messages are internalized (Busselle, Ryabovolova, & Wilson, 
2004; Potter, Pashupati, Pekurny, Hoffman, & Davis, 2002).  Likewise, researchers 
exploring the public understanding of science suggest that future work should attend 
more fully to audience processing of science-related media along with their content 
analyses of texts (Bates, 2005).   
 Uses-and-gratifications research approaches television as a source of influence on 
conceptual understanding within the context of other possible influences (Rubin, 2004).  
336 
Audiences purposefully seek out programs from a diverse selection of television 
programs, as well as competing forms of media, with a specific goal in mind (Rubin, 
2004).  The consumer is an active viewer.  The content alone may be less important to the 
meaning that is ultimately constructed than the media experiences audiences bri g, the 
context in which they use media, and how and why they use the medium (Brown 1998).   
 What then is the influence of nature programming on knowledge development 
related to the understanding of evolution?  Ultimately, two kinds of information are 
needed: (1) whether viewers possess, and use, the kinds of knowledge provided to them 
by the nature program, and (2) what kinds of knowledge viewers actually possess and use 
when understanding the nature program (Livingstone, 1998).  Whether or not viewers can 
use the information depends in part on the conceptual understanding of science and, in 
the analysis that follows, evolution.  In addition, the prior experiences audiences have 
with specific genres are critical in their textual readings and interpretation of new 
experiences (Bates, 2005; Busselle and Bilandzic, 2008; Livingstone, 1998).   
 Wildlife and nature programs that present evolutionary science poorly may be 
particularly insidious if audiences perceive the genre as “educational.”  For example, 
audiences expect certain types of character and plot development in soap operas because 
of past experiences with soap operas, and they interpret these elements in light of those 
past experiences (Livingstone, 1998).  Moreover, emotional connections affect recall and 
memory (Fujioka, 2005).  Thus, past experiences with educational programming may 
leave audiences unaware that narratives in wildlife and nature programs are shaped from 
dramatic perspectives rather than educational perspectives.  For example, wildlif  
programs often feature orphans as the main characters, but life history evolution predicts 
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that in species with high parental care (most charismatic megafauna), orphans will rarely 
survive to adulthood.  Narration that incorporates teleology as a mechanism may not 
directly promote alternative “theories” to evolution, such as intelligent dsign (Dingwall 
and Aldridge 2006), but it can promote alternative conceptions nonetheless.  
 
Personal Epistemology 
 Personal epistemology, or the beliefs an individual holds about knowledge and its 
production, may provide the theoretical grounding to predict media influences, and more 
broadly, the learning outcomes about science in the marketplace of ideas.  Specifically, 
personal epistemology may be closely tied to the kind of knowledge viewers use when 
understanding a nature program.  Numerous models are available that address how 
individuals’ beliefs about the certainty, source, justification, acquisition, and structure of 
knowledge affect learning (see Duell & Schommer-Atkins, 2001).  Multi-dimensional 
models predict that these dimensions develop independently, whereas uni-dimensional 
models hypothesize that if one dimension develops the other dimensions also develop 
(Duell & Schommer-Atkins, 2001).  Using a multi-dimensional approach, Schommer 
(1990) and Schraw et al. (2002) characterize personal epistemology along five axes: (1) 
the stability of knowledge, ranging from knowledge being unchanging to knowledge 
being tentative; (2) the source of knowledge, ranging from omniscient authority to reason 
and empirical evidence; (3) the structure of knowledge, ranging from isolated bits and 
pieces to integrated concepts; (4) the speed of learning, ranging from quick to not-at-all 
to gradual; and (5) the ability to learn ranging from being fixed at birth to being able to 
change.   
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 The Reflective Judgment Model takes a uni-dimensional approach to personal 
epistemology.  With extensive study, King & Kitchener (1994) describe seven stages in 
the development of complex reasoning about ill-structured problems (problems that 
cannot be solved with a high degree of certainty).  These stages can be grouped into three 
levels: pre-reflective, quasi-reflective, and reflective thinking (King & Kitchener, 2004).   
Pre-reflective thinking is characterized by judgments that knowledge is c rtain and single 
correct answers exist that usually come from authority figures.  Quasi-reflective thinking 
is characterized by judgments that uncertainty is part of the process of knowing, 
understanding that knowledge is an abstraction, and that it is constructed – not simply 
accepted from others.  Individuals recognize different types and rules of evidence.  Their 
judgments, however, indicate a tenuous relationship between gathering evidence and 
drawing conclusions, resulting in idiosyncratic views of knowledge claims.  Reflective 
thinking is characterized by judgments that consistently use evidence and reason.  
Reflective thinkers are metacognitive thinkers, aware of the context dependency of 
knowledge and the need to revisit and re-evaluate conclusions and knowledge claims 
(King & Kitchener, 2004). 
 Although psychologists disagree about the independence of the development, the 
dimensions of most personal epistemology models generally fall into two classes (Hof r, 
2004): 
1. the nature of knowledge (what one believes knowledge is), including dimensions 
of certainty of knowledge and simplicity of knowledge; and  
2. the nature or process of knowing (how one comes to know), including dimensions 
such as source of knowledge and justification for knowing (a dimension specific 
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to the Reflective Judgment Model that describes how individuals evaluate 
knowledge; King & Kitchener, 1994). 
In addition, researchers generally agree that these beliefs play an important r le in 
learning.  For example, if people believe knowledge is certain and passed down by 
authority figures, they are less likely to question authority in the classroom (Schommer-
Aikins, 2004) or in free-choice learning environments.  This can be particularly 
worrisome with regards to “ill-structured” problems and controversial or socio cientific 
issues (Sadler, 2004) because the marketplace is full of authority-driven resources that 
derive their credibility from little more than name recognition (e.g., The Center for 
Science and Culture).  Personal epistemology may be especially important in a broad
cultural acceptance of evolution (Sinatra, Southerland, McConaughy, & Demastes, 2003). 
 The challenge, then, is that people continue to learn outside of the classroom, and 
they may be incorporating mixed messages into their understanding depending on the 
free-choice science resources from which they draw their knowledge.  Therefore, 
understanding the educational beliefs audiences may have about nature films may be a 
key first step in improving evolution education in a broad context.  Individuals motivated 
to learn may choose resources based on some unknown assessment of the “educational” 
value.  If audiences generally consider wildlife and nature films to be educational, hen 
the film’s flawed representation of science may not only be overlooked, but the 
misconceptions portrayed may be incorporated into viewers’ conceptualizations.   
 This study attempts to determine audience’s views of the educational value of 
wildlife and nature films.  Personal epistemology may play an important role in the 
impact wildlife and nature programs have on the viewing public’s understanding of 
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evolution.  If viewers believe knowledge is certain, then they may accept the information 
presented in wildlife and nature films without question.  Similarly, if they believ  
knowledge is passed down from authority figures, they may be even less likely to 
question the authority of free-choice learning environments.  Individuals with higher 
levels of education in general, and the natural sciences in particular, should be more wary 
of nature films than less well-educated individuals because of both advanced 
understanding of scientific processes and advanced development of personal 
epistemology.  They should have less of an expectation for an “educational” experience.   
 A more subtle distinction lies with how educational audiences believe nature 
programs are designed to be.  Addressing the design aspect may remove some bias 
associated with interest in nature programs in general.  Indeed, audiences that b lieve 
wildlife and nature films are designed to be educational may be more likely accept the 
content as an accurate portrayal of natural processes, like evolution, than audiences that 
do not (Figure 5.1). 
 
Materials and Methods 
Developing the Instrument  
 I designed a survey (Chapter Appendix 1) using principles outlined in Dillman 
(2007).  Twenty closed questions (e.g., Likert-scale, yes/no) intended to assess different 
aspects about beliefs about the educational value of nature programs or characteristics of 
the respondents were developed.  These items were designed to elicit individuals’ belief  
about nature programs and the information used to make those judgments.   
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Figure 5.1.  The research approach for determining audiences beliefs about the 
educational value of nature programs.  Heavy arrows indicate the variables addressed 
with the audience survey. 
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 Because defining the educational value of a television program was potentially 
problematic, the dependent variable, educational, was operationalized in the survey in a 
variety of forms.  The first form was a direct question: “Do you believe that nature films 
are educational?”  The second form was the development of a scale designed to identify 
the qualities respondents associate with the word.  Participants were asked whether they 
agreed or disagreed with a series of statements (e.g., “If a nature film is educational, then 
it is accurate, the content has been reviewed/approved by scientists, and it presents the 
most current scientific understanding) scored on Likert-type scales from strongly agree to 
strongly disagree (Chapter Appendix 1). 
 Determining whether a nature film was “educational” was only one approach to 
the problem; determining whether audiences believed films were designed to be 
educational added a dimension that extended beyond whether an individual liked 
“educational” programs.  In general, if a wildlife/nature film was designed to be 
educational, then by definition, one would expect the primary goal for the program to be 
teaching about wildlife and nature.  Similarly, one would expect that the narration was 
written to explain and clarify the scientific understanding of the wildlife and/or the 
ecology of the topic.  A subtler distinction was the expectation that the producers have 
advanced knowledge about wildlife and natural sciences.  Therefore, designed to be 
educational was operationalized using several items that produced straightforward, 
nominal answers: (1) do you believe the primary goal of most nature films is to teach 
about nature, (2) do you believe the narration for nature films is written to explain and 
clarify what we know about nature, and (3) do you believe the producers for nature films 
are experts in the natural sciences.  A second item addressed the knowledge respondents 
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believed producers had with regard to science.  “Do you believe the producers for nature 
films know more about wildlife and natural sciences than you do?” was a Likert-scale 
item ranging from producers know significantly more to significantly less than the 
respondent (Rank Knowledge).  A third form questioned whether respondents believed 
that science and nature were portrayed accurately (Portrayal of Science, Portrayal of 
Nature). 
 Two different metrics were used as independent variables: descriptive 
characteristics and epistemological characteristics.  These variables were operationalized 
in several forms.  Descriptive characteristics included gender, the highst level of 
education the participant had achieved, the number of courses respondents had taken that 
included biology, ecology, or the natural sciences, and the respondents’ self-reported 
interest in biology, ecology, or the natural sciences.  Epistemological characteristics were 
based on recent assessments developed in personal epistemology (e.g., Hofer, 2000; King 
& Kitchener, 1994; Schommer, 1990; Schraw, Bendixen, & Dunkle, 2002) relating to the 
nature of knowledge (certainty and simplicity of knowledge) and the nature and the 
process of knowing (sources of knowledge and justification for knowing).  People that 
believe knowledge is certain should be more likely to believe nature films are 
educational, and people that believe knowledge is passed down from omniscient authority 
should believe nature films are designed to be educational.  Addressing how individuals 
related the structure of knowledge to their beliefs may not be as generalizable because 
some nature films clearly approach the story from an integrated standpoint.  Nevertheless, 
understanding the complexity of knowledge should influence beliefs about the 
educational value of nature films.   
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 The personal epistemology characteristics defined here are likely related to the 
descriptive characteristics (King & Kitchener, 1994), but personal epistemology metrics 
are subtle and require extensive questioning to obtain measurements.  Therefore, I chos  
to include personal epistemology items specific to issues regarding evolution education 
as proxies for larger, more complex metrics.  Nominal items included asking whether 
respondents believed nature films should only include facts about nature not theories, 
whether theories were important in nature films, whether trustworthy narrators are an 
important component of the educational experience, and whether issues have more than 
one side.  Respondents also were asked about the influence of fact-based stories on 
knowledge simplicity, whether knowledge changed over time, and whether most things 
worth knowing are simple to understand (Chapter Appendix 1).   
 Items were tested in three phases to improve clarity and assess the informat on 
being collected.  The first test included a group of five professionals with experi nc  in 
education, evolution, and television production.  These individuals spoke openly about 
their thinking as they answered each survey item.  This initial testing indicate  that some 
items required revision to clarify objectives, but all five professionals agreed in the value 
of the research.  In addition, time to completion during this initial testing was me ured.   
 The second phase was a “beta-test” with the revised items using students in an 
upper division forest ecology course taught at the University of Montana.  This sample 
was selected specifically to determine how adults with an advanced knowledge of the 
natural processes portrayed in nature programs might think about the educational value of
those programs.  Results from this second phase indicated that some of the items were 
still not addressing their intended goals (e.g., the acceptability of faking situations in 
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nature films), so the survey was offered to ecologists and science educators at a national 
meeting of the Ecological Society of America as a third phase.  Visitors to a cientific 
poster presenting the results from the beta-test of the instrument were solicit d for their 
responses.  Several open-ended items were included in this version of the instrument to 
determine whether concepts were being addressed adequately with other items.  
Reviewers were very helpful with their input, and the open-ended items were converted 
to closed items based on their responses.  The final survey included 28 items, taking less 
than 10 minutes to complete (Chapter Appendix 1). 
 
Implementing the Survey 
 The ideal survey population for this research is adults who may or may not watch 
nature films.  This population does not include homeless individuals, but it does not 
exclude individuals that do not own television sets.  This survey population would be the 
most broadly representative in assessing how one defines nature films as educational and 
who has thought about the educational value of these films.  Alternatively, a population 
exposed to nature films frequently should represent the uppermost bounds of the 
variables being tested.  The city of Missoula, Montana, annually hosts an internatonal 
wildlife film festival, and the festival organizers actively involve the Missoula 
community, through citizen judging panels, parades, and/or public viewings.  A major 
goal for the organizers is, in fact, promoting the educational value of these type of films.  
Moreover, Missoula is a community with close ties to the ecological world around it; a 
large proportion of the community lives there to experience the outdoors.  Therefore, the 
likelihood of individuals thinking about the educational value of nature films in this 
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community is high.  Indeed, this population should provide more illuminating results than 
a broad US survey population.  Therefore, the sample frame was limited to Missoula 
County.   
 Participants were selected systematically from the most recent local elephone 
book using a randomly generated starting number.  Only home addresses or individuals 
listing their business address as their sole address (e.g., lawyers) were included.  The 
number of respondents required was derived from the amount of sampling error tolerated, 
the population size from which the sample was drawn, the variation in response 
characteristics, and the confidence interval desired for the estimates according t : 
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where Ns is the completed sample size, Np is the population size, p is the proportion of the 
population expected to choose one of two response categories, B is the accepted sampling 
error, and C is the Z statistic corresponding to the confidence level desired (Dillman, 
2007).  Using a 95% confidence interval, an 80/20 split (an homogenous response level), 
and a population of 35,000 households in the telephone book, the sample size calculated 
was 243 respondents.  Dillman’s (2007) Tailored Design Method suggested that upwards 
of a 60% response rates could be expected, so a total of 480 respondents were contacted 
with a pre-notice postcard explaining the research and indicating the survey would be 
arriving shortly.  Only one adult per household was directed to respond to the survey.  A 
confidentiality agreement was in place per Institutional Review Board specifications at 
The University of Montana.   
 Roughly 30% of surveys were returned within 10 days of being sent.  The 2006 
American Community Survey (http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/ADPTable?_ m=y&-
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geo_id=05000US30063&-qr_name=ACS_2006_EST_G00_DP5&-
ds_name=ACS_2006_EST_G00_&-_lang=en&-redoLog=false&-_sse=on) provided a 
breakdown of the adult population of Missoula County.  Early analyses confirmed 
predictions that the sample would represent an older segment of the population than 
census data would indicate; the mail sample was significantly short on individuals 40 
years old and younger.  Rather than continue on with an expensive method designed to 
elicit a greater response rate from this segment of the population, efforts were re-di ected 
towards younger members of the Missoula community.  A single reminder/thank-you 
letter was sent to all participants (which elicited an additional 75 responses), and that 
aspect of the survey was closed.   
 Although the population at The University of Montana may not have represented 
the entire missing age group, it was chosen as the most likely source for a large number 
of “younger” respondents.  Invitations to complete surveys were solicited at different 
times of day at several different locations around the campus, targeting individuals that 
likely did not live on campus (parking lots, main points of entry/exit, and the “mall” 
between the library and the University Center) and thus, respondents tended to be older 
than students living in on-campus residences.  To enhance the likelihood of broad 
representation, participants were offered the opportunity to enter a drawing for a $50 gift 
card for the university’s bookstore.   
 
Analyses 
 Likert-scale variables:  All of the 7-item Likert-scale variables were highly 
skewed with generally high kurtosis and consequently very little variability (Table 5.1).  
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Transformations did not improve the distributions of the responses.  As a result, 
responses to these items were reclassified to reflect more even distributions than the 
original scale variables without losing much of the diversity of original data.  The Likert-
scale variable describing how educational respondents believed nature films actually are 
required additional re-coding.  Initial examination of this variable indicated incongruities 
with other measures of this concept; respondents seemed to believe that nature films were 
less educational than they had indicated previously.  Only 53% ranked the educational 
value at 5 or greater (of 7 possible), and 35% ranked it 3 or less.  This ranking likely 
reflected an error in survey design, however.  On the survey form, the item about the 
educational value of nature programs appeared immediately after the item asking 
respondents how educational they believed nature films were designed to be, but the two 
items scaled in opposite directions.  As a result, respondents may have used the same 
scale on both items in their assessments, that is, inadvertently reversing the scale for their 
thoughts about the educational value of nature films.  The item addressing design was 
highly skewed toward “designed to be educational”.  In fact, the modal response was 2 
(on a scale from 1 = designed to be educational to 7 = not designed to be educational), 
and 80% of respondents ranked the variable 3 or above.  Respondents that did reverse 
scales should have been most apparent for those selecting the same numerical value for
each item; someone that ranked the design of nature films as a “2” would have select d 
“2” for the educational value rather than “6” if they had reversed the scale.  Ind ed, 84 
individuals selected identical values for the two items (20 of which were “4” or the 
equivalent of “no opinion”).  When those respondents’ scores were reversed (i.e., “2” 
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Table 5.1.   
Measures of the shape of the distributions of Likert-scale items obtained from the 
audience survey. 
Likert-scale Item n Skewness SE Kurtosis SE 
Designed to be Educational 293 -0.917 0.142 0.651 0.284 
Educational Value 295 -0.615 0.142 -0.543 0.283 
Interest  297 -0.703 0.141 -0.273 0.282 
Portrayal of Science 293 -0.556 0.142 0.158 0.284 
Portrayal of Nature 293 -0.901 0.142 0.928 0.284 
 
 
replaced with “6”), the distribution reflected the skewed distribution apparent in the
variable “designed to be educational” (Figure 5.3).   
 Responses to 7-item Likert scales were converted from interval data by recoding 
them as three or four relatively equally distributed categories that varied depending on 
the original distribution of the data (Table 5.2).  For example, responses of 1, 2, 3, and 4 
on the Designed to be Educational Likert scale were recoded as “1”, 5 was recoded as 
“2”, 6 as “3”, and 7 as “4” to represent those who did not feel strongly about the design, 
those that were almost neutral, those that strongly believed, and those that very strongly 
believed that nature films were designed to be educational (the scale was r versed to 
reflect a similar direction in responses).  Similarly, Interest was recoded to three 
categories representing those with high interest, those with moderate interest, and those 
with little or no interest. 
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Table 5.2.   
Sample size and proportion of responses for categories of recoded Likert-scale items. 
  
Item 1 2 3 4 
Designed to be Educational 60 (21%) 68 (23%) 116 (40%) 49 (17%) 
Educational Value 58 (20%) 110 (37%) 99 (34%) 28 (10%) 
Interest  86 (29%) 134 (45%) 77 (26%) ---a 
Portrayal of Science 44 (15%) 72 (25%) 94 (32%) 83 (28%) 
Portrayal of Nature 73 (25%) 91 (31%) 101 (35%) 28 (10%) 
a Recoded scale only included three categories. 
 
 
 One additional Likert-scale item was recoded; Rank Knowledge was recoded 
from a 6-item scale to three categories.  These categories represented those individuals 
that felt they know significantly more about wildlife than nature film producers, those 
that felt they know slightly more, and those that felt they know the same or less. 
 Variables were coded and analyzed using SPSS (v16.0).  Generally, non-
parametric tests (Chi-square, Mann-Whitney U-test, Kruskal-Wallis H-test) were used to 
analyze relationships because of the non-numerical nature of most variables and violtion 
of normality assumptions for other variables, whether they be independent or dependent.  
Where variables did not appear to violate assumptions of normality, analogous parametric 
tests were used. 
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Results 
Characteristics of the Sample Population 
 Of the 480 surveys sent out by mail, 207 were returned for a 43% return rate.  In 
addition, 94 responses were obtained via the on-campus survey.  The average age of the 
289 participants that provided their age was 47.1 years old (SE = 1.20).  Proportions 
in10-year age categories were fairly consistent with proportions from the 2006 American 
Community census, however ages from 25 to 45 were slightly underrepresented and ages 
55 to 64 were slightly overrepresented in this sample.  In addition, more males (53%, n = 
157) than females (47%, n = 139) completed surveys.  Nearly half (49.0%) of all 
respondents had completed at least a bachelor’s degree, although, as would be expected, 
this sample was highly dependent upon the survey sub-sample; campus respondents were 
generally still completing their first degree and mail respondents had completed degrees 
(Table 5.3).  Nevertheless, campus respondents had not taken more biology courses than 
mail respondents (Table 5.4). 
 Respondents were not all avid nature film viewers, as might be expected from a 
self-selected sample.  In fact, responses were distributed fairly evenly across the options 
for frequency of viewing except those that rarely or never watched (> 1-2 times per 
month = 26%, 1-2 times per month = 23%, 1-2 times every few months = 26%, 1-2 times 
per year = 19%, and never = 5%; n=300).  In addition, mail survey respondents were not 
more likely to represent avid nature film viewers than campus survey respondents (Figure 
5.2).  Interest in biology, ecology, or the natural sciences was highly skewed, however, 
with more than 70% of respondents ranking their interest as high (1-3 of a possible 7;  
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Table 5.3.   
The proportion of respondents in the mail and campus samples and the highest level of 
education they had attained. 
Highest Level of Education Mail Campus 
Some high school 1 0% 0 0% 
High school diploma or equivalent 27 13% 9 10% 
Some technical school 5 2% 0 0% 
Technical degree or equivalent 7 3% 1 1% 
Some college 35 17% 45 48% 
2-year college degree 14 7% 8 9% 
Bachelor’s degree 60 29% 18 19% 
Master’s degree 37 18% 9 10% 
Higher degree 18 9% 4 4% 
Total 204  94  
Note.  The difference between samples was significant (χ2 = 20.78, 3 df, p < 
0.001). 
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Table 5.4.   
The proportion of respondents in the mail and campus samples and the number of 
courses they had taken that included biology, ecology, or the natural sciences. 
Number of Biology Courses Mail 
 
Campus 
none 28 14% 
 
7 7% 
1-2 59 29% 
 
33 35% 
3-4 54 27% 
 
23 24% 
5-6 23 11% 
 
10 11% 
more than 6 39 19% 
 
21 22% 
Total 203  
 
94  
Note.  The samples were not significantly different (χ2 = 3.405, 4 df, p = 0.49). 
 
 
Chapter Appendix 1).  The campus survey respondents tended to be more interested in 
these subjects than the mail survey respondents, but the difference was not significant. 
 
Scale Construction 
 Because the overall purpose of the survey was not to develop scales describing 
audience beliefs but to predict relationships between beliefs about knowledge and beliefs 
about the educational value of nature programs, items were generally treated as separ te 
variables.  Two scales were identified a priori, however: personal epistemology and 
audiences’ defining characteristics of nature programs.  Different appro ches were  
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Figure 5.2.  Proportion of respondents from each sub-sample (mail survey n = 207, 
campus survey n = 93) watching nature films regularly (more than 1-2 times per month), 
frequently (1-2 times per month), often (1-2 times every few months), and rarely (1-2 
times per year to never). 
 
 
necessary in the development of these scales because the original items did not all yield 
the same kind of data (e.g., nominal or interval).   
 
 Personal Epistemology Dimensions:  A limited and varying number of items 
addressed three axes of personal epistemology, so the items addressing the (1) tentative 
nature of knowledge, (2) source of knowledge, and (3) complexity of knowledge were 
collapsed to reflect the boundaries of their respective dimensions (Table 5.5).  First, to 
address what respondents believed about the tentative nature of knowledge (from stable  
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Figure 5.3.  Proportion of respondents ranking the educational value of nature programs 
from not educational to educational (n = 295).  Original = non-recoded data.  Recoded = 
data were adjusted for respondents likely misreading the ranking scale.  
 
 
and unchanging to uncertain and evidentiary), a single Likert-type item that asked about 
agreement or disagreement with the idea that our basic understanding of a topic would 
not change in five years was collapsed to reflect the sample population.  Fifty-nine 
percent of respondents strongly disagreed indicating some understanding of the tentative 
nature of knowledge, but 25% only mildly disagreed, and 16% believed otherwise.  As a 
result, a high score of “3” was assigned to respondents that strongly disagreed, a 
moderate score of “2” to those that only mildly disagreed, and a low score of “1” t those 
that agreed or strongly agreed (Table 5.5).   
 Second, two items were posed that were directed at the source of knowledge from 
omniscient authority to evidence and reason.  Respondents were asked about the 
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educational value of a nature film using a trustworthy narrator, and 39.0% indicated th  
yes, the narrator’s credibility was associated with an educational experience.  Likewise, 
when asked whether respondents agreed or disagreed with the statement that if two 
different nature films present two different arguments about the same topic, at least one 
of them must be wrong, the majority of respondents disagreed (yes = 12.9%, no = 87.1%, 
n = 294).  Using a cross-tabulation of the two yes/no items, individuals were assigned a 
score of “2” (use of evidence and reason) if they responded “no” to both, and a score of 
“1” (respond to omniscient authority) if they responded “yes” to either (Table 5.5).   
 Third, the last epistemological characteristic explored respondents’ beliefs about 
the structure of knowledge by focusing on the importance of isolated bits of informati n 
versus integrated concepts.  When asked if scientific theories are unimportant because 
they are “just theories” (a vernacular misconception about the nature of scientific 
theories), a significant majority disagreed (yes = 13.4%, no = 86.6%).  Similarly, when 
asked whether only facts not theories should be presented in nature films, 20.4% said 
“yes” and 79.6% said “no.”  Two additional items addressed respondents’ beliefs about 
this complexity of knowledge using Likert-type scales.  In general, respondents agreed 
that nature films were easy to understand because they contained so many facts, and that 
most things worth knowing in nature films are simple to understand (Figure 5.4).  These 
four items employed different scales and collapsing required a series of cross-tabulations 
that divided respondents based on some ability to recognize the complexity of knowledge 
or their reliance on facts (Table 5.5).  Consequently, I used cross-tabulations in three 
steps.  First, I combined the two yes/no items into a single variable with three cat gories 
(“yes” to both, “no” to both, and combination of “yes” and “no”).  Second, I combined 
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Table 5.5.   
Items used to measure and construct three nominal scales describing personal 
epistemology: understanding of the tentative nature of knowledge, the role of the source 
of knowledge, and understanding the complexity of knowledge.   
Scale Item Mean Mode Range 
Tentative Nature of Knowledge   
 Stable Knowledge (Likert-type) 1.6 1 0-4 
recodeda  2.4 3 
1-3  
(low, medium, 
high) 
Source of Knowledge   
 Trustworthy Narrator (yes/no) 1.6 2 1-2 
 Omniscient Authority (yes/no) 1.9 2 1-2 
recoded  1.5 2 
1-2  
(low, high) 
Complexity of Knowledge   
 Nature of Theories (yes/no) 1.9 2 1-2 
 Fact-based Knowledge (yes/no) 1.8 2 1-2 
 Easy Knowledge (Likert type) 2.9 2 1-3 
 Simple Knowledge (Likert-type) 2.8 2 1-3 
recoded  1.6 2 
1-2  
(low, high) 
Note.  See Chapter Appendix 1 for survey. 
a  Items within each sub-category were collapsed using cross-tabulation and groupin  to 
produce the recoded variables. 
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Figure 5.4.  The proportion of respondents that agreed or disagreed with the survey 
Likert-scale items addressing the epistemological characteristic Complexity of 
Knowledge (n = 296).  Easy = “wildlife and nature films are easy to understand because 
they contain so many facts”.  Simple = “most things worth knowing in nature films are 
simple to understand”. 
 
 
Easy Knowledge with Simple Knowledge into another variable, the highest values (5-6) 
were recoded to “3”, the intermediate values (4) to “2”, and the lowest values (2-3) to 
“1”.  Third, I combined the values from these two variables to produce the final collapsed 
item, with low values (2-3) representing low understanding (“1”) and high values (4-5) 
representing high understanding (“2”).  These new collapsed variables (Tentativ  
Knowledge, Source of Knowledge, Complex Knowledge) were used to test for effects of 
personal epistemology on respondents’ beliefs about the educational value of nature 
films. 
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 The Defining Characteristics of Educational Nature Programs:  One of the 
approaches used to determine what respondents believed about the educational value of 
nature programs involved a series of statements describing potential characteristics of 
educational nature films; respondents were asked to agree or disagree with each n a 
Likert-scale format.  Not surprisingly, the responses to this series of items w re highly 
correlated.  In fact, only 11 relationships were not correlated at the p < 0.001 level, and 
those primarily involved respondents’ beliefs about giving human motivations to wildlife, 
whether nature films should fake situations, and whether review and approval by 
filmmakers was an important component of defining an educational film.  Factor analysis 
indicated that the items could be reduced to two components that together explained 52% 
of the variation in the original items (Table 5.6).  These two components represented th  
concept of accurate portrayal (Portrayal = scientist approval, accurate, re l stories, current 
science, no sensationalism, and learn from watching), and the concept of representativ  
production aspects (Production = fake scenes, anthropomorphism, and filmmaker 
approval; Table 5.7).  As a result, the two new variables Portrayal and Production were 
used as dependent variables to examine audience beliefs about the educational value of 
nature programs.  
 
Personal Epistemology 
 As theory would predict, the descriptive characteristics of respondents were 
indeed related to the epistemological characteristics (Table 5.9).  For example, 
respondents with more education, especially in the natural sciences, generally had higher 
scores for both Tentative Knowledge and Complex Knowledge than those with less 
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Table 5.6.   
Factor structure of the initial and rotated factor analysis of items describing the 
characteristics of an educational nature program. 
 
Initial  Rotated 
Component Eigenvalue % variance  Eigenvalue % variance 
1 3.135 34.831  3.128 34.752 
2 1.601 17.794  1.609 17.873 
Note. n = 262.   Eigenvalues < 1.0 have been omitted. 
 
 
education.  Age also appeared to affect how respondents thought about the Source of 
Knowledge, but in an unexpected direction.  Apparently, younger individuals were more 
wary of authority in nature programs than older individuals. 
 
Audience Beliefs about the Educational Value of Nature Films 
 An overwhelming majority of respondents believed that nature films are 
educational (yes = 95.9%, no = 4.1%), and ranked the educational value high (mode =6, 
65% ranking 5 out of 7 or above).  This unwavering homogeneity of responses did not 
lend itself to meaningful analyses with the independent variables, however.  Only level of 
interest and the epistemological characteristic Complex Knowledge were related to the 
educational value respondents assigned to nature films (Table 5.10).  Those that tended to 
rank their level of interest as low also ranked the educational value of nature films as low.    
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Table 5.7.   
Factor loadings for components identified with factor analysis using the items describing 
the characteristics of an educational nature program. 
 
Component 
Item 1 2 
Accurate 0.767 
 
Scientist Approval 0.742 
 
Real Stories 0.741 
 
Current Science 0.731 
 
Sensation 0.633 
 
Learn from Watching 0.517 
 
Anthropomorphisma 
 
0.824 
Filmmaker Approval 
 
-0.697 
Fakea 
 
0.606 
Note. n = 262.  All loadings smaller than 0.4 have been omitted. 
a Reverse keyed. 
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Table 5.8.   
The proportion of respondents in the mail and campus samples and their interest in 
biology, ecology, or the natural sciences. 
Level of Interest Mail Campus 
1 (low interest)  5 2% 1 1% 
2 10 5% 5 5% 
3 14 7% 13 14% 
4 28 14% 10 11% 
5 52 26% 14 15% 
6 49 24% 19 20% 
7 (high interest) 45 22% 32 34% 
Total 203  94  
Note.  The samples were not significantly different (χ2= 11.790, 6 df, p = 0.07). 
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Table 5.9.   
Statistical relationships between descriptive and epistemological characteristi s of the 
sample population. 
  Epistemological characteristic 
Descriptive characteristic  
Tentative 
Knowledge 
Source of 
Knowledge 
Complex 
Knowledge 
Highest level of education  
χ
2  
df 
p 
13.310 
6 
0.038 
.638 
3 
0.888 
13.206 
3 
0.004 
Biology courses  
χ
2  
df 
p 
23.183 
8 
0.003 
8.045 
4 
0.090 
13.239 
4 
0.010 
Gender 
χ
2  
df 
p 
2.834 
2 
0.242 
3.616 
1 
0.057 
.423 
1 
0.515 
Numerical age of respondent 
F 
df 
p 
2.485 
2, 282 
0.208 
5.282 
1, 273 
0.022 
1.153 
1, 265 
0.284 
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Table 5.10.   
Statistical relationships between items that addressed whether respondents believed 
nature programs were educational and respondent characteristics. 
Respondent characteristics  Educational 
Educational  
           Value 
Descriptive characteristics    
Highest level of education  
χ
2  
df 
p 
2.660 
3 
0.447 
6.746 
9 
0.664 
Biology courses 
χ
2  
df 
p 
6.457 
4 
0.168 
17.084 
12 
0.146 
Interest 
χ
2  
df 
p 
0.632 
2 
0.729 
16.713 
6 
0.010 
Gender 
χ
2  
df 
p 
0.137 
1 
0.711 
4.854 
3 
0.183 
Numerical age of respondent 
F  
df 
p 
1.871 
1, 280 
0.172 
2.196 
3, 278 
0.089 
Epistemological characteristics    
Tentative Nature of Knowledge 
χ
2  
df 
p 
3.602 
2 
0.165 
4.899 
6 
0.557 
Source of Knowledge 
χ
2  
df 
p 
0.344 
1 
0.558 
3.703 
3 
0.295 
Complexity of Knowledge 
χ
2  
df 
p 
0.402 
1 
0.526 
17.548 
3 
0.001 
Note. Educational was operationalized as a nominal variable (yes/no) and a Likert-scal  
variable (range 1-7) whose values were collapsed to four nominal categories (see above). 
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Similarly, those less likely to think of knowledge as isolated bits (Complexity of 
Knowledge) were more critical and likely to rank the educational value as low.
 Another measure of what audiences believed about how educational nature 
programs are involved agreeing or disagreeing with a series of statements describing the 
characteristics of educational nature programs.  Respondents clearly believed that to be 
educational nature films should be accurate, the stories should have really happened, 
nature films should present the most current findings, and people should learn from 
watching (Figure 5.5).  The majority of respondents at least mildly agreed (mildly agree = 
53.4%, strongly agree = 30.0%) that to be educational, scientists should have approved 
the content of the nature film.  Although respondents agreed that nature films should not 
sensationalize how nature works (Figure 5.5), respondents did not feel strongly about   
anthropomorphizing wildlife or faking situations to add to the story (Figure 5.6).  
Feelings were mixed about whether other filmmakers should have approved the content; 
about half agreed and the other half disagreed.   
 As with the straightforward items about educational value, little evidence 
indicated that respondents waivered from their beliefs when defining characteristics of 
nature programs.  Portrayal (the new scale developed from the data) was related only to 
the personal epistemology characteristic Complex Knowledge (Table 5.11).  Those with 
higher Complex Knowledge scores had lower scores on the Portrayal scale than those 
with lower Complex Knowledge scores.  The highest level of education and all three 
epistemological characteristics were related to the new scale, Production, that described 
respondents’ beliefs about production aspects of nature films.  Higher levels of education 
and higher epistemological scores were related to higher Production scores.   
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Figure 5.5.  Proportion of respondents that agreed or disagreed with items comprising the 
Portrayal scale characterizing educational nature films (n = 262).  
 
 
 
Figure 5.6.  Proportion of respondents that agreed or disagreed with items comprising the 
Production scale characterizing educational nature films (n = 262). 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
Strongly agree Mildly agree Mildly disagree Strongly disagree
P
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
 o
f 
re
sp
o
n
se
s
Accurate
Scientist approval
Real Stories
Current
Sensationalize
Learn
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
Strongly agree Mildly agree Mildly disagree Strongly disagree
P
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
 o
f 
re
sp
o
n
se
s
Anthropomorphize
Filmaker approval
Fake scenes
367 
 When examined separately, epistemological characteristics were relat d to the use 
of anthropomorphism in nature films, and the role of film-maker approval, but not 
whether producers fake scenes to add to the story (Table 5.12).  Individuals that tended o 
believe in unchanging knowledge passed from authority in isolated bits were more likely 
to accept anthropomorphism as a characteristic of nature programs than those that 
accepted knowledge as tentative (Tentative Nature of Knowledge), arising from reason 
and evidence (Source of Knowledge), and complex (Complexity of Knowledge).  
Similarly, individuals that accepted knowledge as tentative, arising from reason and 
evidence, and complex were less likely to believe that film-maker approval was an 
important characteristic in defining educational nature programs than those that believe in 
unchanging knowledge passed from authority in isolated bits. 
 
Audience Beliefs about the Design of Nature Programs 
 As discussed previously, respondents believed nature films were designed to be 
educational; over half scored them in one of the top two positions.  Similarly, respondents 
believed that the primary goal of most nature films is to teach about nature (yes = 87.4%, 
no = 12.6%), and the narration for nature films is written to explain and clarify what we 
know about nature (yes = 87.2%, no = 12.8%).  When asked to rank their knowledge 
versus nature program producers, respondents consistently believed they knew less about 
wildlife and the natural sciences then producers.  In fact, nearly half (47.2%) believed 
producers knew “significantly more” than they did.  In contrast, however, only 20.9% of 
respondents believed producers for nature films were experts in the natural science .   
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Table 5.11.   
Statistical relationships between items that addressed the defining characteristics of 
nature programs and respondent characteristics. 
Respondent Characteristics  Portrayal Production 
Descriptive characteristics    
Highest level of education  
F  
df 
p 
0.911 
3, 255 
0.436 
6.529 
3, 255 
< 0.001 
Biology courses 
F  
df 
p 
0.638 
4, 255 
0.636 
2.129 
4, 255 
0.078 
Interest 
F  
df 
p 
1.982 
2, 259 
0.140 
1.401 
2, 259 
0.248 
Gender 
F 
df 
p 
0.083 
1, 258 
0.774 
3.766 
1, 258 
0.053 
Numerical age of respondent 
r2 
F  
df 
p 
<0.001 
0.008 
1, 253 
0.927 
0.006 
1.511 
1, 253 
0.220 
Epistemological characteristics    
Tentative Nature of Knowledge 
F  
df 
p 
0.039 
2, 258 
0.962 
8.057 
1, 258 
< 0.001 
Source of Knowledge 
F 
df 
p 
0.371 
1, 255 
0.543 
10.273 
1, 255 
0.002 
Complexity of Knowledge 
F 
df 
p 
13.997 
1, 251 
<0.001 
8.357 
1, 252 
0.004 
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Table 5.12.   
Statistical relationships between the three items comprising the Production variable and 
epistemological characteristics. 
Epistemological characteristics  Anthropomorphize Fake Scenes 
Film-Maker 
Approval 
Tentative Nature of Knowledge 
χ
2 
df 
p 
15.023 
6 
0.020 
6.892 
6 
0.331 
14.212 
6 
0.027 
Source of Knowledge 
χ
2 
df 
p 
9.980 
3 
0.019 
3.176 
3 
0.365 
9.611 
3 
0.022 
Complexity of Knowledge 
χ
2 
df 
p 
17.873 
3 
<0.001 
0.519 
3 
0.915 
12.289 
3 
0.006 
 
 
 The variables addressing the design of nature films were only somewhat related to 
descriptive characteristics.  Individuals with some post-high school education were most 
likely to agree that the primary goal of nature films was to teach about nature than 
individuals with more or less education (Table 5.13); the number of biology courses 
respondents had taken was not related to their beliefs.  Although age was not related to 
agreeing with this goal, gender was.  Females were more likely than males to gree that 
the primary goal was to teach about nature.  Females also were more likely than males to 
agree that the narration is written to clarify what we know about nature.  Although a 
surprising proportion of respondents believed that producers know more about wildlife 
and the natural sciences than they did (Figure 5.7), biology education, interest, gender, 
and age influenced respondents’ ranking.  Those with more biology education and/or 
interest tended to rate producers’ knowledge relative to their own as being lower than 
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those that had fewer biology courses or less interest.  Females underrated their knowledge 
more than males.  Older individuals also were more likely to believe nature program 
producers know significantly more about the natural world than they do.  In addition, 
gender and interest were related to how strongly respondents believe nature programs 
were designed to be.  Females ranked this variable the highest more often than males.  
Respondents with high interest tended to believe nature programs were designed to be 
educational more strongly that those with low interest (Table 5.13). 
 Personal epistemology was related to design variables with most effects resulting 
from how people thought about the complexity of knowledge.  The variables describing 
respondents’ understanding of knowledge complexity were related to whether 
respondents believed the primary goal of nature films was to teach about nature, whether 
the narration was written to clarify what we know about nature, and how educational 
respondents believed nature films were designed to be (Table 5.13).  In all three 
relationships, individuals with more developed personal epistemologies were more likely 
to identify the production of nature films as media goals rather than educational goals. 
 Indeed, defining experts may be an important media literacy issue in naturefilms.  
The personal epistemology variables that described the source and complexity of 
knowledge explained how respondents ranked their knowledge relative to producers was 
affected by both how they viewed the Source of Knowledge and the Complexity of 
Knowledge variables (Table 5.13).  Similarly, responses to whether or not respondents 
believed producers were experts.  In fact, respondents who believed in stable knowledge 
(Tentative Nature of Knowledge) passed from authority (Source of Knowledge) in 
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Table 5.13.   
Statistical relationships between items related to how educational nature programs are 
designed to be and respondent characteristics. 
Respondent 
Characteristics 
 
Primary 
Goal 
Narration 
Rank 
Knowledge 
Designed  
to be 
Educational 
Experts 
Descriptive characteristics     
Highest level of 
education  
χ
2  
df 
p 
7.780 
3 
.051 
0.879 
3 
0.830 
3.712 
6 
0.716 
10.172 
9 
0.337 
2.226 
3 
0.527 
Biology courses  
χ
2  
df 
p 
3.501 
4 
0.478 
2.043 
4 
0.728 
37.776 
8 
<0.001 
6.904 
12 
0.864 
3.714 
4 
0.446 
Interest 
χ
2  
df 
p 
0.533 
2 
0.766 
0.255 
2 
0.880 
22.591 
4 
<0.001 
33.781 
6 
<0.001 
0.427 
2 
0.808 
Gender 
χ
2  
df 
p 
4.236 
1 
0.040 
4.215 
1 
0.040 
7.178 
2 
0.028 
8.971 
3 
0.030 
0.143 
1 
0.706 
Numerical age of 
respondent 
F  
df 
p 
0.017 
1, 271 
0.897 
0.237 
1, 281 
0.627 
5.820 
1, 286 
0.003 
1.175 
3, 276 
0.319 
0.572 
1, 278 
0.450 
Epistemological characteristics     
Tentative Nature of 
Knowledge 
χ
2  
df 
p 
2.596 
2 
0.273 
0.692 
2 
0.708 
2.302 
4 
0.680 
9.047 
6 
0.171 
4.943 
2 
0.084 
Source of Knowledge 
χ
2  
df 
p 
0.853 
1 
0.356 
0.825 
1 
0.364 
11.600 
2 
0.003 
1.712 
3 
0.634 
5.998 
1 
0.014 
Complexity of 
Knowledge 
χ
2  
df 
p 
10.891 
1 
0.001 
5.058 
1 
0.025 
7.436 
2 
0.024 
13.509 
3 
0.004 
5.263 
1 
0.022 
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Figure 5.7.  The proportion of respondents ranking producers’ knowledge about wildlife 
and the natural sciences as higher or not higher than their own given the number of 
courses they’d taken that included biology, ecology, or the natural sciences (n = 297).  
 
 
isolated bits (Complexity of Knowledge) were more likely to agree that producers were 
experts than those who did not.   
 Two items were included in the survey specifically to test the effects of beliefs 
about the design of nature programs on respondents’ beliefs about the credibility of the 
resource.  In every case, respondents’ beliefs about the credibility of the information in 
nature programs were related to their beliefs about the design of the programming.  For 
example, if respondents believed that the primary goal of nature programs was to te ch 
and the narration was written to clarify what we know about nature, they often believed 
that both the science was portrayed accurately and nature was portrayed accurately (Table 
5.14).  Similarly, the relationships between both the accurate portrayal of science and of  
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Table 5.14.   
Statistical relationships between items related to how educational nature programs are 
designed to be and how accurately respondents believe the science and nature are 
portrayed. 
Educational Value  
Primary 
Goal 
Narration 
Rank 
Knowledge 
Designed  
to be 
Educational 
Experts 
Portrayal of Science 
χ
2  
df 
p 
23.037 
3 
<0.001 
27.250 
3 
<0.001 
26.502 
6 
<0.001 
99.564 
9 
<0.001 
15.849 
3 
0.001 
Portrayal of Nature 
χ
2  
df 
p 
18.641 
3 
<0.001 
12.162 
3 
0.007 
28.882 
6 
<0.001 
144.4821 
9 
<0.001 
20.042 
3 
<0.001 
 
 
nature were related to respondents’ beliefs about producers’ expertise.  Moreover, the 
degree to which respondents believed nature films were designed to be educational ws 
related to the accuracy of the science and nature portrayed.  Likewise, the degre  to 
which respondents believed producers knew more about the natural sciences than they 
did was related to respondents’ beliefs about the accuracy of the science and nature 
portrayed.   
 
Discussion 
 Only recently have science educators attempted to define “educational” in free-
choice environments.  Typically, these types of explorations are based on deficit models 
– models that set a standard and then determine how well the public rises to meet that 
standard with their knowledge (Sturgis & Allum, 2004).  Researchers exploring the free-  
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choice environment, however, have stressed that people are very competent in specific 
areas of their own choosing and related to their own interests (Falk, 2002).  This survey 
took a different approach, allowing the public to identify whether they viewed nature 
programs as educational resources.   
 The overwhelming majority of respondents believed nature programs were 
educational.  More importantly, respondents believed that nature films were designed to 
be educational and people should learn from watching them.  Consequently, the role 
these programs play in the public understanding of science and evolution in the 
marketplace of ideas may be significantly related to these two variables lone.  Nearly 
half of the respondents indicated that they watched nature programs at least once or twi  
a month.  As an audience, therefore, they are not only motivated to learn, they are 
thinking of the experience as “educational.”   
 How did consumers define educational nature films?  Respondents were asked to 
rank their agreement or disagreement with a series of statements about potential 
characteristics of nature programs.  Expectations were clearly related to accurate 
explanations of current scientific understanding.  Nevertheless, audiences were mor  
open than expected to anthropomorphizing and faking scenes (apparently only as long as 
the stories were not overly sensationalized).  Although the item was designed to address 
how we might define “educational” in terms of a nature show, respondents may have 
interpreted the question to mean that if a show had been identified as educational, how 
well did it meet the criteria listed.  Either way, these diverging concepts might have been 
related to audiences’ perceptions of these programs as a form of entertainmnt; over 90% 
agreed that nature films are designed to be entertaining.  Because this inconsistency was 
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not related to personal epistemology, perhaps respondents believed they were savvy 
enough about the medium to see production value in the visual and story aspects at the 
expense of realism.   
 Items about where one might go to watch educational and entertaining programs 
on the survey instrument indicated similar conflict with the definition of “education l” in 
free-choice situations.  Most respondents indicated that they would turn to the Discovery 
Channel (versus PBS) to watch “entertaining” shows.  To watch “educational” shows, 
however, they would turn to PBS and Discovery.  Individuals may consider PBS a 
credible source that airs programs of high educational value. Alternatively, if r spondents 
have conceptually defined “educational” as “not entertaining,” it may be from 
experiences that led them to believe PBS shows one kind of nature program (dry, boring, 
“educational”) and the Discovery Channel shows another (entertaining and, perhaps, even 
“educational”).  In addition, some of the difficulties in defining educational in this 
context may be due to a “nature film tautology”: nature films are educational, by 
definition, and the two concepts cannot be disconnected.   
 If the marketplace of ideas holds similar dilemmas for consumers approaching 
other free-choice science resources, understanding personal epistemology may provide 
valuable insight to how these dilemmas play out.  Public understanding of science 
research wrestles with questions of expertise and authority related to socioscient fic 
issues (e.g., Collins & Evans, 2002; Jasanoff, 2003; Kolstø, 2001; Rip, 2003; Wynne, 
2003), and many authors suggest examining how individuals negotiate through the 
knowledge offered in the marketplace (e.g., Felt, 2000).  This work highlights some 
important points easily transferrable to other free-choice opportunities.   
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 For example, personal epistemology research suggests that individuals who 
believe knowledge is certain and passed down from “expert” filmmakers serving as 
authority figures were not likely to question the information presented.  As predicted, 
several relatively basic measures of personal epistemology were related to what 
respondents believed about the role of expertise.  In fact, those respondents relying on 
authority as a source of knowledge were most likely to believe in the importance of film-
maker approval (χ2 = 9.611, 1 df, p = 0.022), as well as the expertise of film-makers.  
Respondents who believed in complex knowledge were more critical of the importance of 
film-maker approval in defining an educational experience, as well as anthropomorphism 
as a device, and the educational value of nature films in general.   
 Surprising were the significant relationships between the respondents’ ranking of 
their own knowledge relative to filmmakers and how respondents viewed authority and 
knowledge complexity.  Even though many respondents had significant experience with 
biology, ecology, and the natural sciences, nearly 46% of respondents believed 
filmmakers knew significantly more about science and nature than they did.  This 
relationship was apparent during the testing of the instrument, too.  In fact, the pre-test 
individuals were upper-level university students majoring in ecological sciences.  Most 
had significant experience with these disciplines, yet over half believed filmmakers had 
more expertise than they did.  Few nature film producers, in fact, have advanced degrees 
in science, however; their expertise comes in the form of telling stories through 
television.  Even the Natural History Filmmaking Master of Fine Arts Program at 
Montana State University, a program designed specifically to enhance n ture film 
production, does not require advanced coursework in the sciences (students are 
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encouraged to develop working relationships with scientists and assist in field projects; 
http://naturefilm.montana.edu/index.php).  Therefore, respondents may have presumed 
some context-specific expertise associated with the filmmaker’s personal research and 
ability to tell a story.  Apparently, the relationship is affected by advanced familiarity 
with the biological sciences, however.  The small sample of ecologists and scie ce 
educators used in the pre-testing was less likely to believe filmmakers knew significantly 
more than they did; over half ranked them as slightly or significantly less.  Nevertheless, 
the fact that the accuracy of the portrayal of both the science and nature were strongly 
related to how respondents ranked their personal knowledge speaks volumes about how 
consumers may approach expertise and authority in the marketplace.   
 Of greater concern is the level of personal epistemology at which most individuals 
operate according to the Reflective Judgment Model (King & Kitchener, 1994).  Years of 
research indicate that after four years of college, individuals are thinking at only a quasi-
reflective level (understanding that knowledge is constructed – not simply accepted from 
others, recognizing that uncertainty is part of the process of knowing and different types 
and rules of evidence, but subject to idiosyncratic views of knowledge claims).  In this 
view, the variability in how diverse publics interface with science in the marketplac  may 
be the result of personal epistemologies that predominately represents pre-reflective and 
quasi-reflective thinking.  The idiosyncratic beliefs about credibility and authority 
associated with these levels of reflective judgment result because of th  tenuous 
relationship between gathering evidence and drawing conclusions in the marketplace of 
ideas (King & Kitchener, 1994). 
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 Television may be especially important to consider from a personal epistemology 
perspective.  Because of its broad reach and celebrity-making power, television may have 
particularly strong appeal in terms of credibility and authority.  de Cheveigné and Véron 
(1996) classified television viewers according to their attitudes toward television and 
attitudes toward acquiring knowledge from television (Table 5.15).  They found that even 
viewers who believed the acquisition of knowledge from television was problematic 
(“beneficiaries” and “intellectuals”) relied strongly on credibility and authority in their 
judgments.  Indeed, Livingstone (1998) suggested that when it is a trusted and solemn 
source of information, television likely affects viewers in a strong sense.  Paradoxically, 
nature films classified as “blue-chip” (‘mega-fauna’ in an environment of visual splendor, 
a dramatic story line, and marked by the absences of politics, people or historical 
reference points) and “presenter-led” (expanded human presence, more human/animal 
interaction, dynamic editorial approaches) generally contained the most egregious 
narratives with respect to evolution (Dingwall & Aldridge, 2006).  Although D. R. 
Anderson (1998) argued that “educational television is not an oxymoron,” not all 
“educational” television is created equal.  The influence of apparently credible sources 
combined with narratives that introduce misconceptions to broad and diverse audiences 
may make “educational” television the antithesis of “educational.” 
 The results from this survey indicate at least three issues that need to be addresse  
more thoroughly within the theoretical framework of personal epistemology: issues of 
gender, issues surrounding knowledge gaps, and issues surrounding evolution 
understanding.  Females underrated their knowledge relative to producers mor than 
males and more strongly believed nature films were designed to be educational.  Ge der 
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Table 5.15.  
Classification of science television viewers according to their attitudes toward television 
and acquiring knowledge from television (from de Cheveigné & Véron, 1996). 
  
Acquisition of knowledge from television 
  
Problematic Not problematic 
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d 
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F
av
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le
 
“beneficiaries”  
TV is a legitimate source of 
knowledge, and science is accessible  
a credible authority is essential  
“intimistic”  
positive attitudes toward TV, but 
more critical and less curious about 
learning  
N
ot
  f
av
or
ab
le
 
“intellectual”  
TV is not a legitimate source of 
knowledge  
prefer documentaries with 
unmediated viewpoint 
“excluded”  
“can’t” understand science and what 
they do understand can’t be science  
 
 
 
is apparently related to disparities in attitudes toward science that materialize f om socio-
demographic backgrounds (education and religious belief; Hayes & Tariq, 2000).  
Personal relevance is obviously important to discussions about science and evolution 
(Sadler, Chambers, & Zeidler, 2004).  In addition, women tend to use media that fosters 
informal learning less than men and may hold comparatively lower levels of scientific 
knowledge (Nisbet et al., 2002).   
 Likewise, the knowledge-gap hypothesis predicts that increasing the flow of nes 
on topics, such as climate change and evolution, results in greater acquisition of 
knowledge about that topic among the more highly educated segments of society than 
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less educated segments (Tichenor, Donohue, & Olien, 1970).  Indeed, knowledge gaps 
may result specifically because individuals with more education tend to have more 
developed personal epistemologies and may be able to navigate the competing ideas of 
the marketplace better than those less well educated.  The results from this survey 
indicate that nature programs may fall into that gap. 
 Other research has shown gender to be an important predictor of attitudes about 
human evolution (Haider-Markel & Joslyn, 2008; Schibeci, 1984).  These results suggest 
that females should have poorer understanding of evolution, especially if they are using 
nature films to construct knowledge.  Clearly, future research needs to examine the role 
of personal epistemology in gender-specific understanding of evolution.   
 Ultimately, these findings may have particular importance in terms of how 
evolution is portrayed in nature films.  Evolution educators have a distinctly different 
view of the educational value of nature films (see also Smith & Resier, 1997).  Content-
analyses indicate serious issues regarding the presentation of this important biological 
process (Aldridge & Dingwall 2003; Dingwall & Aldridge, 2006).  Although the 
approach and experiences audiences bring to a learning opportunity in the free-choic 
marketplace may be more important to learning outcomes than the content (D. Anderson, 
Lucas, & Ginns, 2003; Falk & Adelman, 2003; Gijlers & de Jong, 2005; Lawson & 
Worsnop, 1992; Livingstone, 1998; Rubin, 2004; Stocklmayer & Gilbert, 2002), the 
combination of audience approach and poor science content has the potential to 
significantly affect conceptions about evolution.   
 Evolution is a complex concept, and the path of least resistance is often the wrong 
one.  Personal experiences comprise a powerful source of perceived evidence that can be 
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incorporated into “lay theories” about how the world works.  Where these lay theories 
relate to ecology, and evolution in particular, they can lead to misconceptions that can be 
very difficult to alter (Wandersee et al., 1994).  If a nature program resonat  on some 
level with individuals’ “lay theories” about evolution, it may have long-lasting effects on 
learning.  For example, people identify with individuals, not populations, and the 
concepts of “improvement” and “adaptation” frequently are applied to individuals 
overcoming adversity – everyone loves the triumph of the underdog.  If this application 
stems from an experience they perceive watching television (such as the orphaned 
cheetahs that survive in the harsh and cruel savannah), it may end up as an unconscious 
embodiment of the process of evolution (R. W. Busselle & Greenberg, 2000).  Of course 
these events are relevant to biological evolution; who survives and who does not 
underlies a major component of fitness and the process of natural selection.   
 
Conclusions 
 From a consumer’s perspective, scientific “truth” in the free-choice marketplace 
might be defined through some connotation of “educational,” and this definition may be 
much broader than how a producer (science educator) might define it.  Understanding 
epistemological worldviews may help audiences bridge this gap.  Epistemological 
worldviews that ultimately help consumers navigate through science learning 
opportunities in the marketplace of ideas may be developed and nurtured in formal 
education environments with “mile-deep” philosophies that incorporate the nature of 
knowledge in general, and the nature of scientific knowledge in particular (see Alters & 
Nelson, 2002; Bell & Lederman, 2003; Cobern, 2000).  Teachers also need to be aware of 
382 
the flaws in nature film narratives.  Beautifully crafted nature programs that highlight the 
splendor of the natural world may be valuable tools to generate interest in ecology and 
science in students.  However, constructivist frameworks clearly caution about the 
difficulties with which alternative conceptions are overcome (Mintzes & Wandersee, 
1998).  Nature film narratives that use concepts of “design” indiscriminately may be 
promoting misconceptions unintentionally (Dingwall & Aldridge, 2006).  A broadly 
defined “educational” experience used in the science classroom may be even more 
harmful to science conceptions than a similar experience in the free-choice world. 
 Nevertheless, as Ziman (1992) noted, in the marketplace of ideas “the public 
receives and uses scientific knowledge that is incoherent, practically inadequ te, 
incredible, and inconsistent.”  If nature films are an important source of free-choice 
science learning, the issue is clear: audiences inevitably will incorporate misconceptions 
about science and nature if no effort is made to teach some level of media literacy.  
Nature films cannot be considered “educational” by default.  Especially if teachers are 
using nature programs in the science classroom, “educational” has to be defined and 
standards have to be developed that programs must meet before taking on the 
“educational” moniker.  In the free-choice environment, clearly a need to inform the 
public of the misnomer emerges.   
 Recently, Falk et al. (2007) suggested that rather than framing efforts in 
communicating science, educators should approach this from the perspective of offering 
the public opportunities for engaging with, appreciating, and better understanding the 
science that interests them.  Giving the public the tools to navigate those opportunities in 
an open marketplace is difficult, however.  Several authors have called for developing a 
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learning infrastructure that includes both free-choice and formal learning opportunities 
(Bybee, 2001; Muscat, 2001) with a goal to create an agenda centered on lifelong 
learning (Muscat, 2001).  Although such an extensive network within a diverse and ever-
changing marketplace of ideas seems overwhelmingly difficult to achieve, the possibility 
of a system that casts a wide net and helps consumers navigate through the myriad of 
resources, no matter their level of interest or prior knowledge, is intriguing. 
 
References 
Aldridge, M., & Dingwall, R. (2003). Teleology on television?  Implicit models on 
evolution in broadcast wildlife and nature programmes. European Journal of 
Communication, 18(4), 435-453. 
Alters, B. J., & Nelson, C. E. (2002). Perspective: Teaching evolution in higher 
education. Evolution, 56(10), 1891-1901. 
American Association for the Advancement of Science. (1990). Science for all 
Americans. Washington, DC: American Association for the Advancement of 
Science. 
Anderson, D., Lucas, K. B., & Ginns, I. S. (2003). Theoretical perspectives on learning in 
an informal setting. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 40(2), 177-199. 
Anderson, D. R. (1998). Educational television is not an oxymoron. Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science, 557, 24-38. 
Antolin, M. F., & Herbers, J. M. (2001). Evolution’s struggle for existence in America’s 
public schools. Evolution, 55(12), 2379-2388. 
Baker, C. E. (1989). Human liberty and freedom of speech. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
384 
Bartley III, W. W. (1987). Alienation alienated: The economics of knowledge versus the 
psychology and sociology of knowledge. In Radnitzky, G., Bartley III, W. W. & 
Popper, K. R. (Eds.), Evolutionary Epistemology, Rationality, and the Sociology 
of Knowledge (pp. 423-452). Peru, IL: Open Court Publishing. 
Bates, B. R. (2005). Public culture and public understanding of genetics: A focus group 
study. Public Understanding of Science, 14, 47-65. 
Bell, R. L., & Lederman, N. (2003). Understandings of the Nature of Science and 
decision making on science and technology based issues. Science Education, 
87(3), 352-377. 
Bousé, D. (2000). Wildlife films. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
Brown, J. A. (1998). Media literacy perspectives. The Journal of Communication, 48(1), 
44-57. 
Busselle, R., & Bilandzic, H. (2008). Fictionality and perceived realism in experiencing 
stories: A model of narrative comprehension and engagement. Communication 
Theory, 18(2), 255-280. 
Busselle, R., Ryabovolova, A., & Wilson, B. (2004). Ruining a good story: Cultivation, 
perceived realism and narrative. Communications, 29(3), 365-378. 
Busselle, R. W., & Greenberg, B. S. (2000). The nature of television realism judgments: 
A reevaluation of their conceptualization and measurement. Mass Communication 
& Society, 3(2&3), 249-268. 
Bybee, R. W. (2001). Achieving scientific literacy: Strategies for insuring that free-
choice science education complements national formal science education efforts.
385 
In Falk, J. H. (Ed.), Free-choice science education: How we learn science outside 
of school (pp. 44-63). New York: Teachers College Press. 
Chalmers, A. F. (1999). What is this thing called science? (3rd ed.). Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing Company. 
Cialdini, R. B. (1993). Influence: Science and practice. New York: Harper Collins. 
Clark, B., Foster, J. B., & York, R. (2007). The critique of intelligent design: Epicurus, 
Marx, Darwin, and Freud and the materialist defense of science. Theory and 
Society, 36(6), 515-546. 
Cobern, W. W. (2000). The Nature of Science and the role of knowledge and belief. 
Science and Education, 9(3), 219-246. 
Collins, H. M., & Evans, R. (2002). The third wave of science studies: Studies of 
expertise and experience. Social Studies of Science, 32(2), 235-296. 
de Cheveigné, S., & Véron, E. (1996). Science on TV: Forms and reception of science 
programmes on French television. Public Understanding of Science, 5, 231-253. 
Dillman, D. A. (2007). Mail and internet surveys: The tailored design method (2nd ed.). 
Toronto: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
Dingwall, R., & Aldridge, M. (2006). Television wildlife programming as a source of 
popular scientific information: A case study of evolution. Public Understanding of 
Science, 15, 131-152. 
Duell, O. K., & Schommer-Atkins, M. (2001). Measures of people’s beliefs about 
knowledge and learning. Educational Psychology Review, 13(4), 419-449. 
386 
Falk, J. H. (2001). Free-choice science learning: Framing the discussion. In Falk, J. H. 
(Ed.), Free-choice science education: How we learn science outside of school (pp. 
3-20). New York: Teachers College Press. 
Falk, J. H. (2002). The contribution of free-choice learning to public understanding of 
science. Interciencia (web), 27(2), 62-65. 
Falk, J. H., & Adelman, L. M. (2003). Investigating the impact of prior knowledge and 
interest on aquarium visitor learning. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 
40, 163-176. 
Falk, J. H., Heimlich, J., & Bronnenkant, K. (2008). Using identity-related visit 
motivations as a tool for understanding adult zoo and aquarium visitors’ meaning-
making. Curator, 51(1), 55-79. 
Falk, J. H., Storksdieck, M., & Dierking, L. D. (2007). Investigating public science and 
understanding: Evidence for the importance of free-choice learning. Public 
Understanding of Science, 16, 455-469. 
Felt, U. (2000). Why should the public “understand” science?  A Historical perspective 
on aspects of the Public Understanding of Science. In Dierkes, M. & von Grote, 
C. (Eds.), Between understanding and trust: The public, science and technology 
(pp. 7-38). Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers. 
Forrest, B. (2007). Understanding the intelligent design creationist movement: Its true 
nature and goals, A Position Paper from the Center for Inquiry Office of Public 
Policy. Washington, DC: Center for Inquiry Office of Public Policy. 
Forrest, B., & Gross, P. R. (2004). Creationism’s trojan horse: The wedge of intelligent 
design: Oxford University Press. 
387 
Fujioka, Y. (2005). Emotional TV viewing and minority audience: How Mexican 
Americans process and evaluate TV news about in-group members. 
Communication Research, 32(5), 566-593. 
Gijlers, H., & de Jong, T. (2005). The relation between prior knowledge and students’ 
collaborative discovery learning processes. Journal of Research in Science 
Teaching, 42(3), 264-282. 
Haider-Markel, D. P., & Joslyn, M. R. (2008). Pulpits versus ivory towers: Socializing 
agents and evolution attitudes. Social Science Quarterly, 89(3), 665-683. 
Hayes, B. C., & Tariq, V. N. (2000). Gender differences in scientific knowledge and 
attitudes toward science: A comparative study of four Anglo-American nations. 
Public Understanding of Science, 9(4), 433-447. 
Hofer, B. K. (2000). Dimensionality and disciplinary differences in personal 
epistemology. Contemporary Educational Psychology, 25(4), 378-405. 
Hofer, B. K. (2004). Exploring the dimensions of personal epistemology in differing 
classroom contexts: Student interpretations during their first year of college. 
Contemporary Educational Psychology, 29(2), 129-163. 
Hopkins, W. W. (1996). The Supreme Court defines the Marketplace of Ideas. 
Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly, 73(1), 40-52. 
Ingber, S. (1984). The Marketplace of Ideas: A legitimizing myth. Duke Law Journal, 
February, 15. 
Jasanoff, S. (2003). Breaking the waves in science studies: Comment on H. M. Collins 
and Robert Evans, “The third wave of science studies”. Social Studies of Science, 
33(3), 389-400. 
388 
King, P. M., & Kitchener, K. S. (1994). Developing reflective judgment: Understanding 
and promoting intellectual growth and critical thinking in adolescents and adults. 
San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
King, P. M., & Kitchener, K. S. (2004). Reflective judgment: Theory and research on the 
development of epistemic assumptions through adulthood. Educational 
Psychologist, 39(1), 5-18. 
Kolstø, S. D. (2001). ‘To trust or not to trust,...’-pupils’ ways of judging information 
encountered in a socio-scientific issue. International Journal of Science 
Education, 23(9), 877-901. 
Lawson, A. E., & Worsnop, W. A. (1992). Learning about evolution and rejecting a 
belief in special creation: Effects of reflective reasoning skill, prior knowledge, 
prior belief and religious commitment. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 
29(2), 143-166. 
Livingstone, S. (1998). Making sense of television: The psychology of audience 
interpretation (2nd ed). London and New York: Routledge. 
Locke, S. (1999). Golem science and the public understanding of science: From deficit to 
dilemma. Public Understanding of Science, 8(2), 75-92. 
Maurer, M., & Reinemann, C. (2006). Learning versus knowing: Effects of 
misinformation in televised debates. Communication Research, 33(6), 489-506. 
Mintzes, J. J., & Wandersee, J. H. (1998). Reform and innovation in science teaching: A 
human constructivist view. In Mintzes, J. J., Wandersee, J. H. & Novak, J. D. 
(Eds.), Teaching science for understanding.  A human constructivist view (pp. 29-
58). San Diego: Academic Press. 
389 
Mitman, G. (1999). Reel nature: America’s romance with wildlife on film. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press. 
Muscat, A. M. (2001). A practioner’s view on the value of an infrastucture for free-
choice science learning. In Falk, J. H. (Ed.), Free-choice science education: How 
we learn science outside of school (pp. 199-204). New York: Teachers College 
Press. 
Napoli, P. M. (1999). The marketplace of ideas metaphor in communications regulation. 
The Journal of Communication, 49(4), 151-169. 
National Research Council. (1996). National science education standards. Washington, 
DC: National Academy Press. 
Nisbet, M. C., Scheufele, D. A., Shanahan, J., Moy, P., Brossard, D., & Lewenstein, B. 
V. (2002). Knowledge, reservations, or promise?  A media effects model for 
public perceptions of science and technology. Communication Research, 29(5), 
584-608. 
Potter, W. J., Pashupati, K., Pekurny, R. G., Hoffman, E., & Davis, K. (2002). 
Perceptions of television: A schema. Media Psychology, 4(27-50). 
Rip, A. (2003). Constructing expertise: In a third wave of science studies? Social tudies 
of Science, 33(3), 419-434. 
Rubin, A. M. (2004). The uses-and-gratifications perspective of media effects. In Bryant, 
J. & Zillmann, D. (Eds.), Media effects: Advances in theory and research (pp. 
525-548). Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Sadler, T. D. (2004). Informal reasoning regarding socioscientific issues: A critical 
review of research. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 41(5), 513-536. 
390 
Sadler, T. D., Chambers, W. F., & Zeidler, D. L. (2004). Student conceptualizations of 
the Nature of Science in response to a socioscientific issue. International Journal 
of Science Education, 26(4), 387-409. 
Schibeci, R. A. (1984). Attitudes to science: An update. Studies in Science Education, 
11(1), 26-59. 
Schommer-Aikins, M. (2004). Explaining the epistemological belief system: Introducing 
the embedded systemic model and coordinated research approach. Educational 
Psychologist, 39(1), 19-29. 
Schommer, M. (1990). Effects of beliefs about the nature of knowledge on 
comprehension. Journal of Educational Psychology, 82(3), 498-504. 
Schraw, G., Bendixen, L., & Dunkle, M. E. (2002). Development and validation of the 
Epistemic Belief Inventory. In Hofer, B. K. & Pintrich, P. R. (Eds.), Personal 
Epistemology: The Psychology of Beliefs about Knowledge and Knowing (pp. 
261-276). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Scott, E. C., & Matzke, N. J. (2007). Biological design in science classrooms. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 104(suppl. 1), 8669-8676. 
Sinatra, G. M., Southerland, S. A., McConaughy, F., & Demastes, J. W. (2003). 
Intentions and beliefs in students’ understanding and acceptance of biological 
evolution. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 40(5), 510-528. 
Smith, B. K., & Resier, B. J. (1997). What should a wildebeest say?  Interactive nature 
films for high school classrooms. ACM, 193-201. 
391 
Stocklmayer, S., & Gilbert, J. K. (2002). New experiences and old knowledge: Towards a 
model for the personal awareness of science and technology. International Journal 
of Science Education, 24(8), 835-858. 
Sturgis, P., & Allum, N. (2004). Science in society: Re-evaluating the deficit model of 
public attitudes. Public Understanding of Science, 13(1), 55-74. 
Tichenor, P. J., Donohue, G. A., & Olien, C. N. (1970). Mass media flow and differential 
growth in knowledge. Public Opinion Quarterly, 34(2), 159-170. 
Wandersee, J. H., Mintzes, J. J., & Novak, J. D. (1994). Research on alternative 
conceptions in science. In Gabel, D. L. (Ed.), Handbook of research on science 
teaching and learning. New York: MacMillan Publishing Co. 
Wilson, T. (1993). Watching television: Hermeneutics, reception and popular culture. 
Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Wynne, B. (2003). Seasick on the third wave?  Subverting the hegemony of 
propositionalism: Response to Collins and Evans (2002). Social Studies of 
Science, 33(3), 401-417. 
Yager, R. E., & Falk, J. H. (2007). Exemplary science in informal education settings: 
Standards-based success stories. Arlington, VA: NSTA Press. 
Ziman, J. (1992). Not knowing, needing to know, and wanting to know. In Lewenstein, 
B. V. (Ed.), When science meets the public (pp. 13-20). Washington, DC: 
American Association for the Advancement of Science. 
 
392 
Appendix 1.  The Survey Instrument 
 
AUDIENCES’ BELIEFS ABOUT 
THE EDUCATIONAL VALUE OF NATURE FILMS 
 
 This short survey addresses how audiences feel about films that portray wildlife and 
nature.  The survey is part of a graduate student project, and the information will be used 
to assist educators at the University of Montana using these types of films.  Participation 
is completely voluntary and no record of participants will be kept.  All information is 
strictly confidential.  If you have any questions, contact Alison Perkins 
(alison.perkins@mso.umt.edu).  Please, only one adult per household need respond.  
Thank you for taking the time to share your thoughts. 
 
Start Here 
1. How often do you watch nature films? 
 More than 1-2 times per month 
 1-2 times per month 
 1-2 times every few months 
 1-2 times every year 
 Never 
 
2. Where have you watched most nature films? 
 Film festival 
 Television 
 Video rental 
 Online 
 
3. Why would you watch a nature film?  (Select all that may apply.) 
 To learn about nature 
 To be entertained 
 To see wildlife in its natural environment 
 Other                                                                          . 
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4. Wildlife and nature films are easy to understand because they contain so many 
facts. (Easy Knowledge) 
 
 strongly agree 
 mildly agree 
 mildly disagree 
 strongly disagree 
 no opinion 
 
5. What are the characteristics of an educational nature film?  Please indicate whether 
you would agree or disagree with the following statements: 
 If a nature film is educational, then you believe: 
a. it is accurate. strongly agree 
mildly 
agree 
mildly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
b. the content has 
been 
reviewed/approved 
by scientists. 
strongly 
agree 
mildly 
agree 
mildly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
c. the story it tells 
really happened. 
strongly 
agree 
mildly 
agree 
mildly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
d. it presents the most 
current scientific 
understanding. 
strongly 
agree 
mildly 
agree 
mildly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
e. it may fake 
situations or scenes 
to add to the story. 
strongly 
agree 
mildly 
agree 
mildly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
f.  people should learn 
from watching it. 
strongly 
agree 
mildly 
agree 
mildly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
g. it gives wildlife 
human motivations 
we can relate to. 
strongly 
agree 
mildly 
agree 
mildly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
h.  the content 
has been 
reviewed/approved 
by other 
filmmakers. 
strongly 
agree 
mildly 
agree 
mildly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
i. it does not  
sensationalize / 
over-dramatize how 
nature works. 
strongly 
agree 
mildly 
agree 
mildly 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
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6. Do you believe the primary goal of most nature films is to teach about nature?  
 Yes 
 No 
 
7. Do you believe the narration for nature films is written to explain and clarify what we 
know about nature?  
 
 Yes 
 No 
 
8. Do you believe that nature films are educational?  
 Yes 
 No 
 
9. How educational do you believe nature films are designed to be?  (Please circle 
the number that represents your belief on a scale from 1 = designed to be 
educational to 7 = not designed to be educational.) 
 
Designed to be 
educational 
Not designed to 
be educational 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
10. How educational do you believe nature films actually are?  (Please circle the 
number that represents your belief on a scale from 1 = not educational to 7 = very 
educational.) 
 
     Not  
educational 
                                   Very 
educational 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
11. Scientific theories are not important in nature films because they are just theories. 
(Nature of Theories) 
 
 Yes 
 No 
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12. If you wanted to watch an entertaining nature film, what channel would you go to? 
 Discovery Channel 
 Animal Planet 
 National Geographic Channel 
 Public Broadcasting System (PBS) 
 Other        
 
13. How would you rate your interest in biology, ecology, or the natural sciences? 
(Please circle the number that represents your belief on a scale from 1 = high 
interest to 7 = low interest.) 
 
  High 
interest 
                                   Low 
interest 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
14. If you wanted to watch an educational nature film, what channel would you go to? 
 Discovery Channel 
 Animal Planet 
 National Geographic Channel 
 Public Broadcasting System (PBS) 
 Other        
 
15. Most things worth knowing in nature films are simple to understand. (Simple 
Knowledge) 
 strongly agree 
 mildly agree 
 mildly disagree 
 strongly disagree 
 no opinion 
 
16. How accurately do you believe wildlife and nature films portray science?  (Please 
circle the number that represents your belief on a scale from 1= very accurately to 
7= not very accurately.) 
 
   Very 
accurately 
                             Not very 
accurately 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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17. How accurately do you believe wildlife and nature films portray nature?  (Please 
circle the number that represents your belief on a scale from 1= very accurately to 
7= not very accurately.) 
 
   Very 
accurately 
                            Not very 
accurately 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
18. Do you believe the producers for nature films know more about wildlife and natural 
sciences than you do?  
 
 Significantly more 
 Slightly more 
 About the same 
 Slightly less 
 Significantly less 
 No opinion 
 
19. If two different nature films are presenting two different arguments about the same 
topic, at least one of them must be wrong. (Omniscient Authority) 
 
 Yes 
 No 
 
20. Do you believe the producers for nature films are experts in the natural sciences?  
 Yes 
 No 
 
21. Nature films are more educational when they use a trustworthy narrator in the 
program than when the narration is just added in later by an unknown voice. 
(Trustworthy Narrator) 
 
 Yes 
 No 
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22. Five years from now, producers don’t need to make a new nature film about a topic 
because, even though they might get some new footage, there probably will not be 
much that is new to add to our basic understanding of the topic. (Stable Knowledge) 
 
 strongly agree 
 mildly agree 
 mildly disagree 
 strongly disagree 
 no opinion 
 
23. Do you believe nature films are designed to be entertaining? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
24. Nature films should only include facts about nature not theories. (Fact-based 
Knowledge) 
 Yes 
 No 
 
25. What is the highest level of education you have received?   
 Some high school 
 High school diploma or equivalent 
 Some technical school 
 Technical degree or equivalent 
 Some college 
 2-year college degree 
 Bachelor’s degree 
 Master’s degree 
 Higher degree 
 
26. How many courses have you taken that included biology, ecology, or the natural 
sciences? 
 
 none 
 1-2 
 3-4 
 5-6 
 More than 6 
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27. What is your gender? 
 Male 
 Female 
 
28. What is your age?     years 
 
Do you have any comments? 
 
Thank you so much for taking the time to fill out this survey! 
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CHAPTER 6.  
SOURCES AND SENTIMENT: HOW NATURE PROGRAMS MAY BE  
LEADING SCIENCE LITERACY ASTRAY 
 
Abstract:  
 Television is a powerful source of mass communication, but the “educational” 
content is rarely critically examined.  Nature and wildlife programs are generally 
considered educational; audiences clearly believe them to be accurate sources f r th  
portrayal of science and nature.  These programs use the same devices as fiction l 
television, however, and the narratives often include serious misconceptions about 
science and important ecological processes, such as evolution.  I used the Scienc and 
Nature Program Assessment Tool (SNaP) to examine the science content of programs 
appearing during a sweeps month on four channels: Animal Planet, Discovery Channel, 
National Geographic Channel, and PBS.  Overall, programs did not score well (range 33-
78%); the presentation of science was particularly poor (8-57%).  Misconceptions were 
common in the Presentation of Facts and Interpretation category; Animal Planet and 
Discovery Channel programs were the most egregious and National Geographic 
programs the least.  In fact, Animal Planet and National Geographic Channel differ d 
significantly in all categories describing the presentation of science, as well as Total 
Score.  These differences may translate to science literacy issueson a socio-economic 
scale.  Nevertheless, because nature programs are such beautiful spectacles, they have the 
potential to be credible educational resources.  Science educators need to be aware of the 
issues associated with these programs, however, and design instruction materials and 
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approaches that specifically address the poor science.  SNaP can be a valuabletool for 
students to learn more than just science content, they also can use this too to develop th  
critical evaluation skills necessary to make scientific sense of the cont nt. 
 
Keywords:  nature programs, evolution understanding, nature program assessment tool 
 
 In spite of on-going efforts by science educators, research indicates th  many 
people still hold serious misconceptions about evolution and other key scientific concepts 
(Nelson, 2000;  Rudolph & Stewart, 1998; Southerland, Abrams, Cummins, & Anzelmo, 
2001).  These misconceptions can have far-reaching effects when they influence policy at 
the public interface with science.  Whether it be adding “intelligent design” as part of the 
science curriculum in schools (see, for example, Evolution shares a desk with ‘Intelligent 
Design’ [Washington Post 12/26/04]) or dismissing compelling and peer-reviewed 
evidence of global climate change, misconceptions commonly held by the general public 
diminish opportunities to engage thoughtfully in civic discourse that has important policy 
implications.   
 But where do these misconceptions come from?  Misconceptions are constructed 
from a variety of sources, whose influences surely overlap.  The Committee on 
Undergraduate Science Education (1997) outlines several sources of misconceptions 
about science, including vernacular issues, experience, and formal and informal sources.  
Misconceptions can arise because common words have different meanings in scientific 
versus common language contexts.  For example, “fitness” may refer to physical strength 
(Bishop & Anderson, 1990), and “theory” is often used in everyday language to mean a 
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“guess”.  Everyday experiences also may lead to misconceptions; for exampl, personal 
experiences with streams and rivers may lead to misconceptions about how water flo s 
underground (Committee on Undergraduate Science Education, 1997).  The inheritance 
of a genetic disease or family characteristic may affect how individuals think about 
heritability, variation, and time.  Another important source of misconceptions arisefrom 
formal educational environments that do not adequately address prior misconceptions that 
students hold.  If students are taught new information without being encouraged to 
confront their own preconceived notions and nonscientific beliefs, they may simply 
accommodate the new knowledge in the framework of an old misconception (Alters & 
Nelson, 2002; Committee on Undergraduate Science Education, 1997).  For example, 
teaching genetics does not necessarily help students incorporate the role of changes in 
gene frequencies into how populations actually change over time (Clough & Wood-
Robinson, 1985).  Indeed, without finding a way to learn something about the more 
abstract statistical components of genetics, misconceptions may arise about beneficial 
mutations and the directed transformation of species over time.  In addition, informal 
sources, including parents, television, the Internet, fiction, and religious and myth-based 
sources may influence misconceptions.  Clearly, wives tales about lightning strikes can 
be transmitted and learned in informal environments (Committee on Undergraduate 
Science Education, 1997).  Similarly, fictionalized accounts in movies and on television 
of a young earth and humans living with dinosaurs conflict with scientific evidence.   
 Nature programs can provide a powerful tool for science education and lifelong 
science learning, especially if they address science and nature content thoughtfully.  In 
fact, viewing television programs, such as Jacques Cousteau’s The Cousteau Odyssey, 
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can positively influence public attitudes and behaviors toward the environment (Eagles & 
Demare, 1999; Fortner, 1985; Holbert, Kwak, & Shah, 2003).  Attitudes and 
understanding are not the same, however.  Nature programs may be enticing emotional 
sentinels for the natural world, but without balance, positive environmental attitudes may 
conflict with science understanding.  This conflict may have unintended consequences 
such as pitting endangered shorebirds against introduced red foxes in ecosystem 
management.   
 Science-related programming can just as easily promote or createmisconceptions 
about scientific concepts and theories.  Misconceptions about science can be especially 
problematic if the way the concepts are presented encourages, rather than challenges, 
prior naïve conceptions (see Linn 1983; Posner, Strike, Hewson, & Gertzog, 1982; Strike 
and Posner 1992; Watson and Kopnicek 1990).  Science educators need to be aware of 
the range of influences these free-choice opportunities can have on public understanding, 
especially in relation to important ecological processes such as evolution. 
 Audiences, and many educators, view nature films as environmental 
documentaries, but most are fictionalized accounts whose narratives are driven by the 
cinematic themes and thrills of mainstream entertainment that ensure commercial success 
(Bousé, 2000; Cottle, 2004; Mitman, 1999).  Some educators have cautioned that the use 
of language in these programs may reinforce misconceptions about evolution (e.g., 
Bishop & Anderson, 1990; Dingwall & Aldridge, 2006).  Indeed, the very production 
values of awe-inspiring nature programs (expert photography, underexplored locations, 
respected presenters, cutting-edge science) not only promote teleological (purpose-
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driven) and design-based explanations of evolution but also misconceptions about the 
nature of the scientific endeavor (Dingwall & Aldridge, 2006).   
 Similarly, video images designed to enhance the narratives of nature progams 
may serve as powerful “virtual witnessing” events for viewers (Kirby, 2003, see also 
Graber, 1990), resulting in an epistemological impact that is difficult to overcom, 
especially with socially controversial topics such as evolution and global change.  Even 
scientists fall prey to the power of the moving image.  For example, Padian (1987)
suggests that scientific reconstructions of bat-winged pterosaurs were influenced by 
“plausibility” of pictorial images.  He notes, “a picture is not only worth a thousand 
words; however inaccurate, it may be worth a wealth of well-documented evidence to the 
contrary” (p. 76).  Visual representations (such as graphs) are essential for 
communicating ideas in the science classroom; however, the design of such 
representations is not always beneficial for learners (Cook 2006).  Viewers make factual 
assessments using the experiences gained watching crime dramas, for example (Shrum, 
1999), and judgments about evolution and science likely are correspondingly affected 
based on experiences with nature programs.  Indeed, research into the effects on learning 
from one beautifully crafted nature film suggests that the misconceptions presented in the 
narration affect undergraduate students’ understanding of evolution (Bright et al., 
abstract; Dissertation Appendix 1).  Consequently, individuals may approach democratic 
issues related to science with prior knowledge and naïve conceptions about the natural 
world that may stem directly from experience, or virtual experience, with nature 
programs.   
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 Understanding what individuals learn outside of school is a difficult task because 
the free-choice marketplace for science education content is consumer oriented.  
Individuals have different identity-related motivations for their free-choice learning 
opportunities, and these motivations can predict learning outcomes (Falk, Heimlich, & 
Bronnenkant, 2008).  If viewers distinguish between educational and entertainment value, 
they may approach the content presented in a film or program differently, being more 
open to learning from programs that are considered “educational.”  More importantly, the 
understanding of individuals motivated to learn about nature from programs they deem 
“educational” may be affected more than those that are watching purely for 
entertainment, or not watching at all.   
 In a recent survey concerning audiences and the educational value of nature 
programs, respondents were asked about their beliefs regarding the educational value of 
nature programs (see Chapter 5).  Respondents indicated that the National Geographic 
Channel and PBS were the primary sources they would turn to to watch educational 
nature programs.  Discovery Channel also was listed as a source of educational programs 
but most frequently listed as a source of entertaining programs.  Animal Planetlargely 
was considered a source of entertaining programs.  (National Geographic and PBS were 
less frequently listed as a source of entertaining nature programs.)  The criteria for how 
individuals make that value judgment were not clear because the vast majority of 
respondents (>95%) believed that nature programs were indeed educational and that they
portrayed science and nature accurately.   
 Clearly, people are looking to specific channels for their science content, but what 
are they actually getting?  I predicted that the nature programs appearing on channels 
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with a mission geared toward educational programs would represent the sciencerelated to 
nature better than those whose mission was geared towards entertainment.  My 
assumptions were that commercial channels were driven by different factors than those 
funded with public money, and that comparisons would be valid from a human 
constructivist perspective, where ultimately, the viewer was the important variable. 
 
Methods 
 To determine the quality of science education resources available to viewers, I 
examined a selection of nature programs offered during a “sweeps” month for their 
accuracy and presentation of the science.  Sweeps is the period where commercial 
stations are rated for their commercial value.  As a result, channels actively solicit 
audiences with new programming and scheduling to enhance viewership.  Stations 
funded with public money, such as PBS, are not subject to the same commercial ratings, 
but they may schedule programs to encourage viewership to determine their audience 
share.  Programs on each of four channels (Animal Planet, Discovery Channel, National 
Geographic Channel, and PBS) during November, 2008, were identified using schedules 
found on their websites.  Only programs identified as broadly including nature and/or 
wild animals were included.  Animal Planet and National Geographic Channel both 
offered significant programming, and 10 hours of programming were selected randomly 
from among an alphabetized list of potential programs.  Recording equipment availability 
affected access to National Geographic Channel programming, however, and several 
shows had to be replaced based on their scheduling.  Nature programming was far less 
common on PBS and Discovery Channel during November, 2008.  Because they rely on 
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public funding, PBS was not affected by sweeps.  On the other hand, Discovery promoted 
a series titled Whale Wars about the tactics of protesters to foil whale hunting expeditions 
for that month’s sweeps.  As a result, few nature programs were included in the 
November, 2008, schedule for Discovery.  Discovery Channel did produce the highly 
acclaimed Planet Earth series, however, and two episodes that appeared in January, 
2009, were included in this assessment to add to the limited sample size. 
 The accuracy and quality of the science presented in the nature programs viewed 
were assessed using the Science and Nature Program Assessment Tool (SNaP; 
Dissertation Appendix 1).  The review criteria used in the tool were based on important 
elements of the National Science Education Standards (National Research Council, 1996) 
and the Guidelines for Excellence (North American Association for Environmental 
Education (NAAEE), 2000).  The SNaP tool grouped review criteria into categories 
representing the presentation and interpretation of facts, scientific context, presentation of 
nature of science “issues,” and the human dimensions of the science profession.  All 
criteria, except for two categories describing misconceptions, were scored on a scale from 
one (poorly met or addressed) to four (highly met or addressed).  Each scale was 
converted to quarter points so that each criterion contributed a maximum of 1.0 point to 
the overall score.  As a penalty within the presentation of facts and interpretation 
category, the two categories assessing the inclusion of misconceptions were cored from 
zero (no misconceptions) to three (serious misconceptions) and converted to a negative 
third-point scale.  Each of these criteria contributed a maximum of -1.0 to the overall
score (see Table 6.1 for an example calculation).  Because not all programs address ll 
the elements that could be reviewed using SNaP (e.g., not all programs include graphics), 
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scores for each category were standardized by summing all scores for levant criteria 
and dividing by the number of criteria evaluated.  The final score was weighted by he
total score of a separate category describing the overall impression of the program.   
 In a previous study, the SNaP tool proved applicable to a broad range of nature 
programs, the scores were consistent among science educators, and the criteria functioned 
to identify nature programs with serious flaws in the presentation of ecological sc ence 
(Dissertation Appendix 1).  In addition, the evaluation of characteristics of nature 
programs using SNaP was flexible enough to assess programs in out-of-school settings.  
For the present study, I was interested specifically in the factual presentation and 
interpretation of the science, the context of the science presented, and the presentation of 
the nature of the scientific process.  Programs were recorded and reviewed individually, 
and the scores entered into a spreadsheet for tallying.  I calculated the mean score for 
each category and the total weighted score for each program.  I used parametric statistics 
(SPSS v. 16.0) to compare programs scores among channels.  
 
Results 
 Program diversity varied among the four stations.  All offered some high 
production nature programs – programs that included extensive high quality footage and 
scripting (“blue-chip” programs of Aldridge & Dingwall, 2003), in addition to a number 
of “one-off” programs (“one-off” programs are usually produced independently, a d they 
may or may not be incorporated into a series).  Animal Planet offered the greatest 
diversity of programs, including several under-produced series that simply recited bits of 
information about the organism or incorporated amateur footage, such as Untamed and  
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Table 6.1   
Example calculation of criteria used in the SNaP tool.  Within the Facts & Interpretation 
category, the first five criteria were scored from one (poorly met or addressed) to four 
(highly met or addressed), converted to a quarter-point scale, and averaged as the 
category sub-total.  The last two criteria were scored from zero (no misconceptions) to 
three (serious misconceptions), converted to a third-point scale, averaged, and then 
subtracted from the category sub-total as a penalty. 
Criterion Score Points 
Authorities are credible 4 1.0 
Factually correct 3 0.75 
Correctly presents current theory 2 0.5 
Presents a range of perspectives from different scientists and/or 
different research groups  
2 0.5 
Actively investigates alternative interpretations of scientific 
theory/fact as part of the story 
1 1.0 
sub-total  0.75 
Inadvertently promotes misconceptions of scientific theory or 
facts (penalty) 
2 -0.66 
Intentionally promotes misconceptions of scientific theory or facts 
(penalty) 
0 0 
sub-total  -0.33 
Total Presentation of Facts & Interpretation score  0.42 
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Uncut, Unexplained/Unexplored, and Weird, True, & Freaky.  Orangutan Island was the 
only ongoing series reviewed during this assessment; in its second season, the program 
included 13 episodes that explored the orangutan rescue operation in Borneo.  The only 
two nature programs that appeared on the Discovery Channel during November, 2008, 
were pseudo-experimental examinations of feeding in bears and crocodiles.  The program 
host demonstrated the awesome power of these ferocious predators and then climbed into 
a sturdy, clear predator-safe box to react to them as they approached.  In contrast, Planet 
Earth was the highly acclaimed “blue-chip” series produced for Discovery and originally 
aired on British Broadcasting Company in 2006 and in the US in 2007.  Planet Earth 
represented high production values and investment.  National Geographic highlighted 
nature with several series featuring diverse content, including W ld, America’s Wild 
Spaces, Living Wild, and Reptile Rulers.  The nature programming on PBS was 
essentially limited to Nature, a weekly one-hour series and the occasional one-off 
programs offered by local program directors.   
 Nature programs were not the dominant type of program on any channel during 
the review period.  Programs that included nature were most common on Animal Planet; 
approximately 40% of the weekly schedule was devoted to nature programs.  Both 
Discovery Channel and National Geographic Channel focused on a diversity of program 
content.  Discovery’s content was extremely limited in November, 2008, but the Plan t 
Earth series was featured in January, 2009.  Nature programs accounted for 
approximately 15% of weekly programs on National Geographic (pet shows accounted 
for over 20%).  As mentioned previously, PBS’s nature programming was almost 
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completely restricted to Nature, although NOVA has explored ecological science in the 
past (just not in November). 
 Several themes emerged in the content presented in the programs reviewed.  
Sensationalizing fear of nature was a common programming trend, at least on the 
commercial stations.  The Maneaters series, on Animal Planet, featured individual 
programs titled “Killers in the Water” and “Big Cats.”  Untamed and Uncut was a series 
of short segments (approximately 5 minutes) that almost exclusively featured animals 
attacking humans or each other.  Discovery programs highlighted the “feeding frenzy”, 
including “Bear Feeding Frenzy” and “Crocodile Feeding Frenzy.”  Similarly, Wild, on 
National Geographic Channel included shows titled “Man-eating Prides” and “Whales: 
The Dark Side.”  (Surprisingly, the “dark side” of killer whales included interes ing 
research on their mating behavior and cultural transmission of some behaviors.)  Living 
Wild: “Nature’s War Zone,” also on National Geographic, depicted the nesting behavior 
of sea turtles, and although sea turtles and their young faced different predators, the “war 
zone” metaphor was without merit (or support in the script).  Despite its name, however, 
“America’s Deadly Dozen” (America’s Wild Spaces series) was less about being afraid of 
the animals that prey on humans and more about human intrusion into their habitat.  
Shark stories also were popular on both Animal Planet and National Geographic Channel 
in November (Discovery hosts “Shark Week” annually in late summer).   
 Titles notwithstanding, the nature programs that appeared during the November 
sweeps did not represent the science well.  Using SNaP, science scores were universally 
very low with Animal Planet, Discovery, and PBS averaging about 25% of the total 
possible (Table 6.2).  National Geographic averaged somewhat higher with an average 
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score of 42%.  Even the adjusted scores weighted by overall impression and 
recommendation were 60% and below (Table 6.2). 
 The overall impression of programs was generally high whereas NOS and context 
tended to be relatively low across all four channels (Figure 6.1).  Differenc s were 
apparent in the Facts and Interpretation category, however.  Misconceptions were 
accounted for in the Facts and Interpretation category and were subtracted from the 
overall category score.  When examined separately, National Geographic programs 
included the fewest misconceptions, and programs airing on Discovery and Animal 
Planet included the most (Figure 6.2).  The context of the science and the nature of the 
scientific endeavor were rarely explored in any program on any channel.  National 
Geographic and PBS tended to include more context in their programs than Animal  
 
 
Table 6.2.  
Mean percentage and range of science scores and adjusted overall scores for programs 
reviewed using the SNaP Assessment Tool. 
Channel n Total science score  Adjusted score  
Animal Planet 12 
27% 
(9%-51%)a 
48%  
(30%-64%) 
Discovery 3 
23 % 
(17%-30%) 
50% 
(33%-65%) 
National Geographic 13 
42%  
(26%-57%) 
60%  
(48%-69%) 
PBS 4 
31% 
(9%-45%) 
56% 
(46%-78%) 
 a Range of scores.  
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Figure 6.1.  Mean percentage scores obtained using the SNaP Assessment Tool for the 
Facts & Interpretation (Facts), Scientific Context (Context), Nature of Science Issues 
(NOS), and Overall Impression (Impression) categories for programs viewed on Animal 
Planet, Discovery, National Geographic, and PBS. 
 
 
 
Planet and Discovery, and National Geographic was the only channel that regularly 
included at least some discussion of evidence, uncertainty, explanation, and prediction.  
When programming on Animal Planet and National Geographic Channel was compared, 
the two channels differed significantly in quality of science presented.  All three SNaP 
content scores, as well as the adjusted scores, were significantly higher in programs on 
National Geographic Channel than on Animal Planet (Table 6.3).   
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Figure 6.2.  Mean scores for the Presentation of Facts and Interpretation category of the 
SNaP Assessment Tool for programs viewed on each channel.  Misconception scores are 
separated out of the total category score for comparison. 
 
 
Discussion 
 The results clearly illustrate that nature programs do not represent sci ce or the 
scientific process well, despite the fact they are consistently labeled as “educational.”  
Not only is the science misrepresented, evolutionary theory is often presented as 
teleological, need-based, or caused by the environment (see also Aldridge & Dingwall, 
2003; Dingwall & Aldridge, 2006).  Nature and science television shows may be the only 
contact a significant portion of the population has with the natural world, and programs 
often are used in classrooms as teaching tools.  Science educators should be concernd 
about the content of the programs being produced and promoted because these programs 
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Table 6.3.   
Mean scores and standard errors of the Facts & Interpretation, Scientific Context, 
Nature of Science Issues, and Overall Impression categories from the SNaP Assessment 
Tool for programs viewed Animal Planet and National Geographic Channel. 
Channel n 
Facts & 
Interpretationa 
Scientific 
Contextb 
Nature of 
Science Issuesc 
Overall 
Impressiond 
Animal Planet 12 0.23 + 0.11 0.33 + 0.02 0.26 + 0.01 0.60 + 0.03 
National Geographic 13 0.49 + 0.06 0.40 + 0.02 0.36 + 0.03 0.74 + 0.02 
a F = 4.570, 1, 23 df, p = 0.043. 
b F = 7.149, 1, 23 df, p = 0.014. 
c F = 7.050, 1, 23 df, p = 0.014. 
d F = 12.303, 1, 23 df, p = 0.002. 
 
 
may have profound effects on the knowledge students bring to the classroom, as well as 
on the conceptual knowledge they will have once they leave the formal education system.   
 Ausubel (1968) emphasizes that the most important aspect for teaching is to find 
out what a learner already knows.  Students indeed bring the experiences they have had 
with television into the science classroom (Dhingra, 2003, Aikenhead, 1988), not just 
textual readings, but visual representations as well (Cook, 2006).  In a constructivist 
context, individuals watching nature shows are “experiencing” science, and unfortunately 
the lesson they may take home is that nature is purposeful and responds to need.  
Moreover, they may learn that scientific knowledge is idiosyncratic and certain, and that 
evidence is not separated from explanation and consensus.  Consequently, for educators, 
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understanding prior knowledge is critical in designing instruction that adequately 
addresses potential areas of misunderstanding (National Research Council, 2007).  
Familiarity with the merits and faults of nature programming may give educators a 
foundation from which to draw in the conceptual change process.  Indeed, the challenge 
to science educators is to use this media effectively to address naïve views about science 
(Aikenhead, 1988, see Chapter 3 for an example of how to do this).   
 
Knowledge Gaps 
 The disparity between channel availability and programming quality also is 
alarming.  Neither Animal Planet nor National Geographic Channel is a broadcast 
channel; typically both are available only through cable or satellite services.  National 
Geographic Channel is offered most often in high-end packages.  The difference in pri  
between packages that include Animal Planet and National Geographic, at leastfor 
satellite service, currently runs about $35 per month nationally.  The cost of cable 
services is highly variable.  Special promotions may alter those price points, especially 
with cable services, but because promotions typically extend only 3-6 months, they may 
not overcome financial deterrents.  What does this mean in terms of educational content
for consumers?  Nature programs featured on National Geographic Channel were 
consistently better quality, in terms of the science presentation, than programs on Animal 
Planet.  Most importantly, Animal Planet programs included a host of misconceptions 
about evolution and science in general.  On this station, science often was portrayed as 
derived from single observations, and it was fact-based and certain.  If access to different 
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channels depends on socio-economic status, this could be an implication with 
consequences for knowledge gaps among segments of a democratic society.   
 The Knowledge Gap Hypothesis (Tichenor, Donohue, & Olien, 1970) suggests 
that mass media tends to increase, rather than decrease, the gap in knowledge between 
segments of the population with higher and lower socioeconomic status (SES) because 
higher SES individuals are able to acquire this information at a faster rate.  Higher 
education and, thus, higher SES, is associated with better reading and comprehension 
skills, and greater prior knowledge (Tichenor et al., 1970).  Moreover, people with more 
education may be both qualitatively and quantitatively better at encoding informati n 
from audio-visual media, in particular, than those with less education (Grabe, Lang, 
Zhou, & Bolls, 2000).  Of course, like learning in informal environments, the motivation 
of individuals is an important variable that can alter this relationship (Garramone, 1983; 
Kwak, 1999).   
 What is the consequence of different access to high quality science-related 
programming?  Ecological science messages may move through segments of society at 
different rates.  As a result, assessment of messages related to socio-scientific issues, such 
as evolution or global climate change (Sadler, 2004), may be differentially affected by 
SES.  In fact, individuals that have attained higher education levels may be more likely to 
believe in the promise of science in those messages and less likely to hold reservations 
than those that have not advanced in their formal schooling (Nisbet et al., 2002).  For 
example, because those with more education already have comparatively higher levels of 
factual and procedural knowledge of science (Nisbet et al., 2002), exposure to different 
media of different quality may affect a knowledge gap related to accepting evolution.  
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Nature programs are one source of media that individuals can choose to learn about 
evolution in nature.  Sadly, the sources of information available to individuals motivated 
to learn about nature may be limited based on socio-economic circumstances.  The 
combined effect of poor prior knowledge about ecological processes and economically 
limited ability to access quality sources of information may enhance knowledge gap 
effects in the general public when it comes to understanding nature and wildlife. 
 
Nature Programs and Science Literacy  
 Why are nature programs afforded a level of “educational” integrity when the 
science content related to the natural world is so poorly presented and potentially harmful 
to public understanding?  Does the credibility relate more to sentiment than science?  
This concern is especially important for those individuals motivated to learn (Falk et al., 
2008) or with a positive environmental attitude (Holbert et al., 2003).  There is no 
question that nature programs can be beautifully crafted, enchanting and instilling 
viewers with a love for the natural world that, ultimately, may affect their behavior as a 
citizen.  Furthermore, Papson (1992) argues that nature films are legitimized by 
emphasizing claims to educational and scientific “truth” when in fact they use the same 
production devices as fictional programs.  Most viewers would be expected to realize th t 
CSI: Crime Scene Investigation is fictional and not an educational program.  Yet, the 
science it portrays, although highly sensationalized, is often at least as accurate as that 
found in nature programs based on my reviews.  Interestingly, the program has had a 
significant effect on the number of college students choosing science-related care r paths 
(see Johnston, 2003).  The “CSI Effect” is currently a popularly debated media effect; the 
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science, it seems may or may not influence jurors in terms of the expectations nd beliefs 
of real forensic evidence (see Schweitzer & Saks, 2007; Shelton, Kim, & Barak, 2006).   
 Using emotional relationships with nature to garner public interest is not a recent 
phenomenon, nor is this science-versus-sentiment controversy unique to nature programs.  
As naturalism was becoming popular at the turn of the 19th century, nature writers began 
overdramatizing and anthropomorphizing nature to such an extent that John Burroughs 
felt compelled to call the issue to the attention of the general public (Lutts, 2001).  These
fantastic stories, however, were extremely popular with readers and opened a worl seen 
by few at that time.  The problem lies with the use of the term “educational” as  
descriptor.  According to Lutts, the problem with the “nature fakers” was less about 
fraud, and more about sentimentalism, philosophical bias, and an inability or 
unwillingness to use the tools of science to learn about nature and wildlife.  Although 
most would assume the educational value of nature books has been resolved since the 
highly public debate initiated by Burroughs, the conflict in communication strategies and 
expectations continues (Lutts, 2001).  The approach to factual representation, accuracy, 
and misrepresentation, as well as how well facts can be differentiated from ficti n, are 
still common issues with nature books (Mayer, 1995).  Critical assessment is key 
(Eggerton, 1996).  Just as teachers need to consider the content of the trade books they 
bring to classrooms because science learning in children can be obstructed by fanciful 
stories (Mayer, 1995), so too should they consider nature and wildlife programs.   
 Nature programs on television are not critically examined.  This may be a result 
of the visual experience audiences have as they witness wildlife and the natural world.  
Indeed, from a production perspective, emphasis on photography in nature films (like 
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pornography) can supersede emphasis on the actual story.  Moreover, models that have 
some success are replicated.  Audiences are rarely concerned with the appearance of 
“truth” in television; their interest is more focused on the coherence and logic of stories 
(Shapiro & Fox, 2002).  In fact, unless an inconsistency is easily observed, individual 
viewers have no reason to assess the realism at all (Busselle & Bilandzic, 2008).   
 The SNaP tool allows viewers to focus and reflect on the science realism in nature 
programs and helps them navigate the murky waters of science and sentiment related o 
the popularization of ecological science.  Ford (2008) argues that students need to learn
the importance of knowing how to assess the efficacy of scientific claims, stating “the 
ideal vision of students making their own sense of content is superseded by a more 
defensible ideal vision of students learning how to make sci ntific sense of content.”  
Students working individually or in groups can use the SNaP tool to critically evaluate 
the science they observed while watching these extraordinary programs.  In conjunction 
with curricula designed to address the language we use to describe evolution (Chapter 3), 
this kind of critical examination also may be able to help students overcome common 
misconceptions about evolution.  Indeed, with the proper tools, nature programs can be 
an amazing source for sharing information about the wonders of wildlife and the natural 
world, and to initiate valuable lessons about important ecological processes, such as 
evolution.   
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CHAPTER 7.  
CLIO THE SCIENTIST: USING NARRATIVES TO  
BROADEN THE IMPACTS OF INQUIRY1 
 
Abstract:   
 Inquiry is a vital component of science teaching, and incorporating science texts 
may broaden its pedagogical value.  We developed an inquiry and take-home story to 
engage families in their children’s science learning.  We designed the inquiry, “What in 
the world do insects see?”, for 1st and 2nd grade students as an exploration of how insects 
see their world.  Our goal was to illustrate how our understanding of ecological 
relationships is affected by our perceptions.  By examining the structure of insect eyes, 
students learned that insects may see the world very differently than they themselves do.  
Students were introduced to insects as pollinators using ultraviolet photographs of 
flowers, and they observed flowers and pollinators outdoors.  To complement this 
investigation, the inquiry was re-written as a story for families to read with their children.  
The story included activities from the classroom inquiry and encouraged families to 
explore their own backyards.  Pre- and post-assessments indicated that the inquiry 
significantly increased student understanding that insect pollinators may see flow rs quite 
differently than humans, but students experiencing both the story and the inquiry gained a 
better appreciation of the nature of science than those experiencing either the inquiry or 
story alone.   
                                                
1 All graduate students who received NSF GK-12 funding from the ECOS grant were required to present 
one investigation they developed as a chapter in their dissertation and for publication.  This chapter was 
developed specifically for the journal Science & Children, a journal whose audience is elementary school 
teachers. 
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Once upon a time there was a little scientist named Clio.   
She loved insects!   
She loved creepy crawly insects.   
She loved beautiful flying insects.   
She loved ancient insects.   
And she loved insects that pretended to be something 
other than insects.   
She loved looking at them so much, it got her to thinking…   
Do insects like looking at her as much as she likes looking at them?   
“I wonder what they see when they look at me?” she asked. 
 
 Clio’s questions begin a journey with her grandmother and her father, a story that 
builds on concepts learned during a school inquiry on insect vision.  Inquiry is a way of 
teaching science that exemplifies scientific questioning.  Asking questions and proposing 
explanations based on evidence reflects the ways in which scientists examine the natural 
world, so an emphasis on the scientific process in school may more accurately reveal 
science as a world of curiosity rather than a world of facts (National Research Council 
1996).  Because learning is a cumulative process, creating rich experiences for learning 
outside of school in informal (or free-choice) environments can connect and reinforce 
understanding (Dierking et al. 2003).  In fact, students with enriched informal learning 
environments may develop higher reasoning abilities than students who do not have such 
opportunities (Gerber et al. 2001).  Sharing these experiences with peers, siblings, or 
adults is essential to maximize their effectiveness (Gerber et al. 2001), so one way to 
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foster the development of scientific reasoning in children is to engage families to 
participate in these informal learning experiences (Crowley et al. 2001).  Family 
members can help students build on “islands of expertise” the children have developed 
(Crowley and Jacobs 2002), expertise that was perhaps initiated and nurtured in their 
classrooms at school.   
 How can parents, siblings, and the extended family make the connections between 
science at school and at home?  By reading together!  Science-related ding is a great 
source of learning that can transcend these environments.  Parents often read about 
science and nature to their children, and children are fond of science-related books 
(Korpan et al. 1997).  Reading, like inquiry, draws on experience and knowledge, and 
readers actively construct understanding (Butzow and Butzow 2000; Casteel and Isom 
1994).  Purposefully designing lessons that connect school with home environments 
using science-related stories not only creates positive attitudes in children toward science, 
it provides positive experiences for parents and leads to new avenues of communication 
for parents and teachers (Shymansky et al. 2000).   
 Children love learning about insects, providing amazing opportunities for 
classroom and schoolyard exploration and inquiry.  These engaging creatures provide 
diverse opportunities for addressing many science standards, even for the youngest 
students.  By capitalizing on children’s innate fascination with insects, we can extend 
inquiry not just from the classroom to the home, but from the indoors to the outdoors, and 
from cities to rural locations – insects are everywhere!  “Clio the Scientist” is one such 
means to engage the family in the exploration. 
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Setting the Stage: What in the World Do Insects See? 
 Many insects rely on vision to find nectar and pollen, but what do insects see 
when they look at a flower?  Insect vision is an area of active research in science – an 
area that allows fruitful exploration into the nature of the scientific endeavor because of 
the bias our own vision brings.  As scientists, we use our senses to make observations, 
but we can’t assume that what we see is what insects see; we are forced to think outside 
of our own senses when we ask questions about insect vision.  Our inquiry uses insect 
pollinators to help students think about what scientists currently know about insect 
eyesight, what they can know, and how students, as scientists, can begin to investigate 
eyesight (see http://www.bioed.org/ecos/inquiries/Inquiries/InsectEyes.pdf and Chapter 
Appendix 1).    
 To connect school and home, we developed a narrative take-home story about 
“Clio the Scientist” (available at http://www.bioed.org/ECOS/clio).  In the story, a young 
girl, Clio, who is already interested in insects, turns to her family for help to explore how 
insects see the world around them.  Her family discusses the same optical illusions used 
in the classroom inquiry and provides some new insight into what scientists know about 
how birds see (some birds may see ultraviolet colors, too).   The story encourages Clio 
and the readers to use a scientific approach to answering questions about what insects 
see.  The readers are prompted to make observations of insect pollinators in their own 
backyards, and to draw and record their observations directly in their “book.”  Clio’s 
story also includes an exercise using cardboard tubes and a discussion of ultraviolet 
colors in flowers, similar to the classroom inquiry.  The story concludes by encouraging 
more questions. 
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Assessing the Impacts 
 Can linking classroom-based inquiry with an engaging story that puts students to 
work as scientists when they go home enhance learning?  To test the impact of the 
inquiry and the take-home story, we collaborated with three enthusiastic teachers.  One 
teacher used just the class-based inquiry, another used only the “Clio the Scientist” story, 
and the third used both the class-based inquiry and the take-home story.  Each teacher 
gave her students a simple assessment both before and after the unit that included
drawing and responding to several statements. 
 In the first part of the assessment, students were shown a potted flowering plant 
and asked to draw the flower the way an insect might see it.  In the pre-assessment, 
students in the Inquiry Only class most often drew multiple images of flowers or the
faceted insect eye to represent the multiple images, however one student believed that 
insects could only see in black and white, another that insects can’t see the flowers, and 
another believed the image would be “fuzzy.”  Only one student indicated that insects 
were small relative to flowers.  Other students drew simple flowers or did not guess what 
insects might see.  During the post-assessment, this teacher encouraged students to think 
about the pictures they had seen during the inquiry.  Sixty percent of her students drew 
flowers similar to the ultraviolet photos they had seen with dark centers and light outer 
edges.  Three students drew multiple images of the flower in the post-assessment (all 
three had drawn multiple images in the pre-assessment), but one incorporated the 
ultraviolet colors of flowers into the multiple images. 
 Drawings made by students in the Story Only classroom were diverse.  Although 
the majority of students drew simple flowers during the pre-assessment, four inc rporated 
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some kind of multiple images of the flower or insect’s eye.  Other students believed 
insects could see through flowers, two argued that insects could only see black and white, 
and two suggested that insects had only smell as a way of finding flowers.  Two student  
drew the insects as tiny compared with flowers.  For the post-assessment, studets drew 
wonderful portrayals of pairs of flowers illustrating the way humans see them and the 
way they may appear in ultraviolet light; nine students drew flowers with large areas of 
dark and light contrast.  Drawings of three students did not differ between assessments: 
one drew the flower as black and white, another drew a simple flower, and the third drew 
the flower as multiple images. 
 In the Inquiry+Story classroom, only one of the students drew multiple images 
representing faceted eyes in the pre-assessment, three students suggested insects could 
only see in black and white, two students offered a different range of colors, and one 
suggested that insects could only see flowers (not the stems).  After completing the 
inquiry and reading the story at home, almost all the students drew flowers reflcting the 
ultraviolet photographs in the post-assessment.  The single student who had indicated 
multiple images in the pre-assessment also drew the flower as a contrasting d rk center 
with light petals, but he added the insect would “see millions 
of the same picher [sp].”  One student drew the flowers as 
colorful for humans and gray for insects. 
 Regardless of how the information was presented, all 
the children improved their understanding of how insects 
sense the world through vision.  Responses to statements in 
the second part of the assessment indicated that before 
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instruction, most students believed that insect eyes are not the same as human eyes, that 
we may not see things the same way, and that our eyes are not the same (Table 7.1).  
Especially for students who did not have a view point initially, the inquiry effectively 
improved their understanding.  In both classrooms that used the inquiry, the differences 
were significant: students no longer believed that “Insects see flowers the same way I see 
flowers” and “Insect eyes are just like human eyes”.  In the Inquiry+Story classroom 
students had a better understanding of the nature of the scientific endeavor – that our
brains process the information we see, and that science is active.   The classrooms 
differed in their effects on learning outcomes, however (Table 7.2).  Based on the 
differences in pre- and post-assessment scores, students experiencing the inquiry changed 
their answers more often or to a greater degree than those who only read the story.  The 
largest effect on learning was related to the nature of the scientific endeavor.  The 
proportion of students who realized that scientists don’t know everything about how 
insect eyes work jumped from 9% to 93% in the Inquiry+Story classroom. 
 Clearly, both the inquiry and the story were effective in improving student 
understanding about insect eyesight.  Through informal conversations with students in the 
Inquiry Only classroom at the end of the school year, we discovered that one of their
favorite science learning experiences was to pretend they were insects.  Students from the 
Inquiry+Story classroom made thank-you posters showing dragonfly eyes as multi-
faceted and noted they were really good predators capable of catching mosquitoes 
because of their keen eyesight.  For a local newspaper story, several students mentioned 
learning what insects see as their favorite outdoor experience, and one student adeptly  
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Table 7.1.   
Proportion of students disagreeing with statements made during assessment (only 
students completing both the pre- and post-assessments were included in the statistical 
analyses). 
 
Statement 
 
Inquiry 
Only 
 
n 
Inquiry + 
Story 
 
n 
 
Story Only 
 
n 
Insects see flowers the same way I see flowers (combined: Z = -3.65, p < 0.001) 
 Pre-test 50% 14 25% 12 63% 19 
 Post-test 88%a 17 100%b 14 82% 11 
Insect eyes are just like human eyes (combined: Z = -1.90, p = 0.06) 
 Pre-test 77% 13 77% 13 79% 19 
 Post-test 94%c 17 100%d 15 91% 11 
The way I see the world is the way the world really is (combined: Z = -2.42, p = 0.02) 
 Pre-test 21% 14 36% 11 11% 19 
 Post-test 41% 17 80%e 15 55% 11 
Scientists know how insect eyes work (combined: Z = -1.71, p = 0.09) 
 Pre-test 14% 14 9% 11 5% 19 
 Post-test 12% 17 93%f 14 9% 11 
a Z = -2.46, p = 0.01. 
b Z = -2.76, p = 0.01. 
c Z = -1.73, p = 0.08. 
d Z = -1.73, p = 0.08. 
e Z = -2.27, p = 0.02. 
f Z = -2.27, p = 0.02. 
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Table 7.2.   
Tests for differences in the distribution of differences scores (the inverse of the post-
assessment score minus pre-assessment score) for the three classrooms. 
Question 
Likelihood 
ratio 
df p 
Insects see flowers the same way I see flowers 10.917 6 0.09 
Insect eyes are just like human eyes 12.983 6 0.04 
The way I see the world is the way the world really is 8.025 8 0.43 
Scientists know how insect eyes work 23.526 8 0.003 
 
 
linked an insect investigation on mouthparts from later in the school year to the insect eye 
inquiry. 
 
Conclusion 
 Literacy and inquiry learning are strongly connected (Yore 2004).  From a 
constructivist learning perspective, reading can develop similar kinds of science skills as 
inquiry.  Questioning and analyzing are processes taught by both reading and inquiry;
they provide the framework to set goals, to develop predictions, to organize and explore, 
and for reviewing and reflection (Casteel and Isom 1994).  Developing narratives from 
freely available inquiries is a fairly straightforward process, and it can really enhance 
learning.  Teachers can use the background information provided in the inquiry to 
develop their own storylines and characters based on their personal understanding of both 
the topic and their students.  Similarly, scientists visiting a classroom could use this 
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approach to enhance the impact of their visits.  Moreover, take-home narratives can 
provide new opportunities to assess student understanding.   
 In addition to helping students develop skills that can be applied to both inquiry in 
science and reading for literacy (Casteel and Isom 1994), inquiry oriented narratives may 
serve a diversity of student needs.  Reading inquiry oriented narratives may engage
students that identify themselves more as readers than as scientists (e.g., girls; Ford et al. 
2006).  Development of these narrative texts may be even more valuable to low-
socioeconomic status school districts where informational texts can be unavailable (Duke 
2000).  Best of all, using a simple narrative may help family members feel mor  
comfortable with scientific inquiry and provide one way of bridging formal and informal 
environments to enhance science education in our communities (Resnick 1987; 
Rutherford and Billig 1995; Zuzovsky and Tamir 1989). 
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Appendix 1: Inquiry 
 
In a nutshell: What in the world do insects see?   
Understanding the limits of scientific knowledge using insect vision 
 
Objectives: 
• To explore the physical structures of insect eyes 
• To recognize the assumptions scientists make to understand what insects see  
 
Grade Level: 1-2 
 
Materials: 
• toilet paper tubes  
• 3”x3” cutouts of magazine pictures 
• handouts of optical illusions 
• pictures of flowers in regular and ultraviolet light from the internet 
• scanning electron microscope images of fly eyes  
• magnifying jars (or magnifying glasses and containers) 
• sweep nets/butterfly nets 
• insect mounts 
 
Engage: 
 First, students explore the limits of binocular vision. Using the cardboard tubes, 
they gaze through the tube with one eye and slowly move their hand away from their 
other eye until they see “through” their hand.  Using two tubes at once, students try to 
see two different pictures at once.  They also use the tubes to restrict their field of
vision as they try to find their teammate (the cheese) as they pretend to be a fly.  
Second, several different optical illusions help students explore how our brains make 
us see.  Third, students start to think about what may be important for insects to see 
(food resources in flowers), and some of the interesting circumstantial evidence 
scientists have for their ideas about what insects actually do see (ultraviole 
photographs of flowers and nectar guides).  
 
Explore: 
 Students go outside and observe insects and flowers and think about what is 
important (color, location, flower shape) for insects to see.  Using sweep nets, 
students capture several kinds of insects and put them into the magnifying jars to 
observe the different shapes and placement of eyes.  Scanning electron microscope 
(SEM) images permit students to see extremely close views of insect eyes. They can 
develop hypotheses about insect eyes based on their observations in the outdoors, and 
have their own SEM images made. 
 
For more detail, see What in the World Do Insects See at 
http://www.bioed.org/ecos/Inquiries/inquiries.aspx 
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CHAPTER 8.  
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 My research examined evolution understanding – what it is and where and when 
it develops.  Because wildlife and nature programs so often deal with evolutionary 
theory, either directly or indirectly, I wanted to explore the role these programs played in 
the public understanding of evolution.  Specifically, I was interested in determining how 
wildlife and nature programs that address ecology and evolution affected learning bout 
evolution and the natural world.   
 I began by addressing the literature in a variety of disciplines, from philosophy to 
education, and history to communication.  Without knowing the context of the problem, 
developing an experiment to address the issues or finding a solution is not possible.  I 
began by chronicling the legal threats to evolution education, and the shift in creationist 
tactics to redefine the nature and scope of scientific knowledge.  With the nature of 
knowledge in question, I examined the ontological and epistemological commitments 
related to science and evolutionary knowledge in our society and the historical 
development of this important theory.  The theory of evolution is complex, however, and 
evolution educators have learned much about how people understand evolution, the 
nature of science, and knowledge in general in the last 25 years.  Indeed, the literature 
review in Chapter 2 strongly supports a need for additional research that addresses 
science education, and evolution understanding specifically.  The remaining chapters 
remedied some of that need. 
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 Using data collected during two introductory biology courses, I asked exactly 
what students understood about evolution, and could nature films be used to affect that 
understanding (Chapter 3).  A multi-step curriculum was designed to help students 
overcome misconceptions about evolution; the nature program Fatal Flower was used as 
a surrogate to reduce any personal affiliation with the common misconceptions student  
held.  Initial assessments indicated students indeed held naïve views of evolutionary 
processes, and post-assessments indicated that a number of these misconceptions were 
overcome as a result of the curriculum.  Students were asked to respond to four prepared 
alternative explanations about a natural phenomenon.  These were similar in content but 
differed in their inclusion of common misconceptions about evolution.  The results 
indicated that students’ conceptual ecologies varied, and as they began to grasp the 
complexity of evolutionary theory, their explanations included mostly proximate 
explanations and few misconceptions.  Students who understood the more abstract 
concepts associated with the theory, however, included both misconceptions and 
proximate conceptions in their ecologies, indicating a struggle in their conceptual 
development.  The data from my work and the literature strongly support an approach to 
teaching that embraces the diversity of concepts students may hold, recognizing that 
learning takes time, numerous contexts are required, and that conceptual change will be 
different for different students (diSessa, 2008). 
 Clearly, the results from the curriculum implemented provided indirect support 
for the influence of television programs on evolution understanding, but the data 
collected did not address the prior knowledge students brought with them to the 
classroom, let alone important covariates that may affect outcomes, such as attitudes 
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towards science and beliefs about knowledge.  I addressed this gap by examining the 
influences that attitudes towards science, attitude toward evolution, beliefs about 
knowledge, and understanding the Nature of Science had on evolution understanding 
within a large-scale experiment (Chapter 4).  I used a beautifully crafted na ure program 
with poor presentation of evolution content and designed an experiment to tease apart 
effects of narration and imagery on understanding.  I enlisted students in introductory 
biology courses from The University of Montana, Eastern Washington University, and 
Michigan State University to experience one of four versions of the nature program: the 
original version (re-voiced for consistency), a version with modified narrative but 
original imagery, a version with original narrative but modified imagery, and a version 
with both modified narrative and imagery.  Results of the experiment indicated that the 
one-time viewing of a nature program may indeed have affected students’ evolution 
understanding.  More importantly, this affect was apparent in students that had a 
moderate grasp of evolutionary theory – that is, students with the “best” understaing in 
this study.   The relationships among understanding and individual characteristics, such 
as Attitudes toward Science, Attitudes toward Evolution, and Nature of Science 
Understanding (NOS) were complex, however.  Individuals with a poor understanding of 
evolution (most students in the study) were likely influenced by a combination of poor 
presentation in the nature program and rhetoric proliferated by anti-evolutionists n the 
“marketplace of ideas” that questions the validity of theories in science.  Id ed, NOS 
was an important covariate in most analyses.  As a direct test of watching a single nature 
program on evolution understanding, the trends were apparent despite the complexity of 
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the experimental design, human research subjects, and the single event viewed at 
students’ leisure. 
 The poor quality of science presented in nature programs in the free-choice 
learning environment warranted examining learning from the perspective of th consumer 
of those programs.  I explored audience beliefs about the educational value of wildlife
and nature films because those beliefs may strongly impact learning outcomes (Chapter 
5).  Residents of Missoula, Montana were asked to respond to a survey addressing the 
characteristics they believed important to educational programs their beliefs about the 
presentation of the science in nature programs.  As host to the International Wildlife F m 
Festival each spring, residents should have been more familiar with the genre relativ  to 
the general population.  Over 95% of respondents believed nature films were 
“educational” and slightly fewer agreed that the primary goal for these programs was to 
teach about nature.  In fact, the more they believed these programs were designed to be 
educational, the more they believed that the science and nature were portrayed accurately.  
Audiences clearly treated nature programs as credible and authoritative sourc s f 
science information, a significant issue given that they are expecting to learn from 
something that teaches evolution so poorly (Dingwall & Aldridge, 2006). 
 Chapter 5 prompted an important follow-up question: if audiences interested in 
the natural world were tuning to nature programming with an interest in learning, what 
exactly were they getting in terms of science and evolution education?  I developed the 
Science and Nature Program Assessment Tool (SNaP) to analyze the content of nature 
programs quickly and reliably (Dissertation Appendix 1).  Indeed, SNaP permitted 
evaluation of over 30 nature programs appearing on Animal Planet, Discovery Channel, 
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National Geographic Channel, and PBS during November, 2008, “sweeps” and in 
January, 2009.  Programs did not score well, especially in the category describing the 
presentation of science.  Misconceptions were common.  The lowest scoring programs 
most often appeared on Animal Planet and Discovery Channel; National Geographic 
tended to air relatively high-scoring programs.  The results indicated that, coupled with 
other variables related to socio-economic status, the difference in educational progr m 
quality among channels at different price-points may have repercussions for mass-media 
audiences and the public understanding of evolution.   
 My research with university students lends support to the role of understanding 
the nature of the scientific endeavor in understanding evolution and evaluating science in 
civil discourse.  Teaching NOS is difficult, however, and we take very different 
approaches to teaching science to younger versus older students.  Young students are 
often taught very simple views that do not reflect the power of the knowledge that is
generated with a scientific approach.  By the time students reach higher grad s, they are 
expected to quickly grasp a new, complex approach to scientific inquiry.  Teaching NOS 
to young children is clearly important; they may be quite capable of sophisticated 
thinking, especially within carefully sequenced learning experiences.  Unfortu ately, 
most curricula do not reflect what is now known about younger children’s cognitive 
capabilities (National Research Council, 2007).   
 Using an inquiry plus story approach, Clio the Scientist (Chapter 7) attempted to 
remedy the lack of available curricula for young students.   I developed an inquiry around 
insect vision and what scientists can actually know about what insects see for first and 
second graders at Lewis and Clark Elementary School in Missoula, Montana.  I wrote and 
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designed a take-home story to recapitulate some of the important points and investigati  
strategies accompanied the inquiry.  Pre- and post-assessments of students’ experience 
with the inquiry alone, the story alone, or the inquiry+story indicated that the inquiry was 
quite successful at teaching NOS issues.  Adding the story re-enforced concepts and 
engaged students in a way that the inquiry alone had not.   This work showed that even 
with a minimum time investment, the effects were large; young students unequivocally 
grasped the tentative nature of science conclusion.  “Scientists are still work ng on it!” 
 
Significance 
 Science is but one way of knowing, and knowing about science requires 
sophisticated reasoning skills about the nature of knowledge and how that knowledge is 
generated.  Advances in science engender their own issues in the public forum, issues that 
require understanding of science to address.  It is within the public arena that the 
individuals need to weigh science with other ways of knowing as they make important 
civic decisions.  Individuals may or may not have grasped important scientific concepts, 
like evolution, during formal schooling.  My research suggests that if individuals are 
motivated to learn more about the science necessary to make these decisions, they may 
need new or different tools to assess the resources available in the free-choice 
marketplace.  The video interface is increasing at a rapid pace, and free-choice science 
learning opportunities related to science in general, and evolution understanding in 
particular, will likely become more accessible.  Future research needs to apply the wealth 
of recent literature related to cognition and learning to both public resources for evolution 
education and assessment of learning in those environments.   
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 Nature programs may be extremely engaging, but they often depict science and 
scientific processes poorly.  We believe teachers need to be aware of the lack of scientific 
accuracy of these programs.  We developed and tested a tool designed to help teachers 
assess the educational value of nature programs.   
 
 Nature programs are more than just entertainment, they also serve as a source of 
information and inspiration about the natural world.  In fact, several studies indicate that 
viewing television can positively influence public attitudes and behaviors toward the 
environment (Holbert, Kwak, & Shah, 2003; Eagles & Demare, 1999).  If we assume that 
nature and science programs actually address science and ecological issues thoughtfully, 
then this type of television programming could be a powerful tool for science education.  
Unfortunately, science-related programming can just as easily promote r cr ate 
misconceptions about scientific concepts and theories, especially if the way the concepts 
are presented encourages (versus challenges) prior naïve conceptions.  Nature programs 
are widely accepted as environmental documentaries, thereby giving them high standing 
with viewing audiences, but most nature films actually are fictionalized narratives driven 
by the cinematic themes and thrills of mainstream entertainment that ensure commercial 
success (Bousé, 2000; Mitman, 1999).  Indeed, many educators have cautioned about the 
use of language in these programs that reinforces misconceptions (e.g., inheritance of 
acquired characteristics; Bishop & Anderson, 1990; Dingwall & Aldridge, 2006).  We 
believe that teachers and science educators need to be aware of the concepts thes  
programs promote, so they can take action to help students become literate in both media 
and science (see also Dhingra, 2006).  To that end, we developed the Science and Nature 
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Program (SNaP) Assessment Tool as an evaluation tool that teachers, and studets, can 
use to critically examine the content of nature programs. 
 Nature programs present a host of questions for educational communities.  For 
example, are the facts and scientific context accurately presented, and are theoretical 
constructs, such as natural selection or ecological relationships, adequately explained?  
Do films present science in ways that enrich the viewers’ understanding of the scientific 
enterprise, or do they make science appear to be nothing more than a set of absolute and 
unchanging facts?  And when presenting difficult and controversial topics, such as glob l 
climate change or evolution, do the films represent the best science on what is known 
about a particular topic, or do they inadvertently (or purposefully) repeat commonly held 
misconceptions?  These are the kinds of questions educators need to ask of all 
educational media, including nature films.  Although several film festivals feturing 
wildlife and ecological themes offer awards to producers in the genre, these festivals do 
not use quantifiable criteria that can help reviewers identify programs with poor 
educational content or provide any criticism of inadequate, biased, and/or junk science.  
In fact, shows that illustrate science poorly receive awards for aspects unrelated to their 
educational or scientific content (e.g., cinematography).  Worse yet, some may ven 
receive recognition for their “educational value,” in spite of their inadequat  or incorrect 
representations of nature or science.  Several alternative sources for reviews of nature and 
science films exist (e.g., AAAS publication Science Books and Films), but these reviews 
are not quantifiable summaries.  Therefore, we developed a review tool with quantifiable 
criteria to evaluate whether or not nature films represent science and the scientific 
process accurately and whether or not they use relevant metaphors to explain and 
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interpret key ecological concepts.  Our goal was to develop a rubric that teachers could 
use to analyze the scientific content of a broad selection of wildlife and nature programs.  
 
Developing an Evaluation Tool 
 To ensure SNaP was a credible tool for evaluating the scientific content and 
educational value of nature and science films, we based review criteria on imp rtant 
elements of the National Science Education Standards (National Research Council, 1996) 
and the Guidelines for Excellence (North American Association for Environmental 
Education (NAAEE), 2000).  We also consulted with educators and scientists familiar 
with both the constraints of film and television production and with national science 
standards.  We grouped review criteria into categories representing the scientific context, 
presentation of facts, presentation of nature of science “issues,” and the human 
dimensions of the science profession (Figure 1).  We also included a category for 
reviewers to record their overall impression of the program, both quantitatively and 
qualitatively.   
 All criteria, except for two categories describing misconceptions, were scored on 
a scale from zero (poorly met or addressed) to four (highly met or addressed).  The scale 
was converted to quarter points so that each criterion contributed a maximum of 1.0 
points to the overall score.  A penalty was assessed against the overall score for inclusi n 
of misconceptions (deliberate or not) using a similar quarter-point scale.  We calculated 
the mean score for each category for each film.  We evaluated films across categories by 
compiling mean criteria scores and mean scores per category for all programs reviewed.  
We used non-parametric statistics (chi square) to test for differences among category 
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scores.  Final “grades” were assigned by calculating the mean score of the science 
education categories and weighting this score using the Overall Impression Category.  
Based on the percentage score, we assigned a traditional letter grade.  In general, shows 
receiving an “A” were outstanding in all aspects, including accuracy, context, and 
interpretation.  Shows assigned a “B” may not have represented the science as well as 
they could have (e.g., better portrayal of the tentative nature of scientific conclusions), 
but were above average overall and visually engaging.  A “C” grade indicated the show 
was captivating but did not represent scientists or the scientific process very well.  Grades 
of “D” and “F” indicated both unacceptably poor representations of science and visual 
presentation.  We developed a flower icon teachers can use to provide a visual depiction 
of the quality and highlight a film’s overall effectiveness (Figure 2).  On the flower, each 
petal represents one of the major content categories plus the Teaching Value category.  
The leaves represent the appropriateness for App oach of the Story and coverage of 
Human Diversity.  Problems in any particular category are clearly illustrated by fallen 
petals. 
 
Going to the Movies 
 To test this tool, we took advantage of the International Wildlife Film Festival 
(IWFF), held annually in Missoula, Montana.  The IWFF is one of the longest running 
film festivals, nearly 30 years, whose mission is “to foster and promote knowledge an  
understanding of wildlife and habitat through excellent and honest wildlife films.”  Over 
200 films are entered annually in this juried competition from a wide range of produces 
including corporate producers such as the British Broadcasting Company, Discovery, and 
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National Geographic, and independent producers whose work is often picked up by these 
companies.  The films are judged on broad elements such as “excellence in scientific 
accuracy, technical achievement, aesthetic presentation, ethical wildlife practices, and 
educational value” 
(http://www.wildlifefilms.org/festivals/iwff/2009_IWFF_Packet_Entry.pdf, last accessed 
15 February 2009).  Consequently, the IWFF provides a unique opportunity to review a 
large sample of programs that typically enter the television market.   
 We had three objectives during the test phase of the evaluation tool.  First, we 
tried to get as many reviewers as possible to review as large a selection of shows as 
possible to determine the range of programming for which the tool was best suited.  
Second, we assessed the consistency of the SNaP Tool in identifying problems and issues 
in the reviewed films; we used the film Fatal Flower, a previous award winner (Finalist, 
Merit Award for Soundmix, Merit Award for Narration, Merit Award for Editing, Merit 
Award for Scientific Content), in a case study to assess some of the basic functionality of 
the criteria.  Third, we assessed variation across a large sample of reviewers with three 
specific award-winning programs to explore consistency of the ratings. 
 
A Selection of Shows 
 We recruited faculty, graduate students, and volunteers interested in 
environmental issues to review films at the screenings they attended.  We provided each 
reviewer with instructions on how to use the SNaP tool.  The team of reviewers critiqued 
27 films; the mean number of reviewers per film was 2.4 (range 1-5).  Most films were 
natural history stories, typically presenting “a year in the life of an individual of species 
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x.”  Indeed, 75 % were rated as 3 or 4 (highly met or addressed) for “Describes the 
natural history of a species or place” in the program description category, indicating 
extensive agreement among the reviewers.  The final distribution of grades ws 
illuminating (Figure 3); few films scored a passing grade (mean=35%) even after the 
scores were weighted by overall impression (mean=52%).  In fact, all but three films 
received failing grades for the science content (context, facts, and nature of science 
issues).  The best overall grade was given to a film discussing whether the “cul ure” of 
the great apes was in any way similar to human culture.  In contrast, an advocacy film 
about saving the planet received the lowest score; the film was full of serious, and 
seemingly deliberate, misconceptions about ecological concepts, such as the disconnect 
between personal actions and advocacy (e.g., drawing pictures of leaves to save a forest 
without recognizing that paper comes from trees). 
 The grades films received based on the SNaP Tool were not congruent with the 
awards presented at the IWFF.  All of the films we reviewed received, at a minimum, a 
“Finalist Award,” suggesting they had met the festival’s criteria for educational value and 
science content.  The SNaP Tool revealed a different story about the scientific and 
educational value of most of the films we reviewed.  Using the SNaP Tool, our reviewers 
failed all of the films that had received awards, such as Best of Festival, Best Animal 
Behavior, and Best Children’s Show.  Even the film awarded Best Science Content, e 
program in a series entitled The Shape of Life, scored a miserable 37% based on its 
science and educational values, and received a “D” once the overall score was weighted 
by the general  impression of the film.  In fact, the film awarded Best Educational Value 
only received a 46% from our reviewers. 
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One Fatally Flawed Film 
 Fatal Flower is a traditional natural history story that explores the evolution of 
orchids and their pollinators, as well as their relationships with humans.  The program 
shows how different species of orchids have adaptations that enable them to be pollinated 
by specific pollinators (insects and birds).  Thus, from an educational perspective, the 
film appears to document an excellent example of co-evolution and natural selection. 
 Six reviewers with science and education backgrounds concurrently viewed and 
critiqued the film using the SNaP Tool.  The final weighted grade for Fatal Flower was 
only 45% (an “F”); worse yet, its science content rated only 13%.  The low grade was a
result, in large part, to the prevalence of misconceptions in the narration (Presentation of 
Facts and Interpretation score = 8%).  Both seemingly deliberate (orchids “cheat”) and 
inadvertent (orchids changed specifically to cheat pollinators) misconceptions were 
apparent throughout the narrative.  For example, one passage explains that: 
“The crucifix orchid also tries to be something that it is not; it copies other plants 
nearby which have clusters of yellow and red flowers.  The color guides the 
butterflies to the nectar, which is produced in the yellow parts of the flower heads.  
The crucifix orchid seems to know this, and its flower heads have the same color 
pattern, too.  Some of the flowers are dark red, while the freshest are orange and 
yellow.  But there, the similarity ends, as this orchid is a cheat.  It may look like 
the others, but its flowers are empty.  There is no nectar reward at all, so the 
butterflies are fooled into pollinating it for free.  Orchids really are the femme 
fatale of the natural world.  They’ve made cheating an art form, using it get 
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exactly what they need from the creatures that fall for their many and varied 
charms” (emphases added). 
 Although this dialog may seem engaging, it promotes misconceptions about 
evolution such as evolution as an individual-based phenomena, as a Lamarckian process, 
and as need-based.  The program was quite visually impressive, however (score=0.96).  
We found no difference among reviewers in the overall scores (Χ2=0.822, 6 df, P=0.222) 
nor in the science content categories alone (Χ2=0.639, 6 df, P=0.381).  The reviewers also 
were equally consistent about the Overall Impression of the program (x =0.61±0.081).  
Consequently, Fatal Flower seems fatally flawed based on SNaP.  Clearly, using this 
film in a classroom requires careful curriculum planning and intervention to address the 
misconceptions.  Ironically, this program may be highly educational but only if teachers 
use SNaP to identify and dispel the misconceptions about evolution within its narrative. 
 
Reviewing the Reviewers 
 To assess variation across reviewers, we recruited 15 students, faculty, and 
professionals from around Missoula to evaluate three films at the 2005 IWFF: Ants – 
Nature’s Super Power (festival awards: Best Educational Value, Best TV Program; merit 
awards: Macrophotography, Animal Behavior, and Science Presentation), Capuchins: 
The Monkey Puzzle (festival awards: Best Animal Behavior, Best Narration; merit 
awards: Scientific Content, Music, and Educational Value), and T rantula – Australia’s 
King of Spiders (festival awards: Best Scientific Content, Best Script; merit awards: 
Educational Value, Graphics & Animation, and Editing & Photography).  Not all 
reviewers were able to view all films.  Using SNaP, all three films receiv d scores that 
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were higher on average than scores for the first set of films we reviewed (64% vs. 35%).  
Nevertheless, the scores for science content categories were surprisingly low iven the 
significance of the awards won by these shows.  Misconceptions also were preval nt; 
reviewers identified seemingly accidental misconceptions in all three films, and 
deliberate misconceptions in both the program about capuchin monkeys (e.g., larger brain 
size necessarily leads to larger intelligence) and about ants (e.g., kin selection v. 
altruism).  The Overall Impressions were only slightly greater than the science content 
scores; thus the weighting factor did not greatly affect the final scores.  In these 
comparisons, we identified some differences in scores among reviewers (ants: Χ2=36.84, 
14 df, P=0.001; capuchins: Χ2=27.30, 13 df, P=0.011; tarantulas: Χ2=26.00, 11 df, 
P=0.007).  We also found differences when only the science content categories were 
considered (ants: Χ2=32.18, 14 df, P=0.004; capuchins: Χ2=30.80, 13 df, P=0.004; 
tarantulas: Χ2=24.26, 11 df, P=0.012).  When the reviews were dissected, the differences 
were due in large part to the influence of a single reviewer whose background was not in 
the sciences specifically and whose scores were consistently higherthan other reviewers’ 
scores.  Finally, scores for Overall Impression of programs were similar (ants:x
=0.79±0.027, capuchins:x =0.80±0.031, tarantulas:x =0.77±0.030).  Thus, the SNaP Tool 
was generally consistent from reviewer to reviewer, but as with any critical eview, it 
may require some level of reviewer training for the reviews to be the most useful to 
people selecting films to use in an educational setting. 
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So Where is the Science in Nature Films? 
 The results of widespread testing of the criteria in our tool revealed that most 
nature films do not represent the underlying science adequately.  Indeed, other disciplines 
take issue with the effect the narrative form may have.  Vivanco (2002), in a review of 
environmental films, argues that “we have more to gain by scrutinizing the vehicles of 
representation, including the realisms they project and the dilemmas they omit, than by 
taking their messages and images as disinterested indications of ‘how nature works’ and 
how to resolve its problems.”  As we struggle for scientific literacy in the 21st century, we 
need to be more concerned about scientific context and whether or not theoretical 
constructs are misrepresented, especially given popularity of nature films and the extent 
to which viewers believe the content to be factual and documentary.  Papson (1992) 
argues that nature films are legitimized by emphasizing the educational and scie tific 
“truth,” as distinguished from “fiction,” yet these films use devices commn to fiction to 
add drama and to create meaning for humans.  For example, CSI: Crime Scene 
Investigation, a fictional drama, uses science in very effective stories, yet few would 
promote the show as educational.  “Docu-dramas” about nature (Bousé, 2000) that imply 
some level of scientific accuracy, especially when they have been conferred some level of 
credibility through awards ceremonies, are particularly problematic.   
 What are the key problems?  Information in programs tends to be presented as 
“ready-made science” – the “final product” of scientific inquiry (i.e., characterized by a 
stable consensus that is no longer a fruitful avenue for challenge), as opposed to “science 
in the making” representing the forefront of scientific research where debatable claims 
are common (Latour, 1987).  In a recent study exploring students understanding of the 
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nature of science from television genres, students watching episodes of Wild Discovery 
and Bill Nye the Science Guy (programs where the science was presented as a set of facts 
with a high degree of certainty) had few questions about the content (Dhingra, 2003).  
Without an understanding of the nature of the scientific endeavor, students can have 
difficulty assessing the merits of the information presented (see alo D rley, 2003, Kirby, 
2003).  Moreover, as part of the narrative story, many wildlife films individualize the 
“struggle for existence”; they humanize the dramas (the orphan that struggles to survive 
and returns victorious to breed) that can mislead viewers to teleological and Lamarckian 
misconceptions about evolution (for excellent reviews of the history of film leading to 
this style see Bousé 2000, Mitman 1999).  Indeed, Aldridge and Dingwall (2003) and 
Dingall and Aldridge (2006) show that references to evolution in nature programs indeed
tend to be teleological – the narratives imply evolution is driven by some purpose.  In 
fact, these authors conclude that the narrative in this genre actually increases the 
differences in understanding of evolution between the general public and biological 
scientists (Dingwall and Aldridge 2006).  They note “it is highly questionable whether 
wildlife and nature programming is making an appropriate contribution to the 
preparedness of civil society to deal with key issues in biological and environmental 
sciences.”   
 Misconceptions are difficult enough to deal with in a classroom, but when they 
are promoted in informal and free-choice educational environments, especially with 
complex and controversial topics such as evolution and global climate change, they can 
be particularly insidious.  We believe that programs students may perceive as ducational 
should be reviewed with intense scrutiny to avoid errors that lead to misunderstandings of 
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wild animals and the natural world.  To this end, the SNaP criteria may be effectiv  in 
identifying programs particularly prone to misinforming students’ understanding of 
science. 
 
And the Emmy Goes to… 
 But what is the intent of nature programs?  Champ (2002) argues that wildlife 
films, for example, encourage wildlife protection, and environmental educators tout their 
positive influence on environmental attitudes (Holbert et al., 2003).  Indeed, many 
ecologists point to wildlife and nature films as inspirational in choosing their profession 
(Ecological Society of America, 1993).  To be sure, watching educational television is a 
choice made by viewers over other options, so captivating audiences is important.  In  
study of the effects of different genres, Dhingra (2003) suggests that students are eng ged 
in television science programs, especially when they include characters nd experiences 
relevant to the students (The X-Files was included to begin to address this point).  Stories 
are the heart of the entertainment media, but they may have unintended consequence.  
March of the Penguins i  a phenomenal visual glimpse into the world of Emperor 
Penguins (Aptenodytes forsteri), but without the scientific context, the narrative focuses 
public attention on “good parenting” and “intelligent design” (Penguin Family Values 
[New York Times 9/18/05]; Penguin Paradox [Boston Globe 10/14/05]).  Nature films 
often have spectacular footage that can captivate students and draw them in, but they also 
can send messages that may have a profound impact on science literacy.   
 We designed SNaP to assess the quality of the representation of science in nature 
programs because so many of these films are used to enrich science instruction in 
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schools.  Teachers could use the evaluation form to explore the presentation of the 
science in nature programs with their students.  Indeed, SNaP may be an ideal tool to 
begin addressing misconceptions about evolution as students can be critical of the 
narrative, indirectly confronting their own misconceptions.  In advanced grades, SNaP 
could be used as a teaching tool that allows students to explore the science content more 
deeply and to investigate misconceptions and inaccuracies.  We believe nature programs 
offer exciting and emotional gateways to awareness of the environment and ecology.  Our 
intent is to promote scientific literacy by providing teachers and other viewers with the 
tools they need to assess the information quality presented to them through the powerful 
medium of television. 
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Figure 1.  The SNaP criteria.
464 
Figure 2.  Icon used to depict the final grade assigned with the Science in Nature 
Program (SNaP) Assessment Tool.  In the center of the Echinacea flower’s cone is the 
overall grade assigned to the program.  Each petal symbolizes one of the categories 
scored in the rubric.  The leaves represent the two descriptive categories.  As an example 
of the icon’s function, a C-quality program may look like the inset. 
A 
C
465 
Figure 3.  Distribution of percentage scores of programs rated in the first broad test of he 
Science in Nature Program (SNaP) Assessment Tool.  Figure 3a shows the distribution of 
the final grade; Figure 3b shows the percentage scores based only on the science contt 
(gray bars=scores weighted by impression, maroon bars=science/education s ores).  
Letter grades associated with each bar are shown.  The position of Fatal Flower’s score is 
indicated by the arrow. 
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